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 This dissertation analyzes the convoluted process by which Irish nationalists, Irish 
unionists, and British politicians negotiated Irish self-government in the first two decades of the 
twentieth century.  In December 1909, a modest form of self-government known as home rule 
within the British Empire for all of Ireland became a practical issue in United Kingdom politics 
again, after the failure of two previous home rule bills in 1886 and 1893.  After a decade that 
witnessed a world war and a revolution in Ireland, two new Irish polities emerged by June 1922.  
Northern Ireland, a majority-unionist state comprised of six counties in the province of Ulster, 
acquired a limited form of home rule within the United Kingdom.  Covering the rest of the 
island, the Irish Free State secured significant control of its domestic affairs as a dominion of the 
British Empire, though not the complete independence demanded by Sinn Féin and the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA), which had waged the revolution.   
How did the main political parties and actors in Britain and Ireland arrive at this 
settlement, especially as it was so different from how elites had envisioned Irish self-government 
in 1909?  Using archival material and public discourse, this dissertation seeks to answer this 
question by methodically analyzing the political decisions taken by British and Irish political 
parties and movements between 1909 and 1922.  It challenges historical conceptions that the 
settlement enacted by the Government of Ireland Act (1920) and the Anglo-Irish Treaty (1921) 
was an inevitable evolution in Anglo-Irish relations, that it marks the British government’s 
recognition of the Irish right to self-determination, or the triumph of Irish democracy.  Instead, I 
argue that the settlement was highly contingent upon prevailing political circumstances, heavily 
influenced by British interests, and often defied the democratic demands of Irish people, both 
nationalist and unionist.  Partition, the separation of Ireland into two different states, was 
achieved through the acquiescence of British politicians to the demands of Ulster unionist 
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At the beginning of December 1909, Ireland was an integral part of the United Kingdom.  
Since 1801, the island’s elected representatives had sat in the House of Commons at 
Westminster, while Irish peers sat in the House of Lords.  Many Irishmen served in the British 
Army or in positions within the imperial civil service, acting as administrators in other parts of 
the Empire, such as India and Egypt.  But by 1922 there were two parliaments in Ireland.  The 
Irish Free State was constituted as a dominion within the British Empire, governing twenty-six of 
the island’s thirty-two counties.  Northern Ireland, comprising the remaining six counties in the 
northeast of the island, remained an integral part of the United Kingdom but had its own local 
parliament.  In 1912, then-Chancellor of the Exchequer David Lloyd George spoke against an 
amendment that would administratively divide the island, or “tear up Ireland into little bits.”1  
Seven years later, a government headed by Lloyd George introduced legislation at Westminster 
to do just that. 
The radical changes in Ireland’s political status during this period—the end of the Union 
with Britain and partitioning the island into two states—raise a number of historical questions.  
How did political leaders’ mindsets change so dramatically that they were willing to contemplate 
both Irish self-government and partition?  How did political actors arrive at the particular 
settlement that emerged by 1922?  Why did they prioritize certain ideas or policies and discard 
others?  How did the priorities of Irish nationalists, unionists, and British politicians influence 
the development of the settlement?  How did politicians express their ideals, and rationalize 
compromises of them? 
Scholars sometimes interpret Ireland’s departure from the Union (but continued inclusion 
in the Empire), along with the “two-state solution” achieved by partition, as inevitable and 
positive developments in Anglo-Irish relations.  Components of this argument include the idea 
that the British government was sure to grant a modest measure of Irish self-government, known 
as home rule, contingent on partitioning some part of the northern province of Ulster.  
Proponents of this interpretation tend to disagree primarily on the details, such as the points at 
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which these results became inevitable.2  However, numerous settlements were mooted between 
1909 and 1922, and the form of government eventually enacted in Ireland was sometimes not 
even the likeliest outcome. 
Addressing these and related issues necessitates combining the perspectives of Irish 
nationalists, unionists, and successive British governments to analyze their influence on and 
reactions to the various settlement ideas raised in this period.  Scholars sometimes focus on just 
one of these groups, but contemporaries’ perceptions of and relationships with one another 
significantly impacted their political ideas and actions.  Therefore, understanding how the 
settlement of Ireland developed up to 1922 necessitates a multifaceted analysis of these 
perspectives.  The private papers of leaders or influential members of political parties provide 
key sources for explicating the mindsets behind Irish nationalism, unionism, and British party 
politics.  Each of these groups influenced segments of the press, therefore newspapers provide a 
crucial means of understanding how competing interests promulgated their messages in the 
public sphere, and wanted to be perceived by contemporaries.  Parliamentary debates and 
retrospective publications such as memoirs provide other means of assessing how political actors 
wished their actions would be interpreted.  Combining these sources, this thesis provides an 
analytical narrative of the political decisions taken during the period, methodically explicating 
why individuals made the choices they did, and how these decisions and calculations contributed 
to the constantly developing settlement of Ireland.  First, it is necessary to provide a general 
background and overview of events. 
From the 1880s, the call by Irish nationalist parties for self-government was embodied in 
the phrase, “home rule.”  In 1885, Charles Stewart Parnell’s pro-home rule Irish Parliamentary 
Party (IPP) won 85 out of Ireland’s 103 seats in the United Kingdom Parliament at Westminster, 
and one in Britain.  He justifiably claimed that the majority of Irish people demanded self-
government.  Home rule became practical politics later that year, as Liberal Prime Minister 
William Ewart Gladstone announced his “conversion” to the principle.  He introduced the First 
                                                 
2 Eugenio Biagini, “The Third Home Rule Bill in British History,” in The Home Rule Crisis, 1912-1914, ed. Gabriel 
Doherty (Cork: Mercier, 2014), 435-437; Ronan Fanning, Fatal Path: British Government and Irish Revolution, 
1910-1922 (London: Faber and Faber, 2013), 134, 357; R. F. Foster, Vivid Faces: The Revolutionary Generation in 
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Home Rule Bill in 1886, but it was defeated in the House of Commons.  A second effort in 1893 
passed the Commons, only to be defeated by the Lords. 
Gladstone’s pro-home rule stance split Britain’s Liberal Party.  During the first home rule 
crisis in 1886, social reformer Joseph Chamberlain led a significant portion of Gladstone’s 
supporters into the new Liberal Unionists.  The Conservative Party also opposed home rule, 
despite the often-overlooked fact that their leaders had toyed with the idea of supporting it before 
Gladstone declared in favor.3  The rise of Parnell’s IPP destroyed liberalism in much of Ireland, 
while conservatism increasingly equated with unionism in both islands.  Irish Conservatives won 
eighteen seats in 1885, all but two of them in the northern province of Ulster, which contained 
approximately 73.9 percent of the island’s Protestant population.4  The proportion of Irish home 
rulers and Unionists in Parliament varied little after the 1885 election.  Apart from Trinity 
College Dublin and an occasional victory in South Dublin, Irish unionists’ parliamentary 
strength lay entirely in Ulster.  The Union became a major dividing line in British and Irish 
politics; it was assumed that individuals who joined the Liberals supported Irish nationalists’ 
aspiration to alter the relationship between Britain and Ireland, while those identifying as Irish 
Unionist, British Conservative, and Liberal Unionist supported the political status quo. 
Initially, Conservatives and Liberal Unionists agreed on the issue of the Union alone, 
while differing widely on domestic policy.  But by 1909, their cooperative relationship had 
developed to the point that the Conservatives changed their name to the “Conservative and 
Unionist Party.”  Liberals and Irish nationalists often referred to Conservatives and Liberal 
Unionists as “Tories,” a term that only referred to the former prior to 1886.  By the 1910s the 
terms “Conservative” and “Unionist” were practically interchangeable.  They often derided their 
Liberal opponents as “radicals.” 
Irish self-government became a live issue again in December 1909, when Liberal Prime 
Minister H. H. Asquith announced his administration’s commitment to introducing new home 
rule legislation.  He presented the Third Home Rule Bill to Parliament in April 1912.  The 
measure reached the statute book in September 1914 and thereby technically became law, but 
was never implemented.  The resistance of Irish unionists, encouraged by their British allies and 
                                                 
3 As late as November 1885, Gladstone expected the Conservatives to declare for home rule. See W. E. Gladstone to 
Lord Rosebery, 15 November 1885 in John Morley, The Life of William Ewart Gladstone, 2 vols. (London: Edward 
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concentrated in Ulster, caused a political crisis with potential repercussions throughout the 
United Kingdom, as unionist militancy threatened to provoke civil war in Ireland to prevent 
home rule.  Between 1911 and 1912, northern unionists established a militia, the Ulster 
Volunteer Force (UVF), seemingly giving substance to their threats.  In 1912 a group of 
nationalists formed another armed body, the Irish Volunteers, ostensibly to safeguard home rule.  
Pro-unionist calls for all or part of Ulster to be excluded from the Home Rule Bill grew, but 
Asquith’s Cabinet could not reach an agreement with Irish nationalists and unionists on what 
area to leave out, or for how long.  Some Irish unionists outside Ulster—generally referred to as 
southern unionists—also objected to this de facto partitioning of Ireland by exclusion.  In August 
1914, however, the First World War intervened, and all parties in the United Kingdom agreed to 
a political truce to meet this greater crisis. 
IPP leader John Redmond encouraged nationalists to support the British war effort as a 
means of guaranteeing home rule when peace was restored.  Despite the careful framing of this 
recruiting call, Irish nationalist enthusiasm for the war effort quickly waned.  Irish unionist 
recruitment also dwindled after the first few months of the conflict.5  Nationalist support for the 
war effort was also dampened as Asquith formed a coalition government in May 1915, 
incorporating a number of Unionists who were vociferous opponents of home rule. 
A minority of Irish nationalists subscribed to the more militant tradition which believed 
that the only appropriate form of self-government was an independent republic, entirely separate 
from the British Empire.  In many ways, the home rule movement was a result of a failed 1867 
uprising by the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB), a secret society also known the Fenians.  
Despite its failures and fluctuations in its popularity, the Fenian movement survived, in part due 
to its international connections, particularly with the United States.  On Easter Monday, April 24, 
1916, members of the IRB used the Irish Volunteers to launch a rebellion.  They were joined by 
the Irish Citizen Army (ICA), a small socialist and republican militia originally formed to protect 
striking workers.  The rebellion primarily took place in Dublin, where the rebels seized a number 
of buildings and proclaimed an Irish Republic.  Smaller-scale actions took place in other parts of 
the country.  The British Army suppressed what became known as the Easter Rising after a week 
of fighting that destroyed much of Dublin’s city center.  The government placed Ireland under 
martial law.  Fifteen insurgents were executed by firing squad, and another was hanged in 
                                                 





London.  About 3,500 people were arrested, and 1,800 of them interned or imprisoned.  The 
Rising was erroneously attributed to Sinn Féin, a small advanced nationalist party that was 
among the most vocal critics of the IPP establishment and the British war effort. 
A number of factors combined to produce a profound change in Irish public opinion after 
the Rising.  Many had grown tired of the European war, in which the IPP was deeply implicated.  
There was increasing popular frustration at continual delays in implementing home rule, which 
Redmond had promised.  To some the Rising’s ideal of an independent republic was more 
attractive than the comparatively meager British offer of limited self-government, while the 
seemingly heavy-handed government response to the rebellion angered many more.  Moreover, 
further attempts to enact home rule over the next two years came to naught.  The First World 
War ended on November 11, 1918, and a United Kingdom general election followed.  The 
British results showed an overwhelming majority for Lloyd George’s coalition government of 
Liberals and Unionists.  Sinn Féin won a decisive victory in Ireland.  This virtually destroyed the 
long-dominant IPP, which won just six seats.  Sinn Féin declared a clear mandate for their policy 
of abstention, or refusing to take their seats at Westminster.  They convened an alternate 
assembly, Dáil Éireann, in Dublin on January 21, 1919.  This all-Sinn Féin body affirmed the 
existence of the Irish Republic declared in 1916, issued a declaration of independence, and 
professed the Dáil’s right to govern Ireland. 
The island had been enduring a low level of violence since 1916, which politicians 
sometimes called a “disturbed” state.6  After the Dáil’s establishment, the aggressiveness of some 
Irish Volunteers, which was evolving into the IRA, combined with government attempts to 
suppress republican institutions, caused this state of disturbance to develop into the War of 
Independence.  Throughout 1919, IRA raids, ambushes, and assassinations of government 
officials grew more frequent.  The regular police, the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC), were 
reinforced by British recruits known as “black and tans” for their combination of military and 
police uniforms.  By July 1920, recruitment opened for an even more militaristic policing 
organization, the Auxiliary Division RIC or “Auxies.”  These formations and the British Army 
                                                 
6 Thomas O’Donnell and John Clynes, “Flour,” House of Commons Debates (HC Deb) 14 March 1918 vol 104 
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struck out haphazardly at civilians in what were termed “reprisals,” involving the destruction of 
property, random shootings, and assassinations of republicans. 
Meanwhile, Lloyd George’s administration formally partitioned Ireland through the 
Government of Ireland Bill, which passed in December 1920.  The measure established two 
home rule parliaments, one for the six northeastern counties dubbed, “Northern Ireland,” and 
another for the twenty-six called, “Southern Ireland.”  King George V traveled to Belfast to open 
the Northern Ireland Parliament in June 1921.  Sinn Féin largely ignored what nationalists 
dubbed the “partition act.”  The Cabinet was under pressure from segments of the British public 
and political classes, as well as the international community, to halt the chaos in Ireland.  Lloyd 
George’s administration had maintained contact with members of Sinn Féin throughout the 
conflict, and back-channel negotiations resulted in a truce on July 11, 1921. 
Over the next six months, representatives of Sinn Féin negotiated the Anglo-Irish Treaty 
with the British Cabinet.  Signed on December 6, 1921, it granted the twenty-six counties 
dominion status within the British Empire, with reservations designed to meet British security 
fears.  The agreement’s supporters hailed it as granting a practically independent state.  Treaty 
opponents, including Sinn Féin President Eamon de Valera, derided the new Irish Free State’s 
inclusion in the British Empire and an oath of allegiance to the monarch that all legislators would 
be compelled to take.  This entailed the disestablishment of the Irish Republic they had built, and 
for which republicans had fought and died.  The Dáil approved the agreement by a slim seven-
vote majority on January 7, 1922.  Sinn Féin and the IRA split along pro- and anti-Treaty lines. 
Political attempts to heal the split failed.  The anti-Treaty IRA seized buildings in Dublin 
in April 1922 to assert their opposition to the agreement, and occasionally committed 
provocative acts against the Free State’s Provisional Government.  On June 22, unionist Field 
Marshal Henry Wilson was assassinated in London by IRA members.  The British government 
blamed the anti-Treaty IRA, and prepared to take military action against them if the Free State 
did not do so.  Free State forces began bombarding anti-Treaty IRA positions in Dublin on June 
27, sparking the Civil War. 
 
Irish Settlements and Democracy 
Whether the establishment of the Irish Free State, through the Anglo-Irish Treaty, can be 





academics.  However, only a few scholars broaden this debate to include the entire period in 
which forms of Irish self-government were debated throughout the United Kingdom, querying 
whether concepts such as consent and democratic governance were priorities of any of the 
settlements that fall into the category of “home rule” after December 1909. 
One historian who does address these ideas beginning with the home rule crisis is Ronan 
Fanning.  In Fatal Path (2013), Fanning proceeds from an assumption that Ulster unionists were 
entitled to as large a measure of “self-determination” as their nationalist counterparts, implicitly 
validating their right to separate treatment from the rest of the Irish populace.  According to 
Fanning, the failure of John Redmond’s nationalist and H. H. Asquith’s Liberal parties to 
recognize the Ulster unionist right to self-determination caused the home rule crisis.7  This is 
similar to historian Patrick Buckland’s 1972 argument that the Treaty acknowledged the right of 
Northern Ireland to stand out from the Irish Free State.8 
 By insisting that Ulster unionists were equally entitled to “self-determination,” and 
portraying partition as a fulfilment of that right, historians problematically validate British and 
Irish unionist propagandists who sought to portray the northern province as homogenously 
Protestant, unionist, and unanimous in its opposition to home rule.9  While unionist rhetoric 
constantly promulgated this image, the reality was far more complex.  The large Ulster 
nationalist population objected to partition, as did some unionists.  Among partitionist unionists, 
there was little initial agreement over whether the excluded area should consist of four, six, or 
nine counties.  For some, exclusion should mean continued rule from Westminster, while others 
wanted a local administration in Belfast.  Therefore, there was no accepted definition of “Ulster,” 
or of a northern unionist political ideal.  Painting a picture of a united Ulster containing a 
homogenously Protestant and unionist population craving self-determination is anachronistic.  
Moreover, if self-determination had been a goal of British policy, it should have applied to 
northern nationalists as well as to unionists.  This would have resulted in a different territorial 
composition of Northern Ireland, or legislative safeguards for northern nationalists. 
British politicians used the language of self-determination, particularly as the First World 
War drew to a close, but it is unclear what they meant.  Political scientists Alan Ward and Bill 
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Kissane imply that British politicians equated “self-determination” with “self-government.”10  By 
this definition, giving self-government to one part of Ireland in which nationalists were the 
majority, and to another in which unionists predominated, granted self-determination to each of 
the island’s largest political traditions.  However, Lloyd George defined self-determination as 
government by “the consent of the governed.”11  He likely used this phrase to please U.S. 
President Woodrow Wilson, but there were implications for his government’s Irish policy.  In the 
northern context, the refusal to implement plebiscites denied anyone there—nationalist or 
unionist—a chance to register their consent or dissent in the form of government proposed for 
them.  Limitations on what the British administration would grant to the rest of Ireland, 
combined with the threat of coercion, precluded the principle of free choice there as well. 
There is a considerable corpus of literature analyzing whether the parties that 
implemented the Anglo-Irish Treaty were committed to democratic ideals.  Soon after the Irish 
Free State’s establishment, pro-Treaty publicists began developing arguments to legitimize the 
new regime.  This legitimization was all the more necessary as many Free State supporters had 
been involved in working for the Irish Republic, which their new government had replaced.  
Historians echo some of the arguments established by these pro-Free State interlocutors.  Writing 
in 1924, P. S. O’Hegarty claimed that compelling the British government to ask for a truce 
during the War of Independence was Sinn Féin’s great victory.  This represented British 
“surrender” and an acknowledgment of Ireland’s historic nationality.12  He asserted that self-
government had been the goal of every nationalist movement since Jonathan Swift, and that was 
what the Treaty delivered.13  Similarly, historian R. F. Foster argues that the truce marks the 
IRA’s victory.14  Arthur Mitchell asserts that the Treaty “must be viewed as a British defeat and 
an Irish victory,” because it forced the Empire to recognize an Irish nation-state.15   
O’Hegarty and another early chronicler, Piaras Béaslaí, set further trends in historical 
writing by blaming the Irish Civil War on the irrationality and stubbornness of Eamon de Valera 
                                                 
10 Alan J. Ward, “A Constitutional Background to the Northern Ireland Crisis,” in Northern Ireland and the Politics 
of Reconciliation, 42; Bill Kissane, “The Doctrine of Self-Determination and the Irish Move to Independence, 1916-
1922,” Journal of Political Ideologies 8, no. 3 (Oct. 2003): 343. 
11 Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial 
Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 39. 
12 P. S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein: How It Won It, and How It Used It (Dublin: Talbot, 1924), 63-64. 
13 O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein, 79-80. 
14 R. F. Foster, Modern Ireland, 1600-1972 (London: Allen Lane, 1988), 502. 





and the anti-Treaty faction.  O’Hegarty blamed the conflict on de Valera’s machinations and IRA 
militarism.16  Béaslaí described the “insane irresponsibility” of de Valera and the anti-Treaty 
party.17  In this vein, some historians classify Treaty supporters as realists, willing to abandon 
abstract demands to accrue practical, material benefits.  Conversely, the anti-Treaty faction are 
often portrayed as idealists, purists, or zealots, unwilling to compromise their impractical 
demand for an Irish Republic.18 
Other analyses build on this assumption that opposition to the Treaty was irrational and 
inherently negative.  Several scholars identify an anti-democratic mindset within Irish 
nationalism, particularly fueling resistance to the Treaty.19  Jeffrey Prager equates anti-Treaty 
republican resistance to the new state with resistance to democracy.  He highlights the roles of 
both pro-Treaty Cumann na nGaedheal and de Valera’s anti-Treaty Fianna Fáil in establishing 
Irish democracy, essentially validating the democratic credentials of the two parties that 
dominated the Republic at the time he was writing in 1986.20  The historiographical tendency to 
treat opposition to the Treaty as reflective of an anti-democratic mindset is reminiscent of 
O’Hegarty’s claim that activists working against the Treaty were defying the immutable voice of 
the Irish people.21 
David Fitzpatrick’s The Two Irelands (1998) modifies the anti-democracy argument by 
providing a number of comparisons between the Free State and Northern Ireland in the Treaty’s 
aftermath.  Both states were immediately threatened with civil war, and neither hesitated to 
curtail civil liberties and apply coercive methods to reestablish order in their respective 
territories.  For Fitzpatrick, this willingness to employ the “tyranny of the majority” is a legacy 
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of Ireland’s long experience with British parliamentary democracy.22  This interpretation ignores 
the fact that successive British governments insisted that a future Irish administration—whether 
under home rule or the Treaty—institute safeguards that enhanced unionists’ influence out of 
proportion to their democratic strength.  The British Cabinet did not insist on similar protections 
for Northern Ireland’s nationalist population, despite calls for them.  Therefore, it is difficult to 
escape the conclusion that the British government considered that the “tyranny of the majority” 
should apply when that majority consisted of Protestant unionists, but not Catholic nationalists. 
There was a widespread conviction in United Kingdom politics that a minority could 
overturn the will of a majority.  After an electoral defeat in 1906, Unionist leader Arthur Balfour 
told his followers that it was their duty to “see that the great Unionist Party shall still control, 
whether in power or whether in opposition, the destinies of this great Empire.”23  In other words, 
Unionists had a right to govern regardless of what happened at the ballot box.  Balfour’s 
successor Bonar Law declared in 1912, “there are stronger influences than Parliament [sic] 
majorities.”24  Historians chide de Valera for saying in 1922, “the people had never a right to do 
wrong,” but he operated in a context in which minority resistance was acceptable and, as he 
witnessed of northern unionists and home rule, could be successful.25 
Frank Pakenham’s Peace by Ordeal (1935) remains the only work devoted solely to a 
chronological account of the Treaty negotiations.  It was also one of the first assessments written 
by a non-participant to take a negative view of the settlement, noting ongoing Irish 
dissatisfaction with their country’s relationship to the British Empire.26 
The long years spent in government office by anti-Treaty leader and later Fianna Fáil 
party founder Eamon de Valera gave him ample time and resources to influence the period’s 
historicization.  Historian Patrick Murray points out that as early as 1923, while imprisoned by 
the Free State, de Valera began outlining a historical work chronicling the previous seven years.27  
In 1925, de Valera suggested that fellow republican Dorothy Macardle write the book that 
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became The Irish Republic (1937).28  This work takes the anti-Treaty line in analyzing the 
agreement.  Macardle had significant access to de Valera and his papers, therefore her work is 
valuable as an exposition of his mindset, but its partisan bias must be kept in mind when using 
it.29  The same can be said of de Valera’s official biography, written in 1970 by Pakenham and T. 
P. O’Neill.30 
Scholars who challenge the conception that “pro-Treaty” equals “pro-democracy” while 
“anti-Treaty” equals “anti-democracy” include Bill Kissane, John Regan, and Gavin Foster.  
Kissane points out that Cumann na nGaedheal governments resorted to extralegal and extra-
constitutional means to defend the Irish Free State in its early days, indicating that their 
commitment to democratic ideas and institutions was lukewarm at best.31  Far from the pro-
Treaty party consolidating Irish democracy in 1922 through the Civil War, Kissane says that the 
conflict “derailed” it.32  John Regan indicates that a pro-Treaty Dáil majority was not inevitable 
following the agreement’s signing.33  He supports de Valera’s argument that the threat of British 
coercion should the Dáil reject the Treaty negated the idea of a free choice for a sovereign 
nation.34  Foster adds that this threat of force offended a powerful sense of republican liberty 




 This dissertation makes three major claims.  The first of these is that the form of Irish 
self-government was changeable and contingent upon prevailing political circumstances.  Far 
from being “inevitable” at any point during the prolonged crisis, the two major facets of the Irish 
                                                 
28 BMH, WS No. 457, Dorothy Macardle. 
29 Dorothy Macardle, The Irish Republic: A Documented Chronicle of the Anglo-Irish Conflict and the Partitioning 
of Ireland, With a Detailed Account of the Period, 1916-1923 (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1965), 526-
527, 588-593. 
30 Murray, “Obsessive Historian,” 62-63. 
31 Bill Kissane, “Defending Democracy? The Legislative Response to Political Extremism in the Irish Free State, 
1922-39,” Irish Historical Studies 34, no. 134 (Nov. 2004): 156-157. 
32 Bill Kissane, Explaining Irish Democracy (Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 2002), 28-29. 
33 John M. Regan, “The Politics of Reaction: The Dynamics of Treatyite Government and Policy, 1922-33,” Irish 
Historical Studies 30, no. 120 (Nov. 1997): 543-544. 
34 John M. Regan, The Irish Counter-Revolution, 1921-1936: Treatyite Politics and Settlement in Independent 
Ireland (New York: St. Martin’s, 1999), 68-70. 
35 Gavin Foster, “Res Publica na hÉireann?: Republican Liberty and the Irish Civil War,” New Hibernia Review / 





settlement—partition and the island’s relationship to the British Empire—were negotiable 
throughout the period.  Second, British party politics and imperial interests played decisive roles 
in shaping the settlement.  From 1909 to mid-1911, members of both British parties sought ways 
to cooperate against home rule, or to enact Irish self-government in whatever form best fit their 
political priorities.  After October 1913, both British parties displayed a bias that favored 
conciliating Ulster unionists, to the detriment of Irish nationalists and southern unionists.  The 
third point is that the final settlement was based neither on democratic practice nor on the 
principle of self-determination.  There were a number of opportunities for the British government 
to assess how people in Ireland wished to be governed, particularly in those parts of Ulster under 
consideration for partition.  Successive British administrations chose not to do so, and instead 
framed their policies in accordance with public feeling in Britain.  The settlement reached 
between 1920 and 1922 was not designed to grant self-determination to any section of the Irish 
populace, whether nationalist or unionist.  Throughout the period under review, every proposed 
arrangement was faced with the question: would the British government allow it or implement it?  
This question precluded self-determination. 
 To demonstrate the manifold contingencies that contributed to the settlement that 
emerged by 1922, I provide a detailed analytical narrative of political negotiations and decisions 
beginning in December 1909, when Irish self-government became a practical issue for the first 
time since the failure of the Second Home Rule Bill in 1893.  I will proceed through the third 
home rule crisis (1911-1914), the First World War (1914-1918), the War of Independence (1919-
1921), the Treaty negotiations (July-December 1921), and the formulation of the Free State 
Constitution (1922), analyzing the process by which decisions regarding Ireland’s future were 
taken and the motivations for those choices.  The analysis offered here emphasizes the role of 
British interests and party politics in shaping the form of Irish self-government.  Drawing on the 
imagery of the 1689 relief of Derry, F. S. L. Lyons has called the Irish “Protestant” ethos, “the 
myth of siege, but it was no less the myth of deliverance from siege.”36  Unionists expected that 
their deliverance from home rule would come, as relief had come to Derry, from Britain.  The 
vast majority of British people and politicians believed they had a right to a decisive voice in 
Irish governance, and successive governments exercised that right.   
                                                 





Chapter one charts the earliest phase of the third home rule crisis, too often ignored by 
historians, from Asquith’s public commitment to Irish self-government in December 1909 to the 
passage of the Parliament Act in July 1911.  I argue that both British parties were eager to 
exclude Irish nationalists and unionists from the decision-making process, in order to decide 
Ireland’s future between themselves.  Asquith pledged to introduce a home rule bill, but tried to 
avoid having to redeem his promise.  British unionists were explicit that if they made a deal to 
enact some form of self-government in Ireland, their Irish adjuncts would have no choice but to 
accept it. 
In chapter two, I argue that a considerable body of nationalist opinion was disappointed 
with the Third Home Rule Bill.  Many expected the legislation to grant Ireland the same status 
within the Empire as Australia, Canada, and South Africa, a constitutional arrangement known as 
dominion home rule.  The bill did not do so, as many contemporaries were explicit that the 
British establishment must retain considerable control over Irish political and economic affairs.  
Throughout 1911 and 1912, British and Irish unionists conducted an elaborate campaign against 
any form of self-government.  Northern unionists maintained that their goal was to stop home 
rule entirely, not to achieve some form of separate treatment if it became law.  However, their 
parliamentary representatives supported an amendment to exclude four Ulster counties from the 
bill’s operation, convincing many that this would solve the problem. 
Ulster unionist pledges to resist home rule—and declarations from their British 
counterparts to support them—convinced many observers that United Kingdom politics had 
reached a crisis point.  I argue in chapter three that Bonar Law and other unionist leaders 
deliberately aggravated the situation in an effort to force a general election.  They increasingly 
blamed the crisis on the idea that the Irish nationalists and Asquith’s Cabinet refused to grant 
special treatment to Ulster, particularly by excluding the province from the legislation.  Unionist 
leaders’ private correspondence suggests that they did not want a settlement involving exclusion, 
but when the Cabinet took them up on their rhetoric they were forced into negotiating on this 
basis.  Asquith made several offers of temporary exclusion between 1913 and 1914, gradually 
expanding his concessions relating to the area and time period.  When Redmond objected, the 
Prime Minister simply cut him out of the decision-making process.  The outbreak of the First 
World War temporarily created an artificial semblance of unity among the UK’s political parties, 





delays in its implementation disillusioned many nationalists with the political process as 
represented by the IPP. 
The 1916 Easter Rising brought Irish discontent back to the forefront of British politics.  
This failed rebellion was immediately followed by an attempt, initiated by Asquith and 
negotiated by Lloyd George, to obtain Redmond’s and Carson’s consent for a form of immediate 
home rule.  I argue in chapter four that the long-term result of this episode was that Lloyd 
George—who had supported some form of Ulster exclusion since 1912—settled on a formula 
that became his personal policy regarding Ireland.  He supported Carson in advocating the 
partitioning of six counties in Ulster from the rest of Ireland.  This administrative separation 
would last until Westminster decided otherwise, and Lloyd George and Carson even began to 
develop ideas for a system of self-government for the excluded area.  After the collapse of these 
negotiations, Lloyd George instituted an Irish Convention with the apparent power to frame a 
new constitution for the island.  I argue that this attempt had a real chance of success, but failed 
with disastrous results for Irish unionism outside of Ulster. 
Sinn Féin’s institution of a republican government in Ireland, and its outlawing by the 
British government, led to the escalating violence of the Irish War of Independence.  Some 
historians argue that Sinn Féin leaders could have achieved a similar settlement to that eventually 
embodied in the Anglo-Irish Treaty at any point, if they had just been sensible enough to 
negotiate with the British government.  I argue in chapter five that, in fact, the reverse was true.  
The British Cabinet’s reluctance to grant concessions to the Irish republicans, epitomized by 
Lloyd George, proved the biggest impediment to a truce between 1920 and 1921.  While 
debating the terms of the Government of Ireland Bill, the Cabinet was directly confronted with 
the question of whether its policy should include promoting Irish unity.  Several members of the 
administration claimed that this was their goal, but, on the advice of the Ulster unionist leaders, 
they chose the course least likely to produce that result.  The bill passed Parliament despite the 
obvious fact that the majority in both parts of Ireland did not support it. 
Despite his reluctance to grant concessions to Sinn Féin, by July 1921 it was apparent 
that Lloyd George’s coercion policy had failed.  Some historians assert that, by the time Irish 
republican leaders began meeting with British Cabinet members to negotiate a settlement, the 
broad outlines were already set: partition had been irreversibly established by the Government of 





dominion home rule.  In chapter six I highlight evidence that the British Cabinet was willing to 
consider alterations to both of these facets.  I argue that Lloyd George and his colleagues chose 
not to do so in an attempt to safeguard their domestic political position.  British threats of 
renewed war in Ireland played a significant role in the acceptance of the Anglo-Irish Treaty by 
the Sinn Féin negotiating team, and by the Dáil.  Such rhetoric resurfaced after the new Irish 
Free State’s provisional government attempted to enact a constitution that declared their country 
a sovereign entity.  The new Irish government’s failure to expand its powers as outlined in the 
Treaty contrasts starkly with the British Cabinet’s treatment of Northern Ireland.  The Unionist 
administration in the six counties was granted a de facto equality of status with the Free State, 
and given free reign within its own territory despite its formal status as an integral part of the 
United Kingdom. 
This long process of negotiation and political accommodation shows that there was not a 
steady, inevitable march from home rule to dominion status, or from a united Ireland to the two-
state solution.  At each stage numerous ideas for Ireland’s future were raised and considered.  
The decisions that were taken were made for specific reasons, some ideological, others political, 
and still others because the decision-makers believed that they had no viable alternative. 
 
Cultural Identity and Politics in Britain and Ireland  
While this dissertation is primarily concerned with politics, other sources of identity 
exercised an influence over individuals’ political values and choices.  I engage with three major 
political traditions: Irish nationalism, Irish unionism, and British nationalism, which often 
manifested as imperialism.37  All of them had important characteristics in common: they were 
influenced by religious ideology and organizations; were willing to sanction violence in pursuit 
of their goals; and contained a multiplicity of opinions while attempting to present a united front.  
Recognizing that these groups shared some motivations and had continuities in outlook enables a 
more thorough understanding of their actions, particularly as they interacted with one another. 
 The Irish nationalist drive for self-government was the spark that set in motion the events 
described from December 1909.  The majority of Irish nationalists were Catholic, and some 
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members of this political tradition were informed by religious belief and practice.  Many 
historians trace this to Daniel O’Connell’s mobilization of the Catholic masses against the last of 
the penal laws, which resulted in winning the right for members of this faith to sit in Parliament 
through the Roman Catholic Relief Act (1829).38  Some scholars go further, arguing that a 
religious identity, tending toward exclusion or even sectarianism, was one of Irish nationalism’s 
defining characteristics.39  Sean Connolly asserts that a long history of sectarian conflict makes 
Ireland unique in western Europe.40  Theoretician of nationalism Ernest Gellner calls religious 
identification the only significant cultural differentiator on the island.41  Other commentators 
reject this totalizing analysis, particularly by acknowledging that the tradition within Irish 
nationalism that can be described as IRB, Fenian, or republican frequently clashed with the 
Catholic Church.42 
 Certainly, some Irish nationalists did espouse a vision of Irish nationality as exclusively 
Catholic.  Historians frequently cite D. P. Moran, editor of the weekly newspaper The Leader, as 
epitomizing this tendency in the first quarter of the twentieth century.43  However, Patrick 
Maume and P. J. Matthews assert that later commentators sometimes exaggerate his influence by 
portraying him as the mouthpiece of the “Irish-Ireland” movement, of which Sinn Féin was a 
part.  Others within that movement, and in Irish nationalism more generally, opposed Moran’s 
ideas.44  Historian R. F. Foster cites the formation of the Catholic Association of Ireland in 1902 
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as an indication of “the ascendancy of a sectarian frame of reference.”45  This is an 
overstatement, but even if one accepts this logic, then the multiplicity of Protestant political 
organizations in Britain must show that sectarian politics was even more vibrant there. 
 Far from being unique to Irish nationalism, a coupling of religious and political identities 
was common to the other two major political traditions with which it engaged in this period: Irish 
unionism and British nationalism, or imperialism.  That Irish unionists were overwhelmingly 
Protestant is well known.  Less often acknowledged is the extent to which unionism relied on 
religion as an ideology and an organizational base.  Protestant churches were at the forefront in 
organizing opposition to Irish self-government, and clergy were involved in each step of that 
resistance, even helping to recruit and train the militant UVF.  There were Catholic Irish 
unionists, but while Protestants regularly inhabited the upper echelons of nationalism—both 
within the IPP and Sinn Féin—the unionist elite was almost exclusively Protestant. 
British nationalism was built to a large extent on chauvinistic Protestantism.46  Historians 
who recognize this sometimes imply that this was true of the formative period of British 
nationalism, but that the religious aspect faded sometime in the nineteenth century.47  The 
Catholic Relief Act is a commonly cited landmark.48  The effect is that some historians portray a 
progressively secularizing Britain in which sectarian politics played little role by the twentieth 
century.49  However, other scholars recognize that the equation of Britishness with Protestantism 
survived well into the 1900s.50 
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Many British and Irish Protestants, whether conservative or liberal, equated Catholicism 
with tyranny and intellectual confinement.  They represented Protestantism as the inverse: an 
ideology that promoted individual freedom.51  A London Catholic wrote of “Englishmen” in 
1910, “Catholicism stands to them for the principle of darkness, slavery and retrogression: 
Protestantism for light, liberty and learning.”52  Some historians argue that the participation of 
British Catholics in the First World War won them more widespread acceptance.53  However, this 
did not eliminate anti-Catholicism, or revoke the idea of Britain as essentially Protestant.  
Michael Snape asserts that the main factors in continuing resentment against Catholics after the 
war were Pope Benedict XV’s neutrality and the ongoing Irish conflict.54 
Protestantism and anti-Catholicism regularly intruded into twentieth-century British 
politics.  Debates on education, in particular, were often tinged with religious feeling.  Political 
operatives and commentators analyzed the electorate by religion, particularly in the broad 
categories of “conformist,” meaning members of the Church of England, and “non-conformist,” 
referring to all other Protestants.  Protestant clergy regularly pronounced on political issues. 
British Protestantism and anti-Catholicism as political forces were most evident in the 
home rule debate.  This is largely due to the unionist strategy—employed by both British and 
Irish politicians—to use these passions to overturn Asquith’s government.  Lord Balcarres wrote 
in 1910, “All the Protestant societies are preparing for the fray…People fancy we are no longer 
animated by the No Popery cry, and that our old-fashioned bigotry is dead.  No greater mistake: 
it is merely dormant.”55  Two years later, when the anti-home rule campaign was well under way, 
James Craig wrote to the United Protestant Societies in London, “they knew that if the flag of 
Protestantism was carried through England and Scotland the old feelings would be aroused.”56  
Unionist Party leader Andrew Bonar Law told Asquith in 1913, “one of the strongest feelings in 
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England and Scotland was Protestantism, or dislike of Roman Catholicism.”57  British 
Protestantism and anti-Catholicism were a barrier to Irish self-government, particularly due to 
their employment by the Unionist Party, but these forces existed independently of Irish issues. 
Neither chauvinistic Protestantism nor anti-Catholicism motivated all British people at all 
times.  Moreover, one is not dependent on the other.  Not all Protestants disliked Catholics or 
Catholicism.  Also, an individual did not have to be religious to view Catholicism negatively.  
Members of minority faiths including Catholics and Jews inhabited the highest levels of British 
politics and society.  However, the convergence of religion and politics was a common theme 
within all three traditions: Irish nationalism, Irish unionism, and British nationalism, or 
imperialism. 
Historians struggle to explain why Irish nationalists engaged in violent revolt during this 
period.58  R. F. Foster ascribes this in part to a culture of violence within nationalism.59  After the 
outbreaks in Northern Ireland in the 1970s, some scholars saw it as their duty to counter a 
perceived glorification of force in accounts of Irish history.60  Denouncing violence in one’s own 
context is understandable, but projecting contemporary opinions into the past produced concerns 
over the credibility of the resulting historical interpretations.61  Paul Bew justifiably describes 
republican aggression toward Irish unionists as “self-defeating,” but explains state violence 
against Northern Ireland’s Catholic nationalists as a quest for security.62  Peter Hart asserts that 
by 1922 the IRA inhabited a “gangsterish culture of violence.”63  What this leaves unsaid is that 
that culture was also inhabited by forces loyal to the British government and to Northern 
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Ireland’s unionist administration.  Neither the threat nor the reality of political violence in this 
period was the purview of any one party or tradition; all shades of opinion engaged in both. 
That Irish unionists were willing to countenance violence is obvious by the establishment 
of the UVF, but this tendency manifested itself in other ways.  Irish unionists encouraged the 
government to utilize the apparatus of state violence against their nationalist opponents.  Once 
northern unionists were given their own state they actively militarized it, primarily by 
establishing the Ulster Special Constabulary. 
British unionists consistently pledged to support their militant Irish counterparts.  Some 
Britons privately expressed hopes that the Irish question would resolve itself through violence 
between unionists and nationalists.  There was a widespread conviction within British governing 
circles that force should be the main arbiter in Irish issues.  After the Curragh mutiny in 1914, 
“no coercion of Ulster” became a byword in British politics, but events showed that members of 
both major parties were willing to coerce Irish nationalists.  Lloyd George was determined to 
confront Sinn Féin with state violence from the 1918 conscription crisis.  The Cabinet sanctioned 
the UVF’s transition into the Special Constabulary, and formed the paramilitary Auxiliary RIC.  
Instituting “official” reprisals in January 1921 was an admission that the British government had 
lost control of its servants, who were engaged in spontaneous punitive violence against their 
citizens in Ireland.  The threat of force was ever-present during the Treaty negotiations, and 
Lloyd George’s government planned to coerce the twenty-six counties into accepting their 
revisions to the Free State Constitution as late as June 1922. 
Another characteristic common to the three political traditions examined here is their 
ability to subsume minority opinions within their overall ideologies and structures.  Each 
tradition contained divergent opinions on what their goals should be and the appropriate means 
for achieving them, but at the same time strove for the appearance of unanimity.  Despite the 
existence of numerous nationalist groupings, the IPP in its time and Sinn Féin after them claimed 
to speak for “Ireland,” “the Irish people,” and “the Irish nation.”  Some British and Irish 
unionists opposed self-government on the ground that it was not the demand of a united nation, 
making a show of maximum unity even more important for Irish nationalists.64 
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Like Irish nationalism, unionism was not monolithic.  It is tempting to divide it into its 
constituent northern and southern elements from the outset, however, at the beginning of the 
period under examination, individuals within each declared themselves dedicated to one another.  
It is anachronistic to assume a simple geographical divide within Irish unionism from 1909.  This 
tradition contained a range of stances: some unionists wanted to obtain safeguards that would 
ensure their influence within a home rule government, others asserted that a simple negative to 
self-government should trump all other arguments.  Irish unionists attempted to portray 
themselves as cohesive at all times.  The Ulster Unionist Council did not report on their debates, 
only their unanimous resolutions, and did not even keep a record of dissenting opinions in their 
private minutes.  Unionists could not portray themselves as representing “Ireland,” but they did 
depict their movement as representative of the island’s quality, property, and industry.  Northern 
unionists frequently described themselves as representing “Ulster” and “the Ulster people,” 
eliding the province’s large nationalist population.  
The divisions within British nationalism or imperialism were obvious in the party system.  
Some commentators often assume different levels of imperialism within the British parties; the 
Unionists were overtly imperialistic, the Liberals less so.65  The rapidly growing Labour Party is 
often assumed to have been the least committed to the Empire.  However, during this period 
there was virtual unanimity between the parties that the Empire was a positive political and 
economic organism.66  Ireland, while administratively an integral part of the United Kingdom, 
was also a part of the Empire.  Any reconceptualization of its status was assumed to affect the 
other parts of both structures.  A consensus on Empire is evident in the philosophy of the “New 
Liberals,” also known as “Liberal imperialists,” who dominated Asquith’s government.  
Labour—whom the Unionists derided as “socialists”—played the smallest role in Irish policy 
during this period.  Their spokesmen criticized the Irish policies of Lloyd George’s government, 
particularly partition, but explicitly called for a settlement, “within the Constitution and 
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principles of the British Empire.”67  Thus, every major British party agreed that an Irish 
settlement must safeguard the Empire. 
Like Irish nationalists, British parties frequently claimed to speak for “the people” or “the 
nation.”  This group was sometimes identified as “British,” but politicians more often claimed to 
speak for “England” or “the English people,” emphasizing the importance of the “predominant 
partner” in determining the destinies of the United Kingdom and the Empire. 
As will be seen in the following chapters, the ideologies and mindsets of these different 
traditions, how they viewed and interacted with one another, and even the prejudices this contact 
sometimes engendered, impacted the decisions taken on their behalf as surely as political 
exigencies. These motivations and prejudices influenced the debates surrounding every potential 
political settlement analyzed in this thesis, including the Third Home Rule Bill, the Irish 
Convention, the Government of Ireland Act, the Anglo-Irish Treaty, as well as the innumerable 
ideas suggested by the press, the public, and government officials to supplement or replace these 
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“THE HOLLOWEST POLITICAL CANT:” BRITISH PARTIES, HOME RULE, AND 
THE PARLIAMENT ACT, DEC. 1909- JULY 1911 
 
Introduction 
 Profound political changes in the United Kingdom between December 1909 and July 
1911 made Irish self-government within the British Empire a practical possibility.  At the 
beginning of this period, neither of the two main British groupings, the Conservative and 
Unionist Party or the Liberals, were actively working in the interests of home rule.  While the 
Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP) tended to cooperate with the Liberals, many contemporaries and 
subsequent historians have portrayed this as a firm and almost perpetual alliance.  This 
relationship supposedly began with Liberal Prime Minister W. E. Gladstone’s switch from 
opposition to support for Irish self-government in 1885 and continued for the next three decades, 
with the British party simply waiting for an opportune time to introduce another home rule bill. 
Some historians have revised this impression to a degree, but they only differ as to the 
timing of the Liberal-IPP alliance.  Alan O’Day asserts that the Liberals ceased to actively 
campaign for home rule prior to a decisive electoral victory in 1906, but remained ideologically 
wedded to the concept.1  Alvin Jackson writes that the Liberals as a party were attentive to Irish 
interests, and it was only Prime Minister H. H. Asquith who was indifferent to self-government 
after taking office in 1908.2  Paul Bew implies that the alliance was suspended after Gladstone’s 
death in 1898, but renewed following the January 1910 election.3  These and other analyses 
assume that a firm alliance between the Liberal Party and the IPP was natural, therefore the 
introduction of another home rule bill was inevitable.  This chapter will argue that there was no 
alliance between the Liberals and Irish nationalists during the third home rule crisis.  Asquith’s 
administration only committed itself to Irish self-government as a last resort in order to stay in 
office and reduce the power of the House of Lords.  Home rule as a policy went against the 
religious and political proclivities of several of the most influential Cabinet members, who 
preferred to cooperate with British Unionists rather than Irish nationalists. 
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British unionists were also more ambivalent toward their Irish adjuncts than often 
portrayed.  Historians have tended to assume that British Conservatives and Liberal Unionists 
were unalterably committed to the Union after 1886.4  The flirtations of individual Unionists 
with various incarnations of self-government, particularly federalism, show that many of them 
were not averse to a settlement that would result in an Irish legislature.  The major stipulation 
was that both of the major British parties must agree to it.  The idea of Britain, particularly 
England, as the “predominant partner” in the constitutional relationships that comprised the 
United Kingdom was very strong.  Contemporary discourse reveals a widespread belief that if 
members of the two major parties came to an agreement on some form of home rule, the Irish—
whether nationalist or unionist—would have to accept the results. 
While Irish unionists, particularly those in Ulster, emphasized their role in stopping home 
rule on two previous occasions, they realized that they were relatively impotent without British 
support.  Irish nationalists also recognized that they had to win over popular opinion in Britain.  
However, unionists were more integrated into British social, economic, and political structures 
than most nationalists.  Parliamentary Irish Unionists were full members of the Conservative and 
Unionist Party, but as a small part of this larger entity they played a minor role in deciding what 
legislation did or did not pass.  By the end of this period, Unionists did not control the Commons 
and had seen the Lords’ veto power destroyed.  Therefore, they increasingly contemplated extra-
parliamentary agitation to stop legislation they considered objectionable. 
Without a firm alliance with the Liberals, there was no major British party on which the 
IPP could rely.  Few politicians in the “predominant partner” were ideologically wedded to home 
rule, and many in all parties were angered by Redmond’s perceived dictation of United Kingdom 
policy.  By the end of the period, attempts at cooperation between the two main British parties 
had failed, and Asquith’s Liberals—relying on the IPP to maintain its parliamentary majority—
were committed to producing and passing a home rule bill.  The reduction of the Lords’ powers, 
partly a result of pressure by the Irish nationalists, made home rule practical politics.  Despite 
their early willingness to make a deal on home rule, the passage of the Parliament Act drove 
British unionists closer than ever to their Irish counterparts. 
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Over the course of the debate on the United Kingdom’s constitution, parliamentarians, 
the press, and the public raised the issues that would dominate British and Irish politics until 
1922: what form Irish self-government should take, what relationship a self-governing Ireland 
should have with Britain, and how to treat Irish unionists, particularly in the province of Ulster. 
 
Asquith’s Government and Home Rule 
In late 1909, Herbert Henry Asquith’s Liberal government faced a dilemma.  He and his 
Cabinet had a program of far-reaching social reform that included passing the 1909 “people’s 
budget.”  The overwhelmingly conservative House of Lords had vetoed or significantly amended 
several government bills in the past.  However, when they voted down the 1909 budget, Asquith 
and his supporters argued that they had overstepped their authority.  It was for the Commons to 
develop budgets or “money bills” and, while the Lords possessed the power to veto any bill, the 
efficient running of the country demanded that they ease the passage of financial legislation.  The 
Lords’ defenders argued that their role was to amend bills or force elections on controversial 
legislation.5  If the country genuinely favored a measure that the Lords had vetoed, the 
government should call an election, make that bill the main issue, win the vote, and the upper 
chamber would pass the bill into law.  Asquith argued that the Lords were motivated by politics, 
not patriotism.  In dissolving Parliament, he said, “all this talk about the duty or the right of the 
House of Lords to refer measures to the people is, in the light of our practical and actual 
experience, the hollowest outcry of political cant.  We never hear of it…when a Tory 
Government is in power.”6  Asquith called an election for January 1910, intending to obtain a 
mandate not just for passing the budget but reducing the power of the upper chamber. 
Adding to the Prime Minister’s difficulties, Westminster’s Irish nationalist MPs were 
growing restless.  The Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP) and Labour usually supported Asquith’s 
Liberals.  After the 1906 election, the government had not relied on the support of the 83 Irish 
nationalists or 29 Labour MPs, as their 400 Liberals easily outnumbered 157 Conservatives and 
Liberal Unionists.7  An election might alter the balance of power, and IPP leader John Redmond 
wanted to be in a position to capitalize if it did.  Moreover, the people’s budget was unpopular in 
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Ireland as it would increase taxation on what many considered an overtaxed population, and the 
IPP wanted something in return for not opposing it in the Commons.8   
In October 1909, Redmond began asserting publicly that the Liberal government must 
make home rule for Ireland a prominent issue at the next election.9  On November 27, he wrote 
to Cabinet member John Morley that if Asquith did not declare in favor of home rule, not only 
would the government lose the IPP’s support, they would not recommend that the Irish in Britain 
vote for Liberal candidates at the upcoming election.10  Chief Secretary for Ireland Augustine 
Birrell assured Redmond that the Cabinet had agreed at a December 1 meeting that they would 
declare home rule “the live policy of the Party, without limitation or restriction.”11 
Nine days later at London’s Albert Hall, Asquith announced that he was for setting up “a 
system of full self-government for purely Irish affairs.”  He assured his audience that the issue 
could be addressed soon after the election, as, “in the new House of Commons the hands of the 
Liberal Government and the Liberal majority will be in this matter entirely free.”  At the same 
time, Asquith said that he would not resume his role as Prime Minister unless he had a mandate 
to reduce the power of the House of Lords.12  With this speech, Asquith seemed committed to 
introducing a home rule bill, as well as doing everything in his power to see that it passed both 
houses of Parliament and reached the statute book. 
There is nothing to suggest that this was the inevitable course of Asquith’s political life.  
There is an impression, expressed by some contemporaries and by historians, that Gladstone’s 
“conversion” to home rule committed the Liberals to Irish self-government in perpetuity.13  Some 
scholars argue that the Liberals never removed the issue from their program, but passing home 
rule was simply a practical impossibility between 1893 and 1909.14  While this may have been 
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the case, it is evident that many Liberals had little interest in or compassion for Irish self-
government, and after the failure of the Second Home Rule Bill it could be a political liability. 
 Wilfrid Blunt, an English poet, socialite, and home ruler, told Redmond in February 1910 
that he did not think that Asquith, or Cabinet members Edward Grey or Richard Haldane, were 
“really in earnest about Home Rule.”  He considered Lloyd George and Churchill to be far more 
reliable on the issue.  Redmond agreed.15  That the IPP leader doubted the Prime Minister’s 
sincerity might have surprised contemporaries.   
Some of Asquith’s biographers take his support for Irish self-government so much for 
granted that they do not question his earnestness on the issue.16  After all, Asquith had voted for 
both of Gladstone’s home rule bills.  In one of his memoirs he described himself as “a convinced 
home ruler.”  This was certainly how he wanted to be viewed.17  However, describing his first 
election campaign in 1886, after Gladstone’s commitment to home rule split the Liberal Party, 
Asquith wrote, “we had to demonstrate our title, as against some of our old comrades in arms, 
now disguised in their Unionist war-paint, to the true Liberal succession.”18  In other words, he 
supported Irish self-government because he was a good party soldier, not necessarily because he 
believed in the principle.  Moreover, Asquith disliked Parnell’s tactics in playing the major 
British parties against one another.  He described the IPP’s voting recommendations to the Irish 
living in Britain as bribery, and viewed Parnell’s obstructionism and connections to the Land 
League’s “moonlighting” with distaste.19 
Asquith identified himself with a particular grouping within the Liberal party.  In 
domestic policy they called their doctrine “new liberalism,” but in foreign affairs they were often 
called “liberal imperialists.”  Cabinet member Herbert Samuel explained their paternalistic 
thinking when he wrote, “The same motives which led us to be social reformers at home made us 
favour, for the backward peoples, a stage of colonial administration, as the best means of helping 
them to reach a higher level of civilization.  Besides, the existence of the British Empire assured, 
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over nearly a fourth part of the globe, internal peace and tranquility.”20  Some Irish nationalists 
were also attracted to the imperialist position, and tried to portray home rule as beneficial to the 
Empire as a whole.21  Asquith became a member of Liberal Prime Minister Henry Campbell-
Bannerman’s Cabinet in 1905.  MP Rufus Isaacs told a British audience that the inclusion of 
liberal imperialists, including Asquith, Grey, and Haldane, in the government, “was a guarantee 
that there would be no such measure as a Home Rule Bill introduced into the present 
Parliament.”22  According to historian H. C. G. Matthew, the liberal imperialists wanted a “clean 
slate” for their party, in other words to distance themselves from past Liberal policies.  The only 
area in which they achieved this was home rule, effectively dissociating themselves from 
Gladstone’s idea of establishing an Irish legislature.23   
Campbell-Bannerman’s government did produce the Irish Council Bill in 1907, a 
measure to devolve limited powers to a Dublin-based body consisting of nominated and elected 
members.  It was not home rule, but accorded with the liberal imperialist doctrine of “step by 
step” concessions toward Irish self-government.24  Redmond disliked the bill, but voted for it on 
its first reading and called a nationalist conference in Dublin to consider it.  As historian Dermot 
Meleady notes, home rule was already a compromise of some nationalists’ demands, therefore a 
measure granting even less was unacceptable to many.25  Elements of the Irish nationalist press 
and members of the Dublin conference—supposedly loyal IPP supporters—criticized the Party 
severely for supporting the bill.26  Redmond was forced into an embarrassing climb-down, and 
the government withdrew the measure.27  The affair inculcated a suspicion in Irish nationalists 
that the British government would not deliver an adequate form of self-government, and by 1910 
the Council Bill had become synonymous with a weak, intolerable version of home rule.28 
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It is curious that Redmond believed that Lloyd George and Churchill were more reliable 
home rulers than Asquith.  The former was so strongly against Irish self-government that he 
almost joined the Liberal Unionists in 1886.  By sheer accident, Lloyd George missed a train that 
would have taken him to the inaugural meeting of Joseph Chamberlain’s National Radical Union 
and out of the Liberal Party.29  In addition to this political aversion, Lloyd George was strongly 
anti-Catholic.  Lucy Masterman wrote of him, “His view of the Roman Catholic religion was that 
it was excellent for women and children, whom he appeared to regard as an inferior order of 
beings altogether.”30  He once told a friend, “I hate a priest, Daniel, wherever I find him.”31  This 
hostility had a political dimension.  Masterman recorded, “George is not a very keen Home 
Ruler…he has a good deal of the protestant in him.”32 
Redmond’s trust in Lloyd George might be attributed to the latter’s personal qualities.  
He possessed an outstanding propensity for convincing people that he was on their side.  
Economist John Maynard Keynes described Lloyd George as having “six or seven senses not 
available to ordinary men, judging character, motive, and subconscious impulse, perceiving what 
each was thinking and even what each was going to say next, and compounding with telepathic 
instinct the argument or appeal best suited to the vanity, weakness, or self-interest of his 
immediate auditor.”33  It is possible that conversing with Lloyd George and listening to his 
speeches convinced Redmond that he was a firm supporter of Irish self-government. 
Even more surprising than Redmond’s faith in Lloyd George is that the IPP leader 
considered Winston Churchill a reliable ally.  Churchill began his political career in 1900 as a 
Unionist.  He “crossed the floor” of the Commons and joined the Liberals in May 1904.  Twenty 
years later he would return to the Unionists, but in the interim he was considered one of the most 
influential Liberals.  Churchill made disparaging remarks about the IPP and Irish self-
government.  Referring to the nationalists’ opposition to the Boer War, he said in 1902, “Ireland 
suffered little asses to bray in the same way…they were not real representatives and did not 
represent what was good in Ireland—only what was common, and mean, and disloyal.”34  The 
idea that the Irish nationalists were not “real representatives” reflects a belief that IPP members 
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were products of a corrupt political machine, therefore their election did not illustrate popular 
feeling in Ireland.  This is ironic as British political candidates were also selected by their party 
machines.  In addition, the United Kingdom was not a perfect democracy.  All women, as well as 
men who owned less than £10 of property, were denied the right to vote.  After switching parties 
in 1904, Churchill assured his constituents that, on Irish issues, he was still a Unionist, “I do not 
look forward to the day when there shall be created a separate Parliament in Ireland to be a rival 
of, and perhaps an enemy of, the central Parliament here at home.”35 
Like Lloyd George, Churchill saw the Catholic Church as a pernicious influence.  He 
wrote in 1899, “as a rationalist I deprecate all Romish practices and prefer those of 
Protestantism, because I believe that the Reformed Church is less deeply sunk in the mire of 
Dogma than the Original Establishment.  We are at any rate a step nearer Reason.”36  This had a 
political aspect, as he said in 1911, “priestly rule & ascendancy will always I trust encounter 
staunch resistance from free & enlightened men…the Catholic Church has ruined every country 
in wh[ich] it has been supreme.”37  Like other contemporaries, Churchill had a tendency to 
describe negative events in Ireland as a result of innate characteristics.  He wrote of the Irish in 
1920, “What a diabolical streak they have in their character! I expect it is that treacherous, 
assassinating, conspiring trait which has done them in in the bygone ages of history and 
prevented them from being a great responsible nation with stability and prosperity.”38 
Churchill’s distinguishing qualities were his imperialistic and militaristic aggression.  
After the First World War, Churchill befriended a new MP named Oswald Mosley, who would 
later found the British Union of Fascists.  They remained close until Churchill’s aggression 
drove them apart.  Mosley wrote of Churchill, “He seemed to me constantly to risk war without 
good reason.”39  Churchill’s belief in the Empire meant that he would likely oppose any policy he 
felt would weaken it.  As a Cabinet member Churchill recommended aggressive action against 
both Irish nationalists and Ulster unionists, though at different times. 
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Asquith, Churchill, and Lloyd George were the three most influential members of the 
British government, and none of them were enthusiastic about home rule.  There were few 
principled reasons for the Prime Minister to commit himself to Irish self-government in 
December 1909.  However, Asquith knew that he might need the Irish nationalists.  The large 
Irish vote in Britain might sway a number of crucial election contests.  Also, if his significant 
majority in the House of Commons were diminished, he might need IPP votes to stay in power. 
 
Reactions to Asquith’s Home Rule Stance 
Some Irish nationalists were skeptical as to whether Asquith’s commitment to home rule 
would be translated into action.  Dublin’s nationalist Sunday Independent responded, “You’ve 
done well, Mr. Asquith, but you might be a little more explicit.  A confession of faith does not 
mean a promise to perform.”40  The unionist Irish Times did not believe that self-government was 
an immediate issue.  It said in an editorial, “the Liberals have taken up Home Rule with extreme 
reluctance.  They will not face the grave risks of that policy unless the Nationalist vote becomes 
an essential condition of their return to office.”41 
Redmond embraced the Prime Minister’s declaration.  He told a United Irish League 
conference on December 15, 1909, that Asquith’s Albert Hall speech meant “the coming back of 
the whole Liberal Party to the standard of Gladstone—to full Gladstonian Home Rule.”42  
Redmond’s friend Wilfrid Blunt considered that the IPP leader was taking a risk in trusting 
Asquith so completely.  Blunt called the Prime Minister’s commitment to home rule, “not very 
clear,” and wrote of Redmond, “he runs the risk of being made a fool of should the Liberals 
return in power enough to do without him.”  In this estimation, the best result for the Irish 
nationalists would be for the Liberals to win the election, but with a reduced majority.43 
In order to pass a home rule bill, Redmond knew that the veto power of the House of 
Lords would have to be undermined.  Therefore, he advised the Irish in Britain to vote for the 
two parties pledged to diminish the Lords’ power: the Liberals and Labour.44  Many in Britain 
saw the situation in the same light.  The Morning Leader, a London-based Liberal paper, said of 
                                                 
40 Sunday Independent (Dublin), 12 December 1909. 
41 Irish Times (Dublin), 16 December 1909. 
42 John Redmond in Dublin, Ulster Herald (Omagh), 18 December 1909. 
43 Blunt, My Diaries, II:285, entry for 20 December 1909. 





home rule, “There is no other obstacle to it, as the Irish leader wisely sees, than the House of 
Lords.”45  Redmond spoke out against the Lords in his campaign speeches.  He positioned 
himself as a friend of the English and Irish masses or “democracies,” who were engaged in a 
struggle against noble privilege.  On January 9, 1910, the Irish nationalist leader said, “The 
Lords have been the enemies all through the last century of the democracy of this country,” and, 
“he thanked God to see the day when the democracy of Ireland could join hands with the 
democracy of England in a campaign to destroy this hydra-headed monster.”  Redmond deplored 
that some English people did not trust the Irish with self-government, as they had given similar 
rights to colonies like Canada and South Africa.  He denied that nationalists sought to separate 
Ireland from the British Empire, and defined their demand by drawing on the South African 
precedent, “we want a treaty of peace like that which was made by Botha and De Wet.”46 
 Within weeks of Asquith’s public commitment to home rule, British and Irish unionists 
amplified their anti-home rule rhetoric.  The Ulster Unionist Council (UUC) held a public 
meeting in Belfast on January 4, 1910.  Unionist dignitaries enunciated what would become their 
staple arguments against Irish self-government.  James Hamilton, Duke of Abercorn, sent a letter 
asserting, “if Home Rule were given to Ireland, separation must eventually follow.”47  James H. 
Campbell addressed himself to “the law-abiding and peaceful province of Ulster.”  He declared 
that only within the Union “could the loyal minority in Ireland depend for the retention of their 
civil and religious liberty and the safety of their lives and property.”48  Walter Long told his 
audience that their duty in the election was to “convince their fellow citizens in all parts of the 
United Kingdom what their real view of the situation was in regard to Home Rule.”  Long 
invoked Randolph Churchill’s 1886 saying, “Ulster will fight, and Ulster will be right,” and 
made an ominous prediction when he said, “Civil war might be necessary, it might be justified 
by the circumstances, it might be forced on a people in order to protect the lives of the people 
and their successors; but it was an awful thing to contemplate.”49 
 The idea of Ulster as the loyal and law-abiding portion of Ireland was one of the enduring 
themes of unionist propaganda.  It was designed to draw a stark contrast between the northern 
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province and the rest of Ireland, which unionists portrayed as disloyal and lawless.  Such 
statements also conveyed that Ulster was inhabited solely by people who were loyal to the 
British connection.  It is ironic that unionist leaders encouraged their supposedly loyal and law-
abiding constituents to engage in civil war against a legally constituted authority.  But this idea 
of unionists was, after all, only an impression that they wished to convey.  Moreover, the images 
they conjured of Irish nationalists as reckless law-breakers incapable of rehabilitation rested on 
stereotypes derived from the Land War and Fenian dynamiting periods of the 1880s-1890s. 
Abercorn and Long told the Belfast meeting that Irish unionists’ duty was to try to 
influence English opinion.  This reflects that the “predominant partner” should ultimately decide 
the fate of the whole of the United Kingdom, and shows the impotence of Irish unionists should 
they fail to appeal to British allies. 
Long’s invocation of violent action was one of the most dramatic and complicated 
features of unionist strategy.  The speaker seemed to be advocating violence to his audience 
when he called the idea of civil war “necessary” and “justified” under certain circumstances.  
However, Long then spoke of civil war being “forced” on Irish unionists, whom he described as 
defending their rights.  These kinds of statements enabled unionist leaders to claim that they 
were not inciting their audiences to violence, but that a violent reaction to the introduction of a 
home rule bill was inevitable.  They were simply warning politicians and the public in Britain 
and Ireland of this fact.  Long prudently added that civil war was “an awful thing to 
contemplate,” though he had just compelled his audience to contemplate such a conflict.  The 
idea of a civil war over home rule placed the onus of resisting self-government on Ulster 
unionists.  While there were unionists in every part of Ireland, outside of the northeastern part of 
Ulster they were a distinct minority, living scattered among an overwhelming majority of 
nationalists.  The only group within unionism capable of carrying out any organized violent 
campaign were those in Ulster.  Despite this emphasis, unionists intended to use that fact to 
defeat self-government for the whole island.50  
While the Belfast meeting only laterally referred to this Ulster-centric unionist strategy, it 
was apparent to some observers.  In discussing the meeting, the Unionist Morning Post credited 
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Irish unionists—particularly those in the north—with foiling the first two home rule bills.  It 
said, “Nothing did so much to ensure the defeat of Mr. Gladstone’s attack on the integrity of the 
United Kingdom as the fierce and unflinching opposition offered in Ulster.  Feeling in the North 
of Ireland is the same as it was twenty years ago.”51  Crediting Ulster unionists with defeating 
previous attempts at instituting home rule artificially inflated their importance.  The First Home 
Rule Bill had been defeated by the House of Commons.  The second had been vetoed by the 
Lords, and followed by an election in which home rulers gained a majority only in Ireland.  In 
1910 the Irish Times said of the Lords, “This one safeguard alone has prevented the passing into 
law of Home Rule Bills.”52  Ulster unionists contributed only a few members to the Commons or 
the Lords.  Westminster and the British public remained their greatest safeguard against home 
rule.  Ominously for Ireland-wide unionism, the focus on Ulster amplified the unionists of this 
region above their counterparts elsewhere on the island. 
Some contemporaries believed that for home rule to be enacted, special provision would 
have to be made for those parts of the north of Ireland that were majority Protestant and unionist.  
From the outset of the third home rule crisis, participants in debates about home rule struggled to 
define a geographic entity known as “Ulster,” and to devise means to placate the people living 
there.  In January 1910, N. C. Philpott proposed in the Irish Independent that four counties: 
Antrim, Armagh, Londonderry, and Down, be excluded from the purview of the future Irish 
parliament.  Fermanagh was to be cut in half and the eastern portion excluded as well.  His 
rationale was that these areas “have Orange traditions, and…are strongly Presbyterian and 
Protestant.”  Philpott added that this was equitable as far as the province was concerned, “There 
being nine counties in Ulster, we give half to the Orangemen and half to the Nationalists.”  
Dublin’s Trinity College would also be outside the administration of the home rule legislature.53 
A correspondent who signed as “South Tyrone” replied that parliamentary constituencies 
should be used to determine an area to be excluded from home rule.  He considered that the 
counties of Cavan, Donegal, and Monaghan, as well as the constituencies of South Armagh, 
South Down, and South Fermanagh should be under the jurisdiction of the home rule parliament 
while the rest of the province was left out.  He recognized that there was a nationalist majority in 
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Mid-Tyrone and a large unionist minority in South Down, but these would have to be sacrificed 
to form a more logical, contiguous unit.  He wrote that there would have to be decisions made as 
to which areas were “to be included in Ulster,” meaning excluded from home rule.  The parts of 
the province under nationalist administration would be “out of Ulster.”  The writer also objected 
to Philpott referring to all unionists as “Orangemen,” a term he considered derogatory.  He 
wrote, “We might as well call our Nationalist opponents ‘Fenians.’”54 
It is interesting to note that Philpott used the geographic definition of Ulster as a nine-
county area that may have to be divided.  “South Tyrone” considered Ulster a less tangible 
entity.  To him, an “Ulster” identity was not defined by geographic location but by an anti-home 
rule mindset.  Thus he felt justified in calling the new, unionist-majority area he advocated, 
“Ulster.”  Philpott used an exclusively religious rationale; the excluded areas were “Presbyterian 
and Protestant,” while the traditionally Protestant Trinity College should also be left out.  “South 
Tyrone” used the political characterizations of “nationalist” and “unionist,” and objected to being 
lumped together with the exclusively Protestant Orange Order.  Neither correspondent suggested 
giving the area excluded from home rule its own administration, implying that the population 
there would continue to be governed directly from Westminster. 
Whether there would be administrative change in any part of Ireland had yet to be 
determined.  The results of the January 1910 election did not return a straightforward verdict for 
or against Asquith’s policies.  The Unionists and Liberal Unionists won the largest portion of the 
popular vote, with 46.8 percent compared to the Liberals’ 43.5 percent.  However, due to the 
distribution of seats, 273 Unionists would sit in the new House of Commons alongside 275 
Liberals.  Labour won 7 percent of the vote and 40 seats.55  The IPP won 70 seats in Ireland and 
T. P. O’Connor’s Liverpool constituency.  Independent Irish nationalists won three seats, while 
the loose coalition around William O’Brien and the All-for-Ireland-League (AFIL) won eight for 
a total of 82 Irish nationalists at Westminster.  Twenty-one of the 273 Unionists were from Irish 
constituencies, as was one of the 275 Liberals.56   
While the Irish results barely varied from the 1906 polls (only one seat changed hands 
from nationalist to unionist), throughout the United Kingdom the Unionists gained 106 seats 
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compared with the last election; a result that some interpreted as the public’s rejection of 
government policy.57  The unionist Saturday Review exulted, “The Liberal Government can now 
only exist precariously by favour of the Labour and the Irish gangs.  Beyond all shade of doubt 
England has broken the evil power of the Liberals to wreck the Constitution.”58  Asquith’s 
government could be defeated if the IPP voted with the Unionists on any issue.  Many believed 
that that issue might be the budget, but Asquith’s declaration in support of home rule made it 
seem as though the government and the nationalists had a firm understanding.  Lord Monteagle, 
a unionist from Co. Limerick, foresaw another possibility: the Liberals and Unionists might ally 
against the nationalists.  He wrote to fellow Irish unionist Horace Plunkett, “both the great 
English parties must see the absurdity of allowing Redmond to hold the balance on the big 
constitutional questions, and I still hope that some compromise may be devised that would leave 
Redmond isolated instead of a dictator.”59  To Monteagle, a deal between the major British 
parties that would preclude home rule was not only possible, it was necessary. 
 
Liberals, Nationalists, and the Lords 
The appearance of IPP-Liberal amity was shattered after the election.  Before the final 
votes had been counted, the press began to speculate that the government would prioritize 
passing the 1909 budget over attacking the Lords’ veto, a procedure that would delay home rule.  
In addition, Asquith might compromise with the Lords to pass the budget and leave all of their 
powers intact, including the ability to veto Irish self-government.60 
Almost immediately, many commentators assumed home rule was dead again, and began 
to speculate on other ways of solving the Irish question.  British conservative J. Ellis Barker 
suggested that the IPP should cooperate with the Unionist Party to bring self-government “in a 
much wider sense of the term than is dreamed of by most Home Rulers.”61  He predicted that if a 
Liberal government attempted to enforce a home rule bill there would be civil war between 
nationalists and Ulster, which he assumed to be entirely unionist.  Barker asserted, “Ulster is 
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equally entitled to Home Rule within her own borders” because, “she is Protestant and Anglo-
Saxon.”62  Barker seems to have assumed that if Irish nationalists cooperated with the British 
Unionists to achieve home rule they would face no resistance from Irish unionists, indicating that 
the latter would acquiesce in whatever plan their British allies decided to enact.  If one assumes 
that the British unionist position on home rule was entrenched and unchanging, this idea seems 
far-fetched.  However, there is evidence that British unionists were willing to concede some 
measure of Irish self-government.  John Dillon, one of Redmond’s principal deputies, told Blunt 
in April 1910 that he did not anticipate that Asquith would keep his promises, but expected “to 
get Home Rule from the Tories.”63 
The press reports reflected real disagreements in Asquith’s administration over whether 
to prioritize the budget or the Lords’ veto.  J. A. Spender, a liberal and editor of the Westminster 
Gazette, later described the January 1910 vote as “the budget election,” and asserted that Asquith 
did not feel that the electorate had given him a mandate for drastic action against the Lords.64  
Asquith himself wrote that the efficient running of the country demanded that the budget issue be 
settled as soon as possible.65  This choice of emphases caused rifts within the coalition of parties 
that kept Asquith’s administration in power.  In a speech in Dublin on February 10, 1910, 
Redmond referred to the press reports and declared that “Ireland,” meaning the IPP, would 
oppose Asquith if he attempted to prioritize the budget over the veto.66 
Redmond’s speech prompted a rebuke from London’s Times.  Referring to the IPP’s 
reliance on American contributions, The Times asserted that the Irish nationalists had no right to 
impinge on the decisive role usually reserved for English politicians.  It stated, “The 
‘predominant partner’ does not relish dictation to the Government he has chosen, particularly 
when that dictation comes from a party which confesses that it is kept in existence by foreign 
funds.”67  This reflects a feeling that, despite their island being an integral part of the United 
Kingdom, Irish nationalists should not wield influence in the same manner as English politicians.  
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Ironically, opposition to Irish influence placed this unionist paper on the side of a Liberal Prime 
Minister.   
Other influential Britons were equally dismissive of nationalist opinion.  J. L. Garvin, 
editor of the unionist Observer, wrote that because the IPP would vote against the Lords to 
obtain home rule and not out of principle, their votes on the issue should not count.  He added, 
“A coalition dependent for its position in Parliament and the constituencies upon the Irish vote 
can claim no effective and legitimate majority.”68  The Saturday Review asserted, “the votes of 
the Redmondites are objected to not because they are Irish but because they are Home Rulers.”  
The paper welcomed Irish “loyalist” votes in defense of the Lords.69  A. V. Dicey, one of the 
United Kingdom’s foremost constitutional scholars, wrote that all Irish nationalists were 
separatists, and, “For the opposition of Separatists, as a Unionist, I care nothing.”70  The 
implication of this doctrine for United Kingdom democracy is interesting as it implies that 
citizens could be deprived of their rights for the opinions they held. 
Whether his position was acknowledged as legitimate or not, Redmond’s opposition 
could end Asquith’s government.  Churchill warned the Prime Minister, “We are becoming 
involved in a perfectly unreal dispute with our own supporters.  The Irish, the Labour party, & I 
daresay half our own men say, ‘Veto before Budget.’”71  Nonetheless, Asquith was determined to 
prioritize the budget even at the risk of his own government.  Unionists welcomed the policy and 
predicted that the IPP and Labour leaders would be put in their places.  Austen Chamberlain 
wrote on the eve of the new legislative session, “Budget first and Veto after.  Asquith has beaten 
his own recalcitrant colleagues and now defies Redmond, Barnes & Co. who, being beaten, will 
doubtless come to heel.”72  Lord Balcarres wrote in exactly the same terms, “Redmond will come 
to heel.”73  Edward Carson, MP for Trinity College and a rising star in the Unionist Party, 
predicted that “the Irish,” meaning the IPP, “will simply do as they are told.”74 
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The Irish nationalist leader defied these expectations during the first sitting of the new 
Parliament on February 21, 1910.  Asquith informed the Commons that not only did he intend to 
make passing the budget his first priority, he would not ask the King to create new peers to sit in 
the Lords.  The Prime Minister even seemed to shy away from his supposed commitment to 
home rule, adding that he had not definitely said that he would introduce a bill for Irish self-
government, only that without the Lords’ veto his government would be free to do so.75  In 
response, Redmond declared that his party was independent of alliances and the only issue they 
cared about was home rule.  He quoted Asquith’s statement that he would not take office without 
a mandate to reduce the Lords’ power and said that if the Prime Minister intended to pass the 
budget before the veto, “Ireland,” meaning the IPP, would oppose him.76 
Newspaper comments on the proceedings did not fall along party lines.  The liberal Daily 
News indicated that Asquith had made a mistake, “Mr. Redmond’s support is indispensable, his 
advice is intrinsically sound, and the Government would be wise to accept it.”77  The unionist 
Daily Mail praised the Prime Minister for having “stood firm and resisted dictation.”78  All 
agreed that if the IPP voted against the government, Asquith would be forced to resign.  The 
Morning Post, also a unionist organ, dramatically compared Redmond to Macbeth: “the Irish 
Leader pauses, he hesitates, before he plunges his dagger into the weakened body of 
Liberalism.”79 
Unlike the assassin in Shakespeare’s play, Redmond did not strike.  Over the next several 
weeks, the government negotiated with the IPP while pushing ahead with the budget.  The 
nationalists abstained from voting on the money bill; refraining from opposing the government 
and causing its downfall.  At the same time, the Cabinet developed their “veto resolutions,” a 
series of Parliamentary agreements to limit the Lords’ power.  Bills passed in the Commons but 
vetoed in the Lords would have to be passed by the lower house in three consecutive sessions, or 
for two years, in order to become law.  This would make the Commons the ultimate adjudicator 
of legislation, but over the course of the two-year delay the opposition might force a general 
election that changed the makeup of the legislature. 
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Throughout this period, members of Asquith’s government resented that they appeared to 
be acting at the behest of Redmond and his colleagues.  Lucy Masterman wrote of March and 
April 1910, “The seams in the Cabinet ran very queerly…The anti-Irish prejudice ran very 
high.”80  Churchill’s reports to the King denied that the government had made a deal with the 
Irish nationalists four times between March and April.  On March 1 he wrote, “It would not do 
justice to the Government to attribute to them a weak surrender to [the] Irish faction.”81  The 
Cabinet negotiated with both the IPP and AFIL leader William O’Brien on the terms of the 
budget, aiming to make it more acceptable to the Irish public.  By April 13, the administration 
was on the verge of modifying the budget to alleviate Irish taxation when they suddenly changed 
their minds.  Asquith told the King that the Cabinet was “unanimously of opinion that to 
purchase the Irish vote by such a concession would be a discreditable transaction.”82 
By this time, however, the Commons had passed all of the veto resolutions, showing that 
a majority in the lower house supported the Prime Minister in removing the Lords’ ability to veto 
legislation.  On April 14, Asquith announced that if the upper house remained intransigent, he 
would ask the King to create enough Liberal peers to overwhelm the current voting strength.  By 
this time British political rhetoric was becoming extreme.  The Times decried government policy 
as “revolution full-blown” and lamented, “Mr. Redmond has had his way in every particular.”83  
Lord Esher, a confidant of the royal family, wrote under the pseudonym “Historicus” that even if 
the government won an election on reducing the Lords’ power, the opposition “will not accept 
their defeat at the polls,” an ominous warning of strenuous, perhaps even violent, agitation.84  
Carson, who had been elected leader of the Irish unionist MPs on the first day of the 
parliamentary session, said he was “boiling with rage” and added, “I hope there will be 
violence—it is a justifiable occasion if ever there was one.”85  Such threats of civil disruption 
became increasingly common over the next two years. 
Calls for compromise became more urgent.  On May 5, 1910, Lord Curzon gave a speech 
proposing that the top five members of the two major parties meet with a neutral arbiter to 
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discuss constitutional issues.  He called the group, “the all-England eleven.”86  King Edward VII 
died unexpectedly on the night of May 6, necessitating a temporary party truce.  Aware of the 
calls for compromise and concerned that they had not received a mandate to destroy the Lords’ 
veto in January, the government convened a conference to discuss constitutional issues. 
 
The British Parties Attempt to Compromise 
The constitutional conference opened on June 16, 1910.  While these bipartisan talks 
were going on behind the doors of Westminster palace, some unionists renewed calls for their 
party to consider adopting a home rule policy, though a different one from that expected of the 
Liberals.  One week into the conference, Walter Long, who had threatened civil war in 
opposition to home rule in January, reached out to John Redmond offering to discuss a possible 
scheme for Irish self-government.87  There is no evidence that talks took place. 
On October 20, Observer editor J. L. Garvin sent letters to Balfour and Chamberlain 
urging them to change their policy on Ireland.  He described “some form of devolution” as 
“inevitable,” and suggested a compromise between Gladstonian home rule and traditional 
unionism.  This could be embodied by “an Ireland under Federal Home Rule on the Quebec 
model.”  This referred to the relationship between the national and provincial parliaments of 
Canada, a dominion within the British Empire.  Garvin added that a grateful home rule Ireland 
might send conservative MPs to Westminster to defend “nearly all we care for.”88  Chamberlain 
was open to the concept.  He replied to Garvin that the two British parties should collaborate to 
develop a “safe” measure of home rule for Ireland.89  Chamberlain soon received an offer that 
brought this idea within the realm of practical politics. 
Tired of party warfare and fearful that the British Empire’s place among the great powers 
was not being safeguarded, on August 17, 1910, Lloyd George wrote a memorandum proposing 
that the Liberals and Unionists form a coalition.  This “national government” would deal with the 
most pressing and controversial issues, including land taxes, housing, insurance, and national 
defense.  Under the heading “Local Government” he wrote, “a good deal of work is cast upon the 
Imperial Parliament which could be much more efficiently discharged by local bodies on a large 
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scale.”  This claim that Westminster was overworked was one of the favorite arguments of 
devolutionists and federalists, implying that reform was being undertaken to address a practical 
problem, not necessarily as a concession to any particular sentiment.  Under the heading 
“Imperial Problems” Lloyd George advocated a “non-Party” settlement of the Irish question, one 
that could be enacted “without being subject to the embarrassing dictation of extreme partisans, 
whether from Nationalists or Orangemen.”90  Lloyd George scouted the memo among the 
Cabinet, where he met little resistance.91  Still, he waited until mid-October, when the 
constitutional conference had reached a critical point, to put the proposal to the Unionists. 
By that time Lloyd George had added an explicit statement that federal home rule would 
be coalition policy.92  He sent the memo to Balfour and other Unionist leaders, using Churchill’s 
friend F. E. Smith as an intermediary.  Chamberlain later wrote that the coalition terms were 
amenable to Unionist policy, even to be point of being detrimental to the Liberals, “when we first 
heard of them they appeared so favourable that we could not understand how George could face 
his Party after agreeing to them.”93  On October 21, Chamberlain wrote that if the Unionists and 
Liberals agreed to settle the Irish question, the nationalists would have no power to overturn it, 
“Lloyd George told F. E. Smith that the Liberal Party was pledged to Devolution in some form 
or another and could not abandon the pledge, but if a scheme were agreed on between the two 
great Parties were rejected by the Irish, the Liberals would then wash their hands of the whole 
affair and leave the Irish to stew in their own juice.”94  The same day, he wrote to Smith that if 
both of the major British parties agreed on a change in Irish government “it would go through as 
easily and as swiftly as any great Bill has ever gone through Parliament.”95  This indicates that 
while the Irish nationalists would be unable to expand the powers the British parties were willing 
to grant them, Irish unionists would be equally unable to resist whatever change they imposed.  
Several influential Unionists signaled their support for the plan, including Chamberlain, Smith, 
and Andrew Bonar Law.96 
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At the same time that this initiative for federal home rule was taking shape behind closed 
doors, public pressure for this type of settlement began to mount.  On October 22, a letter 
appeared in The Times written by a unionist who signed as “Pacificus.”  He suggested that if the 
Irish question was out of the way, the two major British parties could easily settle other 
constitutional matters between themselves.97  Pacificus admitted that the unionists could not 
actively advocate home rule.  To change their position so radically would cause most of their 
supporters to desert them, a process he called “Conversion and martyrdom.”  He added, “The 
Unionists cannot champion Home Rule, they might nevertheless submit to it.”98  In further 
letters, Pacificus argued for federalizing the United Kingdom, which entailed granting a local 
parliament to Ireland, as well as one each to Scotland, Wales, and England, or any other agreed 
units.  Westminster would be a supreme authority over them all.  He openly questioned whether 
Irish unionists really opposed home rule.99  The author made distinctions between the interests of 
“the Irish Unionists,” whom he described as “the Protestants of the south” and “country 
gentlemen,” compared to the “Ulstermen” inhabiting “Protestant Ulster.”100  In the midst of his 
letter-writing campaign, the press revealed that Pacificus was actually F. S. Oliver, a unionist 
lawyer, writer, and businessman, but he continued the correspondence under his pseudonym.101 
Support for the Pacificus plan grew in unionist circles.  The Times stood behind the idea, 
as did Garvin’s Observer.  Other unionist journals including the Standard, Globe, and Morning 
Post voiced approval for devolution, though sometimes hesitantly.102  Young unionists involved 
with the Round Table movement were already positively disposed toward federalist ideas.103 
Support for home rule in any form would be a major policy shift for the Unionist Party.  
However, many individual unionists were willing to support giving Ireland a parliament within a 
federal system for the United Kingdom because they saw this as preferable to “Parnellite” or 
“Gladstonian” home rule.  This was usually defined as an Irish parliament and executive 
established with the acknowledgement of Ireland’s separate nationality.  Lord Milner, 
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intellectual forbear of the Round Table movement, drew the distinction in an April 1910 letter 
attempting to convince Balfour to support federalism.  He described devolution, or what he 
called “provincial Home Rule,” as “Ireland to the United Kingdom like Quebec to the rest of 
Canada.”  Whereas Parnellite or “National Home Rule” would be “Ireland like Canada, virtually 
quite independent of the rest of the United Kingdom.”104 
Terminology that was sometimes used interchangeably was often interpreted in very 
different ways.  Historian John Kendle asserts that some unionists viewed “devolution” or 
“federalism” as potentially positive, and most employed these terms synonymously.  However, 
“federalism” was inaccurate to describe establishing a system of devolved, subordinate 
parliaments as the Westminster parliament would remain supreme, while federalism denotes 
equality.  Another synonym for devolution was “home rule all round,” but unionists did not like 
this phrase as, to them, it implied the first step in the British Empire’s disintegration.105  Further 
complicating the question of terminology, there was a difference between federalizing the United 
Kingdom and federalizing the Empire.  The former would mean establishing local parliaments 
for England, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland, or any parts of those units as could be agreed upon.  
Each of these units would also send representatives to a supreme parliament at Westminster.  
Federalizing the Empire would involve setting up assemblies in each colony or dominion that did 
not currently possess one, and arranging that all of them send representatives to an Imperial 
Parliament in London.  Some unionists supported a federal Empire, but not a federal UK.106 
Federalism would seem to mitigate the Irish unionist argument that they wanted equal 
treatment with the rest of the United Kingdom.  If the whole country was to be federalized, 
unionists could not claim that their citizenship rights were being diluted.  By contrast, The Times 
insisted, “It would pass the wit of man to contrive Parnellite Home Rule under which progressive 
Ulster and the retrograde South, Orangemen and Catholics, would live in peace.”107  The 
Morning Post suggested that in a federal system there could be a separate parliament for 
Ulster.108  Ian Malcolm wrote in The Times that, if Ireland must be given a “local parliament” at 
all, “the loyal North” must have one as well.109  Again, British unionists implied that, if they 
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agreed with the liberals that the UK should be federalized, Irish unionists would have to accept 
either one or two Irish parliaments, whether they wanted them or not.  William Redmond, John’s 
brother and an Irish nationalist MP, responded to calls for a separate northern parliament with a 
reminder that the province was “at the very least half Nationalist,” adding, “we do not want new 
and fresh divisions in Ireland but one law and free Government for all.”110 
British federalists seemed to gain unexpected allies within the IPP leadership.  During a 
fundraising trip to North America, John Redmond and T. P. O’Connor made several statements 
that were interpreted as supporting federalism or “imperial home rule,” as it was often called in 
Ireland.  Historian Michael Wheatley interprets this as a sincere attempt to broaden nationalist 
minds to make them amenable to “home rule all round.”  According to Wheatley, the effort 
failed because it was at odds with the Irish nationalist rank-and-file’s passionate adherence to 
Parnellite home rule.111  However, most of Redmond’s and O’Connor’s statements employed 
mixed rhetoric that could be interpreted as supporting a range of positions. 
In the October 1910 issue of New York’s McClure’s Magazine, Redmond wrote under 
the title, “What Ireland Wants,” “We do not seek any alteration of the constitution or supremacy 
of the Imperial Parliament.  We ask merely to be permitted to take our place in the ranks of those 
other portions of the British Empire—some twenty-eight in number—which, in their own purely 
local affairs, are governed by free representative institutions of their own.”112  Redmond was 
suggesting federalizing the British Empire, not the United Kingdom.  Moreover, later in the 
article the nationalist leader asserted that “Ireland” wanted the same measure of self-government 
as “Canada, Australia, South Africa, and other portions of the Empire.”  This was consistent with 
what was called “colonial” and would later be called “dominion” home rule, a status within the 
Empire that conveyed more governmental authority than either of Gladstone’s two bills.  
Redmond described the fight for these rights as “practically over,” adding, “all that remains is to 
settle the exact terms on which the Treaty of Peace is to be drawn up.”113 
On October 5, Redmond told London’s Daily Express, “Our demand for Home Rule does 
not mean that we want to break with the British Empire.  We are entirely loyal to the Empire as 
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such, and we desire to strengthen the Imperial bonds through a Federal system of government… 
We do not demand such complete local independence as the British self-governing Colonies 
possess, for we are willing to forego the right to make our own tariff.”  He added, “We are 
strongly in favor of a Federal Empire.”114  Again, the reference to federalism is a federalization of 
the Empire, not of the United Kingdom, as the Daily Express correspondent acknowledged.115  
The references to imperial loyalty are consistent with statements Redmond and other IPP 
members made to assure the British public and politicians that they were not separatists.  The 
line regarding the “self-governing Colonies” is a backtracking from his statements about wanting 
the same rights as dominions, but this too was designed to allay British fears, especially as tariff 
reform was a divisive issue in Britain at the time. 
T. P. O’Connor’s federalist statements were more explicit.  He declared himself in favor 
of federalizing both the Empire and the United Kingdom.  However, when outlining his idea of 
UK federalism he described the parliaments for England, Ireland, Scotland, and Wales as 
“national and local chambers,” indicating a belief that federal home rule could satisfy nationalist 
aspirations.116  In Ottawa, O’Connor declared, “his mission was to secure Canada’s approval of a 
federal scheme of government for the four Kingdoms of the British Isles, such as the provinces 
in Canada enjoy under a central Government.”117  This is similar to a statement Redmond made 
in New York when he described home rule as, “something like you have here, where Federal 
affairs are governed by the Federal Government and State affairs by the State Government.”118  
Both quotations tried to explain home rule by making analogies to local systems of government. 
The IPP’s home rule rhetoric had always been so all-encompassing as to promise all 
things to all people.119  Nationalist leaders promised their Irish followers that self-government 
would mean the overturning of landlordism and the end of English interference in their affairs.  
They assured British audiences that home rule would not be a disruption to their lives or to the 
Empire.  To Americans and Canadians, they insisted that they were only asking for the type of 
government already operating in those countries; a useful formula for conveying that home rule 
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would be beneficial to its citizens and innocuous to others.  It is also likely that Redmond and 
O’Connor knew that there was a groundswell of support in Britain for federalizing the United 
Kingdom.  They may have hoped to pose themselves as willing participants in a federal solution 
in order to maximize concessions to Ireland should the British parties agree to enforce it. 
Whatever their intent, Redmond’s and O’Connor’s statements caused an uproar in 
Ireland, particularly among the nationalist press opposed to their party.120  On October 17, the 
Irish Independent called home rule all round, “an attempt to sidetrack Home Rule for Ireland.  It 
is an effort to save the Liberal Party from being compelled to redeem Mr. Asquith’s Albert Hall 
pledge.”  The paper added, “Gladstone’s Home Rule is the minimum.”121  A letter to the 
Independent called home rule all round, “an insidious, but destructive attack upon the principle 
of Irish Nationality.”122  The writer was correct in assuming that some federalists wanted to deny 
any acknowledgment of Irish nationalism.  John Sweetman of Sinn Féin also wrote that 
accepting a devolved assembly comparable to that of a U.S. state would undermine the idea of 
Irish nationalism, “it would be as absurd, under this system of Federation, to call Ireland a self-
governing nation, as it would be to call Minnesota a self-governing nation.”123 
Redmond’s statements angered nationalists, and gained him little credence with unionists.  
Arthur Walsh of London wrote in The Times, “Unionists will not be deceived by Mr. Redmond’s 
protestations of loyalty to the British Empire; they know very well that ‘national independence’ 
is and always has been that gentleman’s motto.”124  The IPP leader repudiated the Daily Express 
interview, claiming that the reporter had put words in his mouth.125  In a further statement, 
Redmond said home rule all round might be achieved, but Ireland must come first.  He added, 
“the Irish Party and I stand on the question of Home Rule precisely where Parnell stood, and 
have not, and never will, recede one inch from the position he took up.”126 
Irish unionists added their voices to the anti-federalist chorus.  On October 22, 1910, the 
UUC declared, “Any plan of Federation would be fatal to the civil and religious liberties of the 
loyal minority in Ireland, would overwhelm the prosperous commercial and manufacturing 
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portions of that island with ruinous financial burdens, would render further progress in land 
purchase impossible for want of funds, would imperil Imperial defence, and would prove to be 
the first step in the disintegration of the Empire.”127  This statement encapsulates all of the Irish 
unionists’ arguments against any form of home rule, indicating that they saw federalism as 
identical.  A member of the Grand Black Chapter, an Orange organization, wrote, “The scheme 
of Federal Home Rule was simply a kite sent up by the Nationalists to see how the wind was 
blowing.”128  Southern unionist Richard Bagwell wrote that proponents of a separate parliament 
for Ulster forgot “there are plenty of loyalists outside of Ulster,” who would be worse off if the 
northern province had its own legislature.129  Abercorn tried to discard the idea of separating the 
north from the rest of Ireland when he wrote, “If anybody thinks that Ulster can be bought off by 
a separate Legislature for the province, let him abandon the idea.  Ulster will never abandon the 
loyalists of the other provinces, and it will always prove loyal to England.”130 
British unionists also began to speak out against federalism.  The Spectator denounced 
“The breaking up of the United Kingdom under the alias of Federalism,” adding that such a 
solution “will not come to pass unless the people of this country are bent upon their own 
destruction.”131  Despite his previous overture to Redmond, Walter Long declared against 
federalism on October 29.  He wrote, “Home Rule in any form would be a danger to the Empire, 
would imperil the growing prosperity of Ireland, and would involve the most cowardly betrayal 
of a vast number of our fellow-subjects.”132  Hugh Cecil voiced unalterable opposition to a 
federated United Kingdom, though he was not against federalizing the Empire.133 
Balfour privately made it known that he was as opposed to the federal idea as any other 
form of Irish self-government.  He wrote to F. S. Oliver on October 22 that any scheme 
satisfactory to the Irish nationalists would confer a parliament, an executive, and control of the 
police.  There would be no way of controlling Ireland, “short of two Army Corps, or a Naval 
Blockade.”  Alluding to the idea of separating Ulster from the rest of the island, he asked, “Is 
Ireland to form one province or two?  If you prefer the latter, will any Nationalist, of any type, 
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accept this administrative solution?”134  In short, Balfour pointed out that federalizing the United 
Kingdom would involve all of the dangers of Irish home rule, with the added complications of 
setting up local parliaments all over Britain. 
As the Unionist Party leader, Balfour’s rejection of federalism meant that Lloyd George’s 
idea for a coalition government fell by the wayside.  The members of the constitutional 
conference came to tentative agreements that would leave the Lords’ powers largely intact.  The 
conference agreed that legislation would be divided into ordinary and constitutional categories.  
If the Commons and Lords disagreed on constitutional legislation, it would require a referendum 
to pass.  The Unionists wanted home rule classified as constitutional legislation, but the Liberals 
refused, likely due to Asquith’s home rule pledge.  This marked an impasse, and the conference 
broke up.135  The government prepared to move forward with the veto resolutions, which had 
been formulated into the Parliament Bill.  The next steps were to dissolve Parliament and call a 
general election.  Unionists blamed Redmond for the entire crisis, and for forcing a second poll 
in less than a year.  The Daily Telegraph dubbed him the “Dollar Dictator,” and predicted that 
the government would be “deeply damaged” in the polls by their association with him.136  The 
Daily Mail called on “moderate men of all parties” to unite against “the scandal and peril of an 
Irish dictatorship subsidised by the gold of American Fenians.”137 
Unbeknownst to most at the time, after the breakdown of the conference, Asquith met 
with the King on November 16, 1910.  The monarch agreed that, if the government won the 
upcoming election, he would create as many peers as necessary to pass the Parliament Bill.138  
The IPP leadership were among those in the know; T. P. O’Connor learned of the King’s 
promise to Asquith from Alec Murray, the Master of Elibank and chief government whip, on 
December 21.  Thus, the Irish nationalists received the election results secure in the knowledge 
that the government had the power to deprive the Lords of their veto on home rule.  O’Connor 
did not foresee any complications from the northern unionists, as he commented, “Of course we 
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shall have difficulties over the details of the bill—especially with regard to finance; but the Govt 
I believe, will be as reasonable as well as we.”139 
 
Home Rule Resistance, Religion, and Separate Treatment for Ulster 
Unionist electoral rhetoric highlighted the government’s alleged deference to the Irish 
nationalists, whom they portrayed as corrupt and under foreign influence.  Edward Carson said 
on November 17 that the government was “selling this country for American dollars,” adding 
that Irish unionists depended on the Imperial Parliament to protect their “civil and religious 
liberties.”  Carson also announced that the Irish unionist MPs had agreed that he should publicly 
reject calls for the northern province to have its own parliament, “Ulster would never be a party 
to separate treatment.”140  Later that month, Carson warned a Belfast audience that under home 
rule unionists would be a “permanent minority,” unable to influence economic policy and 
without the prospect that elections would change their position.141 
While the Irish unionist leader spoke of maintaining the bonds between Britain and 
Ireland, Balfour appealed more directly to British nationalism.  After denouncing the Irish 
nationalists and home rule he said, “Great Britain shall manage the affairs of Great Britain; and 
that if and when we alter the fabric of our immortal Constitution it shall be of our own free will 
and not at the bidding of those who care nothing for our Constitution and nothing for our 
history.”142  The assumption was that, though Irish nationalists had the right to sit in Parliament, 
they were not to exercise the same powers and in the same ways as their British colleagues. 
On November 28, the UUC announced that they were opening an arms fund to resist 
home rule.  Their announcement read, “we shall feel ourselves justified in resorting to any means 
that may be found necessary to enable us to preserve unimpaired our equal citizenship of the 
United Kingdom.”143  Before the week was out reports indicated that the Council was seeking 
quotes for arms and ammunition.144  Joseph Devlin, Irish nationalist MP for West Belfast, 
dismissed these threats of “revolution” as designed to frighten British voters.145  On Christmas 
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Eve, leading northern unionist James Craig said that “Ulster,” “would not remain loyal if it came 
to tampering with its ancient rights and breaking up the Constitution.”  He added that they would 
soon form unionist clubs across the province, and suggested that young men learn military 
drill.146 
Unionist activists forcefully injected religious rhetoric into the home rule debate during 
the election.  In mid-November 1910, the London-based Protestant Alliance issued a manifesto 
describing the IPP as the “Irish Roman Catholic party,” alleging that they were using Irish-
American money “to cripple, and, if possible, bring disaster upon the British Empire.”  It 
concluded, “The predominating question is, Who is to rule Britain, King or Pope?”147  More than 
2,000 British nonconformists signed a declaration describing Irish self-government as “a menace 
to the rights of Protestant minorities in Ireland.”148  The Anglican Bishop of Durham said it was 
“disquieting” that more nonconformists were not speaking out against “the surrender of the 
Protestant and other loyalists of Ireland to a rule which must be largely Roman and Parnellite.”149  
At a meeting in Scotland, an audience member asked Asquith, “Will you be prepared to permit 
the soldiers of the Crown to shoot down any of the Protestant minority in Ireland if, and when, 
the latter take up arms in defence of their present liberties?”  Asquith refused to answer.  
Interestingly, while the questioner referred to the whole island, The Times placed this exchange 
under the heading “Ulster Protestants,” emphasizing the northern province as the locus of anti-
home rule sentiment, to the exclusion of unionists elsewhere.150 
In the first week of December, a group of Irish Presbyterians appealed to British 
nonconformists to vote against home rule candidates as a means of defending of civil and 
religious liberty.151  On December 15, the Church of Ireland General Synod’s Standing 
Committee announced, “the great body of clergy, as well as the laity, of the Church are as much 
opposed as ever to the introduction of any measure of Home Rule.”152  In the midst of these 
political pronouncements by Protestant religious officials and organizations, The Times asserted 
that the Catholic Church “effectively guides the government of three-fourths of Ireland.”153  The 
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implication was that, while Protestant clergy and laity involving themselves in politics on 
religious grounds was natural, the involvement of Catholic clergy or ideas was inherently 
different, authoritarian, and unwelcome. 
There was pushback against the idea of home rule as a religious issue.  Protestant home 
ruler Pierce O’Mahony protested the Church of Ireland’s statement against self-government.154  A 
correspondent to the Irish Times who signed as “An Irish Protestant” identified himself as a 
unionist but deplored the extreme rhetoric his fellows used against home rule, “this exaggerated 
way of speaking, to say nothing of threats of armed violence, merely makes Irish Protestants and 
Unionists look ridiculous in the eyes of the world.”155 
Stephen Gwynn, a Protestant nationalist MP, wrote that the Bishop of Durham’s letter 
implied that Catholics were incapable of dealing fairly with Protestants, therefore a majority-
Catholic country could not be trusted with self-government.  By contrast, Gwynn insisted, “there 
is no quality upon which the Catholic Irish pride themselves more, or more justly, than upon 
their tolerance.”156  Robert Anderson, a Presbyterian theologian who had been a London police 
official during the Fenian outbreaks, responded that it was not “their Catholic fellow-
countrymen” that Irish Protestants feared, it was their church.  However, he also disparaged 
individual Catholics when he wrote, “an executive dependent on the votes of the ignorant 
electorate in Roman Catholic Ireland would be helplessly in the power of the hierarchy and 
priesthood of that Church.”157  T. W. Russell, a Presbyterian and Unionist-turned-Liberal, argued 
that Irish Protestants feared the societal and economic consequences of self-government.  He 
said, “many Protestants were seriously alarmed lest the whole system should be reversed—lest 
having enjoyed everything for centuries, a new régime might relegate them to the position in 
which the Roman Catholics were so long placed.”  Russell added that such fears were not 
baseless, but Protestant representation in the home rule parliament and bureaucracy would 
adequately safeguard them.158   
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These exchanges show that, from the beginning of the third home rule crisis, British 
Protestants were actively involved in defining the conflict over home rule as a religious one.  At 
the same time, Irish Protestant unionists knew that they depended on British sentiment to defeat 
home rule.  They were equally aware that they could draw on chauvinistic British Protestantism 
and anti-Catholicism to support their defense of the Union.  Even Liberals like Russell agreed 
that legislative safeguards for the Protestant minority were necessary.  Irish nationalist leaders 
consistently agreed to provide them, but the inference that Catholics could not be trusted to treat 
people of minority faiths fairly was an ever-present feature of anti-home rule discourse. 
After the election, Ulster nationalist leader Joseph Devlin quipped that there were more 
Protestants in the IPP than there were British Catholics in the entire House of Commons, 
implying that religious minorities in Ireland were better represented than in any other part of the 
United Kingdom.159  He was correct.  According to John Dillon, after the December 1910 
election there were fourteen Protestants among the seventy-four IPP MPs.160  Combined with the 
nineteen Irish Unionists—all of whom were Protestant—and one AFIL MP, Protestants held 
thirty-four of the 103 Irish seats.  Catholics sat for just eight of the 567 British constituencies at 
Westminster.161  By population, Irish Protestants were over-represented in Parliament.  They 
comprised approximately 25 percent of Ireland’s population but held 33 percent of Irish seats.  
British Catholics were under-represented at more than 5 percent of the population and 1.4 
percent of legislative representatives.162 
Polemical religious rhetoric failed to turn the electorate against the government in 
December 1910.  There were few changes in the prospects of any party, but the alterations 
actually increased Redmond’s influence in British politics.  The Unionists and Liberal Unionists 
held fast at 273 seats.  The Liberals lost four representatives and ended up with 271 in the new 
Parliament.  Labour gained two seats for a total of forty-two.  The IPP seized two constituencies 
to rise to seventy-four, both of them from the Irish unionists, who now held nineteen seats.  
William O’Brien’s AFIL remained at eight successful candidates.  Overall, the poll changed little 
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from the January election.  The only result was that Asquith’s Liberals would be slightly more 
dependent on the IPP and Labour in close votes. 
After the December election, Redmond’s policy was clear: he simply had to hold firm 
and support Asquith in steering the Parliament Bill through the Commons, after which the Prime 
Minister would introduce home rule.  Carson hoped to inject some bellicosity into the Unionist 
Party.  He wrote to Lady Londonderry that he wanted “a policy with principle and a fight for 
everything we believe in.”163  Carson intended to visit Ulster, “to know whether men are 
desperately in earnest and prepared to make great sacrifices.”  Of the government’s policy 
toward the Lords he wrote, “I earnestly hope that all the bitterest hate of the innate savagery of 
the human being will be brought to play on those who are prepared to adopt the role of vandals—
I never felt more savage—I only wish I was younger and stronger for the fight!”164 
Spectator editor John St. Loe Strachey suggested a policy that Carson might adopt.  On 
Christmas Eve he published an article arguing that if the “Home-rule principle” was conceded, 
what he called “North-East Ulster” should agitate for a separate parliament.  He recognized that 
“Ulstermen” did not want this, and had resisted making it a part of their strategy, but argued that 
they should change their minds.  Strachey justified separating some portion of the northern 
province from the rest of the island on racial, religious, and political grounds.  He wrote, “Ireland 
never was a single political unit, nor, again, is Ireland a homogeneous country, or even a country 
in which there is always a local majority of Nationalists and Roman Catholics of the Celtic or 
Iberian race.”  By contrast, “In Belfast and the counties of North-East Ulster the local majority, 
in many cases in overwhelming numbers, are Protestant in religion, Teutonic, or at any rate 
English-speaking, in origin, and anti-Nationalist in politics.”  Strachey acknowledged that 
northern unionists were concerned for the fate of their compatriots elsewhere in Ireland, and 
argued that agitating for self-government “will almost certainly destroy the chances of a Home-
rule Bill being passed,” as, “unless the Dublin Parliament has got the rich city of Belfast and the 
manufacturing districts of the North to tax, it will be bankrupt within six months.”165 
Strachey did not identify a geographic area as “North-East Ulster.”  He included no 
statistics of census or election results to justify his statements regarding the wishes of the people 
                                                 
163 PRONI, Lady Londonderry Papers, D2846/1/1/59, Edward Carson to Lady Londonderry, 23 December 1910. 
164 PRONI, Lady Londonderry Papers, D2846/1/1/60, Edward Carson to Lady Londonderry, 13 January 1911. 





there.  His article was not a search for a solution to the “Ulster problem,” it was a purely political 
appeal.  He encouraged northern unionists to advocate separating themselves from the rest of 
Ireland in order to defeat home rule entirely.  Strachey’s article identifies one of the basic 
problems in grappling with the idea of partition: what unit to use.  If one’s starting-point is 
Ireland, it is obvious from election results that nationalists form a majority there.  Strachey, like 
most unionists, used the United Kingdom as his unit.  Nationalists were a mere “local majority” 
in Ireland, but remained a minority throughout the UK.  If nationalists argued that they were 
entitled to self-government, they could not deny the same treatment to another local majority, 
this time in Ulster.  If one takes this reasoning to its logical conclusion, nationalists in the 
northern province also deserved self-government, or at least a choice as to which government 
they wished to join.  This is likely why Strachey did not specify a geographical area or quote 
statistics, as to do so would acknowledge that there were Catholic and nationalist populations in 
every part of Ulster.  He was more sensitive to this issue than most of his contemporaries, as 
adding the qualifier “North-East” to “Ulster” acknowledges that there were majority-nationalist 
parts of the province.  Most unionist rhetoric concerning Ulster was phrased to portray the entire 
province as Protestant and unionist. 
The Spectator’s appeal drew a number of responses.  The Times and Irish Times printed 
extracts from the article.  An anonymous letter supposedly from a UUC secretary stated that he 
and his colleagues “are in honour bound not to desert their fellow-Unionists of the South and 
West.”  He admitted that Redmond would likely reject a home rule bill excluding Ulster, which 
he called, “the future milch-cow of the Nationalist Parliament.”  The writer added on behalf of 
Irish unionists, “we claim direct representation in the British House of Commons, and, except in 
local matters, to be governed by its direct authority.”166  This claim to direct governance from 
Westminster precluded a parliament for Ulster, or any part of it. 
Samuel M. Miller of Mountstewart, Co. Tyrone, attempted to put a geographic definition 
to Strachey’s proposals, though his letter made clear that he was really searching for 
justifications to exclude all of Ulster from home rule.  He assumed that “North-East Ulster” 
meant the four counties of Antrim, Armagh, Down, and Londonderry.  However, he described 
Fermanagh and Tyrone as “half Unionist” with majority-unionist county councils, and noted that 
                                                 






there were “strong and extremely militant Protestant minorities” in Cavan and Monaghan.  Miller 
had no justification for keeping Donegal out of home rule, except that if it were included it 
would be physically cut off from the rest of the area of nationalist governance.  Strachey 
responded that there should be a poll of each Ulster county gauging whether the population 
wanted to be governed from Dublin or Belfast.  The resulting “geographic chaos” would render 
the home rule project impossible, “You cannot apply the principle of local autonomy fairly and 
safely in Ireland without a reductio ad absurdum.  Therefore you had better leave the Union 
alone.”167 
The most militant response came from Leslie D’Esse of London.  He wrote that though 
he had left the northern province as a boy, he identified as an “Ulsterman.”  His family were 
“Anglo-Normans” involved in the original conquest of Ireland, who had “kept our blood pure 
from Celtic taint; we loathe mixed marriages.”  D’Esse referred to unionists as England’s 
“garrison” who would be “betrayed” by the passage of home rule.  He predicted that if the 
British Army were sent to Ireland to force home rule on the unionists, the soldiers would quickly 
join them in a civil war against the nationalists.  D’Esse wrote, “At the end will be a new 
Ireland—a separate State—purged of the Celt, but hating and despising England more bitterly 
than America did a century ago.”168  This apocalyptic vision likely confirmed Strachey’s belief 
that a movement for separating Ulster from a home rule Ireland would expose too many 
problems for self-government to be enacted. 
By February 1911 Strachey was even more insistent that, if home rule passed, “separate 
treatment” should be accorded to some part of Ulster, whether anyone there wanted it or not.  He 
wrote, “this matter cannot be wholly left to the men in the North.”  English and Scottish 
unionists had a right to advocate separate treatment.  If the government framed a home rule 
measure with ample safeguards for Ulster, the right of unionists there to resist it, and of British 
unionists to support them in doing so, would be diminished.  Strachey defined the area to be 
afforded separate treatment as, “Belfast and that part of north-east Ulster in which there is a 
Protestant majority.”  He still did not say how that area was to be determined.169 
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Carson did not adopt Strachey’s suggested course.  His plan for an energetic offensive 
against home rule consisted of a campaign to win over British opinion.  The thin margins 
between the parties after both 1910 elections may have encouraged him in this strategy.  Carson 
told a UUC meeting in Belfast in January 1911, “He believed in his heart that the English and 
Scotch people hated Home Rule.”  He announced, “Now was the time for action.  There was not 
a moment to be lost in setting about educating the English people on this question.”170  The Irish 
Times later asserted that unionist policy should be to, “bring home to the English people the 
Nationalist Party’s unfitness for self-government.”171  There were prominent potential 
sympathizers in Britain.  London’s Standard asserted, “Ulster knows very well that Home Rule 
means Rome rule, whatever people like Mr. Redmond and T. P. O’Connor may say.”  The paper 
was certain that the Catholic Church would be the determining influence in an Irish state, “From 
the first the priests will ‘boss’ the elections, and they will dictate the policy of the Government.”  
Home rule would face determined resistance from the northern unionists that British people 
should support, “against a Dublin Parliament’s rule it is certain that Ulster would fight, and who 
will say that Ulster would be wrong?”172  Despite such statements, there are no indications that 
the government or the Irish nationalists were taking threats of unionist resistance to home rule 
seriously.  Chief Secretary Augustine Birrell told Wilfrid Blunt in January 1911, “the only real 
difficulty now in Home Rule was the financial one.”173 
There were signs that the anti-home rule movement might take on a more serious 
character than platform rhetoric.  In March 1911, the RIC began investigating press reports of 
Orangemen drilling near Aghadrumsee, Co. Fermanagh.  District Inspector James McMahon 
reported, “there is hardly anything in the case,” and the incident was “got up for bluster and 
bravado in order that it would get into the Press of the United Kingdom to show what determined 
fellows the Orangemen of Aghadrumsee are in opposition to the anticipated Home Rule Bill.”  
He said the rector of the local Protestant church had assembled young men for shooting matches, 
but no drilling took place.174  Nonetheless, the reports continued, and eventually reached Birrell’s 
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desk.  He ordered the RIC to watch such activity, adding, “I am not disposed to treat the ‘armed 
force’ movement as ridiculous.”175 
 
The Parliament Act Passed 
As the Parliament Bill wended its way through Westminster, a rift developed in the 
Unionist Party over the lengths of acceptable resistance to the measure.  Their dilemma was that 
the bill would certainly pass the Commons with Liberal, Labour, and IPP support.  When it 
reached the Unionist-dominated House of Lords, they could accept it and avoid Asquith’s threat 
to advise the King to create peers.  Or, the upper house could reject the bill and gamble that the 
monarch would not consent to create new liberal peers.  Those unionists advocating the latter 
course were called “die-hards” or “ditchers,” after George Wyndham swore that they would “die 
in the last ditch” fighting against the Parliament Bill.176  This faction included Lords Salisbury, 
Selborne, and Hugh Cecil, as well as Carson, Chamberlain, and F. E. Smith; all apparently 
staunch opponents of home rule.  The term “die-hards,” referring to uncompromising Unionists, 
survived long after the Parliament Bill controversy, though the size and personnel of the group to 
which it referred varied.  The problem with their position regarding the House of Lords in 1911 
was that, under the Parliament Bill, the upper house could delay legislation for two years, during 
which time the opposition in the Commons might force a general election.  If the King created 
several hundred new liberal peers, the Lords could pass government-sponsored legislation 
immediately, therefore there was a clear incentive for Unionists to let the bill pass.   
Everyone involved in the debate knew that home rule was the main issue at stake.  
Unionists in the Lords attempted to insert an amendment into the Parliament Bill that would 
exclude any measure to establish “a National Parliament or Assembly or a National Council” in 
any part of the United Kingdom.  In his speech moving the amendment, Lord Lansdowne said 
that the electors had twice rejected home rule, referring to the elections that followed the 1886 
and 1893 bills that resulted in Liberal defeats.  He added that the December 1910 election had 
not given the government a mandate to introduce a measure for Irish self-government, which 
would become a standard unionist argument.177  Writing in The Times, Hugh Cecil warned that 
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creating peers would “destroy the Constitution” and release those opposed to the government 
from any moral obligation to follow any laws passed under such circumstances, paving the way 
for a revolution.178 
In July 1911, the secret that Asquith already had the King’s promise to create enough 
peers to pass the Parliament Bill began to slip out.  Balfour was willing to consent to the King 
creating 150 peers to equalize the parties in the Lords, but it would take between 300 and 400 to 
“swamp” the upper house and enable the government to pass its full slate of legislation without 
effective resistance.  The Unionists did not believe that the King would consent to this.179  On 
July 5, Viscount Esher told Balfour that this was the case.  Foreshadowing the possibility of 
extra-parliamentary resistance to such a change to the character of the Lords, the Unionist leader 
promised to “do his utmost to keep the struggle within the limits of party conflict.”180  Balfour 
called the promise to create peers, given before the election, a “shocking scandal.”181  The Times 
again blamed Redmond, writing that the Prime Minister had “played a contemptible part in 
subservience to an avowedly disloyal faction.”182  When Asquith stood to speak in the Commons 
on July 24, some Unionist MPs interjected, calling him a traitor and asking for Redmond or “the 
Dictator,” indicating that the Irish nationalist leader was the real Prime Minister.183 
When the House of Lords voted on the Parliament Bill, most Unionist members abstained 
and left the chamber in protest.184  The measure passed and became an act without the creation of 
hundreds of liberal peers.  Lucy Masterman called it, “the biggest constitutional Revolution since 
1688.”185  While this is likely true, the Unionist Lords allowing the bill to pass meant that they 
retained the power to delay controversial legislation for two years.  Moreover, partisan feeling 
was extraordinarily high, and the Liberal government was preparing to introduce more 
legislation that would provoke emotional and combative responses.  Many Unionists held that 
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the constitution they had known no longer functioned.  Therefore, they did not have to observe 
the normal course of the law in opposing measures passed under the Parliament Act.186 
Die-hard dissent within the Unionist Party led to Balfour’s deposition from the 
leadership.  He was replaced by Andrew Bonar Law, the son of an Ulster-born Presbyterian 
minister.  Bonar Law was born in New Brunswick, now part of Canada, and raised between there 
and Scotland.  He had few qualities that designated him as a natural Unionist Party leader.  John 
Maynard Keynes described him as, “almost devoid of Conservative principles.  This Presbyterian 
from Canada has no imaginative reverence for the traditions and symbols of the past, no special 
care for vested interests, no attachment whatever to the Upper Classes, the City, the Army, or the 
Church.”187  Bonar Law’s main attraction was that he was not Austen Chamberlain or Walter 
Long, his two rivals for the post.  Their differing policies, characters, and disdain for one another 
were likely to exacerbate tensions within an already fractured party, while Bonar Law was a 
comparatively neutral choice.188  Moreover, his support of Irish unionists gave him added value 
among what was soon to be the most active section of his party.  Bonar Law requested, and 
received, Carson’s blessing before putting his name forward for the leadership.189  Ronald 
McNeill wrote that Balfour’s resignation had been “regarded in Ulster as a calamity,” but the 
new leader soon proved himself to the northern unionists.190 
 
Conclusions 
 Between December 1909 and July 1911, political dynamics in the United Kingdom 
changed fundamentally.   At the beginning of this period, no major British party advocated Irish 
self-government.  Even if a home rule bill passed the Commons, it would be vetoed in the House 
of Lords.  As a constitutional crisis developed over the 1909 budget, Irish nationalist leader John 
Redmond seized the opportunity to extract a commitment on home rule from Asquith’s 
government.  This pledge was hesitant, grudging, and went against the instincts of Asquith and 
several of his Cabinet ministers.  Far from being allies, the IPP and the Liberals were only 
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incidental partners with a mutual interest in reducing the Lords’ power.  Both Liberals and 
Unionists resented Irish nationalists’ influence in United Kingdom politics.  If either of the two 
major attempts at compromise between the British parties—the constitutional conference or 
Lloyd George’s proposal for a coalition government—had been successful, there would have 
been no Parliament Act and no home rule bill.  A compromise might mean federal home rule, but 
only after a delay while a scheme was worked out for the rest of the United Kingdom, and with 
fewer legislative powers than the Irish parliaments envisaged in either of Gladstone’s bills. 
 As it happened, Redmond achieved his major goal of the years 1910 and 1911: a 
reduction of the power of the House of Lords.  In addition, the IPP held the balance of power at 
Westminster.  However, there were residual effects.  Some Unionists maintained that the 
constitution they had known was no longer in force, therefore they were not bound to 
constitutional methods of resistance to measures supported by those who had carried out the 
destruction.  The imminent introduction of home rule legislation mobilized its opponents in 
Ireland, particularly in Ulster.  Threats of civil war were aired in public, and unionists prepared 
to resist Irish self-government both in and out of Parliament.  This prompted suggestions to 
divide Ireland into separate administrative units.  In short, unionists were already searching for 
radical methods for halting further constitutional changes. 
As unionist politics radicalized over the next two years, Redmond’s lack of real British 
allies undermined his position.  Irish nationalists were committed to self-government for all of 
Ireland, an ambition that most Liberals viewed with ambivalence, at best.  Conversely, the threat 
of home rule and the failure of compromise drove British and Irish unionists into a much closer 
alliance than prior to the passage of the Parliament Act.  British unionists who had been prepared 
to sacrifice their Irish counterparts by advocating a federal scheme were not prepared to do so 
faced with a full home rule bill brought by Asquith’s Liberal government.  While it appeared that 
Redmond was complete master of the situation in July 1911, he faced a united opposition 











“PREPARED TO MAKE GREAT SACRIFICES:”  
REACTIONS TO THE HOME RULE BILL, JULY 1911-DECEMBER 1912 
 
Introduction 
The imminent introduction of the Third Home Rule Bill caused Irish unionists and 
nationalists to react in very different ways.  Irish nationalists had high expectations for the new 
legislation.  However, the bill was framed by Asquith’s government to satisfy British party 
concerns rather than Irish nationalist ones.  Unionists insisted that no bill entailing any form of 
home rule could possibly be acceptable, regardless of the safeguards it might contain.  Prior to 
the measure’s introduction, Ulster unionists, under Edward Carson’s leadership, declared that 
they would institute a provisional government for the province—or some part of it—rather than 
submit to home rule.  This implied the administrative separation of this undetermined area from 
the rest of Ireland, though “separate treatment” was not official Unionist Party policy.  The 
announcement that Winston Churchill intended to hold a home rule meeting in Belfast prompted 
the Ulster Unionist Council (UUC) to organize against it.  The stoppage of the meeting seemed 
to show that the northern unionists could control parts of the province, even against United 
Kingdom Cabinet members. 
Historians debate how effectively the Third Home Rule Bill addressed Irish nationalist 
aspirations.  Some assert that Irish nationalists welcomed the measure enthusiastically.1  Others 
claim that the actual stipulations of any home rule bill mattered little; far more important were 
the symbols of nationhood that would accompany the establishment of an Irish parliament.2  
Michael Wheatley points out that there was some pushback against the bill, but argues that 
reactions were “significantly” more positive than negative.3  Alvin Jackson asserts that there was 
“immediate dissatisfaction” with the bill, largely due to its financial provisions.4   
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I argue that many nationalists were dissatisfied with the stipulations of the Third Home 
Rule Bill due to a crisis of expectations between Irish nationalists and the British government.  
Many Irish nationalists expected that self-government would embody the same type of legislative 
concessions that had been granted to British colonies like Australia and Canada, or to the 
recently defeated Boers in South Africa.  The combination of legislative and financial autonomy 
that these regions enjoyed was known as “colonial” and later “dominion” home rule.  This form 
of self-government entailed a recognition of the national status of the area in question, an 
obvious goal of Irish nationalists.  Irish nationalists of all shades expected better financial terms, 
namely fiscal autonomy, the right of the Irish Parliament to collect and distribute all of its own 
revenue without reference to Westminster.  This was a key power in dominion status.  The only 
reason Asquith’s government refused to grant this concession was an imperialistic mindset; a 
desire to control Ireland to as great an extent as possible, even under home rule.  The Third 
Home Rule Bill’s failure to deliver dominion status caused widespread dissatisfaction that was 
only overcome by the resigned realization that they could not get better terms at the present time, 
at least not through constitutional methods. 
The unionist anti-home rule campaign was largely unaffected by the bill’s introduction, 
though it intensified as the implementation of Irish self-government drew nearer.  Suggestions to 
exclude all or part of Ulster from home rule were mainly conceived of as ways to show that Irish 
self-government was impractical, but when Unionist MPs backed an exclusion amendment in the 
House of Commons, this increasingly appeared to be official Party policy.  Some within the 
Cabinet were predisposed to leaving at least part of Ulster out of the bill, thus members of both 
parties seemed to be moving toward this type of settlement.  Riots in the Belfast shipyards 
embarrassed nationalists and unionists alike, but the formation of the Ulster Volunteer Force 
(UVF) was widely interpreted as instilling discipline in the unionist rank-and-file in order to 
prevent such outbreaks. 
Historians often discuss the UVF’s formation in terms of whether or not Carson and the 
other unionist leaders were “bluffing” in their talk of violent resistance to home rule.  To those 
who consider that they had no intention of actually resorting to violence the organization was 
merely a propagandistic charade designed to pressure the government into making concessions.5  
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Observers who interpret the resistance movement as sincere assert that the UVF was the body 
that would implement the anticipated anti-home rule rebellion.6  Patrick Buckland and Alan 
Parkinson argue that the formation of the UVF was largely an attempt by the leadership to take 
control of rank-and-file unionist militancy.7  I assert that this last interpretation has the most 
merit, though the militant unionist movement should not be interpreted as an entirely grassroots 
phenomenon.  Unionist leaders had employed radical rhetoric since the January 1910 election, 
pre-dating the Royal Irish Constabulary’s earliest reports of arms training.  The unionist rifle and 
drill clubs formed between 1911 and 1912 are evidence that the rank-and-file took their leaders’ 
assertions of active resistance at face value.  
 
Ulster Unionists and Mr. Churchill 
By the end of July 1911, the House of Lords had been denuded of its veto power.  This 
deprived Irish unionists of their greatest assurance that the British Parliament would never pass a 
home rule bill, but did nothing to dampen their resistance.  Irish unionist leader Edward Carson 
had already publicly announced that they would resist home rule regardless of what happened to 
the Lords, if there was an attempt to impose it, “without an appeal to the country.”8  The defeat 
over the Parliament Act cost Arthur Balfour the leadership of the Conservative and Unionist 
Party.  In the midst of this turmoil, Carson and James Craig began to prepare to hold an anti-
home rule meeting in Ulster.  Frustrated by his party’s inability to advance their agenda in 
Parliament, Carson was eager to find alternate means of influencing the political situation.  He 
wrote to Craig regarding his visit to the north of Ireland, “What I am very anxious about is to 
satisfy myself that the people over there really mean to resist.  I am not for a mere game of bluff 
& unless men are prepared to make great sacrifices which they clearly understand the talk of 
resistance is no use.”  He warned that they would be hampered by, “many weaklings in our own 
camp who talk loud & mean nothing & will be the first to criticize us when the moment of action 
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comes.”9  Carson expressed similar sentiments to Lady Londonderry, “I will make a big effort—
(my last in politics) to stir up some life over this Home Rule fight…everyone is demoralised and 
weak and still the country is calling out for a strong man.”10 
The Ulster unionists held their demonstration at Craigavon, James Craig’s home in Co. 
Armagh, on September 23, 1911.  The speakers dwelled on a mixture of social and religious 
grievances against home rule.  The most significant outcome of the meeting was that unionist 
leaders clearly espoused the idea of administratively separating Ulster, or some part of it, from 
the rest of Ireland.  Anthony Traill, provost of Trinity College and a Co. Antrim native, sent a 
message that if home rule passed, for their own protection and that of their southern counterparts, 
northern unionists should insist on the establishment of a parliament for Ulster.11  The argument 
that northern unionists outside a home rule parliament could safeguard their southern comrades 
within it became increasingly common over the next several years.  William Moore, MP for 
North Armagh, assured his audience that they would never submit to government by, “an 
intolerant Roman Catholic majority.”  He dared the government to try to enforce home rule, 
declaring, “Against such domination he would always be a rebel, and he believed and trusted that 
every Ulster Protestant would be a rebel too.”12   
Carson called on his audience to defeat, “the most nefarious conspiracy that has ever 
been hatched in Great Britain.”  He warned them that under home rule they would lose all 
influence in the civil service, the police, and education, and hinted at the possible curtailment of 
religious freedoms.  Carson said Ireland was more prosperous than ever, and unionists saw no 
reason to change the status quo, “We ask for no privileges, but we are determined that no one 
shall have privileges over us…we claim the same rights from the same Government as every 
other part of the United Kingdom.”  Above all, Carson stressed that granting home rule would be 
a betrayal of Irish unionists.  According to the Irish Times report of his speech, the words 
“betray” and “betrayal” occur four times in an oration covering just two columns of newsprint.  
In face of such treachery by the British government, Carson asserted that when home rule passed 
they must be prepared to “carry on for ourselves the government of these districts which we can 
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control.”  He added, “We must be prepared…the morning Home Rule passes ourselves to 
become responsible for the government of the Protestant province of Ulster.”  The area would 
then be administered, “either by the Imperial Parliament or by ourselves.”13 
While Traill called unreservedly for the establishment of a parliament for the province of 
Ulster, Carson’s language was far more ambiguous.  His first statement called for unionists to 
govern the districts they could control, not necessarily the entire province.  However, Carson 
also asserted that they should govern, “the Protestant province of Ulster.”  He likely meant the 
Protestant-majority areas, however one might read this as an assertion that the entire province 
was Protestant, therefore unionists should govern the whole of it.  The Irish unionist leader was 
also unclear on what would happen next; whether they would establish their own administration 
or appeal for direct rule from Westminster. 
The Ulster Unionist Council (UUC) moved to address these ambiguities.  Two days after 
the Craigavon meeting, the UUC announced that they would form a provisional government for 
Ulster to come into being on the day home rule passed.  That government would, “remain in 
force until Ulster shall again resume unimpaired her citizenship in the United Kingdom and her 
high position in the great British Empire.”14  Carson said, “Ulster would march from Belfast to 
Cork” to prevent home rule, indicating that they intended to use their resistance to prevent self-
government for all of Ireland.  John Lonsdale, MP for Mid-Armagh, added that they intended to 
ignore a home rule parliament; they would refuse to pay taxes to it, and, “were prepared to take 
even stronger measures.”15 
The Irish Times praised the Craigavon meeting, claiming that the resistance of “Ulster,” 
meaning northern unionists, would make home rule impossible.  However, the paper called 
Traill’s suggestion of a separate parliament, “mischievous and impracticable.”  Unionists 
advocating such a course would turn themselves into, “the most fatal kind of Separatist party,” 
and the editor predicted, “Two Parliaments in Ireland would perpetuate in their worst forms our 
unhappy differences.”16  The nationalist Freeman’s Journal dismissed the idea of Ulster standing 
apart from the rest of Ireland, “no sensible Unionist, indeed, is likely to abandon the position of 
great influence which Belfast and its hinterland will undoubtedly occupy in the Irish Parliament.”  
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The paper’s London correspondent reported that even the unionist press there were “openly 
poking fun at Sir Edward Carson.”17  The liberal Daily News asserted that the Irish unionist 
leader had, ironically, come out in favor of home rule for Ulster.  The paper commented 
caustically, “Orangemen have always meant by Unionism the right of their little clique to govern 
Ireland.  They have always been Home Rulers in that sense, and they want, at any rate, to be 
Ulster Home Rulers in the same sense, whatever happens.”18 
Some southern unionists were disturbed by the talk of an Ulster provisional government.  
In October, S. P. Boyd told a meeting of Dublin unionists, “there seemed to be some danger of 
Ulster seeking Self Government for itself,” which for them would be “a calamity.”19  
Accordingly, there was no mention of an Ulster provisional government when Carson addressed 
a meeting at Dublin’s Rotunda Rink on October 10.  The Irish unionist leader chose his words 
carefully.  He said, “Ulster asked for no separate parliament.  She had never in the long 
controversy taken that selfish course,” adding, “They need fear no action of Ulster which would 
be in the nature of a desertion of any of the Southern provinces.  If Ulster succeeded Home Rule 
was dead.”  Carson insinuated that the vital contribution of southern unionists would be to back 
the actions of those in the north.20  While this emphasized all-Ireland unionism, it also 
highlighted the impotence of southern unionists and implied subservience to their northern 
counterparts.  None of these statements precluded an Ulster provisional government as long as it 
was not a parliament, a fact the Freeman’s Journal noted scornfully.21  Despite Carson’s appeals 
for unity, some southern unionists clearly wanted to differentiate themselves from their northern 
and British counterparts.  While denying that home rule was a religious question in most of 
Ireland, Limerick-born Henry Blake said, “there was a strong sectarian feeling in the north of 
Ireland, and that feeling was found equally in Liverpool and London.”22 
Soon after northern unionists declared their right to control certain portions of Ulster in 
defiance of either a home rule parliament or the imperial government, circumstances gave them 
an opportunity to demonstrate what authority they really could exercise.  In January 1912, the 
Ulster Liberal Association invited Winston Churchill, John Redmond, and Joseph Devlin to 
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speak at a meeting in Belfast on February 8.  Churchill wrote to Redmond that the Belfast 
meeting should include every facet of Ulster society who were not expressly anti-home rule, as it 
was, “the British electorate who are the real audience.”23 
The meeting was to be held in the Ulster Hall, in Belfast’s city center.  This had been the 
scene of many political meetings, much like London’s Albert Hall, including a famous one held 
by Churchill’s father, Randolph, during the first home rule crisis.  While all parties had used the 
venue in the past, in the heightened political atmosphere northern unionists decided that they had 
a special claim to the Ulster Hall.  About a week after the meeting was announced, the UUC 
declared it a “deliberate challenge” to hold a home rule gathering in the “loyal City of Belfast,” 
and that they would take steps to stop it.24  The Irish Times added that the meeting should not be 
held in the Hall as it was in a Protestant unionist area, close to Sandy Row.  If the meeting were 
held in the majority-nationalist Falls Road district there would likely be no opposition.25  Under 
the circumstances, James Craig told a reporter that they were determined to prevent, “a rebel 
crew dishonouring the historic Ulster Hall.”26 
The Freeman’s Journal denounced the UUC’s action as a sign of intolerance and a 
suppression of free speech, “Even before the Home Rule Bill is introduced the Orange mob in 
Belfast is incited to give a taste of its quality to the electors of Great Britain.”27  Surprisingly, The 
Times agreed that trying to prevent the meeting was a denial of free speech, calling the UUC’s 
course “hard to justify.”  However, the paper also blamed the Liberal government for provoking 
the “content and peaceful” northern province, adding that “The Ulstermen” were determined on 
“a system of passive resistance” to defeat home rule.28  On January 19, the Irish Times asserted 
that the UUC’s decision “cannot be justified,” but added that the occasion provided an 
opportunity for “the North” to show that they were serious in their determination to resist home 
rule.29  However, the unionist press changed its tone as they concluded that the Liberals were 
trying to goad their Belfast counterparts into violent opposition in order to embarrass them.  By 
January 23, the Irish Times argued that if Churchill was such a “tragic fool” as to persist in the 
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meeting, the Chief Secretary should proclaim it an unlawful assembly and suppress it.30  This 
would have created an interesting situation, with one Cabinet member declaring illegal a meeting 
at which another Cabinet member was the guest of honor and principal speaker. 
One of the most interesting reactions to the Churchill meeting came from Frederick 
Crawford, a close associate of Carson who had been involved in violent intrigues during the 
previous home rule crises.  He suggested that, to show the seriousness of their resistance while 
preserving the peace, the Unionist Clubs should raise their own “volunteer police force” 
independent of the RIC.31  It was one of the earliest suggestions of an organized paramilitary 
organization controlled by the UUC. 
Richard McGhee, a Protestant nationalist MP representing Mid-Tyrone, reminded Times 
readers that the Ulster Hall had hosted home rule meetings in the past.32  A correspondent to the 
Irish Times noted that Carson had held a unionist demonstration in Dublin’s Rotunda Rink, close 
to the Ancient Order of Hibernians’ headquarters.33  In the midst of the tumult, the Ulster Liberal 
Association issued a statement that their organization was predominantly Protestant, therefore 
the meeting was likely to be as well.34  A member of the association later argued that the UUC 
objected to the demonstration because it would show, “that Ulster Protestantism was not solid or 
even overwhelmingly solid for Ulster Unionism.”35 
The UUC brought the confrontation to a head by renting the Hall for February 6 and 7, 
implying that they would refuse to leave when the Liberals arrived for their meeting the 
following day.36  After consultations between Churchill, the Ulster Liberals, and Liberal 
headquarters in London, they decided to move the meeting to the Celtic Park football grounds on 
Donegall Road, in a predominantly Catholic and nationalist area of west Belfast.  Churchill 
thought that the unionists would be embarrassed when he and his colleagues “ostentatiously” 
agreed to move the meeting.  He wrote to his wife, “The Orange faction will be left to brood 
morosely over their illegal and uncontested possession of the Ulster Hall.  Dirty dogs ‘chained 
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like suffragettes to the railings.’”37  However, the northern unionist press declared victory in the 
affair.  The Belfast News-Letter wrote that Ulster unionists owed Churchill a debt, as he had 
provided an opportunity to show “the people of Great Britain” their determination to resist home 
rule.38  There were no incidents during the meeting, and Churchill even admitted that it was right 
and dignified for Ulster unionists to insist upon their own rights, but warned them against 
becoming, “the tool or the catspaw of the Tory Party in England.”39 
The controversy was indeed a victory for unionists.  They proved that by threatening 
resistance, even to the point of violence, they could alter events they found objectionable.  
Moreover, while the phrase “no-go areas” became famous during the post-1968 Troubles, this 
vetoing of a meeting in the city center and its movement to west Belfast highlighted that there 
were distinct nationalist and unionist districts that might be closed to persons of differing 
political values, even if they held high office in the United Kingdom.  The proximity of these 
nationalist and unionist areas might have shown the impossibility of neatly separating parts of 
Ulster from the rest of the island without creating isolated and disgruntled minorities, but this 
does not seem to have been realized at the time. 
 
Debating the Third Home Rule Bill 
As anti-home rule demonstrations mounted, some liberals seriously considered excluding 
parts of Ireland from the new parliament’s purview.  Unfortunately for proponents of all-Ireland 
self-government, this included members of Asquith’s Cabinet.  In August 1911, Chief Secretary 
Augustine Birrell wrote to Churchill that the northern unionists’ threats should be taken 
seriously, “Ulster has cried ‘Wolf’ so often and so absurdly that one is inclined to ridicule her 
rhomontade, but we are cutting very deep this time and her yells are genuine.”  Birrell outlined a 
plan to allow each county in Ulster to vote themselves out of home rule for five years.  He 
predicted that every county except Antrim and Down would support self-government.40 
Birrell was one of the most vocal supporters of Irish nationalist interests in the Cabinet.  
The fact that he was willing to negotiate away the principle of all-Ireland home rule was a grave 
                                                 
37 Winston Churchill to Clementine Churchill, 24 January 1912, in Randolph S. Churchill, Winston S. Churchill: 
Volume II Companion Part 3, 1384. 
38 Belfast News-Letter, 9 February 1912. 
39 Winston Churchill in Belfast, Freeman’s Journal (Dublin), 9 February 1912. 





indication that Asquith’s government was not committed to this standard.  Birrell cited RIC 
reports of unionist drilling as a cause for concern, adding that the police were divided as to 
whether “Ulster” really meant to fight.41  Publicly, and in Cabinet meetings, Birrell continued to 
oppose any dilution of all-Ireland self-government, but his private admission of misgivings likely 
influenced other members of the government in their subsequent actions. 
On February 6, 1912, Lloyd George formally submitted to the Cabinet a plan for parts of 
Ireland to contract out of home rule.  Charles Hobhouse wrote that the proposal was clearly 
aimed at Ulster, but the option would be open to every county on the island.  He added that the 
idea was not put forward out of knowledge of the northern province, or a desire to mollify people 
there.  Hobhouse wrote that Lloyd George, “had made no inquiry into the real condition or 
intentions of Ulster, and roundly declared such to be useless.”42  Asquith explained the idea to the 
King as a political tactic, to mitigate possible British popular backlash against home rule on the 
Ulster unionists’ behalf.43  The proposal sparked a heated debate.  Churchill supported Lloyd 
George.  Crewe and Loreburn were opposed.  Churchill asked Loreburn, “how far are you 
prepared to go?  Are you ready to plant guns in the streets of Belfast and shoot people down?”  
He replied, “I shall be prepared to do my duty.”  Churchill later called the response pompous.44 
Hobhouse characterized Birrell as against Lloyd George’s proposal.  This was consistent 
with his support of Redmond’s party in the Cabinet, but inconsistent with his letter to Churchill.  
Historian Patricia Jalland intimates that the Chief Secretary may have deliberately given Lloyd 
George and Churchill the idea for county option with his August 1911 letter, allowing him to 
advance the idea while ostensibly remaining the Irish nationalists’ strongest ally in the Cabinet.  
If Redmond and his colleagues learned that the proposal came from Birrell, they would regard it 
as a betrayal and may have even broken with the Liberals.45  Hobhouse states that Asquith was in 
favor of Lloyd George’s proposal, an assertion that contradicts the Prime Minister’s account of 
the meeting.  Jalland asserts that Asquith likely vacillated from one side to the other, as he was 
prone to doing in Cabinet meetings.46  Ultimately, the Prime Minister supported an alternative 
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proposal put forward by Crewe that they frame the home rule bill for all of Ireland, but make 
clear that the government was free to grant separate treatment to Ulster later, if they saw fit or if 
British opinion pressured them to do so.47 
Historians debate whether the first incarnation of the bill should have included explicit 
safeguards for northern unionists.  Jackson and Jalland argue that this would have disarmed the 
Ulster unionist resistance and divided them from many of their British sympathizers.48  However, 
some British unionists were using their Irish counterparts to undermine the Parliament Act and 
force a general election.  These goals would not have been accomplished by an offer of separate 
treatment in April 1912.  In any case, resistance to home rule was only partially based on 
practical, material concerns.  Irish unionists’ arguments relied far more on emotional appeals to 
British Empire patriotism and fear of Catholic government than apprehensions like over-taxation.  
These sentimental pleas would have resonated with sections of the British public even if 
extensive safeguards were offered from the outset.  As Nicholas Mansergh argues, it is unlikely 
that the Unionists would have accepted initial concessions as sufficient to end their resistance to 
home rule.49  Finally, by proposing home rule for all Ireland, but making clear that they would 
entertain suggestions for separate treatment for some portion of the unionist population, Asquith 
and his Cabinet were following Gladstone’s lead, as they were prone to doing on issues related to 
Irish self-government.50 
The Cabinet debate concerning exclusion took place in the context of drafting the home 
rule bill.  Asquith had formed a Cabinet committee to frame the measure in January 1911.  Its 
members coquetted with a federal scheme, pushed by Churchill and Lloyd George.  They 
ultimately devised a bill based on Gladstone’s 1893 measure.  Despite the bill’s importance for 
Ireland and their supposed partnership with the Liberal government, Irish nationalists had little 
say in its development.  As late as December 1911 the Cabinet even refused to allow the IPP to 
see a copy.51  Irish nationalist leaders were drawn into the process later that month through 
correspondence with Birrell and meetings with the Cabinet, which the Freeman’s Journal 
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happily reported in order to inflate the idea that the IPP were influencing the drafting process.52  
The nationalists also exchanged memoranda arguing points that they wanted included in the 
measure, but this was the extent of government by Irish ideas.53 
While Asquith’s government drafted the bill mainly with British political concerns in 
mind, the IPP had to ensure that the Irish nationalist public would support the legislation.  The 
Party dominated Irish parliamentary politics, but there was competition for nationalist opinion.  
The IPP’s primary domestic opponent was the All-for-Ireland League (AFIL), led by land 
agitator and former Party member William O’Brien.  He broke with the IPP on several 
occasions, the final one in 1909.  The IPP denounced the AFIL as “factionists,” reflecting the 
drive for unity within Irish nationalism.54  O’Brien supported home rule, but wanted it to come as 
a result of “conciliation” and “consent” among Irish unionists, rather than the coercive vote of a 
parliamentary majority.  In other words, self-government should only come if those pledged to 
oppose it changed their minds.  Historians usually portray the AFIL as a loose coalition of anti-
IPP nationalists, rather than an ideologically united opposition pursuing a focused program.55 
Another nationalist political movement at this time was Sinn Féin.  Formally, this group 
was committed to Arthur Griffith’s ideas of economic self-sufficiency and a dual monarchy for 
Britain and Ireland.  This would entail the reestablishment of the Kingdom of Ireland governed 
by a King, Lords, and Commons, reasserting the legislative autonomy that “Grattan’s 
Parliament” had wrung from Britain in 1782.  Sinn Féin called on Irish MPs to abstain from 
Westminster, or refuse to take their seats, and to establish an alternate assembly in Dublin.  The 
movement attracted support from “advanced” nationalists, those who felt that home rule would 
not satisfy Ireland’s national aspirations.  This sometimes included separatists and republicans, 
who wanted to establish an independent Irish state outside of the British Empire.  Sinn Féin had 
some successes in local government elections, and was credited with orchestrating much of the 
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nationalist agitation that defeated the Council Bill.56  However, the group mounted only one 
parliamentary campaign, a 1906 by-election in North Leitrim that resulted in an IPP victory.57 
The most successful non-IPP element of Irish nationalism was the Irish Independent 
newspaper, owned by Dublin industrialist William Martin Murphy.  Unlike most publications in 
this period, it was not the organ of any party or political ideology.  The Independent delighted in 
criticizing the IPP, causing the Party’s own Freeman’s Journal to brand it a “factionist” paper.58  
Despite the Freeman’s official status, its daily circulation stagnated at approximately 30 to 35 
thousand copies, while by 1914 the Independent routinely sold 90 to 100 thousand papers.59  
Though electorally dominant within nationalism, the IPP had potential critics on public platforms 
and in the press, and struggled to ensure that Irish legislation could garner enough support to be 
portrayed as the demand of “the nation” or “the people.” 
The Irish press and public speculated as to what they might expect from a new measure 
for self-government.  In 1911, Erskine Childers published The Framework of Home Rule 
advocating colonial status for Ireland.60  Childers, a former British Army officer and author of 
the famous spy novel, The Riddle of the Sands (1903), had been born in London but raised in Co. 
Wicklow.  In addition to full legislative and fiscal autonomy, the status he advocated implied 
control of police and armed forces.  This status was accorded to Australia, Canada, and South 
Africa, and was widely regarded as a recognition of separate nationhood and virtual 
independence, including the right to secede from the British Empire. 
In a 1911 examination of Gladstone’s 1893 bill, Cork lawyer John J. Horgan assured his 
readers that that measure would have granted an Irish parliament the same rights as those of 
Canada and South Africa.  He called the bill’s provisions against establishing any religion, 
“somewhat ridiculous, and to some extent offensive…as no Irish Catholic has the slightest 
ambition to enact such laws.”  However, “the raving of the Orange bigots has created such a 
condition of mind even amongst singularly clear-headed and logical Englishmen that we must 
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accept these restrictions as a necessary part of any Home Rule Bill.”61  Meanwhile, the Spectator 
asserted that “Very few Catholics” would support a bill that did not include the right to establish 
a state religion, despite the absence of this power from previous home rule legislation.62 
The Irish Independent took up the demands for colonial home rule and fiscal autonomy 
with gusto.63  This type of settlement seemed attainable.  In November 1910, Cabinet member 
Richard Haldane cited Australia, Canada, and South Africa as precedents for the Irish people’s 
“proper control over their local affairs.”64  Pierce O’Mahony wrote in the Freeman’s Journal, 
“Home Rule must be in the nature of a great Treaty of Peace.  It must be acceptable to the British 
democracy as well as the Irish.”  He added that some points might require negotiation, and the 
only people qualified to carry out such discussions were their elected representatives, the IPP.65 
Some supporters of Irish self-government tried to temper expectations.  Joseph Maguire, 
a Clontarf barrister, argued that both financial independence and colonial home rule were outside 
the realm of practical politics.  He blamed Childers for raising the idea of fiscal autonomy, 
calling it, “separatist finance.”66  J. M. Robertson, MP for Tyneside and an official with the 
Board of Trade, rejected the idea of granting financial freedom and colonial home rule to Ireland.  
He said, “Fiscal autonomy would mean the disintegration of the Kingdom…The English Home 
Rulers could no longer say that Home Rule did not mean separation.”  He considered the Ulster 
problem secondary to finance, but suggested, “they might make a separate canton out of Ulster.”  
Robertson then laid out a plan for what was sometimes called, “home rule within home rule,” or 
the granting of a separate parliament or assembly for the northern province subordinate to the 
Irish Parliament, rather than to Westminster.  He added that it was possible that the Ulster 
unionists would reject separate treatment due to the presence of Protestants elsewhere.  In that 
case, they could proceed with an all-Ireland home rule bill.67  While Robertson, like many of his 
contemporaries, was sensitive to the point that treating Ulster separately would leave many 
Protestants under a majority-nationalist authority, he ignored the fact that many northern 
nationalists would be left under predominantly unionist governance. 
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As the introduction of the home rule bill approached, Irish nationalists and unionists held 
mass demonstrations to show their popular strength.  On March 31, 1912, an estimated 100 to 
150 thousand people thronged Dublin’s city center to hear speakers herald the approach of self-
government.68  Redmond called the forthcoming home rule bill, “a great treaty of peace between 
Ireland and England and the Empire.”  Several speakers referred to the Ulster unionists, 
indulging in plenty of the derision that one might expect political opponents to heap upon one 
another.  John Dillon said that there were “emissaries of Ulster” touring Britain, “going about 
from house to house whispering these lies into the ears of the English people.”  However, there 
were more generous assessments.  Dublin MP J. P. Nannetti said, “There were good men 
amongst the Orangemen of Ireland, and good men amongst the Protestants of Ireland—patriots 
as ardent as any of them,” adding that the IPP wanted them to take their place in the “Councils of 
the Nation.”  William Redmond illuminated one of the IPP’s assumptions when he said of 
unionists, “just as their opposition to emancipation and to disestablishment passed away, so their 
opposition to Home Rule will pass away.”69  This was the party’s initial reaction to anti-home 
rule agitation, particularly in the north: they had heard similar threats before, and once the bill 
had been passed and enacted, resistance to it would dissipate. 
Not to be outdone, the unionists claimed an attendance of between 200 and 250 thousand 
at a demonstration at Balmoral, in south Belfast, on April 9.  One of the main features of the 
gathering was that everyone present swore to resist home rule under any circumstances.  Prior to 
the speeches, the Church of Ireland Primate John Crozier prayed, “Deliver us, we pray Thee, 
from those great and imminent dangers by which we are now encompassed.  And continue to 
protect Thy true religion against the designs of those who seek to overthrow it.”  The speeches 
were mainly recapitulations of the horrors unionists could expect under home rule.  Viscount 
Templetown assured his audience, “Home Rule would mean Rome Rule, and their severance 
from the Empire.”  James H. Campbell told them that as a result of nationalist land agitation, 
“that day in many parts of Ireland a reign of terrorism prevailed, paralysing law and order, and 
men and women were falling victims to the assassin in Clare and Galway, and the victims of the 
armed moonlighter could be counted by hundreds.”  Home rule meant, “the surrender of the 
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loyal minority in that country to the implacable and inveterate enemies of England and her 
Empire.”  Earl Erne dismissed the idea of legislation protections being built into the home rule 
bill by retorting, “Unionists did not care a fig for their safeguards.”70 
Unionist Party leader Andrew Bonar Law provided the highlight of the day.  He attacked 
what he considered the basis of the nationalist claim to a separate political structure when he 
said, “Men do not constitute a nation because they happen to live in the same island.  Ireland is 
not, and never has been, a nation.  There are two peoples in Ireland, separated from each other by 
a gulf of religion, of race, and, above all, of prejudice, far deeper than that which separates 
Ireland as a whole from the United Kingdom.”  It was common for unionists to deny that Ireland 
was a nation, and to ignore the existence of Protestant nationalists.  However, Bonar Law’s 
reference to “prejudice” as the greatest bar to a common Irish identity indicates a belief in strict, 
insurmountable cultural determinism.  The Unionist leader asserted that most British people were 
against home rule, but they had to overcome a tyrannical government to express it.  He conjured 
images of the 1688-1689 siege of Derry and the “breaking of the boom” that saved the town.  
Bonar Law declared, “You must trust to yourselves.  Once again you hold the pass for the 
Empire.  You are a besieged city.”  He added, “The Government by their Parliament Act have 
erected a boom against you, a boom to cut you off from the help of the British people.  You will 
burst that boom.  The help will come.”71  Interestingly, Bonar Law told the Ulster unionists both 
to rely on themselves, and that they could trust to British aid.  Whatever his exact meaning, the 
idea that they must resist the Liberal government was clear. 
The Irish Times correspondent at the Balmoral demonstration declared it, “no mere 
political performance.  It was the solemn registering of a people’s will.”  By contrast, the 
introduction of the home rule bill, “will appear as a cynical farce with every grain of reality taken 
from it.  The reality is here in the North.”72 
Asquith introduced the Third Home Rule Bill in Parliament on April 11, 1912.  Officially 
titled the Government of Ireland Bill, it provided for an Irish Parliament and an executive 
responsible to it.  The legislature would consist of a 164-member elected Commons and a forty-
member Senate nominated by the Lord Lieutenant.  Forty-two Irish MPs would continue to sit at 
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Westminster.  The Lord Lieutenant would lead the executive; both he and Westminster could 
veto any bill passed by the Dublin legislature.  The Irish Parliament could not pass bills relating 
to the position of the Crown, raise an army, or make international treaties or trade agreements.  
There were some “reserved services,” meaning powers that would pass to the Dublin legislature 
at some point but that were initially remained with Westminster, the most important being 
control of the police, collecting taxes, and regulating land purchase.  The Irish Parliament was 
debarred from establishing any religion, passing any law that would give legal advantage or 
disadvantage based on religious belief, or refuse to recognize marriage on religious grounds.  
The financial aspects of the bill were complex.  They were designed to balance Irish domestic 
and imperial priorities, as well as to gradually turn the Irish budget deficit into a surplus.  The 
bill did not grant fiscal autonomy, nor give any indication that it might follow in the future.73 
To see a home rule bill introduced at Westminster, knowing that he had the votes to pass 
it, was the crowning moment of Redmond’s political career.  However, while the vague cry of 
“home rule” had been Irish nationalists’ constitutional goal for decades, not all among the rank-
and-file were prepared to accept any legislation under this title.  Reactions among the nationalist 
populace were mixed, ranging from enthusiasm to resigned disappointment.  The Irish 
Independent highlighted the fact that the bill delivered neither legislative nor fiscal autonomy.  
The paper’s editors pledged to await the verdict of their fellow nationalists before passing 
judgement, and said resignedly, “we think the Bill is not one to enthuse over, but the people have 
no alternative but to accept it.”74 
In an attempt to control public reaction, the Freeman’s Journal published every message 
of support they received or could elicit.75  Ironically, these missives sometimes contained 
criticisms, particularly of the bill’s financial clauses.  While a message from Clonmel said the 
legislation, “meets the National demand,” another from Listowel called it merely, “an honest 
attempt at conciliation, with necessity for material amendments.”  D. J. Riley, a member of the 
                                                 
73 For summaries of the Third Home Rule Bill’s powers and restrictions see Finnan, John Redmond and Irish Unity, 
34-35; Meleady, John Redmond: The National Leader, 212-213. The text of the bill is in John Redmond, The Home 
Rule Bill (London: Cassel, 1912). 
74 Irish Independent (Dublin), 13 April 1912. 
75 The paper published these messages for the next several months, but many examples can be found in Freeman’s 





Trim Urban Council, called the home rule bill, “a good one, perhaps as good as we could hope to 
get,” before criticizing the nominated Senate and lack of Customs control.76 
In light of Ulster unionist allegations that religious discrimination would be endemic 
under a home rule government, nationalist papers were particularly eager to print Protestant 
praise of the bill.  Most Protestant home rulers hailed the religious safeguards, and argued for an 
enlargement of the Irish Parliament’s powers.  Arthur N. Wrightson wrote that the legislature 
should control Irish customs duties.  Thomas Henry Webb called it simply, “As good a Bill as 
could have been expected from the present Ministry.”  Waterford Quaker T. Harvey Jacob was 
even less positive when he telegraphed, “Bill absurdly inadequate considered as proposal for 
final settlement.  But might possibly be useful as step towards real Self-Government.”77 
On April 13, Sinn Féin declared that they rejected both the principle of home rule and the 
measure itself.  Their resolution stated, “as the object of Sinn Fein is the independence of 
Ireland, we refuse to accept a final settlement of the dispute between Ireland and Great Britain 
any arrangement which leaves a single vestige of British rule in Ireland.  For this reason we 
decline to regard as liberty the arrangement which has come to be known as Home Rule.”  
Moreover, Sinn Féin considered that Asquith’s bill, “falls short of being a complete measure of 
Home Rule.”78 
The IPP quickly gained control of the discourse surrounding the bill.  Resolutions 
praising the measure came in from local councils and boards of guardians all over Ireland, most 
of them filled with Party supporters.  Redmond received congratulations from every corner of the 
British Empire and the United States.  One came from Edward O’Meagher Condon, one of the 
Fenians who had inspired nationalists by shouting “God Save Ireland” during their 1867 trial at 
Manchester.79  Galway Urban Councilor H. M. A. Murphy asserted, “What Redmond is prepared 
to accept is good enough for the people of Ireland.”80  Thus, regardless of the measure’s details, 
some were prepared to support the Third Home Rule Bill based on the idea that, “What’s good 
enough for Redmond is good enough for me.”  The UIL’s Limerick City Branch called the bill, 
“a generous offer of settlement of our national claim to independence.”81  This message from an 
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IPP organization is interesting for its similarity to Sinn Féin’s denunciation of the bill.  Both the 
Limerick UIL and Sinn Féin expressed Irish nationalists’ demand as one for “independence.”  
While the UIL considered that the bill met this demand, Sinn Féin maintained that no home rule 
measure, especially not this one, could do so.  Therefore, even Irish nationalists who agreed on 
their ultimate goal could disagree as to what that constituted or how it might be accomplished. 
The Freeman’s Journal pointed out that even the bill’s critics recommended its passage.82  
This ignores the rejection of small nationalist groups like Sinn Féin, but even the dissentient Irish 
Independent admitted, “Viewing the Bill from a broad standpoint, the country is, apparently, 
disposed to accept it, though there are, it is evident, a great many who had expected a better 
Bill.”83  The Freeman’s Journal solicited an article from National University professor C. H. 
Oldham stating that the bill’s financial and constitutional aspects were no different from 
arrangements made under colonial home rule.84  Nationalist MP J. J. Clancy noted that even 
during Grattan’s Parliament there had been no Irish executive responsible to that parliament, thus 
the measure marked an advancement in this regard.85  Sinn Féin leader Arthur Griffith also 
idealized Grattan’s Parliament, again showing that even while opposing one another Irish 
nationalists employed the same vocabulary.  Clancy concluded ominously of the bill, “attempts 
to belittle it, to decry it, to depreciate it, ought not to be made by anyone who is not prepared to 
enforce a better settlement by force of arms.”86 
This was an acknowledgment of the realpolitik of the situation, and an allusion to the 
IPP’s limitations.  Despite holding the balance of power at Westminster, Irish representatives had 
to accept legislation framed by their British counterparts.  While that legislation might take Irish 
aspirations into account, they would always be limited by British public opinion and party 
politics.  Despite jibes at Redmond as the “dollar dictator,” supposedly bending Asquith’s 
government to his will, the IPP’s options after the bill’s introduction were limited.  They could 
oppose it, and even turn out Asquith’s government.  This would leave the Unionists to form a 
government, likely killing home rule or ensuring its envelopment within a federal scheme that 
might take years to unfold.  The IPP were not prepared to turn against a sitting government 
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pledged—however reluctantly—to home rule, and had to accept whatever bill they produced.  
The Irish Independent was correct in asserting that the people had no choice but to accept the 
bill, and their representatives at Westminster could do little more. 
In fact, the nationalists had been unable to use a significant piece of leverage to influence 
the framing of the bill’s most contentious clauses: finance.  In 1911, Asquith’s government set 
up a commission to explore the economics of home rule.  Chaired by retired Treasury official 
Henry Primrose, the committee reported that the most beneficial arrangement would be to grant 
Ireland full fiscal autonomy.87  Birrell sent a copy of the commission’s report to Redmond in 
October 1911, with a note that the government did not intend to carry it out due to “political 
considerations.”88  Denis Kelly, Catholic Bishop of Ross and the Irish expert on the Primrose 
committee, believed that the only reason for the government to withhold fiscal autonomy was an 
imperialist mindset.  He wrote, “Like Pharaoh of old they will not let the Hebrews go,” and, 
“Ireland is growing richer.  They want to share in our taxes for all their British schemes, which 
can do us only harm.”89 
On April 20, 1912, the press published the commission’s full report.90  This confirmation 
that the government had ignored its own committee’s recommendations to restrict the Irish 
legislature’s powers seemed to validate protests against the bill’s financial scheme.  The same 
day, the Irish County Councils General Council, a standing committee representing the local 
governments on the island, publicly criticized the financial clauses in harsh terms, while still 
recommending acceptance.91 
Redmond called a convention of Irish nationalists to consider the home rule bill for April 
23.  This was a tense moment for the IPP leadership.92  A similar gathering of Party supporters 
had rejected the 1907 Irish Council Bill, and Asquith’s home rule terms were causing significant 
discontent.  However, the 8,700 delegates, primarily from pro-IPP organizations, signaled their 
approval by acclamation.93  The Freeman’s Journal called the verdict, “the solemn ratification of 
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Ireland to the peace offering of the British people.”94  Support for the bill was widespread enough 
that it moved forward, but was largely based on Irish nationalists’ recognition of the fact that it 
was the best they could expect, not genuine enthusiasm for its terms. 
 
Unionist Arguments against Home Rule 
While the IPP reasserted its authority within nationalism, unionist arguments against 
home rule were not affected by the bill’s introduction.  Some of the opinions that the IPP 
marshalled in favor of the measure were echoed by unionists attacking it.  Belfast businessman 
Thomas Sinclair argued that the existence of an Irish executive would mean that the Imperial 
Parliament would have no more control over its Irish counterpart than it had of the Canadian 
legislature.  He added that the unionists would only be able to secure thirty to thirty-two votes in 
the Irish Commons, leaving them helpless in a house of 164.  As the province of Ulster was 
allotted fifty-nine seats, this was an admission that the population there was approximately half-
nationalist.  Moreover, it gives the impression that unionists might be willing to work home rule 
if they were guaranteed more votes.  Ironically, Sinclair was describing the nationalist quandary 
at Westminster, as for decades they had held around eighty seats in a house of nearly 700.  
Godfrey Fetherstonhaugh, MP for North Fermanagh, even suggested that “Ulster,” meaning his 
fellow northern unionists, might be persuaded to cooperate in self-government, but only for “a 
real Home Rule Bill such as Canada has” not “a silly Bill like that now before Parliament.”95  
This statement might have been meant simply to embarrass the nationalists, as most Irish 
unionists asserted that they would oppose home rule under any circumstances. 
The general terms of the arguments against home rule had already been set at Craigavon, 
Balmoral, and numerous meetings before and between these major demonstrations.  British and 
Irish unionists elaborated their opinions in a book timed to coincide with the introduction of the 
home rule bill.96  Against Home Rule: The Case for the Union was a collaborative effort between 
British, Ulster, and southern unionists. 
The task of explaining the mindset and demands of Ulster unionists was delegated to 
Thomas Sinclair.  He began by asserting that the term, “Ulster” should only apply to areas of the 
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northern province in which unionists were the majority.97  Sinclair never mentioned the existence 
of a nationalist population in Ulster, and the fact that they were an actual demographic majority 
in some of the areas he claimed as primarily unionist was seemingly of no consequence.  He 
wrote that Ulster unionists considered themselves a colonial remnant in Ireland.  The English and 
Scottish peoples owed them some consideration in constitutional issues as, “We are in Ireland as 
their trustees, having had committed to us, through their and our forefathers, the development of 
the material resources of Ulster, the preservation of its loyalty, and the discharge of its share of 
Imperial obligations.”98  He wrote that Ulster unionists wanted to remain united with the rest of 
the island under the Act of Union.  However, if home rule were passed, “contrary to Ulster’s 
earnest and patriotic pleading,” “she” desired to remain under Westminster’s direct rule.  If this 
demand were refused, a provisional government was the only recourse.99 
Lawyer and historian Richard Bagwell spelled out the case for the Union from the 
southern viewpoint.  Many of his subjects, often called the unionists of the “South and West,” 
were landowners who split their time between Ireland and Britain.  For some of them, their Irish 
lands were one of a number of their interests throughout the United Kingdom and they did not 
spend much time on the island.  Though southern unionists were often identified exclusively as 
landowners, many were merchants.  The middle- and working-class population of south Dublin 
sometimes returned a unionist to Parliament.  After 1885, this was the only unionist constituency 
outside of Ulster or Trinity College.  Lord Oranmore and Browne of Co. Mayo estimated that 
there were 270,000 southern unionists, but they were so scattered that their electoral strength was 
negligible in most areas.100  George O’Callaghan-Westropp told a unionist meeting in Ennis, “the 
votes of all the Protestants in Clare would not return even a single District Councillor.”101  
Southern unionists like Carson and Campbell, who identified themselves closely with the 
northern resistance movement, were sometimes frustrated at what they considered lack of action 
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by their counterparts outside of Ulster.102  However, the outlook and goals of the two sections of 
Irish unionism were largely aligned in early 1912. 
Bagwell indicated that while religion was an identifiable dividing line, unionists feared 
political persecution, and they depended on their status within the United Kingdom to prevent 
this.  He wrote, “Protestant ascendency, though used as a catchword, is a thing long past.  Roman 
Catholic ascendency would be a very real thing under Home Rule. The supremacy of the 
Imperial Parliament alone makes both the one and the other impossible.”103  A particular fear was 
exclusion from the bureaucracy and local government offices.104  Bagwell argued that 
safeguarding the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament was impossible.  He wrote, “A 
Parliament is by nature supreme within its sphere of action, and its constant effort would be to 
enlarge that field,” and, “Nothing will conciliate the revolutionary faction in Ireland, and there is 
every reason to think that it would become the strongest.”105  Like Sinclair, Bagwell insinuated 
that Irish unionists were fulfilling a colonial mission in Ireland.  He wrote that southern unionists 
“exercised a great civilizing influence” on those around them.106  Also like Ulster unionists, the 
case he presented was for maintaining the status quo; any change would, according to Bagwell, 
result in Ireland’s separation from the UK and political persecution of minorities. 
Many Protestant clergy openly identified with resistance to home rule.  On April 16, the 
Church of Ireland General Synod passed a resolution denouncing, “any measure that could 
endanger the Legislative Union between Great Britain and Ireland,” and appealing to British 
unionists to prevent their Irish “brethren” being, “thrust out from their inheritance and common 
citizenship.”107  In moving the resolution, Bishop Charles D’Arcy said that being a patriotic 
Irishman was compatible with loyalty to the Empire.  However, there were clear distinctions 
between the two segments of the island’s population, “In the one section they found a brooding 
hatred of England, in the other a devoted affection for all the ideals for which England stands.  
As Irish Nationalists were the most disloyal of all British subjects, so Irish Loyalists were the 
most loyal, the most loving, the most devoted.”  George Chadwick, Bishop of Derry and Raphoe, 
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defined his objections to self-government as expressly religious.  He declared that he had 
“studied Romanism and therefore he was certain they would be persecuted…Rome had never 
failed to persecute when she has the power.”108 
There were a number of protests against the Church of Ireland taking an official stance on 
a political question like home rule.  E. P. Culverwell of Trinity College argued that as Protestants 
had denounced the “priest in politics” as early as 1893, the synod proceedings made them 
hypocrites.  He asked, “if not the Church of Rome, why the Church of Ireland?”109  Walter 
MacMurrough Kavanagh, a former nationalist MP for the Ulster constituency of Carlow, 
expressed similar sentiments during the synod.  The Irish Times defended the Church’s stance by 
arguing that home rule was outside the realm of normal politics.  The paper estimated that 
ninety-nine percent of Protestants were unionists, dismissing home rulers in their ranks as “a 
minute minority.”110 
Clergyman J. O. Hannay, better known as the writer George A. Birmingham, opposed the 
synod resolution, adding that he was a home ruler, but Asquith’s bill was not a good one.  
William Hutcheson Poe argued that the resolution might accurately represent the feelings of 
Ulster unionists, but southern Protestants lived on the best of terms with their Catholic neighbors, 
and, “having no fears of any possible encroachments on their religious liberties are strongly 
opposed to their Church being identified with any resolution of an offensive nature against the 
members of another persuasion.”  He added that he believed the power of the Catholic Church in 
Ireland was diminishing, and would continue to do so under self-government.111 
Despite this debate, the Irish Protestant churches tended toward a unionist stance, 
whether formal or informal.  The same dynamic worked within the Catholic clergy in favor of 
nationalism.  Sometimes this was directed against the unionists.  Thomas Cummins, a parish 
priest in Roscommon, praised the Home Rule Bill as a “Treaty of Peace.”  The only thing 
standing in its way was, “that Orange crowd in a corner of the North of Ireland moved with 
unreasoning hate to [sic] their Catholic fellow countrymen.”112  W. Lillis, the parish priest of 
Ballindangan, Co. Cork, wrote that unionists had no arguments against home rule, simply the, 
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“abuse and insult and threats of hypothetical blackguardism of a few thousand irreconcilable 
bigots from a remote corner of the black North.”113  While unionists themselves often reduced 
their movement to a small part of the island, belittling rather than engaging with their arguments 
against home rule only furthered misunderstanding. 
Movements to accord separate treatment to some portion of Ulster intensified after the 
Third Home Rule Bill’s introduction.  In Parliament on April 11, 1912, Carson raised the same 
point John St. Loe Strachey had discussed in the Spectator.  The Irish unionist leader asked, 
“what argument is there that you can raise for giving Home Rule to Ireland that you do not 
equally raise for giving Home Rule to that Protestant minority in the north-east province?”  
Redmond responded, “Is that his proposal? Is that his demand?,” to which Carson interjected, 
“Will you agree to it?”114  Stephen Gwynn later wrote that Redmond was embarrassed and 
confused at the reply.115  Carson had said numerous times that northern unionists would not 
demand separate treatment, primarily out of common cause with their counterparts in other parts 
of Ireland.  Now, he implied that if the nationalist leader consented to separate Ulster from the 
rest of Ireland, he and his supporters would agree. 
The idea of dividing Ireland soon moved out of the realm of conjecture and into 
Parliament.  On May 11, the Freeman’s Journal reported that an amendment to the Home Rule 
Bill had been tabled that would exclude four counties from the new legislature’s control: Antrim, 
Armagh, Down, and Londonderry.116  Unionists had sponsored most of the modifications.  
However, the exclusion amendment came from Liberal Thomas Agar-Robartes.  Introducing the 
amendment on June 11, he said he was eager to see home rule pass, and his exclusion scheme 
was designed to remove the major obstacle to it.  To justify dividing the island, Agar-Robartes 
said, “I think everyone will admit that Ireland consists of two nations different in sentiment, 
character, history, and religion.”117  Though he claimed to be a home ruler, Agar-Robartes was a 
liberal imperialist and had opposed Irish self-government during the 1906 election campaign.118  
                                                 
113 W. Lillis, Letter to the editor of the Cork Examiner, reprinted in the Freeman’s Journal (Dublin), 4 May 1912. 
114 Edward Carson, “Settlement of an Old Controversy,” House of Commons Debates (HC Deb) 11 April 1912 vol 
36 cc1424-514, Hansard 1803-2005. 
115 Stephen Gwynn, John Redmond’s Last Years (New York: Longmans, Green, 1919), 67. 
116 Freeman’s Journal (Dublin), 11 May 1912. 
117 Thomas Agar-Robartes, “Clause 1.—(Establishment of Irish Parliament),” HC Deb 11 June 1912 vol 39 cc744-
824, Hansard 1803-2005. 
118 H. C. G. Matthew, The Liberal Imperialists: The Ideas and Politics of a Post-Gladstonian Élite (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1973), 300; Patrick Maume, The Long Gestation: Irish Nationalist Life, 1891-1918 (New York: St. 





The Fortnightly Review later asserted that his anti-home rule stance and the exclusion 
amendment stemmed from an intense Protestantism.119 
The Irish Times asserted that the amendment was not designed to operate, but to point out 
the government’s faulty logic, as highlighted by the Spectator and Carson, “If a small fraction of 
the United Kingdom is entitled to self-government, then a fourth part of the population of Ireland 
is entitled to self-government as against the three-fourths.”  It is interesting to note that the paper 
referred to population rather than geographical area, as this facilitated grouping the southern and 
northern unionists together.  The Irish Times called the idea of excluding certain parts of the 
north from home rule, “a trap, designed to secure an admission that the Northern Unionists were 
willing to abandon the Unionists of the rest of Ireland to their fate,” and praised “Ulster,” 
meaning northern unionists, for not falling into it.120  London’s Times called the prospect of 
removing certain counties from home rule, “utterly impractical.”  The value of raising the 
proposal was that, “An attempt to exclude Ulster or any portion of Ulster would…be fatal to the 
Bill and to the whole principle of Home Rule.”121 
Legislators agreed.  Unionist William Hayes Fisher told Parliament, “if this Amendment 
is carried it kills the Bill.”  Carson quoted his own speech in which he asserted, “If Ulster 
succeeds Home Rule is dead,” and added that counties Tyrone and Fermanagh were as entitled to 
exclusion as the four listed.122  Assertions such as these led Irish nationalists to conclude that, 
despite what Agar-Robartes said, the Unionists were using his idea as a “wrecking amendment” 
to destroy the home rule bill.123  Redmond pointed out that the four counties contained 
approximately 315,000 Catholics and 700,000 Protestants, arguing against the unionist portrayal 
of, “a great body of a million there, homogeneous in race, in religion, and in political 
conviction.”  He added that electoral returns showed more home rule votes in the four counties 
than there were Catholics among the population, indicating that many of the area’s Protestants 
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voted for self-government.124  Bonar Law insisted that Unionist support of the exclusion 
amendment was a sincere attempt to avoid an inevitable civil war on the passage of home rule.125 
During a speech at Carlisle, Dillon echoed Redmond when he said, “the Catholic and 
Protestant are inextricably mixed up in these counties.  It was no homogenous population.”  He 
added, “we want home rule for all Ireland or no home rule.”  Dillon ended with a derisive attack 
on his opponents, “The thing the Protestants of Ulster could not bear to accept was equality with 
their fellow-countrymen.  Their attitude was one of hatred, an intolerable spirit.”126  The four-
county exclusion amendment failed, with three Liberals voting in favor.127 
While the Home Rule Bill continued its parliamentary path, the Unionists conducted an 
increasingly strident campaign against it in Britain.  During a meeting in London’s Albert Hall, 
Carson said the government had shown that they would not leave the northern province out of 
the bill, and had therefore issued a “declaration of war against Ulster.”128  A June 25 message 
from Bonar Law to a Unionist candidate declared that the government, “by deliberately refusing 
to give separate treatment to Ulster have made it certain that even if they succeed in carrying 
Home Rule through Parliament it can never be enforced except as a result of civil war, which 
would not be confined to Ireland.”129  Despite Unionist insistence that separate treatment for 
Ulster was not their goal, these statements imply that lack of special legislative provisions for the 
northern province would spark a civil war, rather than the passage of home rule itself. 
The resistance rhetoric reached its height during a unionist demonstration at Blenheim 
Palace on July 27, 1912.  Bonar Law called the government, “a revolutionary committee which 
has seized by fraud upon despotic power.”  He asserted that the Parliament Act had subverted the 
normal course of politics, therefore, “we shall not be restrained by the bonds, which would 
influence us in an ordinary political struggle,” adding, “I can imagine no length of resistance to 
which Ulster will go in which I shall not be ready to support them and in which they will not be 
supported by the overwhelming majority of the British people.”130  Carson referred to a speech 
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Asquith had given in which the Prime Minister said he did not believe the Ulster unionists were 
in earnest.  The Irish unionist leader called it a challenge, and assured his audience that steps 
were already being taken to “perfect our arrangements for making Home Rule absolutely 
impossible.”  He added, “They may tell us if they like that that is treason.  We are prepared to 
face the consequences.”131 
Carson’s rhetoric had changed little since the Craigavon demonstration.  His private 
statements suggest that he meant what he said.  He wrote to Lady Londonderry after the 
Blenheim meeting, “I hope we will have the biggest row there ever has been and be done with it 
one way or the other.”132  In July 1913, Carson indicated to British Unionist MP W. A. S. Hewins 
that they would not have to resort to violence.  The Irish unionist leader said, “he had known for 
a long time that the Government would not force Home Rule on Ulster.  So it is all play-
acting.”133  Historian Ronan Fanning takes this as proof that Carson knew the government did not 
intend to pass the Home Rule Bill without modifications, and interprets the Irish unionist 
leader’s violent rhetoric as posturing to force changes that members of the Cabinet were inclined 
to make anyway.134  However, Carson was conciliatory at times and violent at others.  From 1910 
he consistently expressed to Lady Londonderry his anger and willingness to fight.  On the other 
hand, according to RIC accounts of UUC meetings, Carson was often the most moderate voice in 
the room, urging the Ulster unionists to compromise on home rule.135  Carson portrayed himself 
as using his influence to restrain the northern unionist rank-and-file, a stance that earned him 
praise in the Unionist press, and gained credence among the authorities.136 
Bonar Law’s language marked a considerable radicalization of British unionist rhetoric.  
Given his position, many assumed that he was pledging the entire Unionist Party to violent 
resistance against home rule.  Even some of his supporters thought this was too strong.  The 
Times called the speech, “more explicit than was altogether desirable or necessary,” especially as 
home rule could not be enacted for at least two years.  Nonetheless, the paper asserted that Bonar 
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Law was merely issuing a warning, and that civil war would be the government’s fault.137  Bonar 
Law echoed the Blenheim speech in Parliament on July 31, 1912, and added, “I have seen no 
sign that there is not a Member of the party who does not endorse every word I say.”138  Unionist 
MP Robert Sanders wrote in his journal, “The party as a whole quite agrees with Bonar Law that 
Ulster would be justified in any steps she might take, but I have not yet been able to find out who 
she is going to fight or what form resistance can take.”139  Sanders suggests that he would support 
a certain type of resistance against a specific opponent.  This might indicate support for passive 
resistance against an Irish parliament, but not actual violence against British troops.  Moreover, 
Sanders highlights a major incongruity in the unionist resistance strategy.  While pledging their 
loyalty to the British Crown and Empire, Carson and his associates openly invoked the idea of 
fighting the British Army to prevent home rule. 
There was a fundamental disconnect between how unionists regarded what they were 
saying and how their opponents interpreted their words.  Unionists claimed they were delivering 
cogent warnings that civil war was inevitable, as Ulster unionists were determined to resist home 
rule.  Irish nationalists and some Liberals interpreted their speeches as inciting rebellion against a 
constitutionally elected government.140  After Bonar Law’s message that civil war would not be 
confined to Ireland, Dillon accused him of threatening to bring civil war to the entire United 
Kingdom to prevent home rule.141  The Freeman’s Journal mocked the idea that Bonar Law was 
issuing such outrageous threats because the government had refused to give separate treatment to 
the northern province.  The paper asserted that Ulster unionists claimed the right to bar any 
legislation for Ireland, “the ‘Ulster’ claim is a claim to an ascendancy and a veto, not a claim to 
self-government.”142  Politicians were already trying to lay blame for theoretical violence, and 
soon had actual events to focus their attention. 
On June 29, 1912, a Presbyterian Sunday school procession met an Ancient Order of 
Hibernians band on a road outside of Castledawson, Co. Antrim.  The groups exchanged insults, 
and a melee ensued.  Protestants from the nearby town became involved, and several people 
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were injured, including members of the RIC who had been escorting the two groups.143  At a 
meeting of Belfast Presbyterian clergy the next week, Rev. John McIlveen said he hoped the 
events, “would open the eyes of their fellow-Protestants in Scotland and England to the position 
of peril in which the lives and liberties of their co-religionists would be placed were the proposed 
measure of Home Rule for Ireland adopted by the Imperial Parliament.”144 
Over the next several days, violent outbreaks began in Belfast.  The northern metropolis 
had a long history of rioting, fueled by sectarianism, politics, and the fact that a Catholic 
nationalist minority comprising 24 percent of the city’s population lived in close contact with 
their Protestant unionist neighbors.145  The rejection of the First Home Rule Bill in 1886 sparked 
one of the worst outbreaks, in which thirty-two people lost their lives.146  Throughout July 1912, 
nationalists and unionists attacked one another and wrecked shops associated with the other side.  
The most far-reaching incidents occurred in the shipyards, where approximately 2,000 Catholic 
and 500 Protestant workers were forced from their jobs.  In late July the Army was called in to 
restore order.  Unionists asserted that the introduction of the Home Rule Bill caused the violence, 
the Castledawson incident had been a mere spark.147  Nationalists argued that Unionist Clubs had 
grown within the city’s workplaces, and they used recent events as a pretext to expel home 
rulers.148  Harland and Wolff, the city’s largest employer and builder of the Titanic, shut down 
completely.149  There were also disturbances in the second-largest shipbuilder, Workman and 
Clark.  UUC member George Clark, a partner in the firm, had been tasked with organizing the 
Unionist Clubs.150  The incidents were unfortunate for nationalists, as any violence strengthened 
the unionist argument that only the British administration could maintain peace in Ireland.  
Home rulers might have used the worker expulsions to highlight the possible plight of their 
                                                 
143 The most reliable evidence for the events are the RIC accounts published in the Irish Times on 23, 24, and 26 
July. Augustine Birrell also read an RIC report in the Commons. See The Times (London), 3 July 1912. 
144 John McIlveen in Belfast, Irish Times (Dublin), 5 July 1912. 
145 For statistics on the religious population of Belfast see NLI, John Redmond Papers, Ms. 15,266. 
146 Alan Megahey, “‘God Will Defend the Right’: Protestant Churches and Opposition to Home Rule,” in Defenders 
of the Union: A Survey of British and Irish Unionism since 1801, ed. D. George Boyce and Alan O’Day (London: 
Routledge, 2001), 163. 
147 Irish Times (Dublin), 6 July 1912; Charles Craig, “Belfast Riots,” HC Deb 31 July 1912 vol 41 cc2088-149, 
Hansard 1803-2005. 
148 Joseph Devlin, “Belfast Riots,” HC Deb 31 July 1912 vol 41 cc2088-149, Hansard 1803-2005. 
149 The Times (London), 29 July 1912. 





northern comrades under unionist government, but as proposals to divide Ireland were not being 
taken seriously there was no impetus for doing so. 
At the end of August 1912, Churchill urged Redmond to make an offer to mollify the 
northern unionists, as, “The opposition of three or four Ulster Counties is the only obstacle 
which now stands in the way of Home Rule.”  Churchill added that the stakes were higher than 
the issue of Irish self-government, “I do not believe there is any real feeling against Home Rule 
in the Tory Party apart from the Ulster question, but they hate the Government, are bitterly 
desirous of turning it out, and see in the resistance of Ulster an extra parliamentary force which 
they will not hesitate to use to the full.”  Churchill’s suggested remedy was problematic.  He said 
they should “afford the characteristically Protestant and Orange Counties the option of a 
moratorium of several years before acceding to the Irish Parliament.”151  These statements reflect 
a widely held belief among British politicians and the press that there were “characteristically 
Protestant” counties.  Redmond knew that every Ulster county contained a large nationalist 
population.  If he proposed a deal involving the abandonment of those nationalists—even 
temporarily—he would face recriminations from supporters and opponents alike.  The IPP leader 
encouraged the Liberal government to stick to the Home Rule Bill, knowing that their combined 
parliamentary strength would inevitably pass it.  They could then take steps to mollify northern 
unionists in the knowledge that the law was on the nationalists’ side.152 
 
The Ulster Covenant and Volunteers 
The anti-home rule campaign continued to intensify.  In the midst of the summer tour of 
Britain, James Craig announced they would hold a demonstration on “Ulster Day,” September 
28, 1912.  He said, “every man and woman would have an opportunity of showing to England 
and to the world at large that there was no bluff about their preparations, and that there was no 
humbug when Ulster said she meant to fight.”153  In mid-August the UUC announced that 
“special religious services” would be held all over the province on Ulster Day, and all unionists 
should sign a covenant approved by the Council.154  There were initially few specifics as to the 
nature of this document.  The Times asserted that signatories would pledge themselves not to 
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recognize or pay taxes to an Irish parliament.  The paper predicted that 750,000 people would 
sign, and, “by its gravity, its moderation, and its unflinching firmness that it will arrest the 
attention and command the support of the English and the Scottish peoples.”155 
Thomas Lough, Liberal MP for Islington West and a native of Co. Cavan, in Ulster, told 
the press that projecting 750,000 covenant signatories was preposterous.  He said such 
exaggerations showed the movement was a bluff, “The whole of this stage business adds but one 
more to the many historic examples of a difference of opinion between parties in Ireland which is 
neither serious nor permanent being utilized by leaders of English opinion for the meanest 
purposes of their own party warfare.”156  Like many home rulers, Lough underestimated unionist 
fears of Irish self-government, but it is evident that the resistance movement was being used to 
influence party politics. 
J. B. Armour, a Presbyterian minister and home ruler from Ballymoney, Co. Antrim, 
asserted that Protestant clergy were being pressured to support the covenant.157  There was no 
shortage of active unionist clergymen, but the drive for unanimity among political and religious 
creeds throughout the United Kingdom likely spurred attempts to influence those who disagreed 
or wished not to involve their churches in politics.  Armour wrote to his son of the Ulster Day 
plans, “The whole business is a disgrace to Protestantism and will give it a bad kick…If the 
design of the service was to pray God to send forth a spirit of evil, the prayers have been fully 
answered, as strife and ill feeling have been introduced into almost all congregations.”158  After 
the covenant’s publication, B. R. Balfour, a unionist justice of the peace from Drogheda, 
expressed concern that its terms were a cover for physical force.159 
Despite such misgivings, there was no sign of dissension in unionist reports of September 
28.  As advertised, the day began with Protestant church services around the province.  The Irish 
Times asserted, “Unhappily there has in the past been less co-operation between the various 
Protestant denominations than is desirable, but this Home Rule question has removed all 
barriers.”  The proceedings included a special prayer to, “Avert the dreadful sins of civil and 
religious strife which now threaten.”  The main Belfast service in the Ulster Hall incorporated a 
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reading from Ephesians, chapter 6, verses 10 to 18, which includes, “Put on the full armor of 
God, so that you can take your stand against the devil’s schemes.  For our struggle is not against 
flesh and blood, but against the rulers, against the authorities, against the powers of this dark 
world and against the spiritual forces of evil in the heavenly realms.”160   
Given the religious nature of the day, the early speakers were Protestant clergymen.  
William McKean, former moderator of the Irish Presbyterian General Assembly, told his 
audience that Ulster unionists were the descendants of planters who had found the land a 
“morass” and made it ordered and prosperous by their own industry.  He had no equivocations as 
to what political change would mean for his congregation, “The Irish question is at bottom a war 
against Protestantism; it is an attempt to establish a Roman Catholic ascendancy and to begin the 
disintegration of the Empire.”  The sitting moderator, Henry Montgomery, argued that there were 
two units in Ireland, discernable, “not so much to geographical boundaries as an inherent and 
ineradicable endowments of character and aims.”  He added, “If the Roman Catholic unit may 
choose its course in regard to the British Constitution, the same choice, in fairness, belongs to the 
Protestant section.”  Charles D’Arcy, the Church of Ireland’s Bishop of Down and Connor, said, 
“no power has the right to sell us into slavery,” and home rule would, “ultimately destroy the fair 
fabric of British civilisation.”  Defending the right of Protestant clergy to intervene in politics in 
some circumstances, he said, “When we believe that the very foundations of our life as a 
community are in danger we cannot, we dare not, keep silence.”161  The Irish Times was 
uncomfortable with the religious nature of the proceedings, but argued that it showed the 
seriousness of the resistance movement.  The paper quoted Edward Carson as saying, “For 
Ulster…the Union is not a policy, but a religion.”162 
The secular portion of the day was marked by highly choreographed and dramatic 
actions.  Following the church services, unionists marched together to sign Ulster’s Solemn 
League and Covenant.  In Belfast, the central location was City Hall.  Edward Carson headed the 
procession from the Ulster Hall surrounded by an honor guard of Orangemen and Unionist Club 
members.  Carson was the first to sign the Covenant, which asserted that self-government, 
“would be disastrous to the material well-being of Ulster as well as of the whole of Ireland, 
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subversive of our civil and religious freedom, destructive of our citizenship, and perilous to the 
unity of the Empire,” and pledged its signers to, “using all means which may be found necessary 
to defeat the present conspiracy to set up a Home Rule Parliament in Ireland.”  There was a 
separate but similar Covenant for female signatories.  After the signing, Carson and his honor 
guard marched to the docks, where he boarded the Liverpool-bound ship Patriotic to supervise 
signing ceremonies in Britain.163  Scenes such as this, though with less ceremony and fewer 
distinguished persons present, were repeated in unionist areas all over the province.  Other 
signings took place in Dublin, Glasgow, Liverpool, London, Manchester, Birmingham, Bristol, 
and Exeter.164  The total signatures from Ulster amounted to 218,206 men and 228,991 women, 
representing approximately 28 percent of the province’s total population.165 
While unionist organs praised the day’s religious significance and its disciplined 
ceremonials, the Freeman’s Journal highlighted other aspects of the events.  According to the 
IPP organ, unionist bands played staid hymns alongside incendiary party tunes like “Boyne 
Water” and “Kick the Pope.”  It described Montgomery’s speech as, “An Anti-Catholic 
Diatribe.”  Violent imagery like wooden rifles and a wooden cannon featured in the Belfast 
displays, and Carson’s send-off at the Patriotic was heralded by random revolver fire.  The paper 
described the events as, “farce,” “posturings,” “rantings,” and “wild theatricality.”166  London’s 
Daily News also noted the wooden guns, and said the demonstrations showed that Ulster 
unionists were sincere, but a “small faction” could not resist majority opinion in Ireland, Britain, 
and the Empire.167 
Despite home rulers’ dismissals of the Covenant signing, there were persistent signs that 
unionists were willing to do more to resist home rule than sign a piece of paper.  RIC accounts of 
unionist drilling continued.  In January 1912 there was a report of young men carrying out 
military exercises with wooden rifles in the Orange Hall in Clabby, Co. Fermanagh.  A sergeant 
dismissed it as harmless bravado.168  Birrell intimated that it was a publicity stunt, “The Ulster 
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politicians want to attract as much police with their budding rebellion as possible.”169  Other 
reports filtered in over the ensuing months, most of the notable cases from Fermanagh.  By July 
men in Tubrid were training in companies, with the rector of the local Protestant church acting as 
commander and instructor.170  The RIC began cataloging incidents of drilling in November, 
receiving 219 reports for that month alone.171 
In August, the Young Citizen Volunteers (YCV) was formed in Belfast.  Ostensibly 
apolitical and non-sectarian, the YCV was identified with unionism from its outset.  The Belfast 
Evening Telegraph asserted that the government would not help to arm and train them due to the 
involvement of prominent unionists.172  The Weekly Irish Times said they were formed, “to assist 
the authorities in the suppression of civil disturbances.”173  Despite these assertions, the YCV was 
widely identified as a partisan political organization. 
At the end of August, Enniskillen magistrate W. Copeland Trimble formed a mounted 
escort for Carson when he held a meeting in the town.  The unit, which Trimble named the 
Enniskillen Horse, did not disband after the September 18 meeting, but continued to form part of 
the local unionist pageantry.  By January 1913, Trimble had enrolled 309 troopers and a twenty-
four-member band.  He wrote to Secretary for War J. E. B. Seely asking the British Army to 
incorporate the unit into the yeomanry.  This would entitle them to equipment and ammunition 
from the War Office.  Trimble described the men as, “loyal to the core, which involves, of 
course, obedience to the law & co-operation with it.”174  It is striking that Trimble was confident 
enough to make the request, but one of his letters indicates that Seely agreed to recognize the 
unit as part of the territorial system.175  However, the War Office requested an opinion on the 
organization’s legal status.  A scathing memo by Attorney General for Ireland Ignatius O’Brien 
said it was, “a mere pretence that this Enniskillen Horse is a troop trained with lawful intentions 
and loyalty to His Majesty.”176  The War Office began ignoring Trimble, but the willingness of 
British military officials to countenance Irish unionist militancy recurred. 
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While Trimble acted independently, there were authoritative moves to organize unionist 
militants.  On December 13, 1912, the UUC held a private meeting in Belfast’s Old Town Hall.  
They discussed a compromise on home rule which Lord Londonderry had devised, supported by 
Carson and Craig.  The majority were opposed, but they did not make a definite decision.177  
Later that night, Carson and his UUC advisers met at Craigavon, Craig’s home.  Most of this 
group, too, were against making a deal with the government.  The discussion then moved to 
arming unionists against home rule.  On information from an inside source, an RIC sergeant 
reported that most were in favor of “pacific means” of resisting home rule, only R. H. Wallace, 
leader of the Grand Orange Lodge of Belfast, “stoutly declared himself in favour of the arming 
of unionists generally.”178  Given what followed, it is likely that most of them were for armed 
resistance, but wanted some measure of control over those who bore arms in their cause.  
Just ten days after the meetings in Belfast and Craigavon, the RIC in Carrickmacross, Co. 
Monaghan, reported that the UUC were enrolling Covenant signers “with the utmost haste” into 
a secret organization, the “Ulster Volunteer Movement.”179  On December 28, officers in 
Stewartstown, Co. Tyrone, submitted a copy of the enrollment form.  Called the Ulster Volunteer 
Force, members were to serve, “throughout the crisis created by the passage into Law of the 
Home Rule Bill.”  The object was, “the mutual protection of all Loyalists, and generally to keep 
the peace.”180  The language implied, as had the discussion at Craigavon, that they would not take 
action until the home rule bill was law.  Of course, enrolling the force was a form of action in 
itself.  The language relating to the preservation of the peace was similar to that regarding the 
YCV.  Throughout the period, unionists successfully portrayed their paramilitary organizations 
as designed to prevent rather than provoke disturbances, much as their leaders claimed their 
invocations of civil war were warnings, not incitements.  This was despite the UVF’s plans to 
take over as much of the province as possible, in contravention of British law and authority, if 
home rule passed.181 
Further information on the force’s objects trickled in.  There was a suggestion that it 
would be armed with rifles and act as a police force on behalf of the Ulster provisional 
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government.182  Another report said there would be two organizations; the UVF would be a 
police body while another force would be established with, “more of a military character,” and 
enlist, “all those who are prepared to take up arms to prevent a Nationalist Executive from 
exercising any authority in Ulster.”183 
The UUC was remarkably successful in maintaining secrecy while establishing the 
militant organization.  Many unionist moves had been calculated to sway public opinion, 
particularly in Britain.  The UVF’s formation was orchestrated quite differently.  There were no 
public pronouncements until March 1913, when Robert Sharman-Crawford announced that they 
were establishing two armed bodies: one to “defend their homes” and another to patrol the 
“frontier line.”  The Weekly Irish Times said the organizations were to “prevent the establishment 
of Home Rule in Ulster, and to resist any attack made upon the province.”184  It was unclear who 
might be planning such an attack, but Charles Craig, MP for South Antrim, said later that month, 
“He had been asked if he would advocate resistance to British troops, and his answer 
unhesitatingly was yes.”  Craig added that he did not believe the British Army would fire on 
them, but, “the death of one Ulsterman killed by a British bullet would administer such a shock 
to public opinion in Great Britain that the Government which ordered the shot to be fired would 
be hurled from power.”185  The UVF increasingly became a matter of public record.  By late May 
1913, UUC spokesmen estimated their numbers at 30,000.186 
The UVF would lend Carson and Bonar Law an impressive bargaining chip in any 
negotiations with the government, but also gave the Unionist leaders a measure of control over 
their militant followers.  Drilling was already widespread in the province in late 1912.  There 
were militant unionist organizations in the YCV and Enniskillen Horse.  However, unionist 
leaders had no control over these bodies.  Enrolling the men in a paramilitary organization might 
give them a sense of taking action, removing much of the impetus for unilateral exploits.187 
This need to assert control and prevent spontaneous violence does not mean that unionist 
politicians were irrelevant to increasing militancy among their supporters.  Violent unionist 
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rhetoric pre-dated the earliest instances of drilling recorded by the RIC.  The speeches of 
Unionist MPs including Long, Bonar Law, Carson, Campbell, and Craig undoubtedly raised the 
levels of anxiety, fear, and anger toward home rule among their supporters.  Forming the UVF 
was an attempt to forge those emotions and the militancy they provoked into a weapon.  Pro-
unionist observers emphasized UVF discipline, indicating that they could be relied upon not to 
engage in random violence.188  This convinced some British politicians and the military 
establishment that, though the UVF’s existence was not ideal, it was at least disciplined and 
under control.189  Some historians continue to write in this vein.190 
 
Conclusions 
 In the short term, the introduction of the Third Home Rule Bill was a victory for the IPP.  
Redmond and his colleagues knew they had the votes to pass it at Westminster, therefore their 
party’s long-elusive goal was within sight.  By containing and deflecting nationalist criticism of 
the bill, the IPP proved their influence and power within Irish nationalism.  However, for the 
long term, dissatisfaction with the Third Home Rule Bill was merely silenced, not assuaged.  
That many Irish nationalists expected the bill to embody colonial home rule shows that much of 
public opinion had moved on from the old Gladstonian formula of limited self-government.  Irish 
nationalists accepted the bill because it was the only measure of self-government on offer, but 
many assumed it was merely a starting point, while British and Irish politicians sometimes 
referred to it as a final settlement.191  This crisis of expectations both within Irish nationalism and 
in its relations to British politics was forestalled, but not resolved, in 1912. 
 Unionist resistance to Irish self-government increased in intensity and organization 
between 1911 and 1912.  The movement drew together Irish unionists north and south, their 
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British counterparts, and the Protestant clergy.  Ulster unionists declared their intention to form a 
provisional government should home rule pass, and forced a Cabinet member to change his plans 
to hold a home rule meeting in Belfast, validating their claims to control large portions of the 
province.  Bonar Law’s increasingly violent language troubled some of his British supporters, 
but drew attention to the movement and convinced many that the Unionist Party were prepared 
to go to any lengths to support their Irish counterparts.  The Covenant signing was a further 
propaganda coup for the Ulster unionists, designed to impress contemporaries with its solemnity, 
religious significance, and unyielding defiance of home rule.  All of the unionists’ public moves 
were designed to influence British public opinion.  Even their framing of the Belfast riots was 
designed for British consumption. 
The formation of the UVF was neither an entirely “top-down” nor “bottom-up” 
phenomenon.  Carson and his deputies did not conjure militant unionism into existence in 1912.  
However, Unionist Party leaders had been using violent rhetoric since the January 1910 election 
campaign.  It should have come as no surprise that some of the rank-and-file took them seriously 
and began to organize militantly against home rule in their local areas.  Once the initially secret 
UVF came into the open, it became another facet of the Irish unionist campaign to influence 
British public opinion, emphasizing the force’s discipline and power. 
While unionist resistance to home rule did not force Asquith’s government to abandon 
their course, some were willing to contemplate excluding part of Ireland from the bill’s 
operation.  The earliest proponents of exclusion within the Cabinet were Birrell, Lloyd George, 
and Churchill.  Unionist support for the Agar-Robartes amendment to exclude four of the nine 
counties in Ulster seemed to show that they were willing to consider this type of settlement, 
despite their assertions to the contrary.  Unionist spokesmen even shifted their rhetoric after the 
failure of this amendment to imply that the lack of separate treatment for Ulster, or some part of 












“A SETTLEMENT NOBODY WANTS:” EXCLUSION GAINS GROUND, 1913-1914 
 
Introduction 
 The period 1913 to 1914 marks the point at which the home rule debate moved 
substantially out of the public sphere and into private negotiations.  There were still large 
numbers of political meetings, parliamentary debates, and publications in which both sides 
espoused their ideals and arguments.  Individuals continued to make settlement suggestions, the 
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) came into the open, and some nationalists founded their own 
militia, the Irish Volunteers; all important developments in the public sphere.  But by 1913 the 
major considerations had been aired and party leaders began to make concerted efforts behind 
closed doors to find a compromise in the multitude of ideas that had been tabled. 
 Some historians describe the Unionist Party as wholly backing their Ulster adjuncts in 
any steps they might take, citing Bonar Law as both the symbol and prime mover of this policy.1  
Other scholars assert that Bonar Law cared primarily about Ulster, but much less about the rest 
of Ireland.2  Still others argue that the support of Bonar Law and the Unionist Party for the 
northern unionists was strategic as well as sentimental, and more varied than sometimes 
allowed.3  A number of high-ranking figures within the Party, including Bonar Law, admitted 
that there were circumstances under which they would withdraw their support for the Ulster 
unionists.  The Unionist Party’s primary objectives were to compel the government to call a 
general election, and to win it.  If they did so, they would stop home rule.  The need to maintain 
their electoral appeal meant that they could not support measures that would alienate British 
public opinion.  The Ulster unionists’ objective was to stop home rule at all costs, and they 
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declared that they would employ any means to do so.  This difference in emphases meant that 
there were circumstances under which the British unionists would not support their constituents 
in Ulster, primarily if that support would damage their electoral prospects in Britain.  Historian 
Jeremy Smith notes that the Unionists intentionally prolonged the crisis in their attempt to force 
a general election.4  I argue that not only did Unionists keep the crisis going for their ends, but 
their tactics had an unexpected side-effect that made the administrative division of Ireland more 
likely.  Despite declaring that achieving exclusion for some part of Ulster was not their goal, 
Unionist leaders justified resistance to home rule on the ground that the government refused to 
grant special treatment to their constituents in the northern province.  When Asquith’s Cabinet 
took them up on the idea of exclusion, Unionist leaders were trapped by their own rhetoric.  
Once the Liberal government began making offers to exclude certain counties in Ulster from 
home rule, it seemed that both major British parties were agreed on this policy. 
Several Cabinet members felt that the exclusion of Ulster, or some part of it, was the best 
solution to the third home rule crisis.  This begs the question: why did the government make no 
moves in this direction before the fall of 1913?  Alvin Jackson asserts that Asquith’s “wait and 
see” attitude entailed allowing a situation to develop.5  Ronan Fanning suggests that the Prime 
Minister intentionally prolonged the crisis to allow the time limit imposed by the Parliament Act 
to run out, a strategy that might work in Parliament but raised tensions in Ireland.6  Both major 
British parties pursued strategies designed to strengthen their parliamentary position and appeal 
to British voters; Irish public opinion was only discussed in terms of either faction’s capacity to 
rebel.  Both the government and the Unionists wanted to impress the British electorate by 
maintaining what they publicly proclaimed were their principles on home rule.  After all, 
compromise indicates not only agreement but a step down from one’s position.  For Asquith’s 
Cabinet, this would mean retreating from their Home Rule Bill.  Few in the government were 
sentimentally attached to this legislation, but as the bill represented government policy, 
abandoning it would entail a crippling political defeat.  Asquith and his ministers wanted the 
Unionists to make the first move toward a compromise, as this would acknowledge that the 
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government had “won” the parliamentary game.7  For Unionists, a deal involving exclusion 
meant enabling home rule for the rest of Ireland, thereby abandoning a foundational principle of 
their party.  Instead, they hoped that the possibility of civil war would force the government to 
dissolve Parliament and hold an election.  Faced with growing conviction among the press and 
politicians of all parties that violence would accompany home rule, pressure mounted on Asquith 
to defuse the situation. 
 Contemporary political opponents, particularly Sinn Féin and the All-for-Ireland-League 
(AFIL), accused John Redmond and the IPP leadership of acquiescing in partition.  Some 
historians have followed in this vein.8  Asserting that Redmond and his colleagues acquiesced in 
partition implies that they endorsed the settlement that was eventually enacted: the permanent 
separation of six counties from the rest of Ireland and the establishment of two Irish parliaments, 
without gauging the wishes of the population.  Prior to the First World War, most compromise 
ideas involved “exclusion,” referring to leaving certain areas out of the jurisdiction of the home 
rule parliament and maintaining direct governance from Westminster.  In fact, there was no 
accepted definition of exclusion between 1913 and 1914.  Multiple possibilities were discussed 
in public and in private.  Most of these entailed temporary exclusion and some form of plebiscite, 
particularly county option.  Redmond declared that this was the only type of exclusion he would 
countenance, and he believed that Asquith agreed with him.   
Academics have characterized the Irish nationalist leader as politically inept, overly 
sentimental, overly optimistic, and lacking a forceful personality, traits assumed to have 
contributed to his lack of success in seeing all-Ireland home rule enacted.9  I will show that 
Asquith and other Cabinet members deliberately misled Redmond as to the nature of their 
exclusion proposals.  They led him to believe that they would consult him at every turn and limit 
their concessions to the Unionists in specific ways, only to proceed in accordance with their own 
interests, regardless of what they told the Irish nationalist leader.  Redmond watched his ideal of 
a united home rule Ireland slip away.  This contrasted starkly with the forceful role he had played 
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in reducing the Lords’ power between 1909 and 1911.  While Redmond had compelled 
Asquith’s government to produce a bill for Irish self-government, their power relationship 
shifted after its introduction, as the Irish nationalists relied on Liberal votes to pass it.  In a 
thorough biography of Redmond, Dermot Meleady asserts that the Irish nationalist leader 
underestimated the strength of his unionist countrymen’s aversion to home rule, and decries 
attempts to blame outside forces for his shortcomings.10  Yet, throughout the crisis, Redmond 
maintained that he would make any concessions to the Ulster unionists that would preserve all-
Ireland self-government, even if temporary exclusion delayed the realization of this ideal by a 
few years.  His primary mistake was believing that he could rely on Asquith’s administration to 
maintain this standard. 
 The influence of the Curragh mutiny, when several dozen high-ranking British Army 
officers stationed in Ireland declared their unwillingness to make any moves against Irish 
unionists, particularly in Ulster, cannot be understated.  It brought the issue of whether the Army 
could be relied upon to enforce home rule to a head.  The incident denuded Asquith’s 
government of its power to enforce home rule.  It also convinced some observers that, instead of 
taking a firm line with the Ulster unionists, they should be making further concessions.  This 
exposes a cynical trend, highlighted by historian Ronan Fanning, that British politicians were 
willing to make concessions to the Irish party capable of the greatest violence.11 
 
Averting Civil War 
Early in 1913, observers assumed that a rational compromise on the home rule question 
would be found.  Edmund Vesey Knox, a former nationalist MP for the Ulster constituencies of 
Cavan and Londonderry City, sent his thoughts to James Craig in February.  Knox told Craig that 
his tactics were failing, “I do not think you have made any impression on the English people, and 
if there were an election now there is no reason to suppose the division of the parties would be 
very different.”  If the unionists did not make terms, the Home Rule Bill would pass and they 
would have, “no resource but a helpless resistance to the law.”  Knox’s proposals included one of 
the earliest suggestions for northern self-government.  He argued that the councils of five 
counties: Antrim, Armagh, Londonderry, Down, and Tyrone, should elect a higher council to 
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administer local affairs.  Specifically, they would control the police, local government, 
education, and public works.  This “Ulster Council” would receive its funding from the Irish 
government.  Knox also suggested that greater powers be given to the Irish Senate, an 
independent commission be set up to periodically redistribute seats in the Irish Commons 
according to population, and the home rule legislature give up appointment of judges for six 
years as well as all control of Customs duties.12  A separate draft of the letter asserted that home 
rule was, “practically regarded as an accomplished fact by the English electorate,” and “you will 
get more sympathetic consideration from the Irish Nationalists than you will get from the English 
Liberals.”13  The unionists do not seem to have followed up on the idea. 
Carson seemed to have his own plan for separate treatment for Ulster.  On New Year’s 
Day, 1913, he introduced an amendment to exclude the entire nine-county province of Ulster 
from the Home Rule Bill.  Proposing the measure, the Irish Unionist leader used a number of 
different definitions of “Ulster.”  Sometimes he described six counties involved in the sixteenth- 
and seventeenth-century “plantations” of Protestants in the north of Ireland, at others the four 
majority-Protestant counties.  He acknowledged the existence of Catholic and nationalist 
majorities in parts of the province, including two of the six counties, but nonetheless referred to 
it as “the Protestant part of Ireland.”  Carson said his reason for introducing the measure was that 
most members of Parliament did not realize the seriousness of northern unionists’ determination 
to resist home rule.  He said, “Ulster,” meaning the unionist population, “is a serious fact, and a 
stern reality.”  However, Carson’s entire speech implied that, both within the geographical 
bounds of Ulster and in United Kingdom policy, unionist opinion should count in excess 
proportion to its numbers.  By defining “Ulster” in these terms, he denied that northern 
nationalists, or any other opponents of unionist policy, were a serious fact.14 
In addition to ignoring demographic realities, Carson confused the historical narrative.  
There were multiple plantations of English and Scottish settlers in Ireland in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries.  The official plantation of Ulster between 1603 and 1625 involved six 
counties, but included Cavan and Donegal, which Carson omitted from what he described as the 
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“plantation counties.”  He substituted Antrim and Down, which were not included in the official 
plantation of Ulster.  Informal British colonization took place in these two counties, particularly 
by Presbyterian Scots.  Antrim and Down were included in Oliver Cromwell’s ten-county 
plantation scheme in 1652, as were Armagh and seven counties outside of Ulster.  By Carson’s 
time, scholars acknowledged the uneven execution of the plantations and the persistent Catholic 
presence in the areas involved.15 
During the debate on January 1, 1913, Bonar Law made two blunders while trying to 
support Carson.  First, he said that the northern unionists would prefer to be governed by a 
foreign country than by Irish nationalists.  Winston Churchill, who as First Lord of the Admiralty 
frequently expounded on perceived threats to the Empire, accused the Ulster unionists of 
preferring German to British governance.  Northern unionists had made statements to this effect, 
which Liberals and Irish nationalists publicized in hope of undermining their British support.16  
Secondly, as Churchill pressed his advantage, Bonar Law confessed that his party would not 
continue to support Ulster unionist resistance to home rule if they lost a general election on the 
issue.17  This was a significant pronouncement.  The Unionist leader had previously declared that 
his entire party would support their Ulster constituents in resisting home rule by any means.  
Now, he admitted that there were circumstances in which the northern unionists would be left to 
fend for themselves. 
 There is other evidence that Bonar Law and other British unionist leaders had 
reservations about the Ulster unionist resistance to home rule.  Though James Craig invited 
Bonar Law to Belfast for “Ulster Day” in September 1912, he declined.  Bonar Law wrote to 
Craig, “I have certainly done my full share of this fight, and it would I think be bad policy to 
overdo it.”18  While this conveys that Bonar Law had a public relations motive for distancing 
himself from the proceedings, it is clear that he felt his previous statements in support of 
Carson’s and Craig’s movement should be sufficient. 
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 The Unionist Party—with its power center in Britain—had slightly different motives in 
opposing home rule than its constituents in Ireland.  Irish unionists’ primary object was to defeat 
home rule.  The goal of the Party, and of Bonar Law as its leader, was to force and win a general 
election.  The home rule issue was the most effective leverage for doing so.  Even if the 
Unionists lost at the polls, forcing Parliament to dissolve to hold one would interrupt the period 
of three consecutive sessions required by the Parliament Act to pass legislation vetoed by the 
Lords, and the Home Rule Bill would have to start its legislative life over again.19 
This difference in emphases entailed a slight disconnect between the Unionist Party and 
its supporters in Ulster.  The latter were willing to do practically anything to defeat home rule.  
Some of their British counterparts were willing to support them, but most of the leadership 
realized that aiding an actual Ulster unionist rebellion, as opposed to a theoretical one, would 
likely ruin their chances of winning the next election.  Bonar Law knew they would need a large 
majority in the next election to take control of the situation.  If they won such a victory, his party 
would treat Ireland, “as Mr. Balfour dealt with her.”20  This was an allusion to the stringent 
enforcement of coercive measures that earned the former Unionist leader the nickname, “Bloody 
Balfour.”21  Bonar Law added that they would lower Ireland’s representation in the Commons, 
which, “by reducing the number of the Nationalist Members would finally kill the H.R. 
agitation.”22  In the meantime, Bonar Law did not want to see the Ulster unionists pacified, as the 
nullification of their objections to home rule would help the Liberals.  He told Asquith in 
October 1913, “if the question of Ulster were removed one of the strongest points in our favour 
in an election would be gone and our chance of winning it would, in my opinion, be 
diminished.”23  It was in the Unionist Party’s interest, and indeed was part of Bonar Law’s 
strategy, to keep the crisis going until they forced an election. 
 There was little difficulty on that score.  Despite the secrecy with which it was initially 
established, by May 1913 the UVF had gone public, and became a part of the Unionist 
propaganda machine.  Every action on behalf of the organization received extensive press 
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coverage in Ireland and Britain.  Enrollment numbers, maneuvers, and speeches from unionist 
politicians were all common news fodder.24  In July 1913, Carson declared that the UVF motto 
should be, “For God and Country.”25  A more commonly used phrase was, “For God and Ulster,” 
perhaps reflecting some confusion over what country the Irish unionist leader meant.26 
Among the biggest UVF news stories of 1913 was the increasing involvement of British 
military figures in the movement, some retired and some on active duty.  Timothy Bowman 
downplays this element, arguing that British officers had little impact in making the UVF a more 
efficient fighting force.27  However, as Alan Parkinson points out, the real value of Ulster 
unionists’ “friends in high places” was in lending their prestige, influence, and credentials as 
British patriots to the movement.28  In September, the UUC appointed Lieutenant General Sir 
George Richardson as the force’s overall commander.  Richardson had been recommended by 
Lord Frederick Roberts, a British Army Field Marshal who had been born in Co. Waterford, 
educated in England, and served in a number of theaters throughout the Empire.  Historian A. T. 
Q. Stewart has characterized Roberts as, “the most distinguished British soldier alive” in 1913.29  
The Field Marshal assured Bonar Law that the British Army would never fight the UVF, 
“Protestant officers and men could not be expected to fire willingly upon Protestant civilians, 
who would be fighting in the Protestant cause under the Union Jack.”30   
Other British Army officers in the UVF included colonels William Hacket Pain, F. P. 
Crozier, and T. V. P. McCammon.  Wilfrid Spender, an English captain in the Royal Artillery 
and a UVF member, wrote to Carson in June 1913 offering to leave the Army to fight for the 
Ulster unionists if an outbreak seemed imminent.31  These examples show that what might have 
been a dilemma for the British Army—whether or not to take part in a political quarrel—was not 
a quandary at all for some soldiers.  Many active or retired officers, some of them with few or 
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distant Irish connections, saw no contradiction between their duty as soldiers and agreeing to 
resist the will of the sitting government.  Roberts highlighted religion and patriotism as two 
motives that might compel soldiers to disobedience, to which can be added political conviction. 
 By late summer, 1913, British unionist leaders were concerned that militancy among their 
followers was getting out of control.  F. E. Smith’s speeches caused them particular 
consternation.  He toured Ulster speaking at unionist meetings, sometimes acting as aide-de-
camp to General Richardson at UVF rallies, a role that earned him the nickname, “Galloper 
Smith” among Irish nationalists.32  Lucy Masterman claimed that the IPP did not resent Carson, 
as his sentiments were genuine.  However, they held Smith in contempt as it was common 
knowledge that he had been “quite prepared to accept Home Rule” in 1910.33 
Unionist leaders could not control what Smith said or did on his own authority, but he 
increasingly claimed to speak for the party.  He said on September 20, 1913, that he did not want 
to contemplate a day when “this Government, corrupt and guilty as it was, would dare attempt to 
mobilise an English army to march upon Ulster.”  He continued: 
 
But if that unhappy moment in the history of the Empire arrived he would say 
this, on behalf of the Unionist Party in Great Britain, from that moment they held 
themselves absolved from all allegiance to this Government.  From that moment 
they on their part would say to their followers in England: ‘To your tents, O 
Israel!’  From that moment they would stand side by side with Ulster, refusing to 
recognise any law, and prepared with Ulster to risk the collapse of the whole body 
politic to prevent this monstrous crime.34 
 
This echoes Bonar Law’s statement that civil war would not be confined to Ireland, but Smith 
said explicitly that the Unionist Party would incite their followers to violence against the 
government.  His religious overtones and pledge to countenance lawbreaking are unmistakable.  
Unionist leaders often claimed that they were delivering warnings and not issuing threats, but 
this speech cannot be construed as anything but the latter. 
 Three days later, Lansdowne asked Bonar Law if he was not “a little horrified” that Smith 
was pledging their entire party to “violent action in Ulster.”  It could place them in “a rather 
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awkward position.”35  The Unionist leader agreed, but claimed that Carson was such a 
dominating figure no one would notice Smith’s speeches.36  Despite their private disapproval, the 
Unionist leaders did not denounce such language.  Smith’s son later wrote, “Bonar Law adopted 
the Ulster cause and willingly took responsibility for extreme measures,” while his father, “in all 
he did for Ulster was carrying out the Unionist leader’s policy, and in no way violating orders or 
exceeding instructions.”37  Their lack of condemnation shows that the Unionist leadership at least 
tacitly permitted extreme rhetoric, even to the point of threatening the existence of the state. 
 Some politicians were growing increasingly comfortable with the idea of resolving the 
home rule crisis through violence.  Viscount Esher, one of King George V’s advisors and 
confidants, recorded a September 1913 conversation with Lord George Curzon.  Curzon said, 
“The contest must finally be allowed to solve itself in battle on the soil of Ireland.”  Esher 
agreed, adding, “Carson—a brave, resolute man—should be encouraged to provoke the contest 
at an early date.”38  By this time the UVF numbered 56,551, though it was sometimes claimed 
that they had 80 to 100 thousand members.39  Whether these statesmen were advocating a 
confrontation between the UVF and the British Army is unclear, but there was no other force for 
them to fight.  Moreover, Ulster unionists had professed their willingness to shoot British 
soldiers on a number of occasions. 
Similarly, Winston Churchill told Austen Chamberlain in November that before the crisis 
was resolved, “Public opinion had got to have a shock,” and “A little red blood had got to flow.”  
He expected the Ulster unionist rank-and-file to begin a precipitant conflict that the government 
would suppress.  When Chamberlain expressed dismay at this “gamble on bloodshed,” Churchill 
implied that unionist fears of Irish self-government were groundless.  Home rule did not mean 
real autonomy, as the British government could enforce their will on an Irish parliament through 
economic pressure.  He said, “we can always bring them to book by withholding supplies.”  This 
was an early expression of Churchill’s idea to coerce Irish nationalists by blockading the island, 
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a notion he would revive later.40  These casual assertions that bloodshed could provide simple 
solutions to political problems are reminiscent of George Dangerfield’s assertion in The Strange 
Death of Liberal England (1935) that by 1913 British politics had drifted into a mode in which 
violence was acceptable.  He cites the vitriol surrounding the Parliament Act, as well as the 
embrace of strenuous agitation by trades unionists, women’s suffragists, and anti-home rulers.41 
 Just when it seemed as though violence over home rule was becoming a certainty, 
Cabinet member Lord Loreburn published a letter in The Times calling for a conference on the 
home rule crisis.  He denied that Ulster unionist resistance to self-government would amount to 
civil war, but admitted there would be serious disturbances that exacerbated political and 
religious differences in Ireland.  On the other hand, home rule was so near that nationalists might 
cause equal or greater violence if it were abandoned.  The factor that Loreburn called, “the most 
powerful of all” was that Britain must have a say in Irish government.  Therefore, the British 
parties were entitled to a voice equal to or greater than that of the Irish in any conference.42 
 Loreburn was regarded as one of the most ardent home rulers in the Cabinet.43  His public 
declaration that the Cabinet’s position on Irish self-government was negotiable produced an 
uproar.  The Times’s editors called the letter an admission that the administration’s Irish policy 
was “indefensible.”  The paper asserted that no unionist would accept a national Irish parliament 
with an executive responsible to it, therefore any conference must involve a government climb-
down.44  The Irish Times said that the letter showed Ulster unionists, “they are fighting a winning 
cause.”45  The Freeman’s Journal wrote that, though sincere and well-intended, Loreburn’s letter 
would be “treated as a Liberal white flag.”46  Redmond called it an “unfortunate intervention.”47 
 King George V’s concern over the home rule crisis had been growing for some time.  In 
the first half of 1913, Unionist leaders considered trying to influence the King to refuse his 
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assent to the bill, essentially vetoing it.48  The monarch still technically possessed this power, but 
it had not been used since 1708, and was generally considered archaic in the age of 
representative government.  Alternatively, the King could dismiss Asquith’s administration and 
force an election.  Either course would involve the monarchy in political controversy, a messy 
solution that might diminish the institution’s popularity and reverence.49  King George felt the 
pressure of the situation.  He told Cabinet member Lewis Harcourt, “he would never go to 
Dublin to open a Home Rule parliament, and that if he signed the Home Rule Bill he would be 
hissed in the streets of Belfast.”  Harcourt replied that if the King “didn’t sign the Bill he would 
be hissed in the streets of London.”50 
King George was aware that the Cabinet was amenable to a compromise on the Home 
Rule Bill involving Ulster’s exclusion.  Moreover, he knew that they were willing to force the 
Irish nationalists to agree to this type of solution.  The introduction of the Home Rule Bill had 
subtly altered the balance of power between the IPP and Asquith’s Cabinet.  Between the 
December 1910 election and the measure’s debut in April 1912, the government relied on Irish 
nationalist votes to stay in office.  Once the bill was introduced, the nationalists relied on Liberal 
votes to pass it.  Voting against the government would mean not only Asquith’s ouster, but the 
disappearance of their best chance at home rule.  Birrell alluded to this power dynamic in July 
1913.  The Chief Secretary said that if the Unionists approached the Cabinet with a plan for 
Ulster to “contract out” of home rule temporarily, perhaps for ten years, they would accept it.  
The King objected, “But Mr Redmond would never agree to this plan.”  Birrell responded, “He 
would have to agree!”51 
With this knowledge, King George seized on Loreburn’s conference suggestion as a 
means of resolving the deadlock.  He summoned Bonar Law to meet him during a courtly 
excursion to Balmoral Castle, in Scotland.  On September 16, the Unionist leader told the King 
that there were only two bases for a conference that his party would accept: the government must 
announce that Irish self-government would be folded into a scheme of general devolution, or, 
“N.E. Ulster shall remain an integral part of the United Kingdom, and that some form of Local 
                                                 
48 UKPA, Bonar Law Papers, BL/33/5/20, Andrew Bonar Law to A. V. Dicey, 26 March 1913. 
49 UKPA, Bonar Law Papers, BL/39/1/9, Lord Cromer to John St. Loe Strachey, 22 February 1913. 
50 Charles Hobhouse, Inside Asquith’s Cabinet: From the Diaries of Charles Hobhouse, ed. Edward David (New 
York: St. Martin’s, 1977), 147, entry for 17 October 1913. 





Government be given to the rest of Ireland.”52  Churchill was also at Balmoral, and was under 
orders from Asquith to sound out the Unionist leader as to the possibility of a meeting.53  Bonar 
Law told both the King and Churchill that exclusion was impossible without “a large measure of 
approval from the Unionists of the South and West of Ireland,” as, “the leaders of the Unionist 
Party would not give their consent to any scheme which would be regarded as a betrayal by the 
loyalists of Ireland.”54  Churchill said he had “no doubt that the Nationalists could be made to 
agree to the exclusion of Ulster.”55  The Unionist leader added that if the British Army was sent 
to Ulster to enforce home rule, his party would encourage the soldiers to disobey their orders.56 
Churchill told King George, “he has always admitted that Ulster has a case.”  Despite this 
sympathy, Churchill resented unionist tactics.  It was natural that the opposition would try to 
force out the government, but “it is not ‘playing the game’ to try & do this by trying to raise a 
threat of civil war.”  Nonetheless, he assured the King that they would find a satisfactory basis 
for a conference.57 
Finally, on September 22, 1913, King George wrote to Asquith, recapitulating many of 
the unionist arguments against home rule.  He said that Carson was openly advocating illegal 
methods and had by now admitted that the Ulster unionists would not acknowledge the verdict of 
a general election.  The monarch was convinced that they would rebel against home rule, 
therefore their claims should be taken seriously.  By contrast, he intimated that most Irish 
nationalists were less intense in their feelings in favor of self-government.  He also told the 
Prime Minister to consider, “the effect upon the Protestant sentiment in these Islands and the 
Colonies of the coercion of Ulster.”  The monarch suggested that a conference was the only way 
out of the crisis, and the best result might be the exclusion of “North-East Ulster,” whatever that 
meant, for five or ten years.58 
On October 1, Asquith replied that the prospect of Irish nationalist revolt should the 
home rule bill be rejected was a greater danger than that posed by Ulster unionists should it pass.  
On the subject of nationalist revolt, Arthur Balfour told Churchill at Balmoral that he did not 
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believe in the capacity of the “Southern Irish” to rebel in favor of home rule, implying that they 
could safely leave the nationalists out of their calculations.59  These avowals by the monarch, the 
Prime Minister, and a prominent opposition leader—combined with those of Esher, Curzon, and 
Churchill—highlight a pronounced cynicism in British designs on Ireland; they were inclined to 
conciliate whatever side had the greatest capacity for violence.  Nonetheless, Asquith believed 
they should make, “some special arrangement in regard to the North East, which is not 
inconsistent with the fundamental principle and purpose of the Bill.”60  Thus, between his 
meetings and correspondence, King George had received assurances from his Prime Minister, the 
opposition leader, the Chief Secretary for Ireland, and another prominent Cabinet member, that 
the way to avoid civil disturbance in any part of the United Kingdom lay in excluding an 
undefined entity known as Ulster from the purview of the Home Rule Bill.  It was up to the 
ministers to work out the details. 
 
Negotiations: Asquith and the Unionists 
 After the Balmoral meetings, Asquith reiterated that the likeliest solution was to be found 
in special treatment for the north of Ireland.  He wrote to Churchill, “I always thought (and said) 
that, in the end, we should probably have to make some sort of bargain about Ulster as the price 
of Home Rule.”61  While the government was clearly moving toward a solution involving 
separate treatment or even exclusion, the Unionists continued to consider their position. 
 Bonar Law solicited Carson’s and F. E. Smith’s views, both of whom were staying with 
Craig at Craigavon.  Carson outlined possible complications to exclusion, including, “a difficulty 
arrives as to defining Ulster.”  This highlights the inconsistency of unionist rhetoric—including 
his own—on a crucial point.  He added, “my view is that the whole of Ulster shd [should] be 
excluded but the minimum wd [would] be the 6 Plantation Counties & for that a good case cd 
[could] be made.”  However, the southern unionists would pose another difficulty, “I cd not 
agree to their abandonment tho’ I feel certain it wd be the best settlement if Home Rule is 
inevitable.”  Finally, he was certain that the IPP would never agree to exclusion, “they wd 
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probably prefer a general election.”62  Carson later defended his demand that the whole province 
be excluded based on the strong feelings of Ulster unionists.  He wrote, “The Covenant has been 
signed all through Ulster and although it is quite true that in Monaghan, Cavan and Donegal we 
are only a small minority, the fellow-feeling and comradeship of those in the other parts of Ulster 
towards their isolated friends is very strong and determined.”63  This implies that the sentiments 
of Ulster unionists should trump any practical difficulties that may arise in excluding the whole 
province, and does not consider the wishes of the nationalist population in the least. 
 Smith argued that rank-and-file unionists did not want a conference, as they “are 
conscious of the strategical strength of Ulster’s present position if left uncompromised by 
negotiations.”  He suggested that if any settlement was made, it should be either to leave Ulster 
under the Imperial Parliament, or for the area to be “constituted a province with powers 
analogous to those conceded to the rest of Ireland.”  The main questions in his view were 
whether “Ulster” and the rest of “Unionist Ireland” would agree to such a settlement.  Smith does 
not seem to have considered Irish nationalist wishes worthy of consideration.  He wanted to 
continue the crisis, as, “The existing position is the most favourable to us and the most 
formidable to the Govt.”   In his estimation, there were larger issues at stake than home rule, 
“We should always remember that we are now for the first time given a chance of resisting the 
Parliament Act in operation.  That Act was revolutionary: perhaps we have our one and only 
chance of destroying it.”64  Walter Long also warned Bonar Law that the unionist rank-and-file 
were against compromising on home rule, and if he pursued any course that might enable Irish 
self-government he risked splitting his party.65 
 Lansdowne was less sanguine as to the strength of the Unionist position than Smith.  He 
had conferred with Balfour and Curzon, and the three felt that they were running out of options 
to defeat home rule entirely, “nothing which could be done, or was likely to be done, would 
prevent the Bill from going through.”  Initially, unionists assumed that a conference would mean 
the end of the Home Rule Bill as introduced to Parliament.66  Prior to publishing his letter, 
Loreburn consulted George Hamilton, a former Unionist MP who had been in Balfour’s Cabinet, 
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on the conference idea.  Hamilton was supportive, “provided that the Home Rule Bill was either 
suspended or dropped.”  Loreburn called this, “an unreasonable condition, as it would be a 
breach of faith with the Irish Nationalist Party who had behaved exceedingly well to the 
Government.”67  This makes him one of just a few politicians to praise the IPP for their conduct 
during the crisis.  Knowing Loreburn’s intentions, Lansdowne feared that the government would 
propose, “that we should go into a conference upon the assumption that the Government Bill 
holds the field, and that the only matter open for discussion is the exclusion of Ulster.”  He 
added, “The idea of a conference on these lines fills me with alarm.”68  This shows that Unionist 
leaders still did not consider a settlement by exclusion a positive outcome of the home rule crisis, 
and hoped to force the government to abandon the bill entirely. 
 On September 26, 1913, Lansdowne highlighted the importance of keeping the Ulster 
unionists at arm’s length during any negotiations, as their priorities might differ from the party as 
a whole.  He wrote to Bonar Law, “I have always felt that we have to be extremely careful in our 
relations with Carson and his friends.  They are ‘running their own show’, and there is some 
advantage in our being able to say, as we can with perfect truth, that this is the case, and that we 
are in no sense responsible for their proceedings.”  At the same time, he recognized that the 
situation in the north of Ireland was, “from a party point of view, much the most important factor 
in our calculations.”  They would be “shabby fellows” if they abandoned the Ulster unionists 
after they had done all of the “rough work” in the anti-home rule campaign.69  Bonar Law hoped 
that Carson would rein in his extreme rhetoric, but thought overall that he had shown “wonderful 
restraint.”  The Party leader also indicated that they had not “determined seriously to consider an 
arrangement leaving Ulster out,” adding that the southern unionists must agree to exclusion.70 
 While the Unionist leaders deliberated, Bonar Law received an unexpected letter from F. 
Harcourt Kitchin, editor of the liberal Glasgow Herald.  He had spoken with Lloyd George, who 
felt, “the Ulster Unionists have every bit as good a claim for autonomy within their own province 
as the Nationalists have for autonomy in theirs.”  This again shows the propensity among British 
politicians to portray Ireland as neatly divided into two territories: one majority-nationalist and 
the other wholly unionist.  Lloyd George wanted the Unionists to ask for, “the right of Ulster to 
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exclude itself by popular vote,” which they could use as a basis for a conference.  Kitchin 
assured Bonar Law that Lloyd George was, “more in sympathy with Ulster than a good many of 
his associates” in the Cabinet.  The editor claimed that he had sent this letter on his own 
initiative, realizing the import of the conversation as a means of avoiding civil war.  However, 
Kitchin added a postscript in which he disclosed Lloyd George’s plans for land reform.71  This 
had nothing to do with avoiding civil war, and Lloyd George probably asked Kitchin to send the 
letter to apprise Bonar Law of his personal opinions without being accused of subverting the 
Prime Minister or the Cabinet.  He was also likely trying to coax a settlement offer out of the 
Unionists, which the Liberals could use to portray their opponents as weakening in their 
opposition to home rule.  The statements that Lloyd George sympathized with the Ulster 
unionists and favored exclusion were consistent with his opinions as privately expressed. 
The Kitchin letter was yet another sign that members of the government were moving 
toward a settlement based on exclusion, but this was not Lansdowne’s or Bonar Law’s preferred 
solution.  On October 4, 1913, Bonar Law said he “looked upon the solution of leaving Ulster 
out much more favourably” than Lansdowne, adding, “I have had the idea for very many years 
that that might perhaps in the end be a right method of dealing with the situation.”  Even so, the 
party leader considered, “such a solution is only a last resort, and nothing would seem to be more 
foolish than to give the enemy the idea that we were not only ready but anxious for a settlement 
on those lines.”  They still hoped to force an election, win it by a large majority, and deal with 
Ireland on their own terms.72  But, given the Unionists’ focus on Ulster during their anti-home 
rule campaign and their support for exclusion while debating both the Agar-Robartes and Carson 
amendments, it is understandable that the government thought this was their goal. 
The likelihood of a settlement by exclusion grew as the Unionist Party leaders’ esteem 
for the southern unionists fell.  During an October 8 meeting with Bonar Law, Carson described 
meeting with a delegation of southern unionists who were concerned that Unionist emphases had 
shifted toward excluding their northern counterparts from home rule.  This would leave the 
southerners within a home rule parliament and denuded of the numerical strength they could 
command when combined with the Ulster unionists.  Carson questioned the southern unionists’ 
resolve, and asked why they had not staged more displays of resistance to home rule.  Bonar Law 
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commented, “we are not justified in risking civil war for the sake of people who will take no 
risks even of a financial kind for themselves.”  He added of the southern unionists, “they have 
become more or less reconciled to the idea of Home Rule, and that indeed they realise that owing 
to the extension of Local Government their position under a Home Rule Parliament would not, 
apart from sentiment, be different from what it is now.”73  This is ironic given that Lord 
Salisbury’s Unionist administration had expanded Irish local government in 1898.  Carson wrote 
the next day of the southern unionists, “I do not think they realise that we have no power to stop 
the Bill and that even if we refuse the separate treatment of Ulster the Bill will probably become 
law all the same.”74  Lansdowne called the southerners, “very helpless and inarticulate…But they 
are quite powerful enough to provoke a serious outcry against us if we throw them over.”75  
Thus, Unionist leaders were moving from resisting exclusion because they did not want to 
“betray” the southern unionists, to considering that the latter were not doing enough to resist 
home rule.  As a result, they increasingly left the southern unionists out of their calculations. 
Asquith finally met with Bonar Law on October 15.  Given his public rhetoric, the 
Unionist leader’s most startling revelation was that his party cared more about the government’s 
bill to disestablish the Church of Wales than Irish self-government.  Bonar Law assured the 
Prime Minister that Carson was open to a negotiated settlement, and the latter’s uncompromising 
statements were merely designed to influence the British public.  The Unionist leader said his 
promises to support his Ulster counterparts were “contingent,” and if the government won an 
election on home rule his party would withdraw their support.  Bonar Law admitted the 
impotence of Irish unionists if left on their own, “it was really the certainty of British support 
which made the strength of the Ulster resistance.”  For his part, Asquith emphasized his party’s 
independence from the IPP, “the Nationalists without the support of the Liberal Party were 
powerless, and that if he or the Government decided on any course which commanded the 
support of their own party the Nationalists would have no choice but to accept it.”  Before they 
parted, Asquith secured an assurance from the Unionist leader that if some as-yet-undefined 
portion of Ulster was excluded, his party would not object to home rule for the rest of Ireland.76 
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Lansdowne thought that the position was “becoming extremely difficult.”  He feared that 
Asquith would make what the public regarded as a reasonable offer to resolve the crisis, and the 
Unionists would be exposed to popular backlash if they rejected it.77  Bonar Law wrote to a 
supporter that their strategy was to appear reasonable, coax an exclusion offer from the Prime 
Minister, and wait for Redmond to reject it, thereby making the IPP appear unreasonable and 
willing to selfishly risk civil war over their party’s interests.  He worried that Asquith would 
suggest excluding four counties and holding plebiscites in Fermanagh and Tyrone.  Bonar Law 
said this, “would be so reasonable that we would be in a very bad position if we had to refuse it,” 
but that Carson would not accept.78  Spectator editor John St. Loe Strachey wrote to the Unionist 
leader that they should not quibble over whether an exclusion settlement was labeled 
“temporary” or “permanent,” “No settlement that we could devise could be permanent if the 
people of the Plantation came to the conclusion that they did not want it to be permanent.  On the 
other hand no settlement though labelled as ‘temporary’ would ever prove temporary unless the 
Ulster people wanted it to be so.  We must not fight over a word.”79  The phrases “the people of 
the Plantation,” and “the Ulster people” refer to northern unionists, therefore this implies that 
Irish nationalists would have no say over exclusion.  Strachey’s last piece of advice is 
interesting, as over the next decade conflict between British governments and Irish parties was 
often perceived, sometimes erroneously, as fighting over words. 
Bonar Law met Asquith again on November 7, 1913.  The Unionist leader said that what 
“the Ulster people,” meaning the northern unionists, resented most was being treated differently 
from “the people in England and Scotland.”  He suggested that a “system of Home Rule” 
involving self-government for England, Scotland, and Wales, would provoke less opposition 
from the Ulster unionists.80  It is unclear whether this suggestion originated with Carson or Bonar 
Law.  The latter had supported Lloyd George’s federalist proposals in 1910, and the Irish 
unionist leader occasionally suggested that this was the only alternative to exclusion.81  In any 
case, Bonar Law did not say that Ulster, or some part of it, should receive its own legislature in a 
federal or devolutionary system.  This indicates that the Unionist leaders’ greatest objection to 
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home rule was differentiated treatment from Britain, not the potential religious or political 
tyranny of a Dublin parliament, as they often proclaimed. 
Asquith raised the question of how to define an “Ulster” area to exclude from the Home 
Rule Bill.  He and Bonar Law discussed “essentially Nationalist Counties” and “purely 
Protestant Counties,” indicating their belief that certain areas could be identified exclusively with 
one political and religious persuasion.  Asquith favored excluding a defined region for a 
specified period, and then holding a plebiscite of “the people of Ulster” as to whether they would 
join the Irish Parliament.  The implication was that this vote would take place among the 
inhabitants of the excluded area, not the entire province.  Bonar Law said of Carson and his 
followers, “the very minimum which they would accept would be the six Plantation Counties,” 
and from then on in their conversation, “it was assumed that by Ulster was meant these six 
Counties.”  Bonar Law added, “It is obvious that any settlement of this kind is out of the question 
if the Nationalists are determined not to have it; for the Unionists do not wish it, and you cannot 
impose a settlement which nobody wants.”  Asquith brushed this aside by asserting that 
Redmond and his deputies knew this was their last chance at home rule; they must choose 
between exclusion or nothing.82 
Bonar Law left the meeting with the impression that Asquith was going to get approval 
from his Cabinet and the Irish nationalists for four- or six-county exclusion.  He wrote to Walter 
Long, “if he makes us a definite proposal on these lines I don’t see that we could possibly take 
the responsibility of refusing it,” adding that if the Irish nationalists agree to exclusion, “our best 
card for the election will have been lost.”83  Long said of exclusion, “The proposal has no 
attractions for me: it is a clumsy expedient at best.”  He hoped that, “any offer the Government 
make will be so impossible as to enable us easily to refuse it.”  Long declared that the Unionists’ 
minimum demand should be the exclusion of the entire province of Ulster, “for all time, subject 
of course to her own wishes.”  He did not define how “her” wishes were to be ascertained.  There 
was little practical value in this suggestion, it was merely an idea to try to force the government 
into making a proposal that the Irish nationalists would reject.  Long reiterated that enabling 
home rule for any part of Ireland would leave them open to accusations of betraying the southern 
unionists, “the lot of the Protestants and Loyalists in many parts of Ireland will be a bitter one 
                                                 
82 UKPA, Bonar Law Papers, BL/33/6/93, Andrew Bonar Law, Memorandum, 7 November 1913. 





indeed if they are placed under the hell of an Irish Parliament.  However, it may be necessary to 
sacrifice them in order to escape from Civil War.”84 
Bonar Law had one more meeting with Asquith, on December 10.  Instead of the four- or 
six-county exclusion proposal the Unionist leader expected, the Prime Minister came bearing a 
new set of options.  He suggested either temporary exclusion, or home rule within home rule.  
Bonar Law rejected both.  He said that neither proposal would satisfy “Ulster,” meaning the 
northern unionists, adding, “the essence of their grievance was that they felt they had the right to 
be treated in the same way as the other citizens of the United Kingdom, and to have the 
protection of the British Parliament.”  Asquith admitted that neither idea would satisfy the Ulster 
unionists, but the proposals were reasonable and would undercut Unionist support in “England,” 
referring to Britain.  Bonar Law agreed that refusing the terms would hurt his chances of winning 
an election.  He suggested a settlement based on the exclusion of Ulster (he did not define the 
area), and leaving control of the post office, customs houses, and judiciary—even in the rest of 
Ireland—with Westminster.  The two parted having decided nothing.85 
Having thoroughly sounded out Bonar Law, Asquith decided to appeal directly to Carson.  
On December 23, 1913, the Prime Minister sent the Irish unionist leader a letter containing some 
“suggestions” for modifying the Home Rule Bill.  They would provide special treatment for a 
yet-to-be-defined area he called, “statutory Ulster.”  Asquith was careful to say that these were 
“not put forward as proposals,” and neither the Cabinet nor the Irish nationalists had approved 
them.  They were merely for encouraging discussion and “inviting counter-suggestions,” 
inveighing that the Prime Minister still wanted the Unionists to make proposals of their own.  
Asquith’s ideas included removing control of the post office and customs from the Irish 
Parliament, and having Westminster appoint judges to whom unionists could appeal if they felt 
Irish legislation was unjust.  In statutory Ulster, police control, land tenure, and factory and trade 
inspection would continue as they were.  While Westminster would remain the ultimate 
authority, there was some element of local control in that “Ulster Boards” would be created to 
oversee education and local government.  The area’s representatives would sit in the Irish 
Parliament, but if a majority of them felt that any legislation was unjust they could appeal to 
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Westminster.  All of this would remain in force until the Imperial Parliament decided 
otherwise.86  Asquith’s “suggestions” amounted to a form of home rule within home rule, though 
they would drastically limit the Irish Parliament’s powers and were potentially indefinite. 
Carson consulted Bonar Law on the “suggestions” but rejected them as, “the basis is the 
inclusion of Ulster in the Irish Parliament.”87  The Unionist Party leader said they were “utterly 
fantastic and have no sense in them at all,” but were likely a prelude to the exclusion of Ulster, 
which he expected to be Asquith’s next step.88 
Though the Unionists rejected the Prime Minister’s “suggestions” out of hand, they had 
no intention of ending the talks.  Bonar Law wrote on December 22, “our main object has been, 
and I think still should be, to act in such a way that we cannot be accused of unreasonableness or 
unwillingness.”89  At the same time, they were determined not to make proposals that enabled the 
passage of home rule.  Given that Unionists claimed they wanted a negotiated settlement, and 
even suggested general devolution of the United Kingdom, not making an offer of their own 
seems contradictory.  However, Unionist leaders held that it would be contrary to their principles 
to do anything that might ease the passage of any bill for Irish self-government.  As Hugh Cecil 
put it, “It is for Home Rulers to make Home Rule workable not for us.”90 
Asquith continued to try to draw settlement ideas out of the Unionist leaders, but the most 
he could do was coax a definition of “exclusion” from Carson.  The Irish unionist leader wrote 
on January 10, 1914, “when we spoke of the exclusion of Ulster I meant that Ulster should 
remain as at present under the Imperial Parliament—and that a Dublin Parliament should have no 
legislative powers within the excluded area.”  Carson added that this undefined area should 
continue to send representatives to Westminster, but not to Dublin.91 
 
Negotiations: Asquith and the Irish Nationalists 
While Asquith’s government moved toward a settlement by exclusion, IPP leaders 
remained unreceptive to the idea.  Churchill sounded out the nationalists through T. P. 
O’Connor.  The latter reported on October 7, 1913, that his colleagues would prefer postponing 
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home rule, “rather than consent to a mutilation of the country.”  He added, “This feeling is not 
due merely to the intense sense of Ireland as a national unit, but also to the fact that we have in 
Ulster and even in the Four Counties some of the truest Nationalists in Ireland.  Besides, as you 
know, the only minority in Ireland that suffers from religious persecution is the Catholic 
minority in the North.”92  On October 22, O’Connor described the idea of excluding Ulster as 
extremely unpopular among all Irish parties.  He wrote, “There is no proposal which is more 
resented by the Liberal Protestants and Unionist Home Rulers, and, I am told, even by a 
considerable section of the Carsonites themselves, than the separation of Ulster from the rest of 
Ireland.”93 
Asquith tried to gradually acclimatize Redmond to the idea of a compromise.  On 
November 17, the Prime Minister suggested that the Irish nationalist leader should, “be careful 
not to close the door to the possibility of an agreed settlement.”94  Four days later, having met 
with Bonar Law a second time, Asquith told Redmond that the only settlement the Unionists 
would entertain entailed permanent exclusion, “Ulster to mean an area to be settled by agreement 
and discussion.”  The Prime Minister said he would not countenance this idea, and added that 
Birrell felt “home rule within home rule” was also impossible.  During a Cabinet meeting, 
Herbert Samuel had suggested giving Ulster a veto over all legislation in the Irish Parliament, but 
his colleagues rejected this.  The only idea that gained credence among the Cabinet came from 
Lloyd George, who suggested that whatever area was defined as “Ulster” might be excluded 
from the bill, but would come in automatically after five years.  The government did not view 
this as a satisfactory settlement, but thought that proposing it might prevent violence in the north.  
Redmond said the Prime Minister had assured him that, “he [Asquith] would not dream of 
making any proposal to the other side except after the fullest consultation with me,” adding that 
if they agreed to make a proposal it would not come before June 1914.95 
Redmond rejected Lloyd George’s idea for temporary exclusion on November 24, 1913.  
He said, “our people, and especially in Ulster, would be shocked by the prospect of any 
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exclusion of Ulster.  Such exclusion, apart from its mutilation of Ireland, would expose our 
people in North-East Ulster to intolerable oppression.”  The Irish nationalist leader feared this 
solution, “would tend to perpetuate the sectarian differences we seek to extirpate.  It might even 
accentuate these differences.”  There was no solace in the time limit, as, “During the period of 
exclusion, the Orange leaders, flushed with this great victory, would devote themselves towards 
making what is temporary, perpetual.”  Moreover, if the Unionists won the next election they 
could make exclusion permanent.  Redmond discountenanced the idea of an Ulster unionist 
rebellion.  He urged Asquith to wait and force the Unionists to make settlement proposals of 
their own.  If these were not forthcoming, they might make an offer just as the Home Rule Bill 
was to become law.96  Asquith told the Cabinet that the Irish nationalist leader was personally in 
favor of home rule within home rule, but his colleagues would not permit him to suggest it.97  
Unbeknownst to Redmond, during his December 10 meeting with Bonar Law, the Prime 
Minister proposed temporary exclusion in spite of the Irish nationalist leader’s objections. 
Asquith assured the Irish nationalist leader on November 26, “There is no question at this 
stage of our making any ‘offer’ or ‘proposal’ to Mr Bonar Law.”  He added, “We must, of 
course, keep our hands free, when the critical stage of the Bill is ultimately reached, to take such 
a course as may in all the circumstances seems best calculated to safeguard the fortunes of Home 
Rule.”98  This seemed to accord with Redmond’s idea of making a settlement offer just as the 
measure was about to pass.  However, this was the last consultation between the two before 
Asquith sent his “suggestions” for a settlement to Carson on December 23, 1913.  Not only had 
he told Redmond that they would collaborate on any settlement offer, but none would be offered 
before June 1914.  Asquith tried to skirt these promises by insisting his “suggestions” were not to 
be considered “proposals,” and by sending them to Carson instead of Bonar Law.  Thus, the 
Prime Minister kept the strict letter of his word to Redmond while violating it in spirit.  
Moreover, Bonar Law was correct in supposing that this was not Asquith’s last word in 
conciliating the northern unionists. 
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The Prime Minister’s fears of an Irish nationalist revolt might have grown after 
November 25, 1913, if he had been paying attention to events in Dublin.99  That night, a self-
appointed committee met at the Rotunda and instituted the Irish Volunteers, a militant body 
formed with the vague mission to “secure and maintain the rights and liberties common to all the 
people of Ireland.”  It was unclear what they wanted, but some of the speakers tried to convey 
that they were not establishing a force to fight the northern unionists.  P. H. Pearse said the new 
movement was not antagonistic “to the Volunteer Companies which had been raised by the 
Unionists in the North-East of Ulster.  He could conceive circumstances in which it would be 
desirable and feasible for them to fraternise and cooperate with them.”  Pearse added, “Ireland 
armed would, at any rate, make a better bargain with the Empire than Ireland unarmed.”100 
The establishment of the Irish Volunteers was the culmination of nationalist conviction 
that, if unionists could organize militantly without government interference, so could they.  In 
October 1913 there had been a movement in Athlone, Co. Westmeath, to found a Midland 
Volunteer Force to defend home rule.101  This body eventually folded into the Dublin-based 
one.102  Shortly before the Irish Volunteers were established, labor leaders organized workers into 
a force to defend themselves against police during a massive strike known as the Dublin 
Lockout.  The Irish Citizen Army proved lasting, but attracted only a few hundred members.   
The Irish Volunteers were avowedly following the northern unionist example.  The 
organization originated with an article in the Gaelic League newspaper, An Claideamh Soluis, 
entitled, “The North Began.”  The writer, Eoin MacNeill, was a League founder and history 
professor at University College Dublin, as well as a home ruler and IPP supporter.103  However, 
other Irish nationalists seized on the suggestion of a public militant organization.  Bulmer 
Hobson, a member of the secret Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB), followed up on the article 
by visiting Michael O’Rahilly, editor of An Claideamh Soluis.  The IRB was committed to 
establishing an Irish Republic through physical force, and many members eschewed home rule 
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politics.  Neither MacNeill nor O’Rahilly were in the IRB, and the Gaelic League was officially 
apolitical, but half of the eight-man committee that organized the Irish Volunteers’ launch were 
Brotherhood members.  Of the thirty-man committee that initially governed the Volunteers, 
twelve were in the IRB from November 1913.  Four more joined within the next three years.104 
The Volunteers initially organized without IPP support, but the movement’s success 
forced Party leaders to acknowledge it.  Redmond threatened to start his own militant 
organization if the Volunteer committee insisted on retaining their independence, but by June 
1914 the two sides agreed to a compromise that added twenty-five handpicked IPP supporters to 
the thirty-member committee.105  Combined with his supporters already on the committee, this 
gave Redmond a majority.  By this time, the Irish Volunteers had enrolled approximately 
128,500 men.106  According to RIC estimates, they grew to 182,822 by September 1914.107 
Asquith and his Cabinet were oblivious to the formation of the Irish Volunteers, a 
significant development for their supposed allies in the IPP.  In January 1914, Asquith’s Cabinet 
decided they would consult the Irish nationalists on the timing of their offers to the Unionists, 
but not on their content.  Hobhouse recorded that during a January 22 meeting they agreed “to 
settle times with the Irish, but to do as we wished.”  The government believed that the Irish 
nationalist leaders would accept anything short of permanent exclusion.108 
The Prime Minister persisted in his efforts to accommodate Redmond to the idea of a 
negotiated settlement.  On February 2, the Prime Minister emphasized that the pressure on 
himself had increased when the King threw his weight behind a negotiated settlement.  He 
suggested that when Parliament reopened next week they should make a public offer they knew 
the Unionists would reject, to deprive them of “moral force.”  Asquith said they could offer to 
remove the post office and customs from the Home Rule Bill, grant Ulster local control over the 
RIC and education, and enable their representatives to appeal to Westminster.  These were 
essentially the concessions embodied in the “suggestions” that Asquith sent to Carson on 
December 23, 1913, without Redmond’s knowledge.  The Irish nationalist leader replied that he 
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and his colleagues would allow any settlement that preserved the integrity of Ireland and 
established an Irish Parliament with an executive responsible to it.109 
After consulting his IPP colleagues, Redmond backtracked in a letter rejecting Asquith’s 
settlement suggestions on February 4, 1914.  He said the ideas themselves were unacceptable, 
and now was not the time to offer any concessions.  Redmond wrote, “I might be forced into 
closing the door on proposals which, if they came at a later stage in the struggle, and under other 
circumstances, I might be in a position to consider in a different spirit.”  He added that any 
concessions would be seen as weakening on their part, “all offers to the Orange Party have up to 
the present greatly stimulated their movement.”  A handwritten note on Redmond’s copy of this 
letter indicates that he met with Birrell on February 5, and the Chief Secretary told the Irish 
nationalist leader, “his views would be carried out.”110 
While Asquith prepared to publicly offer concessions to the Unionists, a new suggestion 
surfaced unexpectedly.  Horace Plunkett, a former unionist who had gradually moved to support 
self-government, published a letter in The Times on February 10 that home rule should apply to 
all of Ireland for a certain number of years.  At the end of that unspecified time, each county 
within an agreed area of Ulster would hold a plebiscite to determine if they would remain under 
the Irish Parliament or transfer themselves to Westminster’s authority.111  Plunkett informed 
Carson that he did not support exclusion as, “The crux of the Irish question is to me the ability of 
the majority to deal fairly with the minority and, if the minority is almost wholly excluded, that 
issue cannot be tested.”112  The Times did not recommend the plan as it would not satisfy northern 
unionists, “The Ulstermen are convinced—rightly or wrongly, but quite immovably—that they 
have come to the crisis of their fortunes, the last stage of a struggle which must be settled here 
and now.”113  Asquith welcomed the plan, but did not think those who represented “the Protestant 
majority in certain Ulster counties” would accept it.114 
February 10, 1914 was a busy day for the Prime Minister; Plunkett’s plan was published, 
a new legislative session opened, and Asquith promised to present his own proposals for 
modifying the Home Rule Bill.  Speaking to Parliament, he referred several times to the 
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exclusion of “Ulster” but warned that the excluded area, “would inevitably become the cockpit 
of contending factions.”115 
Asquith told Redmond and the Cabinet that he would propose a plebiscite of each Ulster 
county to decide whether they would be included or excluded in home rule.  The only 
discrepancy was the time limit.  Lloyd George and Birrell led the nationalist leader to believe 
that whatever counties voted for exclusion would be left out for three years.  Redmond indicated 
that he and his colleagues were willing to accept this concession as the “price of peace,” and this 
should be the government’s “last word.”  If the Unionists rejected it, the Cabinet “should pass the 
Bill as it stands, and face any consequences in Ulster that may ensue.”116  On March 6, the Chief 
Secretary informed Redmond that the government had decided to double the exclusion period to 
six years.  The Irish leader told Asquith that this was disappointing, as, “we thought we had an 
understanding.”  He wanted a time limit of no longer than five years, showing that he was 
flexible on the issue, just not as flexible as the Prime Minister.117  Asquith argued that if 
exclusion lasted six years, a general election must take place during that period, a stipulation that 
would either satisfy the Unionists or disarm their contention that home rule should be submitted 
to the voters.  The Prime Minister assured Redmond that, under his scheme, the Home Rule Bill 
would become law in June 1914, the Irish Parliament would open the next year, and by June 
1921 they would achieve a united, self-governing Ireland.118 
If this was to be, it would not be under Asquith’s plan.  The Prime Minister presented his 
proposals to the Commons on March 9, and the Unionist leaders rejected them immediately.  
Carson famously said, “be exclusion good or bad, Ulster wants this question settled now and 
forever.  We don’t want sentence of death with a stay of execution for six years.”119 
 
The Army in Politics 
The Unionists were busy attacking home rule from a different angle: within the Army.  
Politicians had been gathering evidence of party feeling in the military for months.120  Brigadier-
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General J. E. “Johnnie” Gough, an India-born member of a Co. Waterford unionist family, was 
called upon to give his opinions.  Gough thought that the Army would not hesitate to act against 
“Ulster,” meaning the northern unionists, if the latter were the first to act provocatively, perhaps 
by rioting or “attacks on convents.”  However, if the “Ulster forces” showed discipline and a 
“correct attitude,” many in the Army would not move against them, and might even join them.  
Gough inserted his personal belief that a home rule government would be disloyal, dishonest, 
and priest-ridden.121 
By March 1914 the Army Annual Act—a yearly law that enabled the standing force to 
exist in peacetime—was due for debate, and the Unionists considered adding an amendment that 
the military could not be used to suppress anti-home rule agitation in Ulster.  R. B. Finlay, a 
lawyer and Unionist MP, wrote to Bonar Law stressing that the amendment’s language must be 
very specific.  They must ensure the British Army could not be used against unionists, but could 
be employed against Ulster nationalists should they provoke “deliberate rioting.”122  The issuing 
of orders to the Army in the King’s name was one of the royal prerogatives.  It is ironic that the 
Unionists—who had urged King George to utilize a privilege not employed in more than 200 
years by vetoing the Home Rule Bill—would try to curtail a monarchical right that was exercised 
frequently.  Bonar Law acknowledged strong feelings in Britain that the military should not be 
involved in politics, but wrote on March 16, “it seems to me that this is the best, and perhaps the 
only, chance of saving the Army.”  He added that Carson was very keen on the idea.123 
On March 21, news broke that a number of Army officers at the Curragh in Co. Kildare, 
the main British Army base in Ireland, had refused orders to move to Ulster and resigned.124  In 
fact, General Arthur Paget, Commander-in-Chief in Ireland, had orders to move north to 
reinforce a number of arms depots the Cabinet and military hierarchy thought vulnerable.125  
Churchill and J. E. B. Seely, Secretary of State for War, further instructed him to occupy 
positions controlling the approaches to Ulster from the south.126  Instead of conveying these 
orders forthrightly, Paget assembled the officers at the Curragh and told them that “active 
                                                 
121 Notes by Brigadier-General J. E. Gough on ‘Home Rule,’ in Ian F. W. Beckett, ed., The Army and the Curragh 
Incident, 1914 (London: Bodley Head, 1986), 35-39. 
122 UKPA, Bonar Law Papers, BL/31/3/2, R. B. Finlay to Andrew Bonar Law, 2 February 1914. 
123 UKPA, Bonar Law Papers, BL/34/2/39, Andrew Bonar Law to Henry Craik, 16 March 1914. 
124 Irish Independent (Dublin), 21 March 1914; The Times (London), 21 March 1914. 
125 H. H. Asquith to King George V, 18 March 1914; Extracts of the Diary of Lieutenant-General Sir John Spencer 
Ewart, 17-19 March 1914, in The Army and the Curragh Incident, 59-60, 62-63. 





Military operations” were to begin against Ulster.  He gave those “domiciled in Ulster” the 
option to “disappear” during active operations in the province, to be reinstated later.  Other 
officers who did not wish to take part could refuse, but would be dismissed from the service.127  
Thus, Paget did not deliver strict orders to his subordinates but enunciated a number of choices.  
The leader among the sixty-one officers to resign was General Hubert Gough, whose brother 
Johnnie had been advising Unionist politicians since September 1913.  In editing Charles 
Hobhouse’s diaries, historian Edward David found evidence that the first move the Curragh 
“mutineers” made was to inform Bonar Law’s London office of their actions.128 
The Cabinet called Gough to London and gave him a written assurance that the affair had 
been a misunderstanding.  However, Seely added two paragraphs pledging that the government 
would not use the Army to coerce “Ulster” into accepting home rule.  The Cabinet repudiated 
this, and Seely resigned.  General Henry Wilson, Director of Military Operations, convinced his 
boss the Chief of the Imperial General Staff John French to resign as well.  Wilson, a Co. 
Longford native, had been consulting the Unionist Party leaders for months and was heavily 
involved in the Curragh affair.  He had informed the Unionist leadership of every move among 
the military hierarchy, advised Gough throughout his Cabinet interviews, and sent a copy of the 
confidential document pledging non-coercion to Unionist MPs.129 
It is difficult to overstate the effect of the Curragh mutiny on the home rule issue.  The 
British Army, which contemporaries naively praised as apolitical, seemed to have taken sides on 
a strictly partisan political issue.130  The assurances Gough received ensured that the Army—a 
prime tool for enforcing the will of any government—could not function in a portion of the 
United Kingdom without political repercussions.  In the wake of the incident, Liberals and home 
rulers tried to focus the public on machinations involving the British Army.131  Unionists referred 
to it as “the plot against Ulster,” referring to their belief that the projected moves were a prelude 
                                                 
127 Notes by Lieutenant Colonel I. G. Hogg, 25 March 1914, in The Army and the Curragh Incident, 114-118. 
128 Edward David, Inside Asquith’s Cabinet, 169. The unsigned, undated telegram that David asserts was sent from 
the Curragh to Bonar Law on 20 March 1914 is in UKPA, Bonar Law Papers, BL/32/2/54. 
129 UKPA, Bonar Law Papers, BL/32/1/46, L. S. Amery to Andrew Bonar Law, 22 March 1914; UKPA, Bonar Law 
Papers, BL/32/1/50, “Message from General Wilson,” 23 March 1914; UKPA, BL/32/1/66, Edward Carson to 
Andrew Bonar Law, 26 March 1914; Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, I:131-132, 138-145. 
130 For assumptions that politics did not enter into the British Army see the following written by the son of a general 
involved in the Curragh affair: James Fergusson, The Curragh Incident (London: Faber and Faber, 1964), 27-28. 





to full-scale suppression of the UVF.132  Lord Stamfordham wrote on the King’s behalf, “this is a 
most serious disaster to the Army—worse than a defeat at the hands of an enemy—nothing to 
compare to it has happened in the history of our Country.”  He asked Bonar Law to press for the 
permanent exclusion of six counties from home rule, without referenda among the populace.133  
Stamfordham’s proposed solution again shows the readiness of British political elites to 
conciliate Irish unionists due to their ability to rebel, in this case with sympathy from the Army. 
The Curragh incident was followed weeks later by news that made the UVF seem to be 
acting with impunity.  On the night of April 24, 1914, unionists landed 20,000 rifles and 2 
million rounds of ammunition at Larne, Co. Antrim.  The UVF controlled the area around Larne 
for several hours.  They detained harbor officials and RIC who might have interfered.  One 
customs official had a heart attack and died in their custody, but no one else was hurt.134  The 
weapons were a hodgepodge of old firearms, some of which had no ammunition, causing 
historians to doubt their military efficacy.135  Politically, it was quite a coup.  The Curragh and 
Larne episodes seemed to show that the Ulster unionists could take control of portions of the 
province at will, and the government could not rely on the British Army to act against them. 
While momentum swung in the northern unionists’ favor, Redmond watched the Home 
Rule Bill continue to erode before his eyes.  An April 6 Cabinet memo proposed to exclude six 
counties of Ulster from home rule without plebiscite or time limit, namely, “until the Imperial 
Parliament otherwise provide.”  This unit, referred to as “Protestant Ulster,” would be 
administered by Westminster and would not receive its own government without the consent of 
the rest of Ireland.  The Irish Parliament would be denuded of its powers over the post office and 
customs.  United Kingdom devolution would be given new life, and an all-party Irish Convention 
summoned to consider how a united, self-governing Ireland would fit into this wider scheme.  
The memo was not signed.  The United Kingdom’s National Archive notes that it originated in 
the Irish Office, Birrell’s fiefdom.136  Lloyd George later revived many of the ideas contained 
within it, which suggests that he might have contributed.  This memo likely represents an offer 
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that Asquith’s government entertained after the failure of the March 9 proposals, only to be 
drowned in the furor over the Curragh and Larne incidents.  Nonetheless, Bonar Law and 
Redmond received drafts.  The Irish nationalist leader’s dismay at the suggestions is evident as 
he wrote on his copy, “What wd. become of the Irish Parliament?”137 
During an April 28 Parliament debate, Churchill challenged Carson to say, “Give me the 
Amendments to this Home Rule Bill which I ask for, to safeguard the dignity and the interests of 
Protestant Ulster.”138  He was essentially inviting the Irish unionist leader to table any alteration 
to the bill he wished.  Redmond wrote angrily to Asquith the same night that Carson would 
demand “That a larger area than the four counties should be excluded, and that the exclusion of 
Ulster should last until the Imperial Parliament otherwise ordered.”  These were the same 
stipulations contained in the April 6 Cabinet memo, and Redmond was likely venting his anger 
over that document as well.  He added, “it would be impossible for us to agree to any such 
demands.”  The Irish nationalist leader insisted that he and his lieutenants had only agreed to 
four-county exclusion for six years because the government assured them that this would be their 
last word.139  In a May 5 letter, Redmond protested against the idea of exclusion without 
plebiscites, as fewer than four counties might vote themselves out of home rule.  He argued, “It 
is obviously absurd and intolerable that while a majority of Unionists can exclude a county from 
the Irish Parliament, a majority of Nationalists should be refused the right to vote for their 
inclusion.”140 
Redmond’s outrage was for naught, as the government was no longer even informing him 
of their decisions before the opposition.  On May 5, the same day the Irish nationalist leader sent 
his letter, Asquith met with Bonar Law and Carson and told them that he intended to pass home 
rule and immediately introduce an amending bill to address Unionist concerns.141 
The extent of the strain on the Liberal-IPP relationship was not made public.  While the 
press speculated that Churchill’s speech probably irritated the Irish nationalists, The Times wrote 
that Redmond, rather than Asquith and his Cabinet, would likely dictate the terms of the 
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amending bill.142  In fact the IPP leader was surprised and incensed at the idea.  He wrote to the 
Prime Minister that its mere suggestion would convince the UVF that “they can bully the 
Government and the Irish Party to grant any terms they demand.”  Redmond added that the 
amending bill should contain no provisions beyond the March 9 proposals.143 
Bonar Law was almost as upset as Redmond at the idea that exclusion might soon be 
official government policy, but not for the same reasons.  On June 18 he wrote that the Unionist 
Party had always “represented” separate treatment for Ulster as vital to avoiding civil war, but 
“The one object at which we aim is to secure a general election.”  If the government offered “real 
exclusion” they might be “compelled to accept it” because they “must avoid the appearance of 
being unreasonable.”  The Unionist Party were trapped by their own rhetoric.  While they 
intended to use the Ulster unionists as leverage to force a general election, focusing on exclusion 
as a possible solution backfired when the government took them up on the idea.  Bonar Law 
hoped that the Irish nationalists would reject the amendments and break with the government, 
causing the appeal to the country he had been working toward all along.144  The Unionist leader 
seems to have been unaware that Asquith’s government was no longer consulting Redmond or 
his lieutenants on their moves regarding home rule. 
On May 12, 1914, Lloyd George announced that the amending bill would enable 
temporary exclusion by county votes, unless negotiations resulted in some other agreement.145  
This was likely a ploy to stave off further questions, as the Cabinet had already moved beyond 
temporary exclusion and plebiscites.  Still, the idea of county option made some Unionists 
uneasy because, despite their confident assertions regarding the predominantly “loyal” character 
of Ulster, they had no idea what plebiscites might reveal.  Lord Londonderry, one of Carson’s 
principal lieutenants, told the chief party whip Lord Balcarres in March that he was “much less 
confident about the actual majorities of Loyalists in Ulster counties than the average Unionist.”  
Balcarres added, “I had always assumed that a joint poll of Ulster counties would give a majority 
for the Union: even this now seems doubtful.”146 
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Bonar Law and his party refused to negotiate on the amending bill.  His strategy was to 
keep the crisis going until he forced an election, therefore he had no incentive to enable home 
rule by helping to frame the amending bill.  Moreover, he had trouble on his flank from the 
southern unionists.  As early as October 1913, Irish Unionist Alliance (IUA) leader Lord 
Midleton informed Bonar Law, “Some of my friends in Ireland—outside Ulster—are a good deal 
concerned at the turn matters are taking and the concentration of men’s minds upon the 
Exclusion of the 4 Ulster Counties.”147 
In April 1914, Midleton took his case to the press.  In a letter to The Times he claimed 
that, if home rule and exclusion passed, the southern unionists “will be literally thrown to the 
wolves in a hostile Parliament in which, without Ulster, they will have no representatives.”148  
Lord Stamfordham told Bonar Law that the King was “somewhat concerned” by the letter.  The 
monarch believed that the opposition were united in pursuing one of two goals: either forcing a 
general election or excluding a yet-to-be-defined area of Ulster until Westminster decided 
otherwise.  Midleton’s letter undermined that belief.149  This helps to explain why the King never 
bowed to Unionist pressure to dissolve Parliament and call a general election; he did not trust 
that the opposition had a workable strategy for addressing the demand for Irish home rule or the 
issues raised by their campaign against it.  Even Balfour, whom the Ulster unionists considered a 
staunch champion, felt that the focus on this group was causing problems within the Party.  He 
wrote in June 1914, “As regards Unionist opinion, the chief peril to be feared is the notion that 
the Leaders of the Party have compromised their Unionist principles for the sake of Ulster.”  
Even if they settled the Ulster question by exclusion, the party would have to find some way to 
“keep Home Rule as a living issue when the election does eventually come.”150  Unionist Party 
leaders still had no incentive to end the crisis, as they were relying on anti-home rule sentiment 
to win British votes.  With the southern unionists raising a rebellion over exclusion, they 
certainly did not want this type of settlement. 
 Bonar Law’s situation became more complex when the monarch decided to intervene 
again.  For months King George had been urging Asquith to call a conference on home rule to be 
held under royal auspices.  By mid-July the Prime Minister was on the verge of doing so, but 
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decided to make one final approach to the Unionist leaders.  He used Cabinet member Alec 
Murray, the Master of Elibank, as his emissary.  On July 15, Elibank assured Bonar Law that his 
words reflected “the view of the Prime Minister without consultation with the Nationalists.”  The 
proposal was to divide Ireland on explicitly religious lines, “a Protestant area should be created 
in Ulster, which would be excluded from the Home Rule Bill as a unit.”  The proposed region 
included the four counties of Antrim, Armagh, Down, and Londonderry, except for mostly 
Catholic areas of South Armagh and South Down.  Majority-Protestant parts of Donegal, 
Monaghan, and possibly Cavan would be added to the excluded area.  Elibank said that Tyrone 
was difficult, but the government was willing to “partition” it into two parts.  This was the first 
official proposal to exclude areas not based on county boundaries.  Carson insisted that all of 
Tyrone must be excluded from home rule.151 
Asquith tried again in person the next day, pitching the same settlement but adding that 
he would pressure Redmond into accepting it.  Bonar Law pounced at this, reminding the Prime 
Minister that Carson and his colleagues were full members of the Unionist Party, indicating that 
he did not have to obtain consent for a settlement from an outside body.  He added that there was 
no question of intimidating northern unionists, as “the people of Ulster knew that they had a 
force which would enable them to hold the Province.”  Again, violence was to be the main 
arbiter of the Irish question.  Asquith reverted to the idea of county option by plebiscite, stating 
that he would publicly disclaim temporary exclusion—which he had privately abandoned 
already—and whatever counties voted out of home rule would only be included later if they 
voted in as a unit.  It was a desperate plea, and the Unionists recognized it as such.  Bonar Law 
and Carson left the meeting without so much as a reply.  Two hours later, Elibank informed them 
that the King was calling a conference to discuss home rule.152 
The Buckingham Palace Conference sat each day between July 21 and 24, 1914.  Asquith 
and Lloyd George represented the government, Redmond and Dillon the IPP, and Bonar Law, 
Lansdowne, Carson, and James Craig the Unionists.  James Lowther, a Unionist and the Speaker 
of the House of Commons, acted as chairman.  The group discussed a number of possible 
settlements, most of them differing on the area and time limit of exclusion.  The conference 
members had large maps showing the province of Ulster broken into parliamentary 
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constituencies, complete with statistics on their religious populations and voting behavior.153  
During the discussions, Lowther became the latest Unionist to be disabused of his 
preconceptions regarding Ulster.  He later wrote, “The difficulty of separating the Protestant and 
Roman Catholic populations…appeared insuperable.  We found large pockets of Catholics in the 
midst of a Protestant community, and vice versâ.”154  There was no “Ulster” that could easily be 
defined as wholly Protestant or Catholic, unionist or nationalist, nor were there counties that fell 
neatly into these categories. 
From the outset, Carson, Redmond, and Dillon all agreed that the scheme that would lead 
most swiftly to an all-Ireland parliament would be to exclude the entire province of Ulster.  The 
almost equal populations of unionists and nationalists across the nine counties ensured that the 
province would eventually vote for unity.  However, the IPP could not be seen as abandoning 
such a large Ulster nationalist population.  Asquith suggested exclusion based on poor law union 
areas, which pleased neither Carson nor Redmond.  The Prime Minister suggested the scheme 
that Elibank had discussed with the Unionist leaders, beginning with the four-county area but 
adding and subtracting to it by parliamentary constituencies.  Redmond wanted to discuss county 
option, but the Unionists refused.  Carson declared that, if all-Ulster exclusion was not on the 
table, he demanded that he called the six “Plantation Counties” be left out of home rule.  
According to Redmond’s account of the conference, Carson coupled this demand with an appeal 
for “a complete system of Administrative Autonomy as would leave the management of all local 
affairs practically in the hands of the majority.”155  Bonar Law recorded that Carson assured the 
Irish nationalist leader that the Ulster unionists “would not in any way control the Catholics 
within the excluded area,” as they would remain under the Westminster Parliament.156  This was 
the first time that the Irish unionist leader demanded a form a local government for the excluded 
area. 
Both the Irish nationalists and unionists insisted that they must have all of Tyrone, the 
former because the population was majority-nationalist and the latter on the grounds that 
unionists were the principal employers and paid most of the taxes.  Bonar Law even implied that, 
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if the county was only excluded temporarily, unionist proprietors would fire their nationalist 
employees to force them to leave the county.157  Asquith suggested that Tyrone be left out for two 
years and a plebiscite held to decide whether it would join the Irish Parliament.  Carson objected, 
“But they will vote themselves in,” prompting Lowther to ask, “Are you proposing that the 
people themselves should never be consulted?”  Hobhouse, after hearing Asquith’s report of the 
exchange, said that the Speaker was “at last awake to their intentional obstruction.”158 
As the participants prepared to leave the Buckingham Palace Conference on July 24 
without an agreement, Asquith was shocked to see Craig shaking hands with Dillon, and Carson 
tearfully bidding farewell to Redmond.159  Disappointing as the lack of agreement was, larger 
events were overtaking the Irish quarrel.  Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-
Hungarian throne, had been assassinated in Belgrade less than a month earlier.  London’s Daily 
Express, an avid unionist paper, expected life and politics to go on as usual, asserting, “Such a 
murder as this changes nothing.”160  The Prime Minister disagreed.  Asquith wrote the day the 
Buckingham Palace Conference ended, “we are within measurable, or imaginable, distance of a 
real Armageddon, which would dwarf the Ulster & Nationalist Volunteers to their true 
proportion.”161  On August 4, Germany declared war on and invaded Belgium, prompting the 
United Kingdom to declare war against Germany.  The United Kingdom’s political parties 
agreed to a domestic truce to concentrate on the war effort. 
Despite this, Asquith decided, under pressure from Redmond, to put the Home Rule Bill 
on the statute book.  Irish self-government became law in the United Kingdom on September 18, 
1914, though a deal with the Unionists stipulated that it would not be implemented without the 
simultaneous enactment of the amending bill.162  Carson was incensed at this maneuver, and 
threatened to withhold Ulster unionist support for the war effort.163  Only his British counterparts’ 
pleas that an unpatriotic attitude now would damage the Ulster unionists’ case against home rule 
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after the war convinced him to relent.164  By passing home rule, Asquith cemented the IPP’s 
support for British Army recruiting.  Some Irish nationalists, particularly Sinn Féin, opposed the 
war effort, but by mollifying the IPP the Prime Minister seemingly gained the cooperation of the 
vast majority of the Irish populace.  Asquith may also have thought that placing home rule on the 
statute book absolved him of his home rule pledge, given grudgingly back in December 1909.165  
The fact that Irish self-government had still not been enacted was a significant caveat, but 
Asquith had shown a willingness to technically keep faith with Redmond, while violating his 
promises in spirit. 
 
Conclusions 
 The year 1913 opened with the first Unionist exclusion suggestion in the form of 
Carson’s amendment to leave the entire province of Ulster out of home rule.  This was rejected 
in Parliament, and the United Kingdom appeared to many to be on an inexorable path to civil 
war.  The Loreburn letter and King George’s intervention finally forced Asquith to negotiate 
with the Unionists.  Bonar Law and his lieutenants wanted the Prime Minister to dissolve 
Parliament and call an election.  Instead, Asquith took the Unionists’ statements that their Ulster 
supporters required special treatment at face value, and framed his settlement suggestions 
accordingly.  The Prime Minister was instrumental in defining the area to be excluded in 
religious terms.  He moved from proposing to exclude “statutory Ulster” to offering a definition 
of “Protestant Ulster,” despite his own admissions that any administrative division of the island 
would exacerbate political and religious strife in Ireland. 
Exclusion suggestions of any kind caused problems for Bonar Law.  Settling the home 
rule crisis would preclude a general election, and if he rejected a reasonable compromise he 
risked ruining his party’s chances of winning a vote.  The idea of exclusion also caused 
discontent among Ireland’s southern unionists, whom the leadership was increasingly willing to 
jettison from their calculations. 
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Unionist Party leaders hoped that the Irish nationalists would reject all exclusion 
proposals, ruining any potential deal and making the government appear unable to deliver a 
compromise.  Instead, Asquith and the Cabinet simply charted their own course, only belatedly 
and sometimes misleadingly informing Redmond of their offers.  Despite their displeasure, the 
IPP were unwilling to turn against a government that had introduced a home rule bill, and had 
little choice but to acquiesce as the Cabinet’s exclusion proposals gradually encompassed more 
territory for a longer period of time.  While the area and time limit of exclusion were the most 
controversial issues, Redmond also tried to insist that there be a democratic element.  However, 
the government and the Unionists gradually moved away from proposals that would enable the 
inhabitants of Ulster—unionist or nationalist—to vote on whether they wanted home rule or not. 
The third home rule crisis did not reach a resolution.  The First World War intervened 
just when it appeared that all attempts at compromise had failed, and there must either be home 
rule and violence or an election and an uncertain future for Irish self-government.  The party 
truce was designed to hold all controversial domestic issues in stasis, but this also meant that the 
resentment and discontent among all parties at the ways in which the debate had developed were 
also left in place.  Some Irish nationalists had never believed that the British government was 
sincere in offering home rule, or in the IPP’s ability to compel such a concession.  The delay in 


















CHAPTER 4  
HOME RULE DURING A WORLD WAR:   
THE LLOYD GEORGE PROPOSALS AND THE IRISH CONVENTION, 1916-1918 
 
Introduction 
 Before the shock of the Easter Rising had worn off, politicians began discussing how 
they would reform the government of Ireland.  The failed rebellion seemed to show the necessity 
for sweeping changes. Following a visit to Ireland, Prime Minister H. H. Asquith appointed his 
Cabinet’s top negotiator, David Lloyd George, to find a settlement that would be acceptable both 
to Irish nationalists and unionists.  The formula he proposed involved the immediate introduction 
of the 1914 Home Rule Act, the seminal achievement of constitutional nationalism, but the 
exclusion from its powers of six northeastern counties in which there was a large Protestant and 
unionist population.  The negotiations failed amid a welter of competing interpretations and 
accusations of underhandedness, particularly relating to whether exclusion would be temporary 
or permanent.  Some commentators downplay allegations of “treachery” against Lloyd George 
and join him in blaming the southern unionists for wrecking the settlement.1 
Historians often note the short-term effects of the negotiations’ failure.  It was a further 
blow to constitutional nationalism in the face of surging Sinn Féin sympathy.2  Irish unionists’ 
continuing aloofness from home rule showed that the IPP policy of unity through the war effort 
was failing.3  Alvin Jackson argues that Edward Carson’s support of the proposals damaged his 
backing among northern unionists due to the seeming abandonment of their comrades in three of 
Ulster’s nine counties.4  It should be noted that Carson remained the Ulster unionist leader and 
reverence for him among many in this political tradition continued, while the IPP and its leaders 
faded from prominence in part due to their perceived acceptance of partition.5  Ronan Fanning 
highlights the episode as the first instance of the Unionist Party’s “stranglehold” on the 
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government’s Irish policy.  He attributes Lloyd George’s promotion of unionist-inspired policies 
to ambition.6  While Lloyd George certainly acted to further his own career, both his personal 
and political proclivities inclined him more toward unionist stances on Irish issues than British 
Liberal or Irish nationalist positions. 
The Lloyd George proposals had a significance beyond the short term, and influenced the 
character of the two Irish political entities that exist today.  Fanning asserts that the proposals 
“blazed the trail towards partition,” but variations of this idea had been mooted at least as early 
as the January 1910 election.7  I argue that, over the course of the 1916 negotiations, partition 
assumed the form that would eventually be enacted, and Lloyd George was its primary author.  
Though only four of the counties to be excluded were majority Protestant and unionist, Lloyd 
George proposed to meet Carson’s demand, enunciated in 1913, by excluding two more.8  The 
British government would not hold plebiscites to determine the wishes of people within that 
region, and the temporal length of this division would depend, not on public sentiment within the 
six counties, but on parliamentary politics at Westminster.  This form of partition proved the 
most lasting aspect of Lloyd George’s failed attempt at settlement in 1916. 
Following the miscarriage of private negotiations, the government, which changed hands 
from Asquith’s leadership to that of Lloyd George in December 1916, decided on a new 
departure.  Historian John D. Fair asserts that conferences were one of the “safety-valves” for the 
British democracy, providing a space in which, “the participants could rise above the petty 
demands of party and personal ambition for the sake of the entire nation and posterity.”9  Despite 
such lofty ideals, most historians describe the Irish Convention as a non-event.  There is only one 
book devoted solely to its proceedings, R. B. McDowell’s The Irish Convention (1970).  A 
reviewer dismissed it by asserting that the Convention was undeserving of a book-length study.10  
In 1968, F. S. L. Lyons called the Convention a “gigantic irrelevancy,” citing the refusal of Sinn 
Féin and some sections of Irish labor to participate, as well as the intransigence of Ulster 
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unionists on home rule.11  Most historians agree with these assertions, and add that the 
conference was a device Lloyd George used to postpone the contentious Irish question, not a 
legitimate attempt to find a solution.12  Patrick Maume considers the Convention at some length, 
but frames it as a part of the IPP’s eclipse by Sinn Féin, assuming that any agreement come to 
would have been rejected by most nationalists and northern unionists.13 
There is evidence to support the idea that Lloyd George wanted to keep Ireland quiescent 
during the war.  But, whether he intended for the Convention to reach an agreement or not, it 
came close to doing so.  The Prime Minister admitted that, if the conference succeeded, he would 
have to implement its findings.  The assumption that Sinn Féin’s non-participation doomed the 
Convention marks an ahistorical focus on this organization, which was one of a number of 
political groupings vying for popularity in 1917.  Similarly, the assertion that Ulster unionists 
would block any settlement is based on an assumption, and ignores the events of the 
conference.14 
 Most historians disregard the fact that the Convention had very tangible results for Irish 
unionism.  During the talks, southern unionist leader Lord Midleton led some of his supporters to 
agree to a tentative home rule deal to avoid partition.  This fractured southern unionists into 
several different factions, forcing them to reconsider their positions on Irish self-government and 
unity.  Jackson notes that disagreements between southern and Ulster unionists further alienated 
these groups from one another, but barely touches upon the fact that the conference provoked a 
lasting split within the former group.15  Patrick Buckland notes the Convention’s profound effects 
on southern unionism, but sees it as part of an almost inevitable process of decline, rather than an 
evolution in the political thought of many individuals within this group.16 
                                                 
11 F. S. L. Lyons, John Dillon: A Biography (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968), 421. 
12 Paul Bew, Ireland: The Politics of Enmity, 1789-2006 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 383; Fair, British 
Interparty Conferences, 222-223; Fanning, Fatal Path, 162-163; R. F. Foster, Modern Ireland, 1600-1972 (London: 
Allen Lane, 1988), 486; Alvin Jackson, “Irish Unionism, 1870-1922,” in Defenders of the Union: A Survey of 
British and Irish Unionism since 1801, ed. D. George Boyce and Alan O’Day (London: Routledge, 2001), 132; 
Michael Laffan, The Partition of Ireland, 1911-25 (Dundalk: Dundalgan, 1983), 56; Joseph V. O’Brien, William 
O’Brien and the Course of Irish Politics, 1881-1918 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 232. 
13 Patrick Maume, The Long Gestation: Irish Nationalist Life, 1891-1918 (New York: St. Martin’s, 1999), 196-203. 
14 In the collection Defenders of the Union (2001), cited above, Alvin Jackson endorses the traditional view of the 
Convention as irrelevant and doomed by Sinn Féin’s absence as well as Ulster unionist intransigence. He questions 
all of this and calls the Convention “more than an elitist talking-shop” in Home Rule: An Irish History, 1800-2000 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 178-181. 
15 Jackson, “Irish Unionism 1870-1922,” 132-133; Jackson, Home Rule, 183. 
16 Patrick Buckland, Irish Unionism: One, The Anglo-Irish and the New Ireland, 1885-1922 (Dublin: Gill and 






Lloyd George’s Proposals 
Political changes followed swiftly after the Easter Rising.  The United Kingdom’s 
primary administrator in Ireland, Chief Secretary Augustine Birrell, resigned on May 3.  John 
Dillon, a top lieutenant to IPP leader John Redmond, felt that this was an opportunity for 
sweeping out the rest of the administration from Dublin Castle and establishing a “Home Rule 
Executive.”17  Redmond disagreed that such extensive changes were feasible, but knew that he 
had to alter his own policies.  He wrote to Dillon on May 4 recounting a meeting with a member 
of the administration, “I clearly indicated that our unquestioning support of the Government was 
at an end.”18  The statement is significant as the IPP leader indicates that he supported the 
government when he should have defied them, and that he would not make that mistake again. 
Prime Minister H. H. Asquith visited Ireland between May 11 and 19.  On his return, he 
tried to convince Lloyd George to become the new Chief Secretary for Ireland.  The Prime 
Minister asked him on May 22 to “take up Ireland: at least for a short time.”19  Lloyd George 
declined the post, but agreed to act as an intermediary between the Irish parties.20 
 Lloyd George was ostensibly a neutral arbitrator, and portrayed himself as a home ruler.21  
However, as a consistent supporter of exclusion his position was closer to the Unionists than to 
Irish nationalists.  During the 1916 talks, Lloyd George assured a northern unionist, “I have 
always been sympathetic to the claims of Ulster, and as a Protestant Nonconformist I have a 
thorough appreciation of the Ulster anxieties about Home Rule.”22  His anti-Catholicism has been 
noted, and while this was not widely known, those who were aware of it knew that it gave 
unionists the upper hand in negotiations under his auspices.  Ulster Unionist Council (UUC) 
member James Stronge wrote in 1917, “Carson says that Lloyd George is decidedly anti-papist 
and that his feelings on this point are a help to us.”23   
                                                 
17 National Library of Ireland (NLI), John Redmond Papers, Ms. 15,182/22, John Dillon to John Redmond, 3 May 
1916. 
18 NLI, John Redmond Papers, Ms. 15,182/22, John Redmond to John Dillon, 4 May 1916. 
19 UKPA, Lloyd George Papers, LG/D/14/1/5, H. H. Asquith to David Lloyd George, 22 May 1916. 
20 UKPA, Lloyd George Papers, LG/D/14/3/34, Austen Chamberlain to H. H. Asquith, 22 June 1916. 
21 David Lloyd George, “Motion for Adjournment,” HC Deb 24 July 1916 vol 84 cc1427-70, Hansard 1803-2005; 
David Lloyd George, War Memoirs, 6 vols. (London: Odhams, 1938), I:418. 
22 UKPA, Lloyd George Papers, LG/D/14/2/13, David Lloyd George to R. J. Lynn, 5 June 1916. 





During the war, Lloyd George developed a friendship with Carson.  The two were 
colleagues in Asquith’s war Cabinet between May and October 1915.  By October he was 
considering asking Carson to join him in forming a new party, so that the two might remove 
Asquith as Prime Minister.  In July 1916, Lloyd George suggested to his close associates that 
Carson should become Premier.24  He was toying with these ideas while negotiating a deal 
between the Irish unionist leader and his nationalist opponents.  Had Lloyd George’s thoughts 
been widely known, little would have irritated Irish nationalists more than to suggest that Carson 
should be put in the United Kingdom’s top political post. 
Even before the announcement of his role as “Head Pacificator,” as some of his 
correspondents called him, Lloyd George began to outline his ideas to Carson and Redmond.25  
On May 25 he wrote to Redmond that the Cabinet did not want any public statement made 
relating to “the basis of the settlement.”  He added that Carson and Craig had informed him that 
“if at this stage anything of that kind were said it would raise hell in Ulster and destroy every 
chance of success.”26  This implies that the party leaders already had an idea of Lloyd George’s 
general terms, and that they were favorable to the Irish nationalists.  Throughout the negotiations 
Lloyd George inculcated a feeling among the participants that they were united in attempting to 
achieve a common goal, and they may have to overcome great obstacles thrown up by those 
outside their circle in order to do so.  Lloyd George encouraged this feeling in Carson with a 
June 3 letter telling him that the southern unionists and their supporters in the Cabinet—erstwhile 
allies of the Irish unionist leader—were “working hard to prevent a settlement.”27 
Little information on the content of the talks leaked to the press.  Several London papers 
stated that Carson was demanding a “clean cut” of six counties in Ulster, meaning their complete 
exclusion from the operation of home rule.  The Times speculated that Carson would likely get 
what he demanded.28  Reacting to such rumors, the Irish Independent declared that nationalists 
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should resist any deal that would divide the island.  The paper warned that such 
“dismemberment” might be presented as temporary, but was likely to prove permanent.29 
In the first week of June, Carson and Redmond suddenly left London for Ireland.  Carson 
outlined Lloyd George’s proposals at a June 6 UUC meeting in Belfast.  Reports of the 
consultation confirmed press speculation as to the terms being offered.  The most widely 
discussed aspect was that six counties: Antrim, Armagh, Down, Fermanagh, Londonderry, and 
Tyrone, would be excluded from home rule.30  The Irish Independent retorted, “This plan is more 
objectionable than any arrangement previously suggested.”31  On June 9, a number of Catholic 
clergy in northern dioceses published letters protesting exclusion.32  Joseph Devlin, MP for 
majority-nationalist West Belfast and Redmond’s principal lieutenant in Ulster, had sounded out 
several of the bishops on the proposals days before.  They were all hostile.  Patrick O’Donnell, 
Bishop of Raphoe, warned Devlin, “the Party could not survive the offer of such proposals to the 
country,” adding, “the country…was rational, democratic, & responsible, but the present 
proposals were not so.”  On June 3, Devlin predicted that the Belfast nationalists, many of them 
his own constituents, would approve the proposals, but no one else would.33 
With nationalist sentiment swinging against the settlement, Redmond explained the terms 
in greater detail at an IPP meeting on June 10.  The 1914 Home Rule Act was to come into 
operation immediately, except in the six excluded counties.  This arrangement would last until 
one year after the end of the war, when an Imperial Conference involving representatives of the 
self-governing dominions would review the entire situation, including partition.34  The press 
recognized that the Irish leaders were giving different versions of the proposals; in Carson’s the 
exclusion of the six counties was to be “definite” or permanent, while under Redmond’s it would 
be “provisional” or temporary.35 
This question of whether exclusion was to be temporary or permanent became the most 
controversial aspect of the Lloyd George proposals.  Both Carson and Redmond had received the 
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proposals in written form before leaving London.36  The text did not explicitly address the issue 
of exclusion’s permanence, though it did say that the bill—referring to new legislation to 
implement the agreement—would remain in force until a year after the end of the war.  After that 
time the settlement could continue in its existing form, or it could be altered by an act of 
Parliament.  All of this accorded with Redmond’s statements.  Before Redmond left London, he 
obtained an assurance from Lloyd George that he and Asquith would uphold the written 
proposals.  The IPP leader wrote, “we could rely upon him and the Prime Minister not to tolerate 
any further concessions being sprung upon us.”  Lloyd George would “stand or fall by the 
agreement come to.”37  He likely requested this assurance to avoid a recurrence of the constant 
pressure that Asquith had placed on him in 1914 for further concessions.  Devlin also made a 
note of the terms that Lloyd George had authorized them to convey to his constituents.  They 
included, “The arrangement was to be temporary,” “During the interval the Irish representation 
at Westminster would be retained in full strength,” and “There would be no separate Parliament 
for the six counties.”38 
Carson recognized that the proposals did not state whether exclusion would be permanent 
or temporary, and sought clarification.  When Lloyd George sent the Irish unionist leader the 
document on May 29 he included the oft-quoted note, “We must make it clear that at the end of 
the provisional period Ulster does not, whether she wills it or not, merge in the rest of Ireland.”39  
Most subsequent observers interpret this as a commitment to permanent partition.40  David 
George Boyce and Alvin Jackson have pointed out that this is only a statement that the excluded 
area would not be added to the home rule area except by an act passed at Westminster.  Boyce 
observes that this is a rejection of Redmond’s interpretation that the six counties would join the 
Irish Parliament automatically at the end of the provisional period.41  Jackson notes that it would 
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make the permanence of partition contingent on “the sympathies of the party in power.”42  Both 
assert that Carson and Redmond were likely aware of the proposals’ ambiguity on this crucial 
issue, and accepted it in their eagerness for an immediate settlement.43  This does not seem likely, 
as the leaders of both Irish parties pushed Lloyd George to clarify the terms of exclusion.  While 
technically correct that the May 29 note was a confirmation that ending partition required a new 
act of Parliament, unionists interpreted this as a pledge to permanent exclusion.  Carson wrote a 
letter to the press to this effect in 1924.44 
UUC member Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery wrote after their June 12 meeting, 
“Carson holds a letter from Lloyd George stating that the proposed Amendment of the 
Government of Ireland Act is to be a definitive one and not an Emergency Measure for the 
duration of the war.”  Regardless of the technicality that partition could only be ended by an act 
of Parliament, Montgomery interpreted this as permanent partition.  He wrote, “The Ulster 
Unionist will be more or less on velvet when the matter comes to be finally settled.”45   
One aspect of the May 29 note that few contemporaries or historians remark upon was 
that it denied the right of people in the six counties—nationalist or unionist—to decide their 
future status for themselves.  Only Bishop O’Donnell’s statement that the proposals were not 
“democratic” hints at this.  Many contemporaries—including Irish nationalists—often said that 
“Ulster,” referring to the excluded area, should not come into a home rule parliament until the 
population wished to do so.46  This maxim ignored the significant minority in the six counties in 
favor of immediate home rule, and in any case the Lloyd George proposals did not embody this 
pronouncement.  In Lloyd George’s private assurance, the phrase “whether she wills it or not” 
denies any element of choice or, to use a phrase coming into vogue during the First World War, 
of self-determination.  The fact that the proposals contained no provision for gauging the wishes 
of the six-county population, as discussed during the 1914 Buckingham Palace Conference, 
confirms that the inhabitants would not be consulted on the region’s future.47 
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Carson responded to Lloyd George’s written proposals with a memorandum outlining 
what he understood them to mean.  This included, “The 6 counties mentioned in paragraph 2 are 
to be excluded from the Government of Ireland Act and are not to be included unless at some 
future time the Imperial Parliament pass an Act for that purpose.”  This is in accordance with 
Boyce and Jackson, but combining this with his later statements it is evident that Carson 
interpreted this as permanent exclusion.  The proposals suggest that the excluded area would 
require some alternate form of administration, and Carson seized upon this as an offer of self-
government, at least in administering local government, education, the post office, customs, and 
land purchase.48  These interpretations ran counter to both of the major principles in Devlin’s 
understanding of the proposals: that the settlement would be temporary and the six counties 
would not have its own government.  The text of the proposals and Carson’s interpretation skirt 
the second point by not suggesting that the six counties should have a “parliament.” 
On the thorny issues of the geographic area and time limit involved in exclusion, Lloyd 
George’s proposals gave the Ulster unionists everything their leaders had demanded during the 
Buckingham Palace Conference.  Carson stated publicly that he had asked Lloyd George to 
exclude all of Ulster.49  He had to do this in order to mollify his supporters, both in the nine 
counties and in Britain.  Privately, Carson admitted that the proposals met his demands on behalf 
of the Ulster unionists, as did British unionist leaders Andrew Bonar Law, Hugh Cecil, Austen 
Chamberlain, and Lord Lansdowne.50  James Craig later admitted that during the negotiations he 
and Carson asked Lloyd George to exclude six counties, not nine.51 
 
Party Approval and Cabinet Disapproval 
Despite the public disagreement over the length of exclusion, both parties moved forward 
with their votes on the proposals.  Unbeknownst as yet to Redmond, Dillon, or the public, Carson 
was armed with Lloyd George’s private assurance of May 29, and could confidently assure his 
followers that his interpretation of the proposals was the correct one.  On June 12, the UUC 
passed resolutions protesting the introduction of home rule, but because the Cabinet thought it 
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necessary to introduce self-government, “as loyal citizens…in this crisis of the Empire’s history 
it is our duty to make sacrifices.”52  The proceedings were never published, but Ronald McNeill 
emphasized the sacrifice that six-county unionists were making by agreeing to part with their 
colleagues in the three Ulster counties that would be included in home rule.  He wrote of the 
June 12 meeting, “It was the saddest hour the Ulster Unionist Council ever spent.  Men not prone 
to emotion shed tears.  It was the most poignant ordeal the Ulster leader ever passed through.”53  
Publicly, northern unionists and their supporters upheld this moment as a sacrifice they made in 
the interests of peace with the Irish nationalists and the strengthening of the Empire.54 
Privately, many unionists admitted that six-county exclusion was better politics than 
pushing for its extension to the entire province.  This had been Carson’s policy since 1913, 
though most of his Ulster unionist colleagues were unaware of it.55  One of the arguments the 
Irish unionist leader used in his June 6 speech to the UUC was purely utilitarian.  According to 
Carson’s official biographer, he said that the nine counties would contain approximately 869,000 
Protestants and 700,000 Catholics, leading him to project a unionist parliamentary majority of 
one.  The six-county population would comprise 825,000 Protestants and 432,000 Catholics, 
with a unionist majority of seven representatives.56  Montgomery recognized that the nine 
counties currently elected seventeen nationalists and sixteen unionists to Westminster, therefore 
unionists could not consider their position secure if that area were excluded.57  R. I. McConnell 
of Belfast wrote in congratulations to Carson, “as regards practical politics, the exclusion of six 
counties is a better proposition than nine.”58  A note in Unionist Party leader Andrew Bonar 
Law’s papers on the situation in Ulster describes “her sacrifice” as “more psychological than 
real.”59 
While Carson assuaged the northern unionists, IPP leaders remained nervous that they 
could not convince their supporters in Ulster to back the proposals without a declaration that the 
agreement would be temporary.  W. H. Owen, who was in Ireland as Lloyd George’s eyes and 
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ears, reported that Devlin and Dillon wanted a pronouncement to this effect.60  The Prime 
Minister seemed to rise to the occasion.  During a speech at Ladybank on June 14, Asquith said 
regarding Ireland, “what is desired now is a provisional settlement.  When the war comes to an 
end, when the reign of peace is reestablished, we shall have to take stock, as an Empire, of our 
internal relations.”61  On June 16, Dillon wrote to Lloyd George that Asquith’s remarks were 
fortunate, as if the unionist interpretation of exclusion as “definite” had been confirmed, “all the 
nationalists in Ireland would have been unanimous in rejecting the proposals with contempt.”62 
Jeremiah MacVeagh, nationalist MP for South Down, continued to urge Lloyd George to 
declare the deal temporary, and to add that the proposals’ implementation would be followed by 
plebiscites.  MacVeagh suggested that he might say, “the Irish Settlement proposed is merely 
provisional and does not in any way prejudice the undoubted right of the people in every County 
to decide for themselves the question of inclusion or exclusion.”63  No such announcement was 
forthcoming.  Dublin Castle official Frederick Wrench assured Carson, “Asquith as usual is 
confusing the issue.”  He added, “when I saw him the word ‘provisional’ was not in Lloyd 
George’s mind, and he said more than once that there was to be no time limit whatever to the 
exclusion of the Ulster counties.”64 
The Prime Minister’s speech reassured the IPP leadership that their interpretation of 
exclusion in Lloyd George’s proposals was the correct one.  They convened a conference of six-
county nationalists to consider the proposals on June 23 in Belfast’s St. Mary’s Hall.  In urging 
their acceptance, Redmond stressed that the six counties would only be excluded from home rule 
until the end of the war, when the Imperial Conference would review the situation.  He added 
that if they rejected the deal, their sole remaining option was to resume a long and potentially 
fruitless parliamentary battle.  Speaking against the proposals, solicitor F. J. O’Connor of 
Omagh, Co. Tyrone, said that if they accepted them and a parliamentary majority decided 
exclusion should be permanent, the IPP would be powerless to reverse this.65  Both Devlin and 
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Redmond threatened to resign if the six-county nationalists failed to pass the proposals.  The 
Irish Independent compared this to holding a pistol to the delegates’ heads.66 
The final vote was 475 for the proposals and 275 against.  The voting shows a clear 
geographical divide.  Representatives from the majority-nationalist areas: Fermanagh, Tyrone, 
and Londonderry City—which might have been included in home rule if plebiscites were held—
voted against the proposals.  Delegates from counties Antrim (including Belfast), Armagh, 
Down, and the Londonderry countryside, majority-unionist areas that likely would have been 
excluded in any case, voted overwhelmingly for the agreement.67  The convention gave Redmond 
the indication of support he needed among six-county nationalists.  The IPP met in Dublin on 
June 26 to approve the proposals.  This was, by that time, largely a formality.68 
Bodies representing Irish unionists and nationalists had now agreed to Lloyd George’s 
proposals, which might have been assumed to end the ordeal.  However, since Carson and 
Redmond left London, Unionists in the Cabinet had grown alarmed at the lengths to which Lloyd 
George’s offer committed them.  Most protested that he had exceeded his authority by 
representing his proposals as government policy, approved by the Cabinet.  That the proposals 
entailed immediate home rule angered them further.  Austen Chamberlain, Walter Long, and 
Lord Lansdowne had thought that Lloyd George might get consent from the Irish parties for a 
temporary administration to replace the Castle system, but not self-government.69  Long said that 
prior to May 30 he had had only a general idea of what Lloyd George intended to propose, and 
when the two met that day he discovered that the proposals had already been sent to the Irish 
leaders.  At that time, Lloyd George told Long that exclusion would be subject to revision after 
the war.70 
Both British and Irish unionists were concerned that nationalists would see a grant of 
immediate home rule as validating the recent rebellion.  Southern unionist George F. Stewart 
expressed this to Lloyd George immediately after receiving the proposals.71  Long expanded on 
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the point by asserting that self-government combined with exclusion would show adherents of 
both Irish parties that force works.  He wrote on June 11, “Ulster is to be excluded and therefore 
it is said in Ireland that she succeeded because her wealth and her population enabled her to take 
up arms and threaten violent resistance to Home Rule.  It is said that the Nationalists have 
succeeded to a considerable extent owing to the fact that the Sinn Feiners took up arms and 
actually did resort to rebellion.”72  Long’s concern is ironic given that he had encouraged Ulster 
unionists to resist home rule by force as early as the January 1910 election campaign.73 
It is important to note that not all unionists, and not even all of those within the Cabinet, 
opposed Lloyd George’s proposals.74  Its challengers also did not have a coherent alternative.  
This lack of unanimity was particularly acute on the issue of partition.  Southern unionist and 
Attorney-General for Ireland James H. Campbell delivered a prescient warning that any scheme 
involving “a divided Ireland” would “inevitably result in constant agitation, friction, and 
disorder.”75  Lansdowne was also against exclusion.  He opposed the grant of immediate self-
government but wrote, “if Home Rule is to come I should prefer a measure embracing the whole 
of Ireland, with safeguards for the minority.”76 
Arthur Balfour supported the proposals.  He expressed the logic of partition when he 
wrote, “If we must have Home Rule, let us at least exclude from its operation as much of 
Unionist Ireland as is possible.”  This ignores the existence of northern nationalists by assuming 
that it is possible to identify a geographic location of “Unionist Ireland.”  Balfour added that 
Lloyd George’s proposals offered a chance for “settling peaceably and permanently the problem 
of Ulster.”77  The benefit of hindsight highlights the irony in the idea that six-county partition 
would settle the issue either peacefully or permanently, but contemporaries like Campbell also 
warned that this would not provide a lasting solution.  
Still other unionists were for partition but against the six-county area.  The Church of 
Ireland’s Archbishop of Dublin John Bernard warned Lloyd George against dividing the island 
by religious identity.  He wrote, “it is important that the line of division should not precisely 
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correspond with ecclesiastical or religious differences.”  The demarcation should be made “on 
geographical, rather than on theological, lines.”  For this reason, Bernard favored excluding the 
entire nine-county province of Ulster from home rule.78 
Cabinet opposition to the proposals disturbed Ulster unionists, who had based their 
support of the scheme largely on the idea that the government considered immediate home rule a 
war necessity.  Somerset Saunderson learned from Long that Lloyd George never put the 
proposals before the Cabinet, “as he had led us to understand.”79  Travers Blackley, secretary of 
the Cavan UUC delegates, wrote that his group wanted to hold another conference, as when they 
voted to accept the proposals, “they were under the impression that the Unionist party in England 
had thrown them over and would no longer stand by them.”80   
This is a noteworthy moment in the history of Ulster unionism.  Since 1910, they had 
expressed their demands uncompromisingly and warned—or threatened, depending on one’s 
interpretation—that violence would ensue if they were not met.  Their confidence was largely 
based on the support they believed they commanded among the Unionist Party, as well as the 
British government and public.  When that support showed signs of wavering, the Ulster 
unionists made what they considered significant concessions. 
Cabinet opposition to the proposals enabled Lloyd George to continue his strategy of 
making the Irish party leaders feel as though they were united in struggling toward a great goal.  
He wrote to Dillon on June 10 blaming Cabinet opposition on southern unionist pressure.  Lloyd 
George promised that if Dillon and Carson convinced their followers to support the proposals, he 
and Asquith would fight for them within the government.  He ended with a scarcely veiled threat 
that if both British parties were united they could govern Ireland by coercion, but not if he and 
the Prime Minister remained on the Irish nationalists’ side.81  A week later, Lloyd George 
assured Dillon that Asquith had approved the proposals, adding, “I feel certain he also will stand 
or fall by them.”82  He reiterated this to Redmond.83  Lloyd George revealed his lack of concern 
for the opposition when he wrote to Asquith that if Carson and the IPP support the settlement, 
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the Cabinet Unionists “will rail in vain.”84  He told other government members that he would 
resign if they did not support the deal.  Long called his bluff by writing to Lloyd George, “I 
cannot believe that you seriously intend to base your resignation upon this excuse.”85 
Events in Ireland showed that Lloyd George’s tactics were working, but Cabinet 
dissension continued.  T. P. O’Connor warned Redmond on June 28 that there might be changes 
to the settlement.  He was entirely convinced of Lloyd George’s sincerity.  O’Connor wrote, 
“L.G. has complained several times of being left alone to make this fight,” and implored, “I hope 
you will not regard any suggestion made by L.G. to meet the situation as anything like surrender 
or betrayal, or indeed serious modification.”86 
The issue of the permanence of exclusion had not been resolved, and came back to the 
forefront in Parliament.  Responding to questions as to whether exclusion would be temporary, 
Lansdowne told the House of Lords on June 29 that the proposals had not been approved by the 
Cabinet and were therefore only “consultations.”87  On July 7, Redmond urged Lloyd George that 
when Asquith spoke the next Monday he must declare the agreement provisional.  In addition, he 
should say that the six counties would not have its own executive and there would be no new 
conditions added since the nationalist convention approved the proposals.88 
Instead, responding to a July 10 question from Carson, Asquith said that the excluded 
counties could not be brought into home rule without a new bill at Westminster.89  This 
confirmed Lloyd George’s private assurance of May 29 and contradicted Redmond’s assumption 
of automatic inclusion, but the IPP MPs seem not to have realized this.90  The next day, 
Lansdowne said that the proposals entailed “permanent and enduring” amendments to the 1914 
Home Rule Act.91  Dillon called this speech, “absolutely fatal to all further chance of the 
likelihood of a settlement.”92  On July 18, Redmond wrote to the Prime Minister that the text of 
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the new home rule bill should be published immediately, and there should be no deviation from 
the “strictly temporary and provisional character of ALL sections of the bill.”93 
A draft of the new measure circulated to the Cabinet on July 14 contained language that 
would exclude the six counties “only for the period of the war and twelve months later,” which 
accorded with Redmond’s interpretation of the proposals.94  Despite Lloyd George’s promise to 
Dillon to fight for the proposals within the Cabinet, they decided—with his acquiescence—to 
compromise between Carson’s and Redmond’s interpretations.  On July 19 they agreed to keep 
the overall settlement temporary, but to insert language into the new bill stating that the excluded 
counties would not join the home rule parliament automatically.  This would render home rule 
temporary, but partition perpetual.  They also planned to reduce the number of Irish MPs at 
Westminster.95  Redmond called keeping the IPP in Parliament at their full strength, “an 
indispensable safeguard of the temporary character of the whole arrangement.”96  The Irish 
nationalist MPs could counter attempts to make exclusion permanent, but this was less likely if 
their numbers were reduced. 
Home Secretary Herbert Samuel informed Carson of the Cabinet’s decisions on July 21.  
The Irish unionist leader wanted to call the excluded area “North Ireland.”  Samuel objected that 
that would be “taken in the rest of the country as hoisting the flag of a permanent separation and 
as the definite constitution of a new state within the Empire, which is not, I believe, what you 
have in view.”  He suggested that they call the area simply, “the Six Counties.”97  Despite 
Samuel’s assertion that Carson wanted only temporary partition, the groundwork for what would 
become Northern Ireland had been firmly laid.  The idea that the six-county area should have its 
own parliament was not fully developed, but Carson and Lloyd George were already devising a 
form of self-government, even down to the detail of an acceptable name. 
Samuel and Lloyd George conveyed the terms to Redmond on July 22.  The next day the 
IPP leader warned Asquith, “any bill framed upon these lines will meet with the vehement 
opposition at all its stages of the Irish Party.”98  Redmond and Dillon publicly broke off the 
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negotiations on July 24.  Dillon declared, “I rest on the written document,” placing his faith in 
the proposals as sent to them by Lloyd George.99 
The affair permanently damaged the relationship between Redmond and Lloyd George.  
Frances Stevenson, Lloyd George’s private secretary and mistress, wrote in her diary on July 26, 
“The Irish are angry with him: they think he should have upheld the original terms of the 
agreement, & I think they have reason to be angry.”100  The reference to “original terms” is 
significant, as it indicates that the draft bill embodying Redmond’s interpretation of the proposals 
was initially the correct one. 
 
New Government and New Ideas 
The IPP’s anxieties only intensified as 1916 wore on.  Asquith’s Cabinet slowly fractured 
due to his perceived indolence in prosecuting the war.  In December, Lloyd George brought 
matters to a head by using his favorite tactic of threatening to resign.  Asquith preemptively 
stepped down, assuming that the other parties would fail to form a Cabinet and the King would 
call him back into office immediately.101  Instead, the King offered the Premiership to Bonar 
Law, who refused.  Finally, Lloyd George formed a new coalition.  Historian David Powell 
describes the new government as “dominated by the Conservatives,” pointing out that thirteen 
out of the twenty-three Cabinet members were Unionists.102  In his first statement to Parliament 
as Prime Minister, Lloyd George told the Commons that he did not have time to devote to 
Ireland.  Redmond replied that the speech “showed an utter and complete absence of that quick 
decision which, we were told, was to be the characteristic of this Government.”103  IPP member 
Stephen Gwynn, who was serving as a captain in the Army, later wrote that he was happy to get 
back to the Western Front after the hostile atmosphere of Parliament toward the Irish 
nationalists.104 
 Though Lloyd George professed that he had no time to devote to the Irish question, it 
remained on the minds of many.  Opinion gradually shifted toward holding an all-party 
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conference on the issue.  All-for-Ireland-League (AFIL) founder William O’Brien suggested the 
idea as early as September 1916.105  His experience arbitrating land disputes between Irish 
nationalist politicians and unionist landlords in 1902 had instilled a belief in “settlement by 
consent,” and a determination that this was the way to reach self-government.  Lord Lieutenant 
Wimborne also suggested all-party talks as a means of breaking the deadlock.106 
The most ardent advocate within the government of a conference was L. S. Amery.  A 
Unionist and signatory of the Ulster Covenant, in his memoirs he claimed to believe that 
partition would provide “no real solution” to the Irish question.107  Amery’s assessment of the 
situation in February 1917 included cutting criticism of the 1914 Home Rule Act, calling it, 
“unattractive to all sections of Irishmen,” and “framed by Englishmen to suit Parliamentary 
exigencies at Westminster, and not by Irishmen to suit Irish ideas or to meet Irish needs.”  He 
asserted, “No British Government can solve the Irish problem by legislation, and no British 
statesman can solve it by negotiation.”  He added that no solution was possible “until Irishmen 
themselves shoulder the responsibility of discovering a form of government on which they can 
agree.  The surprising thing is that anyone should ever have thought that any other method could 
succeed.”108  This last observation is not surprising when one takes into account that British 
politicians of both major parties worked on the assumption that they must play a major role in 
determining Ireland’s form of government. 
 The Prime Minister did not immediately act on the convention suggestion.  There were 
still other possible avenues of agreement.  In October 1916, Liberal MP William Chapple 
suggested that the government set up a boundary commission after the war to “define Protestant 
Ulster.”  The population of the designated area should then decide by plebiscite whether to be 
included in home rule.109  The new Chief Secretary, Unionist MP Henry Duke, favored referring 
the area of exclusion to a “Statutory Commission.”  T. P. O’Connor liked the idea, if the IPP 
controlled the body’s composition.  The only other option was to convince Lloyd George to 
“bully” Carson into accepting an all-Ireland parliament, which he did not think the Prime 
Minister would do.  In February 1917, O’Connor asserted that the basis of partition proposed by 
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Lloyd George in 1916 was “out of date,” adding, “I could be no party to the exclusion of Tyrone 
and Fermanagh or indeed to any county of Ulster, without a plebiscite.”110 
The Prime Minister tried to restart negotiations with Redmond.  The IPP leader was 
mistrustful after Lloyd George’s conduct during the 1916 negotiations, and the Prime Minister 
had to approach him through intermediaries.  In March 1917, Liberal MP Harold Spender wrote 
that Lloyd George was prepared to offer a boundary commission to delimit the areas to be 
included in and excluded from home rule.111  Spender hinted at the commission’s powers when 
he said, “We often cut up counties in England without engaging in a Civil War.”112  The IPP 
leader was unmoved.113 
Rebuffed by Redmond, on April 16, 1917, Lloyd George appointed a Cabinet committee 
to draft a new home rule bill.  It was composed of Unionists Lord Curzon and Chief Secretary 
Henry Duke, as well as Liberal Christopher Addison.  The last, who described himself as “a 
sincere Home Ruler,” later wrote, “the first stage of our efforts gave me a much poorer opinion 
of the 1914 Act than I had ever had before.”  Addison added, “As an effective instrument of self-
government it was a very crippled affair, for the Irish Government was so hedged about by 
restrictions and limitations and was financially so impotent that the first year of its administration 
would certainly have brought about an unanswerable demand for drastic amendment.”114 
On the crucial issue of exclusion, the new bill would provide county option for each of 
the six counties.  Exclusion was to be temporary with the option of renewal, as each county 
would hold a new poll every seven to ten years.  The committee were “directed” that inclusion 
should require a 55 percent vote of the electors in each county.  Carson wanted the figure to be 
75 percent.115  The drafting committee rejected these ideas, asserting that anything other than a 
bare majority would “invite the criticism that an apparently trifling departure from ordinary 
constitutional procedure was proposed for the transparent purpose of enabling a minority in 
Tyrone and Fermanagh to decide the issue in those counties.”  The counties that voted for 
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exclusion would be linked to the rest of the island via a “Council of Ireland,” which would 
negotiate legislation of common concern and eventual reunification.116 
Addison learned “to his infinite disgust” that the Cabinet decided on May 16 not to 
present the new proposals to Redmond, but to call a convention of Irish parties instead.  He said 
that the sudden change of tact showed Lloyd George’s “secretiveness combined with an 
autocratic temper.”  The Cabinet decided to send the new proposals to Redmond, and offer the 
convention as a secondary option.117  However, when Lloyd George wrote to the IPP leader, he 
said that the six counties were to be excluded as a block.  There was no mention of plebiscites, 
and Parliament would reconsider their position after five years.  This removed the principle of 
choice and confirmed the idea, embodied in Lloyd George’s 1916 proposals, that Westminster 
should decide the area and duration of exclusion.  If Redmond rejected this, the Prime Minister 
offered what Amery had suggested, namely, “that Irishmen of all creeds and parties might meet 
together in a Convention for the purpose of drafting a Constitution for their Country.”118  
Redmond and his IPP colleagues accepted the conference option.119 
Once the government determined to convene an all-party conference, its composition 
became an important and contentious issue.  When he announced the Convention in Parliament 
on May 21, Lloyd George said that each delegate would be pledged “to do his best” to reach a 
settlement.  He promised that if the Convention came to “substantial agreement” as to the 
“character and scope” of a constitution for Ireland within the Empire, his administration would 
frame legislation based on that agreement.120  These phrases were characteristically vague, and 
might enable Lloyd George to argue that any agreement short of unanimity did not meet these 
requirements.  Given the diversity of interests that would be represented, arriving at “substantial 
agreement” was a significant challenge.  Moreover, two days later Bonar Law said on behalf of 
the government that if every party in the conference decided on a plan for an Irish parliament 
except the Ulster unionists, this would not constitute “substantial agreement.”121  Thus, the 
“Ulster veto” seemed to be very much intact. 
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Lloyd George announced the Convention’s composition in Parliament on June 11, 1917.  
The IPP, Sinn Féin, the Ulster unionists, and the southern unionists each received five seats.  The 
AFIL and Irish nobles were offered two representatives each.  Organized labor was given five 
representatives.  Chambers of commerce were allotted three seats.  Local government 
representatives totaled forty-seven, most of them home rulers.  Clerical representatives included 
four Catholic bishops and three Protestant officials.  Finally, the government intended to 
nominate fifteen representatives of “leading Irishmen” for a total of 101.122 
 
Irish Parties and the Convention 
Lloyd George reserved no seats specifically for northern nationalists, a fact that Sinn Féin 
sympathizer Laurence Ginnell pointed out in Parliament.123  The IPP ensured that several of their 
representatives came from Ulster, but the government scheme provides further evidence of their 
refusal to recognize the existence and concerns of northern nationalists.124  AFIL leader William 
O’Brien announced on June 21 that his party would not participate.  He derided the Convention’s 
composition, citing the Ulster nationalists’ exclusion as well as alleged overrepresentation of the 
IPP and northern unionists.125  Thus, ironically, he refused to take part in a conference he had 
helped to inspire, and which most resembled the 1902 Land Conference he wanted to recreate. 
Representatives of Sinn Féin declined to participate in the Convention almost 
immediately after its announcement.  A May 21 statement signed by several prominent members 
of the movement asserted that, as the British government was backing the Ulster unionists on 
partition, the conference’s failure was “assured beforehand.”  They argued that the Convention’s 
collapse “would give the English Government the opportunity of declaring to its Allies, to the 
U.S. and to neutral Powers, that England had left the solution of the Irish question to the Irish 
themselves; that the Irish were unable to solve it; and that therefore, England’s continued 
occupation of Ireland was justified.”126  Labor leader William O’Brien—not to be confused with 
the AFIL founder—signed this statement, indicating that his Irish Transport and General 
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Workers’ Union (ITGWU) would also hold aloof from the Convention.  Sinn Féin founder 
Arthur Griffith and the organization’s National Council met on May 23 and demanded that the 
British government agree to submit a Convention agreement to international arbitration.  Barring 
this, they intended to continue preparing Ireland’s case for representation at the peace conference 
that would end the First World War.127  There was virtually no chance of this demand being met, 
therefore it was tantamount to a refusal. 
 Some historians claim that Sinn Féin’s absence from the Convention is one of the factors 
that doomed it from the outset, the assumption being that it was more important to assuage this 
school of thought than any other within Irish nationalism.  The IPP’s nationalist opponents were 
clearly on the rise.  Prisoners interned after the Easter Rising were released in December 1916.  
Between February 1917 and the Convention’s opening in July, figures associated with the Rising 
and campaigning under the banner of Sinn Féin defeated IPP candidates in four successive by-
elections.  Another Sinn Féin victory followed in August.  Some contemporary observers 
claimed that these elections killed the Convention before it began.128  However, it was unclear 
whether this was an expression of dissatisfaction with the IPP or approval of another policy.  
London’s Daily Telegraph asked in July 1917, “what is Sinn Fein for?  The difficulty is that 
nobody is in a position to answer that question.”129  At this time, Sinn Féin was less an organized 
party than a collective term for nationalists opposed to the IPP.  After his election in February 
1917, Count Plunkett started his own nationalist organization, the Liberty Clubs.  Yet another 
association, the Irish Nation League, claimed to be working toward similar goals as Sinn Féin.  It 
was not until a party conference at the end of October 1917, three months into the Convention’s 
deliberations, that Sinn Féin was reorganized and propounded its objectives. 
Historian Michael Laffan attributes Sinn Féin’s 1917 electoral successes in part to IPP 
weakness.  Sinn Féin was composed of a number of factions, the two most prominent being anti-
IPP nationalists and physical-force republicans who flocked to its banner after the Rising.130  
Given the chaotic state of Sinn Féin, it is not certain that its adherents were capable of 
nominating credible representatives to the Convention that were also acceptable to the 
                                                 
127 Irish Times (Dublin), 24 May 1917. 
128 Irish Times (Dublin), 12 July and 16 July 1917. 
129 Daily Telegraph (London), reprinted in the Irish Times (Dublin), 12 July 1917. 
130 Laffan describes the confusion within nationalism in this period in The Resurrection of Ireland: The Sinn Féin 





government.  Confusion as to who was qualified to speak for Sinn Féin is evident in Lloyd 
George’s announcement of the Convention’s composition on June 11.  He referred to 
“spokesmen of associations which profess Separatist doctrines,” rather than any coherent party.131  
A week later, Bonar Law said, “The Sinn Fein movement” was not “organised in such a way that 
any person or persons could authoritatively speak for those engaged in it.”132 
Moreover, between February and April 1918, the IPP defeated Sinn Féin candidates in 
three consecutive by-elections, showing that the latter were not invincible.  Both the government 
and the IPP admitted that Sinn Féin deserved to be represented at the Convention.133  The 
government went so far as to release the convicted Rising prisoners in June 1917 in an attempt to 
“create a good atmosphere” for the talks.134  The absence of accredited representatives from Sinn 
Féin did not signal the end of the Convention enterprise, and is comprehensible as the 
organization struggled to define itself in 1917.  The government nominated two members who 
were known to have Sinn Féin sympathies: Edward Lysaght and George Russell, the latter a 
writer who published as “A.E.” or “Æ.”135 
The southern unionists agreed to participate in the Convention at an Irish Unionist 
Alliance (IUA) meeting on June 1.  With sympathizers from other delegations, the southern 
unionists eventually mustered ten representatives.  IUA leader Lord Midleton said at the time 
that they only accepted the Convention invitation reluctantly, but later wrote, “As our numbers 
were less than one-tenth of the population, we could not complain.”136  After the Convention, 
Midleton claimed that participating necessitated a change of mindset among unionists.  He said 
that Lloyd George’s terms implied “some form of Home Rule” and “The fact of entering the 
Convention was a sacrifice to every Unionist.”  Therefore, Midleton entered the talks with a 
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belief that home rule was inevitable, and that it was his duty to obtain the best settlement he 
could.137 
The Ulster unionists took the most cautious approach of any party to the Convention.  
Carson seemed open to the idea of the Convention reaching an accord based on home rule.  In a 
May 28 letter, he reminded UUC standing committee member Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery 
that the 1914 Home Rule Act, which included Ulster, was on the statute book, and “has now 
become the law of the land.”  It was therefore necessary for Ulster unionists to obtain every 
safeguard possible by means of the Convention.138 
Carson told the standing committee that their attitude should be to establish that they 
were content under the Union and listen to all that was said, but not necessarily aid in arriving at 
an agreement.  An anonymous standing committee member summarized the policy as, “We sit 
tight, and practically say nothing, until the others have told us what they want, and have come to 
some agreement among themselves.  We will then discuss it with them.”  Carson emphasized 
that the various nationalist parties were divided and there was little chance of the Convention 
reaching “substantial agreement.”  The standing committee member added that Carson, 
“emphatically assured us we can go in, and come out of the Convention without prejudice to our 
position, and no settlement will be forced upon Ulster against our will.”139 
The policy of “considering” and “discussing” forms of home rule was still too open-
minded for some UUC members.  Montgomery indicated that the Ulster unionists were not 
participating in order to aid in an agreement.  Instead, “The main object of the U.U.C. agreeing 
to send representatives to the Convention is to produce a good effect on English Public 
opinion.”140  According to this rationale, refusing to join the Convention might weaken their 
support in Britain, but the Ulster unionists could appoint a delegation with a mandate to do as 
little as possible to contribute to the conference. 
To this end, the UUC set up a system of checks and balances designed to ensure that their 
Convention delegates took no decisions without reference to Belfast.  They appointed five 
representatives, but also formed an advisory council to which the delegates should refer all of 
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their decisions.141  Some unionists outside the six counties were anxious to prevent a repeat of the 
1916 negotiations.  During the UUC meeting that appointed the Convention delegates, 
representatives from Monaghan proposed the resolution, “as Sir Edward Carson said ‘Ulster 
means Ulster’ and that there should be no partition of the Province, and that the three counties of 
Monaghan, Cavan, and Donegal should not again be expected to sacrifice themselves.”142  The 
Ulster unionists’ fallback position to the maintenance of the Union was to be to safeguard the 
nine-county province rather than the six counties discussed in 1916.  The Ulster unionist 
delegation offended their southern counterparts before the Convention even began by not 
consulting them on policy decisions.143  Midleton described the attitude toward his group as, “we 
should hew wood and draw water for Ulster.”144 
The Convention elected its own chairman, Horace Plunkett.  A former Unionist MP for 
South Dublin between 1893 and 1900, by 1911 he quietly adopted a pro-home rule stance, 
without attaching himself to any party.145  He came to view the Ulster unionist delegation as the 
biggest obstacle to an agreed solution.  In his diary for October 1917, he referred to “the arrogant 
Ulstermen,” and wrote, “They seem to assume that they alone count.”146  Lord MacDonnell, a 
unionist and former Chief Secretary from Co. Mayo, called the northerners’ unhelpful stance, 
“an impeachment of their honesty,” a reference to Lloyd George’s statement that the delegates 
were pledged to do their best to work for a settlement.147 
Between the abstaining parties and the difficult attitude of some of its delegates, the 
Convention was not entered upon with much optimism.  Frances Stevenson wrote that the Prime 
Minister was “hopeful that peace may reign for a few months at least in that quarter, though I do 
not know whether he has any hopes of the Convention ultimately solving the Irish puzzle.”148  
Ronan Fanning cites this as evidence that Lloyd George never intended for the conference to 
succeed, merely to defer contentious issues until after the war.149  Horace Plunkett reported that 
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Sinn Féiners were spreading this rumor.150  Ronald McNeill wrote that the Ulster unionist 
delegation were doing their patriotic duty in helping to maintain a peaceful atmosphere during 
the war.  He called the Convention, “a bone thrown to a snarling dog, and the longer there was 
anything to gnaw the longer would the dog keep quiet.”151   
Lloyd George’s purposes in calling the conference were likely more nuanced than this 
allows.  It was evident to many that the Convention had little chance of success, and it is likely 
that the Prime Minister saw the value in deferring the Irish question.  However, Lloyd George 
told Stevenson of the Irish question in April 1917, “I want to get it settled now.”152  The Prime 
Minister had formed multiple committees to draft home rule bills, and before the Convention 
ended he interjected in its deliberations.  Therefore, Lloyd George was willing to commit his 
own and his government’s time and energy to Ireland despite the war.  In addition, his 
government was running out of ideas for solving the problem on their own.  By establishing the 
conference, the Prime Minister could gauge what terms were considered acceptable to the Irish 
public and political classes.  Moreover, the Convention did not keep Ireland quiet, as political 
agitation continued outside of its deliberations. 
Even Horace Plunkett, the most optimistic proponent of the Convention, was not 
sanguine as to its success.  He told the King that the conference was being asked to succeed 
where three British administrations: Asquith’s Liberal government, his war Cabinet, and Lloyd 
George’s coalition, had all failed.  Plunkett wrote, “It is little wonder that even friendly public 
opinion should regard the Convention as an imperfect instrument for the accomplishment of a 
hopeless task.”153  Ulster unionist James Craig typified the almost forlorn hope that the 
conference would succeed.  He said on July 12, “Everyone now felt that a solution free from the 
sacrifice of any principle for which they had struggled so nobly, a solution come to by 
agreement, if such were possible, would be a great relief.”154  In other words, Craig wanted the 
Convention to reach an accord and believed that his constituents did as well, but they were not 
willing to minimize their demands to ensure this achievement.  A similar attitude prevailed 
                                                 
150 NYPL, Plunkett, Confidential Report, para. 20. 
151 McNeill, Ulster’s Stand for Union, 259. 
152 Frances Stevenson, Lloyd George: A Diary, ed. A. J. P. Taylor (London: Hutchinson, 1971), 155, entry for 25 
April 1917. 
153 NYPL, Plunkett, Confidential Report, para. 17. 





among all of the parties involved.  If there was any room for maneuver between these two 
stances, it was the delegates’ task to find it. 
 
The Irish Convention 
The Convention met for the first time on July 25, 1917, in the Regent House at Trinity 
College.  Due to abstentions and government nominations, it numbered ninety-five members.  
After his election as chair, Plunkett became nearly obsessed with procedural issues.  He wanted 
the delegates to discuss topics at prescribed times.155  It was Plunkett, not Lloyd George, who was 
primarily responsible for the Convention’s extended length, as he deliberately prolonged the 
proceedings.  Plunkett wrote, “the longer the Convention takes, the better the chances of a 
settlement in the end.”156  He told the King, “the Irish question has never been argued in 
Parliament (or, for that matter, out of it) on its merits.  Reason has been overborne by passion.”  
Plunkett was determined that the Convention should provide this discussion.  The delegates’ 
speeches were not published, and the only public indications of what they were doing were short 
official statements to the press.  Though Plunkett said secrecy was necessary, this increased the 
public perception that the Convention was not accomplishing anything.157 
Seven different schemes of self-government were submitted for discussion at the 
Convention.  Five of them were based on precedents in operation in Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, and South Africa, called “colonial” or “dominion” home rule.  The remaining two were 
based on the federal idea.  Six out of the seven settlement ideas would give Ireland fiscal 
autonomy, or complete control over collecting and spending taxes.  The dominion schemes each 
had distinctive features.  Some of them contemplated providing provincial legislatures 
subordinate to an Irish parliament.  Other suggestions would create provincial committees with 
local powers within the Irish legislature; all ideas for conciliating the Ulster unionists while 
maintaining political unity.158 
Lord MacDonnell submitted a scheme based on Erskine Childers’s The Framework of 
Home Rule (1911), which argued for both dominion status and fiscal autonomy.  Childers served 
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on the Convention’s secretariat.159  Prior to the Convention’s opening, George “Æ” Russell 
published Thoughts for a Convention (1917) in which he argued for dominion status with 
safeguards for Ulster unionists.160  He predicted that partition would cause lasting strife, as, 
“Ireland would regard the six Ulster counties as the French have regarded Alsace-Lorraine, 
whose hopes of re-conquest turned Europe into an armed camp.”161  The unionist Irish Times 
called the pamphlet, “the most high-minded and persuasive pleading that has ever been 
addressed to Irish people of all parties.”162  The Irish Independent, whose publisher William 
Martin Murphy sat in the Convention as a government nominee, had advocated dominion status 
in 1911, and now renewed the call.163  Plunkett felt that the apparent popularity of Sinn Féin’s 
calls for complete independence was driving IPP supporters to advocate dominion home rule.164  
Edward Lysaght, who had been nominated to the Convention due to his Sinn Féin sympathies, 
told the conference on August 28 that the organization “demanded a republic…But at present 
Sinn Fein was not intransigent.”  He believed that the organization could be won over, “if it can 
be persuaded that national freedom is possible within the Empire.”  Plunkett told the King that he 
believed Sinn Féin would welcome an offer of dominion status.165 
The Ulster unionists assumed that the 1914 Home Rule Act would provide a basis for the 
conference, and were surprised that ideas such as dominion home rule were being mooted.  
Ronald McNeill later wrote, “The Act of 1914 was brushed aside as beneath contempt.”166  In 
their report following the conference, the Ulster unionist delegates said, “Had we thought that the 
majority of the Convention intended to demand…what is tantamount to full national 
independence, we could not have agreed to enter the Convention.”167  They need not have 
worried.  Lloyd George had no intention of implementing an agreement based on dominion 
home rule.  He told Manchester Guardian editor C. P. Scott that it could not be conceded as, “the 
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Dominions were virtually independent States and could secede at any time if they chose.”168  
Therefore, while the Convention was allegedly empowered to frame a constitution for Ireland, 
the British government intended to veto any settlement it considered unsatisfactory. 
The Convention delegated its decision-making powers to a “Sub-Committee of Nine.”  It 
contained five nationalists, three Ulster unionists, and one southern unionist.  Surprisingly, the 
group reached compromises on constitutional issues.  The unionists agreed that there should be 
an all-Ireland parliament.  The nationalists conceded that 40 percent of the lower house be 
occupied by unionists for ten years.  In their report following the Convention, the Ulster 
unionists tried to portray themselves as having rejected this stipulation as “undemocratic.”169  In 
fact, Ulster unionist delegation leader Hugh Barrie suggested the 40 percent figure.  The UUC 
advisory council objected to the idea of nominating some of the Ulster members to the lower 
house as undemocratic, but agreed to this in the case of the southern unionists.170  William Martin 
Murphy noted the irony that the Ulster unionist delegation leader suggested they should be 
represented in excess of their proportion of the population, while “At the same time Barrie 
pronounced himself to be a democrat…and that he was opposed to nominated members.”171  
These varying definitions of democratic practice notwithstanding, there was an agreement in 
place regarding parliamentary representation. 
The deadlock within the Sub-Committee of Nine took the predictable course of dividing 
the nationalist and unionist members, but it occurred on the issue of fiscal autonomy.  The 
nationalists wanted the Irish Parliament to collect and distribute all of its own taxes, including 
customs and excise.  The unionists wished to maintain full fiscal union with Britain.  The 
nationalists suggested that, if the Irish Parliament had fiscal autonomy, they would make a free 
trade treaty with Britain.  The unionists rejected the idea.172 
Faced with the possibility of a breakdown, Redmond wrote to Lloyd George urging him 
to intervene and compel the Ulster unionists to give way.  He suggested that the government 
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might simply declare their intention to enforce the suggestions of the Primrose committee as a 
way out of the deadlock.173  Lloyd George replied that he was busy with war work but had 
already urged Carson to advocate a compromise.  He inveighed that the only alternative to an 
agreement at the Convention was government by coercion, which he assured Redmond he had 
always opposed and “would regard with perfect horror.”174  It was the same combination of 
assurance and threat that Lloyd George had used during the 1916 negotiations. 
Suddenly, the unionists moved toward a compromise.  During a November 26 debate, 
Redmond declared himself willing to entertain any suggestions to break the deadlock.  Barrie 
moved off of his extreme position and admitted that the Irish Parliament should have some 
taxation powers, but that customs and excise must remain with the Imperial Exchequer.  That 
day, Midleton composed a memo suggesting that customs be retained by the Imperial Exchequer 
as a form of contribution, but that excise duties might be reserved for “special treatment,” 
presumably by an Irish parliament.  He argued that Ireland’s prosperity was growing “by leaps 
and bounds,” and if this continued a home rule government would return a financial surplus and 
be capable of contributing to Imperial services.175 
Midleton’s compromise suggestion steadily gained ground.  His southern unionist group 
backed it, and at a meeting on New Year’s Day, 1918, the IUA passed a resolution supporting 
their Convention delegates by a 41 to 4 vote.176  Redmond did not pledge his support, but it was 
widely believed that he would uphold the compromise.  Bishop O’Donnell of Raphoe opposed 
the idea.  He told Plunkett that his strategy was “to put the Nationalists in a strong position in the 
country by getting them to come out for fiscal autonomy.  He [O’Donnell] then thinks that the 
Government will step in and sweep away all Unionist resistance.”177  The idea seems to have 
been to beat the Ulster unionists at their own game; to appear so intransigent that the British 
government would acquiesce.  Nonetheless, Midleton learned that Dillon, whom he described by 
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that time as “probably the most powerful member of the Nationalist Party,” intervened and 
convinced the bishops to support the deal.178   
Plunkett despaired of getting the Ulster unionists’ consent to any settlement.  He wrote in 
October 1917, “At the proper time I may have to tell them that the Convention will report 
without asking their leave.”179  Plunkett shifted his strategy to getting an agreement between the 
southern unionists, the IPP, and the independent nationalists.  He wrote to Lord Bryce in January 
1918, “I, personally, think that the Government would put pressure upon the Ulster Unionists 
and, if necessary, legislate over their heads once it could be shown that they alone blocked the 
ending of the Irish Question.”180  He told Shane Leslie that for his strategy to work, “I rely on the 
Government backing me up with all the pressure they can bring to bear.”181 
This was the fundamental problem of all of the Convention members working for an 
agreement: if, against all odds, they were able to pass a settlement within the conference, they 
relied on Lloyd George’s government to give it practical effect.  Plunkett expressed this several 
times, as did Redmond and O’Donnell.  While Plunkett maintained his faith in the British 
government, the IPP leader did not.  On December 4, 1917, Redmond told Plunkett that he had 
come to the conclusion that the Convention was only called to pacify Ireland during the war.  
Plunkett denied this.  However, the next day he felt compelled to tell Lloyd George that he 
would not keep the Convention going merely “for the sake of keeping the country quiet,” 
indicating that he was getting uneasy on this point.182 
Despite Plunkett and Redmond having given up on the Ulster unionists, Midleton 
received indications that they might be willing to accept his compromise.  John Crozier, the 
Church of Ireland’s Primate and a member of the Convention, wrote that Carson was counseling 
acceptance and had said they must “risk all their popularity in Ulster” to pass the compromise.183  
Crozier later faced unionist criticism for supporting the compromise.184 
On December 18, the Ulster unionist delegation met privately and developed 
amendments to Midleton’s compromise, indicating that they were willing to see it go forward.185  
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A meeting with the advisory council in Belfast on New Year’s Day, 1918, confirmed their 
decision to approve the settlement.186  However, the meeting also sanctioned an exclusion scheme 
to be submitted to the Convention at a time the delegation leader deemed appropriate.187  
Montgomery said the exclusion plan was, like so many of the Ulster unionists’ moves throughout 
the home rule saga, designed to influence the British public.  He told Barrie that it must be 
framed in such a way as to make them appear “not as people who put special provincial interests 
before those of the Empire, but as people who by the stand they made against Home Rule saved 
the Realm from a very dangerous position.”188  Barrie now had several options.  His delegation 
could endorse Midleton’s compromise and refrain from submitting the exclusion scheme, which 
would result in a unanimous settlement.  If the Ulster unionists intended to wreck the deal, Barrie 
could submit the exclusion scheme as soon as agreement between the other parties seemed 
likely.  Finally, they could abstain and let the other parties pass a majority agreement. 
Some members of the advisory council considered Midleton’s movement toward a 
settlement a betrayal.  One of its members, Adam Duffin, wrote of the southern unionists, “They 
want to capitulate and make terms with the enemy lest a worse thing befall them.  They are a 
cowardly crew and stupid to boot.”189  Barrie later wrote in similar terms, as he called the 
compromise “surrender” and claimed that Midleton and his associates “tried to betray Ulster.”190  
However, after the Convention reassembled in January 1918 he told the southern unionist leader, 
“I think you may count on us. We shall certainly not be against you.”  This indicates that the 
Ulster unionists would abstain from voting or support the compromise.191  It is likely that the plan 
agreed between the UUC and their delegation was either to abstain from voting on the 
compromise or to support its passage with their amendments, just as Barrie had told Midleton, 
but then to try to ensure that the resulting arrangement would not apply to the northern province 
by announcing their exclusion scheme.192  This would have failed on a Convention vote, but its 
introduction might have ruptured the fragile coalition supporting the Midleton compromise and 
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would have placed the Ulster unionists’ appeal for separate treatment on record.  It is also 
possible that Amery’s hope that the conference atmosphere would incline its members to work 
constructively was playing out with Barrie and other members of his group, inclining them 
toward aiding a settlement. 
Redmond did not believe that the Ulster unionists intended to endorse the compromise, 
and spent the Christmas break trying to compel a promise from Lloyd George that the 
government would enforce an agreement between the nationalists and southern unionists.  On 
December 26, 1917, he wrote that the Prime Minister had assured Devlin and himself that if the 
other Convention parties compromised on the Midleton proposal, he would “fight the 
Ulstermen” to ensure it succeeded.  However, Lloyd George refused to put this promise in 
writing.193  Finally, on New Year’s Eve the Prime Minister promised that if the Midleton plan 
passed “with the opposition of Ulster alone,” he would “use his personal influence with his 
colleagues…to accept the proposal and to give it legislative effect.”194  The language was 
characteristically vague, but it was the most that Redmond could extract from Lloyd George.  On 
January 12, 1918, the Prime Minister wrote to Bonar Law, “If the southern unionists and the 
nationalists agree, as they are likely to, the position of any government that refuses to carry out 
that compact will be an impossible one.”195  It is unclear whether Lloyd George was happy at this 
prospect or not, but he was warning the Unionist leader that he may have to renege on his 
promise not to force a settlement on the Ulster unionists, which would nullify Bonar Law’s 
assurance that “substantial agreement” could not be reached without them.   
The Convention reassembled on January 2, 1918, and two days later Redmond 
announced his support for Midleton’s compromise.  He even declared that, given the large 
unionist representation in the Irish Parliament within the agreed scheme, he was prepared to 
serve under the first Unionist Prime Minister of Ireland.196  However, the compromise on fiscal 
autonomy was not immediately put up for a vote.  The Convention was scheduled to hear debates 
on land purchase and, despite the urgency of the issue, Plunkett did not alter the program.  
Writing years later, Midleton blamed this delay for wrecking the settlement.197  Historian Alvin 
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Jackson supports him in this.198  However, at the time Midleton did not place such a high value 
on speed.  Instead of staying in Dublin that week and pressing for a vote on his solution, he went 
to London and took part in a parliamentary debate.199  Plunkett had always felt that the more time 
spent talking the better.  Moreover, he wanted to delay a vote on a contentious resolution for 
fiscal autonomy, and allow time for Midleton and others to attend Parliament.200  As it happened, 
the delay provided an opportunity for nationalist supporters of fiscal autonomy to rally against 
Redmond.  On January 15, the IPP leader met with Plunkett and told him that three of the four 
bishops and Devlin intended to defy him on the Midleton compromise, therefore he must 
withdraw his support.  Plunkett called it “the worst shock of my public life.”201 
This ended the Convention’s best chance at arriving at an agreement with such 
overwhelming support that Lloyd George would be forced to enact it, with or without the Ulster 
unionists’ support.  The conference continued sitting until April 5, but had reached its climax.  
Plunkett and Redmond continued to implore Lloyd George to act as an intermediary.  Instead, in 
a letter to the Convention on February 25, 1918, the Prime Minister listed what his government 
would and would not accept in a settlement.202  Even in this supposedly free conference between 
Irish parties to frame a constitution for Ireland, the British government intended to play a 
deciding role. 
On March 6, Redmond died.  His lack of initiative during the Convention reflected his 
declining health and self-confidence.203  The IPP chairman’s passing provided a sad analogy for 
the home rule movement, coinciding almost precisely with the historical moment at which this 
idea ceased to captivate the majority of Irish nationalists. 
The Convention eventually submitted three reports and five “notes.”  The majority report, 
supported by sixty-six delegates including the southern unionists and those nationalists who 
supported the Midleton compromise, embodied the agreements of the Sub-Committee of Nine, 
modified slightly by Lloyd George’s letter.  In the final irony of the Convention, the Ulster 
unionists voted with the “extreme” nationalists headed by O’Donnell and Devlin against the 
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majority report.  Just days after receiving the report, Lloyd George declared in Parliament that it 
did not represent “substantial agreement,” and no one argued with him.204 
Whatever goodwill the Convention fostered between the Irish parties was ruined when 
the Prime Minister announced on April 9 that the government intended to extend conscription to 
Ireland.205  After the Military Service Bill became law on April 18, the IPP—many of whom 
declared that they would support conscription if passed by an Irish parliament—left the House of 
Commons.  The Catholic Church had been struggling to chart a neutral course between the 
British government and the various Irish nationalist factions, but now the clergy and the IPP 
allied with Sinn Féin in protesting the extension of conscription to Ireland.206  The Irish unionists 
remained at Westminster.  In future, when Lloyd George wanted to justify his government’s right 
to impose legislation on Ireland, he used the Convention as evidence that Irish people could not 
agree on their own administration.207  This confirmed the worst fears of every opponent of the 
conference idea, and seemed to vindicate the criticism of skeptics like Sinn Féin. 
 
Southern Unionists Split 
The Convention fallout had a direct impact on the coherence and goals of southern 
unionism.  At their meeting on January 1, 1918, the IUA overwhelmingly approved the course 
the southern unionist delegates were pursuing at the Convention.  Therefore, the southern 
unionist leaders had every reason to believe that their base was secure.  However, a Church of 
Ireland Synod meeting on January 16 revealed deep fissures among their supporters.  Richard 
Bagwell, the only IUA member to speak against the Convention delegates on New Year’s Day, 
vehemently attacked them.  He called Midleton’s initiative, “not a compromise but a surrender.”  
UUC member Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery was present and said the “only weak point” in 
Bagwell’s speech was that he declared himself against partition.208 
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Over the next several weeks, Montgomery and other Ulster unionists contacted a number 
of discontented southern unionists.209  On March 4 a document titled, “The Crisis in Ireland: Call 
to Unionists,” appeared in the unionist press.  It appealed to “all true Irish Unionists, especially 
those outside Ulster” to “reiterate, with no uncertain voice, their conviction in the maintenance of 
the legislative Union between Great Britain and Ireland…lies the only hope for the future of our 
country.”210  It was signed by a number of prominent unionists, north and south.  The “Callers,” 
as they were dubbed, formed the Southern Unionist Committee, but denied wanting to start a 
new organization to compete with the IUA.  They claimed that the IUA was not representative, 
implying that any apparent support for Midleton’s Convention policy was illegitimate.211  
“Caller” John E. Walsh asserted that more than 10,000 people signed the document by April 
27.212 
Carson signaled his approval of the movement on May 2.  In a public letter he wrote that 
self-government now “will place Ireland under the joint rule of Sinn Fein, Nationalists, and the 
Roman Catholic Hierarchy.”213  Despite this personal sanction, Ulster unionist organizations did 
not officially take sides.214  However, the IUA was an Ireland-wide association.  As such, it 
contained many northerners who were also UUC members.  Montgomery, chief among this 
group, said they were determined “to purge the I.U.A. of traitors and get the machine into sound 
Unionist hands.”215 
An IUA meeting on January 24, 1919, rejected an anti-partition resolution that Midleton 
proposed.  He and his supporters resigned and formed a new organization, the Unionist Anti-
Partition League.  In appealing for support for his new group, Midleton called the restructured 
IUA, “for all practical purposes an offshoot of the Ulster Council.”216  Despite the Callers gaining 
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control of the IUA, Midleton remained the trusted representative of the southern unionists in the 
eyes of both Irish nationalists and the British government. 
One of the ironies within Irish unionism between 1916 and 1917 is that, while some 
accused Midleton and his colleagues of treachery for their willingness to cooperate with home 
rulers, Ulster unionists had declared their readiness to abandon their counterparts in other parts 
of the island while the six counties were excluded.  Historian J. J. Lee asserts that, if one takes 
unionist rhetoric at face value, “If the Pope was indeed anti-Christ, if unionist fears of the 
persecution awaiting Protestants in a Home Rule, much less a Sinn Féin, state were valid,” then 
the six-county unionists’ abandonment of their fellows in the other three Ulster counties was “the 
basest of all ‘betrayals’ in the period.”217  This would also apply to six-county unionists’ 
treatment of their southern counterparts. 
Another irony is that, while Midleton was losing the confidence of a significant part of 
his Irish following, Lloyd George tried to make him the most powerful person in Ireland.  On 
April 27, 1918, the Prime Minister offered the struggling southern unionist leader the post of 
Lord Lieutenant, “with a free hand” in the governance of the island.218  The new viceroy’s 
primary duty would be to carry out conscription, which Lloyd George viewed as necessary to 
asserting the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament, and “also of giving the Catholic hierarchy a 
lesson that they could not control the State.”  Midleton warned that 90 percent of the Irish 
population were against conscription.  Further interviews convinced him that the Cabinet had no 
real, determined strategy regarding Ireland, “the Government have in this case as in so many 
others been so busy with other troubles that they have not had time to think out their 
scheme…they think that a slap-dash policy can suddenly be adopted with success.”219  Midleton 
declined the post. 
Several organizations rose and fell between 1918 and 1919.  In November, Horace 
Plunkett formed the Irish Reconstruction Association, a non-party group to oppose partition.  In 
his diaries he called it the “I.R.A.” and wrote on December 7, 1918, “I hope these initials will get 
known.”220  The association did not last long, but the initials were already becoming famous. 
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The 1916 Easter Rising brought simmering discontent among non-IPP Irish nationalists 
into the open, and highlighted the importance of dealing with it immediately.  Lloyd George’s 
attempt entailed the immediate grant of home rule and the exclusion of six of Ulster’s nine 
counties from its operation.  However, Redmond believed that this partitioning of Ireland would 
be temporary, while Carson understood it to be permanent by requiring new legislation at 
Westminster to end the arrangement.  Lloyd George was likely correct in asserting that if Carson 
and Redmond embraced the settlement, opposition within the government could be overcome.  
The fact that the government drew up a bill embodying temporary exclusion in almost exactly 
the terms the IPP leader described shows that this was, at one time, the correct interpretation of 
the proposals.  When the Cabinet forced Lloyd George to clarify his intentions he made little 
effort to uphold his promises to Redmond or Dillon, but did stand by his assurances to Carson. 
As historians have noted, the short-term impact of the Lloyd George proposals’ failure 
was to further undermine the IPP by again delaying Irish self-government.  Despite the 
breakdown of the 1916 negotiations, six-county partition without plebiscites, while instituting a 
form of local government for the new area, became a basis upon which Lloyd George dealt with 
Ireland in the future.  His government explored other possible settlements and forms of partition, 
but ultimately returned to the formula enunciated in 1916. 
Lloyd George tried several alternative means of reaching an Irish settlement after he 
became Prime Minister in December 1916.  He suggested that a boundary commission might 
delimit the areas included or excluded from home rule.  He established two committees to draft 
new home rule bills, but when they suggested temporary exclusion combined with plebiscites he 
disregarded their suggestions and changed tack.  Lloyd George then offered to establish an all-
party convention to debate and, if possible, agree to a new constitution for Ireland.  Despite the 
Prime Minister’s assertions, the Convention was not free to determine Ireland’s future.  
Convention members did not know it but dominion home rule was definitely off the table, and 
Lloyd George tried to shape the gathering’s conclusions to suit his government’s priorities. 
While contemporaries acknowledged that the Irish Convention faced long odds, success 
was possible.  Whether Lloyd George intended for the conference to succeed or not, and 
evidence suggests that he wanted an Irish settlement by any means, he admitted that the 





Convention came close to a deal in January 1918.  The southern unionists and all of the 
nationalist factions initially signaled their consent.  The Ulster unionist attitude is difficult to 
gauge, but there is evidence that they would either abstain from voting or support the 
compromise.  Lloyd George warned Bonar Law that the government would have to implement 
an accord between the southern unionists and the nationalists.  The deal fell through as some 
nationalists decided to push for fiscal autonomy, though one of their leaders, Bishop O’Donnell 
of Raphoe, believed that by doing so he could compel the British government to force a 
settlement on the Ulster unionists. 
Consistent delays in self-government damaged the IPP in the eyes of their Irish 
nationalist constituents.  Home rule had always had its nationalist critics.  Moreover, Sinn Féin’s 
ideal of complete independence was more attractive to many than this comparatively meager 
concession.  Some southern unionists were more accommodating than ever to the idea of self-
government, but their traditional organization was fracturing as a result of the concessions their 
leaders recommended during the Convention.  With both of the old parties embattled, the way 





















CHAPTER 5  
“RICKETY PARLIAMENTS:”   




 The December 1918 elections produced clear majorities in Britain and Ireland.  In 
Britain, the coalition headed by David Lloyd George and supported by Unionist leader Andrew 
Bonar Law won a stunning 526 out of 707 seats.  The second-largest party was Labour with 57 
MPs.  Coalition Unionists were the largest single grouping, as they won 383 seats compared to 
133 “Lloyd George Liberals.”1  The coalition majority was so overwhelming that the government 
would have a practically free hand in formulating policy.  On hearing the results, Frances 
Stevenson exclaimed, “George is practically dictator!”2  The other clear result of the election was 
Sinn Féin’s victory in Ireland.  The party swept seventy-three out of 105 seats.  The Irish 
Parliamentary Party (IPP) was nearly destroyed, winning just six seats, five of them in Ulster.  
Twenty-two Irish Unionists were elected, all but two of them in the northern province.  Sinn 
Féin’s intention not to sit at Westminster was well known, but after the election they announced 
that they would form an alternative assembly in Dublin, Dáil Éireann.  The Irish Republican 
Army (IRA) engaged in a constantly escalating guerrilla war to destroy British institutions on the 
island, which could be replaced by services administered by the Dáil.  Over the next two years, 
the Irish policy of Lloyd George and his Cabinet largely involved dealing with this challenge to 
British authority. 
In tandem with confronting the republican threat, the government had to replace the 1914 
Home Rule Act.  The result was the Government of Ireland Act (1920).  This measure codified 
the form of partition that Edward Carson proposed in 1913 and Lloyd George adopted in 1916: 
the permanent separation of six counties without plebiscites of any kind.  Alvin Jackson argues 
that Ulster unionists are often charged with rigidity due to their dogmatic resistance to self-
government, but acceptance of the Act shows the movement’s flexibility.  By 1919 they had shed 
their alliance with the southern unionists, and the adoption of six-county partition precipitated a 
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break with unionists in the other three counties of Ulster.3  Actually this was the realization of 
Carson’s long-held policy which, with a small number of lieutenants including James Craig, he 
pursued unswervingly through 1920.  In framing the Government of Ireland Bill, Lloyd George’s 
Cabinet was compelled to question whether their long-term goal was to facilitate Irish unity.  
They knowingly chose the form of partition least likely to produce this result. 
Commentators who argue that the establishment of Northern Ireland merely 
acknowledged Protestant unionists’ right to separate treatment do so by ignoring the significant 
Catholic nationalist minority in the six counties.  This group only exists as a voting bloc in 
Patrick Buckland’s 1973 exposition of partition, and is barely mentioned in Ronan Fanning’s 
analysis published forty years later.4  The Cabinet noted the existence of the large Catholic 
nationalist population in the new Northern Ireland, but I assert that they did not provide them 
with any of the safeguards considered necessary for Protestant unionists under home rule 
because they assumed that a majority Protestant and unionist administration could be trusted to 
govern fairly. 
The most widely mooted alternative to government policy was dominion home rule.  
Supporters of this type of settlement do not fit neatly into the categories of “nationalism” or 
“unionism,” therefore they have not found a place in the histories of either tradition.  The few 
historians who discuss the main organization advocating this solution, the Irish Dominion 
League, portray it as politically impotent and largely an attempt to compromise with the Ulster 
unionists.5  In fact there was considerable support for dominion home rule, but not from either 
Lloyd George’s government or Sinn Féin.  Dominionists were divided on how to deal with 
northern unionists, but promulgated a number of possible solutions.   
Though their main object failed, the Dominion League and its sympathizers succeeded in 
marshaling significant non-republican opposition to government policy, both in Britain and in 
Ireland.  They were one of many groups that denounced the Government of Ireland Bill and 
partition.  The most explosive issue they helped to highlight was the disastrous effect of Crown 
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forces reprisals against Irish civilians.  Initially unofficial and extralegal, this campaign of 
material destruction and killings of republicans was legitimated in January 1921, when the 
Cabinet sanctioned “official reprisals.”  Indignation at the government’s initial toleration and 
later adoption of such methods divorced significant sections of public opinion from Lloyd 
George’s administration, and agitation against reprisals hastened the end of the conflict. 
Some historians assert that Sinn Féin could have achieved a settlement along the lines of 
the eventual Anglo-Irish Treaty (1921) far earlier than they did, blaming the Irish republicans for 
prolonging the conflict.6  However, I argue that Lloyd George and his government did not want 
to make any concessions that might have enabled a settlement.  While the Government of Ireland 
Bill wended its way through Parliament, the Cabinet tried to deal with the republican threat with 
a simultaneously policy of coercion and conciliation; coercing the “gunmen” supposedly to 
encourage moderates to negotiate.  This resulted in a number of communications between the 
government and Sinn Féin, even as the guerrilla war in Ireland escalated.  Some historians argue 
that the opening of the Northern Ireland Parliament was a prerequisite to the government opening 
negotiations.7  There is evidence that some members of the government believed this simplified 
their problems, but given that they had almost reached a truce agreement in December 1920, and 
considered postponing the operation of the Government of Ireland Act, it is unlikely that this was 
the decisive factor.  As late as May 1921 Lloyd George refused to consider making any 
concessions to Sinn Féin.  Only as political pressure mounted on the Prime Minister did he seize 
an opportunity to make an about-face. 
 
Ulster Unionists and the Government of Ireland Bill 
 Prior to the issuing of the Irish Convention report, Lloyd George had already appointed 
yet another committee to draft a home rule bill, this time chaired by Walter Long.  A lifelong 
Unionist and vociferous proponent of northern unionists’ right to resist home rule by force, Long 
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noted the “strange irony” that he should be charged with devising a scheme of Irish self-
government.8  However, he had been a federalist since at least 1910.  Long asserted that a federal 
system for the entire United Kingdom would sate Ulster unionists’ opposition.  Simply 
eliminating the words “Home Rule for Ireland” from the nomenclature would go a long way, as 
“the words ‘No Home Rule’ have become a sort of sacred creed in Ulster.”9  The committee 
prepared two bills.  A June 1918 draft was expressly federalist, envisioning “local national 
parliaments” for England, Ireland, Scotland, and Wales.  There was no special provision for 
Ulster or any part of it.10  A bill produced in August would amend the 1914 Home Rule Act by 
excluding six counties immediately, but provided for each county to opt in by plebiscite after 
seven years.11  With the Addison-Curzon-Duke effort of 1917, Lloyd George’s government had 
now drafted three home rule bills.  None of them were introduced in Parliament, and the Prime 
Minister again changed tack. 
In November 1918, with the general election approaching, Lloyd George told Bonar Law 
that they must exclude six Ulster counties and set up a council to extend legislation of the Irish 
Parliament to this area.  There was no mention of a separate legislature.12  Before redrawing the 
map of Ireland, Lloyd George and his government spent much of 1919 realigning Europe at the 
Paris Peace Conference.  Some lawmakers thought it unnecessary to introduce new Irish 
legislation, until reminded that the Third Home Rule Act was on the statute book and would 
come into operation automatically after the First World War peace treaties were concluded.13 
On November 4, 1919, the Cabinet committee on Ireland recommended establishing two 
parliaments: one for the nine-county province of Ulster, the other for the rest of the country.  
They decided against plebiscites on the grounds that they would “inflame religious and political 
passion” and “divide Ireland on purely religious lines.”  The decision to give Ulster a parliament 
was taken to remove British government from the entire island, thereby eliminating the grievance 
that motivated the home rule movement.  The committee predicted that a nine-county Ulster 
parliament would contain nationalists and unionists in practically even proportions.  They 
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acknowledged that either a six- or nine-county area would contain “large nationalist majorities” 
in parts of Ulster, and argued that they should not be left under British rule as this would “clearly 
infringe the principle of self-determination.”  This indicates the Cabinet’s assumption that a large 
nationalist population would have no cause for complaint if they lived under an Irish 
government, even one with a unionist majority that might prove perennial.  At the same time, the 
committee resolved to “do everything which an outside authority can do to bring about Irish 
unity.”  This entailed establishing a Council of Ireland comprised of an equal number of MPs 
from the two parliaments.  There was a strong implication that a future united Ireland would be 
given the same status as a dominion, but not while the two parliaments sat separately.14 
On November 11, Arthur Balfour suggested a simpler plan: they should hold a plebiscite 
throughout Ireland on whether to continue the Union.  If a majority voted no, Ireland would be 
“cut off from the United Kingdom after a certain date.”15  Cabinet member H. A. L. Fisher called 
this Balfour’s “thesis that the only alternative to Unionism is an Irish Republic in S. [South] & S. 
W. [Southwest].”  Fisher quoted Balfour as saying, “let them go to the devil in their own way.”16  
Most Cabinet members objected that they could not afford an independent Ireland, as it might 
declare neutrality in wartime. 
Balfour did not give up.  In a November 25 memo, he argued that they should cut the 
“South and West” out of the Union, create an “autonomous” state there, and sign a treaty 
guaranteeing payment of a portion of the Imperial debt and British naval access to the Irish coast.  
Balfour’s willingness to grant “autonomy” to an Irish state was based on his belief that that state 
would fail.  He had expressed this on November 11, and in his memo argued for leaving the six 
counties out of any scheme of self-government because “only Home Rule areas should be 
compelled to endure Home Rule.”  He argued that Ireland was never a unitary state, and “if she 
were not surrounded by water, no human being would ever think of forcing the loyal and 
Protestant North into the same political mould as the disloyal and Roman Catholic South.”17  The 
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memo embodies the assumption that Ireland’s population could be neatly divided between 
Protestant unionists and Catholic nationalists. 
James Craig was brought into the process in November 1919, and he suggested that he 
might also confer with UUC Secretary R. Dawson Bates.18  On December 15 the Cabinet was 
informed that “the Ulster leaders,” presumably Carson and Craig, perhaps with Bates, were 
“doubtful whether the Northern Parliament of Ireland would be able to govern the three Ulster 
Counties where there was a Nationalist majority, and greatly preferred that the scheme should be 
applied only to the six Protestant Counties.”  This ignores the Catholic nationalist majorities in 
two of the six counties, Fermanagh and Tyrone, as well as significant minorities in each of the 
other four.  Craig suggested that the government should establish a boundary commission to 
“examine the distribution of population along the borders of the whole of the six Counties,” and 
then hold votes in local communities immediately adjoining the border as to which parliamentary 
area they preferred.19  On December 19 the Cabinet considered the idea of a commission “to 
draw the exact line of demarcation with a view to the inclusion of Protestant and Roman Catholic 
communities living near the border,” but did not reach a decision.20 
Lloyd George briefly outlined the bill in Parliament in December, but the debate over a 
six- or nine-county northern parliament continued until it was formally introduced.21  The 
discussions turned on the long-term purpose of the government’s Irish policy.  Cabinet papers 
argued that if the “ultimate aim of the Government’s policy was a united Ireland,” then the 
northern parliamentary area should include all of Ulster.22  The nearly equal voting power of 
nationalists and unionists in the nine counties virtually ensured eventual reunification.  However, 
the December 10 meeting had been “reminded that one of the principal aims of the 
Government’s policy was to produce a good effect in the Self-Governing Dominions, as well as 
in the United States of America and other foreign countries.”23  If this was the primary goal, it 
was more important to produce a justifiable bill than one that could be enacted with success.   
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The Ireland committee appeared to be on the verge of deciding in favor of the nine-
county area when Balfour interceded on February 10, 1920.  He asserted, “our Home Rule policy 
has been largely influenced by our desire to show the world that the principles we apply to other 
peoples are those we accept for ourselves.”  Balfour predicted, “if you carry out logically the 
principle of self-determination, you need fear no effective agitation either outside Great Britain 
or in Ireland for re-uniting the two fragments of the Island which your Home Rule Bill divides.”  
To Balfour, this meant establishing a six-county northern parliamentary area, or what he called 
“small Ulster” rather than “big Ulster.”24  He did not explain how doing this without plebiscites 
of any kind accorded with the principle of self-determination, and assumed that the large 
nationalist minority in “small Ulster” would not agitate against their inclusion in a unionist-
dominated political unit.  Nonetheless, Balfour’s intervention was decisive.  A February 24 
Cabinet meeting decided on a six-county northern area without further debate.25 
Lloyd George introduced the Government of Ireland Bill in Parliament the next day.26  It 
was roundly condemned in Ireland.  The Irish Unionist Alliance denounced the proposals after 
Lloyd George’s December 1919 outline.  The IUA argued that the unsettled state of Ireland made 
self-government unsafe.  It also declared, “The solution of ‘partition’ is hateful to us, as well as 
to our Nationalist fellow-countrymen.”  Lord Midleton’s Unionist Anti-Partition League 
condemned the proposals the next day, asserting that the envisioned twenty-six-county 
legislature would be dominated by republicans, and its machinery made a tool in the secession of 
“the Southern provinces” from the United Kingdom.  The League also declared, “no measure 
which involves a partition of Ireland will provide a solution of the Irish problem.”27 
Joseph Devlin, the Ulster nationalist chief and sole IPP leader to retain his seat after 
December 1918, called the scheme, “one of the most insulting proposals ever submitted” as it 
“divides Ireland permanently.”  He added, “This bill is purely a measure to please Sir Edward 
Carson…and will be rejected with contempt by all Ireland except, perhaps, by the ascendant 
party in Ulster, whose bill I believe it is.”28  Lloyd George’s private statements support Devlin’s 
assumption.  The Prime Minister said of the measure, “Nothing could be done to amend it to 
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which Carson objected,” and, “Carson had made it a condition of his support that the Bill should 
be put through.”29 
Sinn Féin largely ignored the proposed statute.  Arthur Griffith was the acting President 
of the Irish Republic while Eamon de Valera toured the United States to raise money and drum 
up support.  He called the Government of Ireland Bill, “England’s present scheme, with her 
agent Carson, to dismember Ireland.”  However, he was nonplussed, as “It will never come into 
operation.”30  Griffith was not alone in this assumption.  The unionist but anti-partition Irish 
Times asserted, “there is a widespread suspicion that the Bill is designed merely as a manoeuvre 
to get the existing Home Rule Act out of the way.”31  Bates, the UUC Secretary, also indicated 
that the bill might never be enforced.32  Cabinet member F. E. Smith, who had been made Lord 
Birkenhead in 1919, told Midleton bluntly, “he had not the slightest belief that the Bill would 
pass,” and, “he would never have assented to it if he had thought that it was possible that it 
should pass.”  Birkenhead added that two of his Cabinet colleagues felt the same way.33  
London’s unionist Saturday Review said of the measure, “nobody believes the Bill will ever 
become an operative Act.”  The paper called it, “a moral demonstration rather than a practical 
policy,” which was “meant to put England right with the world, especially with the United 
States.”34  The Irish Times placed its hopes for the bill’s rejection in the Ulster unionists, as 
establishing a six-county legislature would force them to violate their 1912 Covenant against 
home rule.  If they rejected the bill it would have no Irish support whatsoever, and “the last 
excuse for the Government’s proposals will have vanished.”35 
The UUC considered the bill during a series of meetings in March 1920.  The northern 
unionists had accepted six-county exclusion from home rule during the Lloyd George proposals 
of 1916, but reverted to representing unionists in the entire province during the Irish Convention 
of 1917-1918.  The form of partition codified by the bill also stipulated that the six counties 
would have their own parliament, not governance from Westminster as envisioned in the pre-
First World War idea of exclusion.  Six-county unionists realized that this would cut them off 
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from the rest of Ireland, and from unionists in the three Ulster counties outside the northern 
parliamentary area.  Ironically, these were sometimes called the “excluded counties,” as they 
were to be left out of Northern Ireland.36 
The UUC met on March 10.  Craig presented the case for accepting the Government of 
Ireland Bill, and it was purely pragmatic.  The Council’s standing committee calculated that a 
six-county parliament would likely contain thirty-one to thirty-two unionists and twenty to 
twenty-one nationalists; a unionist majority of eleven or twelve.  A nine-county parliament might 
produce a unionist majority of two, or equally divided parties.37  The meeting passed a resolution 
protesting home rule, but supporting the Government of Ireland Bill on the grounds that it 
repealed the 1914 measure and embodied “separate treatment” for the six counties.38 
Instead of settling the issue, the decision prompted considerable soul-searching among 
Ulster unionists.  UUC members in the three counties, and their supporters in the six, argued that 
accepting the “partition of Ulster” was a breach of the Covenant.39  The decision’s supporters 
denied this, but the Covenant was not the deciding factor in any case.  Six-county unionists 
wanted a unit they could control.  UUC standing committee member John B. Gunning Moore 
said that six or nine counties “is not a question of ethics and honour, but a question of 
arithmetic.”40  He wrote, “including the whole 9 will be such a rickety parliament that it must 
almost at once be absorbed into the Dublin one,” adding, “We believe we can hold 6, possibly 
we could hold 7 or even 8—but there seems to be authority for saying we can’t hold 9.”41  Bates 
concurred, “if the Home Rule Bill was passed for nine Counties Ulster would be absorbed in the 
rest of Ireland within a comparatively short space of time.”42 
Nine-county supporters claimed that Carson had told them that if they demanded all of 
Ulster the government would accede to their wishes.43  This is confirmed by the Cabinet debates, 
which show how close the government came to establishing a nine-county parliamentary area.  
Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery did not believe that the bill would ever operate, or if it did it 
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would not last.44  He argued that the division between six- and nine-county unionists was not “a 
permanent severance, but only as a move in the battle.”45  The appeal to the Covenant had 
considerable pull.  Montgomery—whose thought process is easy to analyze due to his extensive 
correspondence—almost switched his support to the nine-county position, until its supporters 
made the split public by taking their grievances to the press.  In a political tradition that valued 
unanimity, this was a cardinal sin.46  The debate became more heated.  Montgomery and the six-
county supporters began referring to the nine-county advocates as the “cave-dwellers.”47 
Matters came to a head at a standing committee meeting on May 27, 1920.  Ambrose 
Ricardo, a representative from Co. Tyrone who nonetheless supported all-Ulster partition, moved 
a resolution in favor of a nine-county parliamentary area that would require a 75 percent vote to 
join an all-Ireland legislature.48  The UUC did not publish voting statistics as this would damage 
its image of unanimity, but according to Montgomery the resolution failed on a 301-80 vote.49  
Ricardo assumed that the UUC’s acceptance of the Lloyd George proposals four years earlier 
was the root of the current situation.  He wrote, “The damage was really done in 1916.”50  
Despite Ricardo’s position as a member of the standing committee, he was apparently unaware 
that Carson and Craig had been advocating six-county partition since 1913, and had reaffirmed 
this as recently as the Cabinet debates on the Government of Ireland Bill.  Six-county supporter 
Barry Melaughlin of Co. Tyrone was less sympathetic when he wrote of the three-county 
unionists’ 1916 stance, “the Delegates from these Counties showed the stuff they were made of 
by agreeing, under the then circumstances, to waive their rights under the Covenant.”  Bates 
ensured that Melaughlin obtained a seat on the standing committee in time for the March 10 
vote.51 
The Government of Ireland Bill became law on December 23, 1920.  This ensured 
separate political treatment for the six counties.  Nonetheless, the region remained subject to the 
same forces at work in the rest of the island.  IRA activity in the northeast was initially less 
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frequent than elsewhere, but arms raids, ambushes, and assassinations occurred.  The terms of 
the government’s bill guaranteed northern unionists’ political predominance over the six 
counties, and the idea that they were entitled to military control soon surfaced.  In May 1920, the 
press reported that the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) were patrolling districts from which the 
Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) had been withdrawn.52  Frederick Crawford, who had run guns 
for the UVF in 1914, urged Craig to “mobilize” the force on behalf of the government.  He wrote 
of the Cabinet, “If they do not accept the help the people (Protestant) of Ulster are willing now to 
give them they will be sorry, and the Protestants of Ulster will take the matter of protecting 
themselves into their own hand in a ‘rough’ and ‘ready’ way.”53 
Sometime between May and July 1920, Carson and Craig asked Wilfrid Spender, a 
former British Army colonel, to go to Belfast and reorganize the UVF.54  Spender was an ardent 
militant unionist.  Just a week before Britain joined the First World War he had urged the 
northern unionist leaders to allow the UVF to take over all of Ireland.  Spender had guaranteed 
that the force could “maintain order” everywhere “except in the wilder parts that do not 
matter.”55  He had no compunction about using the UVF in whatever way the northern unionist 
leaders would sanction. 
Spender later wrote that Lloyd George and Chief Secretary Hamar Greenwood tacitly 
approved of the UVF revival.56  There was sympathy in the Cabinet for creating a partisan force.  
Winston Churchill said on July 23 that he would “raise 30,000 men in Ulster by whom the 
authority of the Crown could be vindicated.”57  The prewar narrative of the UVF as a well-
organized, disciplined force undoubtedly played into this willingness to utilize them in an official 
capacity.  This narrative continued as, following riots in Derry and Belfast in July 1920 that left 
dozens dead, the press and local officials credited the UVF with helping to restore order.  It is 
noteworthy that most reports gave equal credit to the Irish Volunteers, who by this time were 
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synonymous with the IRA.58  After these fatal clashes, Walter Long suggested that the 
government enroll UVF members on a “special constabulary basis.”59 
General C. F. N. Macready, Commander-in-Chief of the British Army in Ireland, 
opposed the reformation of the Ulster unionist militia.  He saw little difference between Irish 
nationalist and unionist militants, as he wrote of the latter, “I always looked upon the leaders of 
that movement as rebels.”  Macready noted the irony that northern unionists expected to be 
empowered to do as they wished, as long as they declared that they did so in the government’s 
interest, “If everybody took up arms under the Flag of so-called ‘loyalty’ as they did, I cannot 
see how any Government can be carried on.”60  However, a number of Army commanders 
supported the Ulster unionists.  General William Hacket Pain, Constabulary commissioner for 
the six counties, had been the UVF’s chief of staff before the war.  Spender counted Generals H. 
H. Tudor, commander of all Irish police, and George Carter-Campbell, head of the Army in the 
six counties, as personal friends.61  The IRA intercepted a letter between Admiralty officials in 
Cork and London stating, “the Officers of the Ulster Volunteer Force are at our disposal.”62 
Spender was certain of his official support.  In August 1920 he asked General E. G. T. 
Bainbridge, recently appointed Army commander in Belfast, to arm the UVF.  Bainbridge 
refused, as “arming small bodies of civilians in the manner suggested will only lead to more 
trouble and excitement.”  However, he suggested that UVF members should enroll in a “Special 
Reserve” which the government could recognize as part of the Crown forces.63  Spender had 
already formulated a scheme for three different categories of UVF membership.  The “A” 
category would be called up for fulltime service “to meet a general rising,” “B” would be part-
time and operate within their own neighborhoods, and “C” would strictly “defend their homes.”64  
He presented this to John Anderson, a joint Under-Secretary in Dublin Castle, who was 
instrumental in getting it approved.  On November 1, 1920, the government began enrolling the 
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Ulster Special Constabulary (USC) on exactly the lines Spender had suggested.65  Unionist 
politicians especially encouraged Ulster Volunteers to join.66 
The enrollment of Special Constables ensured that Northern Ireland’s unionist 
government, once given control of the police, would have a considerable means of enforcing its 
authority.  The new force also impacted the way in which the administration related to the 
minority population.  The UVF’s political and religious character was well known, as was the 
fact that the force was providing the backbone for the new Special Constabulary.67  J. F. Gelston, 
commissioner of the Belfast RIC, asked some of the city’s Catholic clergy to encourage their 
followers to enroll in the USC, but the response was not positive.68   
The Cabinet knew when they decided on the six-county area that it would have a 
Protestant and unionist government.  A police force of the same complexion would only enhance 
this group’s control.  Extensive safeguards for Protestant unionists had been suggested for the 
Third Home Rule Act.  Extra representatives or special committees within the Irish home rule 
parliament and petitions to the King or to Westminster had all been considered as possible 
benefits for the Irish minority under home rule.  None of these solutions were proposed for six-
county Catholics and nationalists under the Government of Ireland Act.  Devlin appealed for 
minority safeguards to be inserted into the measure, but to no avail.69 
The debate concerning legislative safeguards for minority populations in any part of 
Ireland rested on two assumptions.  The first was that Catholics could not be trusted to treat 
Protestants fairly, therefore any home rule arrangement must include safeguards for the latter 
group.  The second presumption was that Protestants could always be trusted to govern Catholics 
fairly, rendering explicit safeguards for the Northern Ireland minority unnecessary.  This 
assumption of Protestant good governance is evident in Balfour’s Cabinet memos, as he 
indicated that northern nationalists would be content under a unionist administration.  Walter 
Long favored establishing an upper house within the Dublin parliament as a safeguard for the 
southern minority, but decried the idea of a second chamber for the six-county legislature as an 
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impingement on democracy.70  Lord Stuart assumed impartial Protestant unionist governance 
when he said, “in the South you will have the strongest motive in an orderly community for 
showing that a minority will be treated in the South as it probably will be in the North.”71  This 
presumption applied to police as well; nonpartisan police were considered unnecessary as most 
assumed that a Protestant unionist force would deal fairly with the Catholic nationalist minority.  
Stuart’s proposal that the majority in one part of Ireland should treat the minority well merely so 
their compatriots in another part of the island would receive the same only highlights the 
potential for endless abuse.  Montgomery foresaw this dynamic when he envisioned partition in 
1918, but expressed it far more ominously, “the predominant party in Ulster would hold 
important hostages in the shape of the R.C. [Roman Catholic] minority living among them.”72 
The government did amend the bill to provide Northern Ireland with a Senate, but most 
of its members would be elected by the House of Commons.  Majority rule would prevail 
throughout the legislature.  The first Northern Ireland election took place in May 1921, resulting 
in a Commons of forty unionists, six Sinn Féiners, and six Nationalists.  Ulster Unionist MP 
William Coote later declared that the result validated total unionist governance, “With a 
representation of 40 as against 12 we are entitled to say that we control the six counties area, and 
that no party has any right to take exception to our administering the six counties area.”  Coote 
added that the area had been “given to us by the British people.”73 
 
Dominion Status: Ideas, Organizations, and Limitations 
While the Government of Ireland Bill represented the Cabinet’s vision of Ireland’s future, 
civilian groups were developing their own plans for their administration.  Many of these ideas 
centered on dominion home rule.  Horace Plunkett declared himself in favor of this solution in a 
letter to The Times on April 15, 1919.  He advocated an all-Ireland parliament with fiscal 
autonomy.  Plunkett admitted that some parts of Ulster might require special treatment due to 
“the difference of its economic life from the rest of Ireland,” but this should be accomplished by 
county option.  He did not suggest any separate administration for the partitioned area.  Topics of 
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special concern, especially defense, could be negotiated between Britain and Ireland within the 
purview of international organizations like the Paris peace conference and the League of 
Nations.74  This last point closely mirrors the international appeals Sinn Féin was making at this 
time.  Plunkett had other ideas for dealing with the northern unionists.  His diaries mention 
“moral coercion,” implying non-violent but compulsive means of bringing the northern unionists 
into all-Ireland political institutions.75  He wrote to Lord Bryce that “Ulster” would likely have to 
be given a “provincial legislature of the Canadian type” subordinate to the Irish Parliament.76 
Plunkett gathered a number of politically engaged people who did not conform to 
republican or unionist political ideals into a new association.  The Irish Dominion League 
published its manifesto on June 28, 1919, in Plunkett’s new journal, the Irish Statesman.  The 
League primarily attracted moderate nationalists and southern unionists.  Landowners were well 
represented, including at least four nobles.  A number of the League’s adherents were also local 
officials like resident magistrates, justices of the peace, or deputy lieutenants.  Former nationalist 
MP Stephen Gwynn had formed the federalist Irish Centre Party in January, and merged it with 
the League.  Its members included Crown solicitor W. E. Wylie.77  Those who did not join 
Plunkett’s organization but signaled their support included Ulster unionist civil servant Frederick 
Wrench, Unionist MP Aubrey Herbert, and Ulster nationalist leader Joseph Devlin.78 
Many of the Dominion League’s supporters were accustomed to wielding influence at the 
local or national level, but the group never captured widespread popular support.  Plunkett 
lamented that the League sent out thousands of circulars but had received only forty replies by 
July 9.  This did not deter him, as the League was designed to influence British politicians.  
Plunkett described its job as “to show that an Irish Parl’t would not be dominated by Sinn Fein,” 
and “the most important fish” to catch were in London and Paris.79   
The League’s aims were based on Plunkett’s letter to The Times, though they called their 
proposed state the “Kingdom of Ireland.”80  Responding to the Government of Ireland Bill, the 
League declared its “irreducible minimum” demands on February 7, 1920.  The government 
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should declare Ireland a dominion.  Irish representation at Westminster would then cease, and the 
population would elect a “constituent assembly” to draft a constitution, including safeguards for 
Ulster, over which United Kingdom legislators would have no say.  The resulting Irish 
parliament would have fiscal autonomy but defense would be left to Westminster.81 
Though there were nationalists and unionists in the Dominion League, the organization 
was criticized by politicians on both poles.  John Dillon called the program “unworkable” and 
“dangerous,” asserting that “Ulster,” meaning the northern unionists, would refuse to cooperate 
while the condition that Ireland remain within the Empire would alienate Sinn Féin.82  Edward 
Carson called dominion home rule, “an Irish Republic camouflaged by another name.”83  The 
IUA argued that the assembly envisioned by the League would be dominated by Sinn Féiners, 
who would declare a republic.  In that case, the government might not have the right to interfere, 
as dominions could leave the British Empire, or “cut the painter,” any time they chose.  Lloyd 
George, Bonar Law, Balfour, Carson, and de Valera all agreed that dominion status included a 
right to “secede” or leave the Empire.84  The IUA added disapprovingly that Dominion League 
publications implied they would coerce “Ulster,” meaning the unionist population there, into 
accepting their ideas.85 
To counteract arguments that his policy was impractical, Horace Plunkett insisted that 
Sinn Féin would accept dominion status.86  He provided little evidence for this, but members of 
the League were in touch with Sinn Féiners.  Lord Monteagle regularly corresponded with James 
Douglas, a Quaker who adopted dominionism after the Rising, and eventually republicanism.  In 
May 1919 Douglas wrote, “Sinn Fein I think believes that the only way to get even Dominion 
self-govt is to present a united demand for Independence.”  This might be construed as asserting 
that Sinn Féin’s real goal was dominion status.  However, in the same letter he wrote that 
dominion home rule should only be demanded “If & when all hope of Independence & of 
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international pressure is gone,” indicating that separation was the party’s primary objective.87  
Douglas did not want to narrow Sinn Féin’s options.  He cautioned Monteagle against starting 
the new association, warning, “the Dominion League will only force S. F. to reject the Dominion 
Settlement which I think would be a disaster.”88  Douglas was not a heavyweight within Sinn 
Féin, and wrote primarily on his own authority.  Even when he inserted the opinions of leaders 
like Arthur Griffith, he had obtained these through an intermediary.  Nonetheless, the Dominion 
League’s leaders accepted his hesitant predilections toward their ideas as indicative of the real 
attitude of many professed republicans.89  The dominionists took Douglas’s letters so seriously 
that they forwarded at least one of them to Lloyd George’s secretary.90   
Most supporters of dominion home rule hoped that their solution would appeal to Ulster 
unionists, as it would establish self-government while keeping Ireland within the Empire.  
Douglas had justified dominion status in 1917 by telling South African Premier Jan Smuts, “we 
did not think it would be as objectionable to Ulster as an Irish Republic.”91  Plunkett called the 
idea, “the only possible lasting compromise” with the Ulster Unionists.92  However, some 
dominionists were willing to envision a partitioned Ireland.  Lord Shaftesbury counseled 
Monteagle in July 1920 that establishing two governments was “the only way of making a 
beginning.”  He added, “Ulster must, at any rate temporarily, be treated as a separate unit.  I 
think Sinn Fein has practically swallowed that view.”93  Charles Brett argued that the envisioned 
constituent assembly should adopt a constitution on a three-quarters vote, as majority voting 
would render “the North perfectly powerless.”  He added, “is not the rule of Government by a 
bare majority a superstition and unsuitable in many cases?”94  Monteagle replied that it was 
“better to give N.E. Ulster power to contract out but no power to veto the decision of the 
majority.”95 
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Republicans, dominionists, and some southern unionists recognized the extent to which 
Lloyd George and the Cabinet were pledged to support the Ulster unionists.  Plunkett wrote to 
The Times, “‘Ulster’ will make no answer to us as long as the Government encourages that 
minority of the Irish people to refuse to come into any Parliament for the whole of Ireland.”96  
This implied that Irish unity could be achieved if Lloyd George and his colleagues relaxed their 
support for partition.  This is similar to Sinn Féin’s insistence that, if the British government 
stood aside, the republicans would grant any necessary safeguards to ensure a united Ireland.  
The Government of Ireland Bill confirmed impressions that Lloyd George’s administration was 
expressly partitionist.  The Irish Times said that it “fulfills…the Government’s pledges to North-
East Ulster at the cost of a permanent destruction of Irish peace and unity.”97 
While primarily a lobbying group, Dominion League members made an effort to give 
legislative effect to their ideas.  Thomas Spring Rice, second baron Monteagle of Brandon, was 
among the group’s most active members.  He was a unionist for most of his life.  After the Third 
Home Rule Bill’s introduction in 1912 he wrote, “I am as much opposed to Home Rule as ever, 
because I still believe it would be bad for Ireland.”  Yet, he added that if self-government arrived 
it should come with fiscal autonomy, a key stipulation of what was then called colonial home 
rule.98  In 1914, Monteagle still described himself as a southern unionist.99  However, after the 
Easter Rising he admitted that self-government was inevitable; the two necessities were to 
achieve fiscal autonomy and to win over the Ulster unionists.100  In April 1917 Monteagle 
declared in favor of a “semi-Dominion status” for Ireland, incorporating full fiscal autonomy as 
well as restrictions on defense not considered necessary in other self-governing territories.101  His 
political evolution serves as an example of similar processes at work among other southern 
unionists. 
Monteagle, in consultation with Horace Plunkett and Henry Harrison, drafted the 
Dominion of Ireland Bill in 1920.  It would establish self-government largely on the League’s 
lines.  This included fiscal autonomy, the right to make commercial treaties, as well as control of 
the police and a territorial force or “National Guard;” provisions forbidden under every home 
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rule bill.  The British military was to be withdrawn from Ireland.  The new dominion would not 
be represented at Westminster, and could apply for membership to the League of Nations.  The 
Irish legislature could establish subordinate “parliaments or councils for any provinces, part of 
provinces, or group of provinces,” a stipulation clearly aimed at the northern unionists.  Under 
Monteagle’s bill, the Irish populace would elect a constituent assembly to draft a constitution.  
After this, the representatives of the six counties could appeal to the King for a plebiscite as to 
whether the constitution would operate there.  The six-county representatives could also ask for a 
poll on establishing a provincial parliament, as provided by the bill.102 
Monteagle sent a draft to Douglas for republican comments.  After consulting with “a 
leading Sinn Féin acquaintance who is in touch with Griffith,” Douglas predicted that the party 
would work those aspects of dominion status “consistent with a free Ireland,” particularly power 
over finance, courts, and police.  Sinn Féin would accept under protest elements that were 
“inconsistent with a free Ireland,” namely any British military presence and a Lord Lieutenant.  
Partition they would ignore altogether.  Despite the advantages he saw in accepting dominion 
status, Douglas believed, “if only England could see it she would be acting wisely from her own 
point of view in granting at once a Republic.”103 
Monteagle introduced the Dominion of Ireland Bill in the House of Lords on June 22, 
1920.  Arguing for it on July 1 he said, “The dearest wish of my heart is to keep Ireland as a 
willing member within what General Smuts called ‘the British Commonwealth of Free Nations.’  
I believe that this is possible on a Dominion basis, but on nothing short of it.”104  Much of the 
Lords’ criticism focused, not on whether dominion self-government was positive or appropriate, 
but on the assumption that Sinn Féin and the Ulster unionists would refuse to participate.  Irish 
federalist Lord Dunraven opposed the bill in part because it purported to make Ireland a 
dominion, but qualified that status.105  This was essentially a protest against constitutional 
experimentation.  Birkenhead denounced the bill on behalf of the government.  He objected to 
the idea that an Irish parliament would have the power to make commercial treaties, participate 
in Imperial councils, and join the League of Nations.  He added that the bill would not appease 
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Ulster unionists, and the legislature would be dominated by republicans.  Far from interpreting 
the measure as offering a truncated dominion status, Birkenhead asserted, “This Bill gives 
enormous powers and takes enormous risks.”106  It failed on a 41-28 vote.107 
Instead of the Dominion of Ireland Bill’s failure ending efforts toward this type of 
settlement, they only gained momentum.  In June the Trinity College Historical Society 
approved a pro-dominion resolution by a slim 8-7 margin.  Speaking against dominion status, W. 
F. Patton warned that it was “the stepping-stone to higher things.”108  In early August, Cork 
businessmen began circulating a petition in favor of dominion status, and the Dublin Chamber of 
Commerce passed a resolution in its favor.109  The Cork initiative resulted in a deputation that 
met with Lloyd George and the Cabinet on August 4.  Three days later the deputy lieutenants and 
magistrates of Queen’s County declared for dominion home rule in a body.110  On August 9 two 
Liberal MPs and one Unionist published a letter in The Times in favor of fiscal autonomy, which 
they declared, “the real substance of Dominion Home Rule.”111  On August 13 the Unionist Anti-
Partition League passed a resolution in favor of “self-government with an adequate control of all 
local affairs, including taxation.”112  League leader Lord Midleton told Cabinet members that he 
was under pressure to declare for dominion home rule.113  By September he warned that “even 
loyalists” were pushing for this type of settlement, and in November called for “generous 
concessions by the Government.”114 
The Dominion League seized on the Prime Minister’s suggestion to the Cork deputation 
that they should organize “all that was best in moderate Irish opinion in the interests of a 
satisfactory settlement within the Empire.”115  To this end, they planned the Irish Peace 
Conference, which met in Dublin on August 24.  George Berkeley estimated that 600 people 
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attended.  They included dominionists, unionists, and moderate nationalists.  In one of the ironies 
of the Conference, IRA members served as doorkeepers for this gathering of non-republicans.116 
The Peace Conference met regularly until late September 1920.  They approved the 
Dominion League program for an Irish settlement; a predictable outcome given that the 
organization had arranged the gathering.117  They suggested that the northern unionists be granted 
a provincial parliament subordinate to the Irish legislature, the area of which would be decided 
by county option.118  It seems that the group intended to be continuously active, as they appointed 
a standing committee and a deputation to present their proposals to Lloyd George.119   
The Peace Conference communicated its initial decisions to the Prime Minister, but 
received no response.120  On November 4 the Conference secretaries wrote to Lloyd George 
asking “whether you still wish to confer with the representatives of Moderate Irishmen.”  They 
reminded him that they assembled “in response to an invitation from you.”  The Peace 
Conference members had become unsettled after Lloyd George’s speech at Carnarvon on 
October 9.  The Prime Minister derided the idea of offering dominion status to Ireland, and 
argued that it would be a danger to the Empire.  He added a flourish that emphasized the 
symbolic importance of defeating the IRA to British nationalists when he said, “This is a great 
country…it has done more for human freedom than any other country…We are not going to 
quail before a combination of a handful of assassins in any part of the British Empire.”121   
The Conference representatives wrote that such an attitude, coupled with the Cabinet’s 
determination to pass the Government of Ireland Bill, would “render it useless for Moderate men 
to discuss the Government’s policy.”122  Lloyd George responded nearly two weeks later, 
indicating that he did not intend to take any steps toward a settlement until he dealt a blow to the 
insurgents, “the Government must take the sternest counter-measures in defence of the law and 
its guardians, and real progress toward a settlement is wellnigh [sic] impossible.”  He also 
implied that it was up to “the people of Ireland” to “insist on the termination of the campaign of 
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murder and assassination, which can never succeed.”123  This last suggestion is ironic given that 
the Prime Minister was addressing a primarily Irish body appealing for an end to violence 
through negotiation, and Lloyd George was refusing to engage.   
Without meaning to, the Irish Peace Conference had called Lloyd George’s bluff.  His 
suggestion to the Cork deputation that they organize moderate opinion was consistent with 
Cabinet complaints that extremists had taken hold of Irish politics; that if only moderate 
constitutionalists would assert themselves a generous settlement could be secured.  The Prime 
Minister likely meant his statement to the Cork deputation as a sop to his immediate audience 
and a further justification of harsh methods against republicans, not as a call to action.  However, 
the Dominion League, who had been attempting to organize moderate opinion for more than a 
year in the hope of influencing government policy, took it as an earnest invitation to amplify 
their work.  Some members resented that their sincere attempt was rebuffed.  Henry Harrison, 
one of the Conference secretaries and the Dominion League’s most vociferous propagandist, 
published The Irish Peace Conference 1920 and Its Betrayal in January 1921.  He accused the 
government of militarism, and “an attempted reconquest by executive terrorism.”  Harrison 
asserted, “It is quite clear that the Prime Minister and those who control his policy have not 
seriously considered anything but a ‘knock-out blow’ peace.”124 
Just as the Irish dominionists were becoming discouraged, British politicians took up the 
cause.  On September 29, 1920, Lord Edward Grey published a letter in the Westminster Gazette 
proposing dominion home rule, but without allowing Ireland an army, navy, or the right of 
secession from the Empire.125  A week later, Lord Morley issued a protest against reprisals.126  
While he did not actually make any administrative proposals, his criticism of government policy 
was widely interpreted as support for dominion status.127 
Former Prime Minister H. H. Asquith took the opportunity to state his own position.  
During an election campaign in February 1920 he had announced that he would grant an Irish 
parliament fiscal autonomy, and claimed that this would put them on par with the dominions.  In 
a moment of sublime irony given the course of the 1913-1914 negotiations, he quoted Redmond 
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on the necessity of maintaining Ireland’s “essential unity.”128  Asquith maintained his attitude 
throughout 1920, particularly while criticizing the Government of Ireland Bill.129  On October 5 
he wrote a letter to The Times reiterating his new policy.  He claimed not to fear an Irish 
Republic, as “Men do not in the long run fight for phrases, but for realities.”130  The political 
evolution of Asquith, Grey, and Morley is ironic given that, when they formulated their own 
home rule bill, they denied Ireland any powers approaching dominion status.  Asquith later wrote 
that his newfound conviction was a result of Sinn Féin’s electoral success, and provided an 
opportunity for criticizing government policies.131 
Whatever their motives, parliamentary criticism of government policy continued to 
mount.  On October 29, Unionist Lord Henry Cavendish Bentinck gathered a group of British 
MPs and supporters into the Peace with Ireland Council.  They mainly engaged in publicizing 
and condemning reprisals by government forces.  The growth of “reprisals,” or destruction 
carried out by the military, RIC, or the new Auxiliary RIC, caused public indignation in Ireland 
and Britain.132  The term stems from attacks on German civilians by Allied forces during the First 
World War, operations that caused controversy in that context as well.133  The word itself implies 
that these actions were undertaken after provocation, but wanton destruction by Crown forces, 
including wrecking, looting, or shooting at shops or houses, burning buildings, and assaulting 
civilians frequently occurred where no IRA operations had taken place.  Shootings of republicans 
sometimes accompanied material destruction.134 
In Bentinck’s words, the aim of the Council in denouncing reprisals was to “appeal to 
public opinion to vindicate the fundamental British principals [sic] of Law and Liberty.”135  The 
organization did not advocate governmental reform, but Bentinck had already declared himself 
in favor of giving Ireland a similar status as Canada.136  The group established links with the 
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Dominion League and attracted support from all of the major parties: Unionists, Liberals, and 
Labour.  A striking feature of its membership lists is the number of Church of England clergy 
involved, including at least five bishops.137  Discussing clerical opposition to government policy, 
The Times commented, “Religious forces such as these are still potent in England.”138  Another 
notable member was General Hubert Gough, who had led the Curragh mutiny.  In February 
1921, Gough declared in favor of dominion status for Ireland.139 
Irish dominionists possessed many of the advantages necessary to successful political 
action.  They had an organized party.  Its members were influential and represented a wide range 
of opinion.  The League had its own newspaper, and received positive press comment from other 
organs.  The group was well funded, could introduce measures into Parliament, and—crucially 
for Irish constitutional movements—had powerful supporters in Britain.  Given all of these 
advantages, why did it come no nearer to passing a measure to establish an Irish dominion? 
The most cogent criticism of the League was its failure to win support either with an 
overwhelming segment of the public, or with key individuals or groups.  Those who argued 
against its aims on the grounds that neither Ulster unionists nor Sinn Féin would accept 
dominion status were largely correct.  Many southern unionists and a few of their northern 
counterparts saw the benefits of a large measure of self-government.  However, Ulster unionist 
leaders like Carson argued that dominionism was really republicanism in disguise, implying a 
greater degree of separation from Britain than they would consider. 
To Sinn Féin supporters, dominion status sounded like a republic with greater 
restrictions.  Republicanism demonstrated its appeal to Irish voters in national elections in 
December 1918, and continued to do so in local elections.  After the League’s foundation, Arthur 
Griffith condemned it as the “latest attempt to sidetrack Irish national demand.”140  In July 1919, 
the Abbey Theatre hosted a debate on the merits of a dominion versus a republic.  Plunkett said 
that he believed in a dominion settlement because “the more freedom Ireland had the more she 
would be friendly to England.”  Sinn Féin spokesman Aodh de Blácam called that “the best 
argument for a Republic he had heard.”141  Moreover, Sinn Féin leaders were convinced that their 
                                                 
137 NLI, Monteagle Papers, Ms. 13,415, Peace with Ireland Council circular; NLI, G. F. Berkeley Papers, Ms. 
10,924, “My Experiences with the Peace with Ireland Movement,” November 1921. 
138 The Times (London), 5 October 1920. 
139 Irish Times (Dublin), 11 February 1921. 
140 Irish Times (Dublin), 3 July 1919. 





electoral victories guaranteed their control of public opinion.  Reacting to an invitation to the 
Irish Peace Conference, Michael Collins remarked scathingly, “these people do not really 
matter.”142 
There is evidence that high-ranking members of Sinn Féin considered entering a 
“constituent assembly,” presumably that proposed by the Dominion League.  However, they 
would only do so if it was empowered to make a settlement outside the British Empire, and if 
Westminster pledged to implement its decisions without interference.143  Sinn Féin had issued 
similar conditions for entering the Irish Convention in 1917, and the British government would 
almost certainly reject them. 
The Dominion League continued its work until November 1921.  By that time, the 
Cabinet was negotiating terms with Sinn Féin.  The League’s raison d’être had, therefore, 
expired.  In winding up the organization its leaders complained that it “had not received the 
support which it was entitled to expect.”144  Thus, Lloyd George’s criticism that supporters of 
dominion status could not “speak for Ireland” was largely correct.145  The Prime Minister’s 
position at the head of a large parliamentary majority meant that his policy would prevail, despite 
significant criticism.  It would take an overwhelming display of popular support—possibly from 
both islands—to divert him from his course.  Even if the dominionists convinced Lloyd George 
or a large portion of his supporters to back a measure on their lines, they could not guarantee that 
Sinn Féin or the Irish public would agree to it.  As long as this was the case, no settlement based 
on dominion status was possible. 
 
Seeking Peace with Sinn Féin 
 The first meeting of Dáil Éireann on January 21, 1919, confirmed the Proclamation of the 
Irish Republic signed by the Easter Rising leaders in 1916.  They issued a Declaration of 
Independence which referred to “the existing state of war between Ireland and England.”  In the 
ensuing months, this government of the Irish Republic established ministries, departments, and a 
civil service as alternatives to the British administration of the island.  Violent clashes between 
the IRA and Crown forces, encompassing the RIC and Army, grew more frequent, particularly 
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after the outlawing of the Dáil in September 1919.  However, the government in London did not 
immediately counter the republican campaign with any major policy shift. 
 One of the factors that prolonged the conflict was British politicians’ and military 
figures’ abhorrence of the idea of negotiating with Sinn Féin.  It was May 1920 before Lloyd 
George began to seriously consider stronger measures in Ireland, and when he did so it was to 
save face.  He wrote to Churchill, “We cannot leave things as they are.  De Valera has practically 
challenged the British Empire, and unless he is put down the Empire will look silly.”146  On 
August 4 Bonar Law said that making concessions to Sinn Féin would be “showing that we are 
on the run.”147  Even on the eve of negotiations more than a year later, a Dublin Castle official 
said that a colleague working to end the violence “has apparently no idea whatever of the dignity 
of the Empire.”148  This sentiment made it potentially politically damaging for anyone to 
negotiate with Sinn Féin directly. 
Nonetheless, the Cabinet was aware that something had to be done.  On June 2, 1920, 
they decided that the time had almost arrived to reach a “comprehensive settlement” with Sinn 
Féin.  The precedent they invoked was the 1882 “Kilmainham Treaty,” in which then-Prime 
Minister William Gladstone agreed to release Irish nationalist leader Charles Parnell from prison, 
remove a Chief Secretary identified with coercion, and introduce land legislation.  In return, 
Parnell promised to use his influence to curtail agrarian violence.  However, the Cabinet decided, 
“it was necessary for the Government first to secure the upper hand in their policy of establishing 
law and order in Ireland” before seeking an agreement.149  They also developed a plan to suspend 
representative government if the southern parliament envisioned by the Government of Ireland 
Bill refused to meet or was unable to do so.  Instead, they would nominate an assembly and 
require only a one-third quorum for it to convene.150 
Therefore, as early as June 1920 the administration was open to negotiating with Sinn 
Féin, but only after the vague requirement of reestablishing “law and order” had been fulfilled.  
This meant that a policy of conciliation would only be followed by one of coercion.  Lord 
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Curzon described the idea as, “ardent coercion, trusting to force the Sinn Feiners into a frame of 
mind favourable to settlement.”151  Throughout the conflict, government officials did not believe 
that Sinn Féin could control the IRA.  They portrayed republican “gunmen” as terrorizing 
moderates, even within Sinn Féin, and maintained that if they cracked down on the former the 
latter would come out in favor of a settlement.  As Walter Long expressed it, “if the Sinn Féin 
leaders try to negotiate they’ll be shot by the extremists.”152  As late as April 1921 Lloyd George 
said, “De Valera cannot come here and say he is willing to give up Irish independence, for if he 
did, he might be shot.”153  Historian Keith Middlemas remarks on how often the government 
relied on rumor and hearsay in making decisions on Ireland.154  Such statements reflect genuine 
ignorance of the relationship between the Dáil, Sinn Féin, and the IRA, but also provided cover 
for the government assertion that they were acting on behalf of the Irish population, who they 
claimed were being terrorized by a few extremists.155  It also drew upon stereotypes of the Irish 
as uncontrollably violent and incapable of coordinated action.156 
While the Cabinet set plans in motion to reestablish law and order, some of its members 
made back-channel attempts to ascertain whether Sinn Féin would accept a solution that fell 
short of an independent republic.  One of the first people approached with settlement ideas was 
Art Ó Briain, the Dáil’s representative in London.  On July 15, Ó Briain met with lawyer and 
baronet Charles Russell, who had been sent by Charles Riddell, one of Lloyd George’s close 
associates.  Russell passed on Riddell’s message that they were anxious to get in touch with Sinn 
Féin.  Ó Briain said they should speak with Arthur Griffith, but before any negotiations took 
place the Cabinet should recognize the Irish Republic.157 
On July 22, Alfred Davies, Unionist MP for Lincoln, approached Ó Briain and told him 
that the government would grant Ireland “any measure of Dominion Home Rule, in fact absolute 
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freedom,” if the British connection was maintained.  Ó Briain told Davies that if Lloyd George 
“wanted to go down to history as the greatest statesman that England ever had, he should come 
out with a campaign, telling the English people that, in the interests of England, the Irish 
Republic must be recognised.”  After this, the two countries could make a peace treaty.158  Davies 
returned a week later and suggested that members of the Irish republican government meet with 
the British Cabinet.  Deflected on this idea, Davies proposed that Griffith should meet privately 
with Lloyd George.  Ó Briain reiterated that the British government should first recognize the 
Republic.  One of Lloyd George’s secretaries, E. R. Davies, was present at the second meeting 
and said that this was impossible.159 
Government officials were divided over what they would offer Sinn Féin if they did 
restore law and order.  At a July 23 Cabinet meeting, Crown solicitor W. E. Wylie argued 
passionately that “No amount of coercion could settle the Irish question,” and the government 
should offer “any terms short of an Irish Republic,” combined with county option for Ulster.160  
General Macready supported him.  Weeks after arriving in Ireland, he had written to Frances 
Stevenson that force “will not heal the root of the disease.”161  Churchill interjected that he was 
not “afraid of full Dominion Home Rule, except as part of a defeat.”162  In other words, he would 
consider dominion status but wanted to save face by restoring imperial authority before 
negotiating.  Cabinet members Lord Curzon and H. A. L. Fisher suggested that they might 
amend the Government of Ireland Bill to expand the southern parliament’s powers.  The latter 
specifically mentioned granting control of customs and excise taxes, a key dominion power.163  
Fisher predicted that the government would be “driven” to grant dominion status eventually.164  
Balfour opposed concessions that entailed abandoning the bill.  The next day, he submitted a 
paper outlining his main argument, “A parliament has been promised to Ulster.  Whether the 
promise was originally wise or unwise is immaterial; it cannot now be withdrawn.”165  Instead of 
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formulating concessions, Lloyd George asked for “the definite and final proposals of the Irish 
Government for the enforcement of the law.”166 
Despite the fact that a number of influential individuals favored making concessions to 
Sinn Féin, Lloyd George ultimately decided government policy.  The Prime Minister was vague 
and contradictory as to how far he would go to conciliate Irish nationalists.  MP J. H. Thomas 
noted that Lloyd George told a Labour Party deputation in June 1920 that the administration 
would negotiate on any basis except a republic, but days later Lord Birkenhead denounced 
Monteagle’s Dominion of Ireland Bill on behalf of the government.167  In Ireland: The Politics of 
Enmity (2007), historian Paul Bew puts great store in the idea that Lloyd George “dropped vague 
hints” that he was prepared to grant dominion status in the first week of August 1920.168  He met 
with the Cork deputation on August 4.  Press reports of the meeting were positive, and the Prime 
Minister later spoke as though he had offered dominion home rule “with important reservations.”  
However, a transcript of the conversation shows that the Prime Minister emphatically rejected 
this idea.  He said, “As a matter of fact you cannot offer Dominion Home Rule.  You cannot do 
it,” adding, “Dominion Home Rule means control over harbours, control over the Army, control 
over the Navy, and control over money.  That is exactly what we cannot confer upon them.”169  
Publicly and privately, the Prime Minister argued against amending the Government of Ireland 
Bill in the direction of dominion status.  He portrayed an Irish dominion as a threat to British 
security, and was adamant that the administration could not grant fiscal autonomy.170 
Another element of Lloyd George’s personal Irish policy was his eagerness to punish 
Sinn Féin.  The Prime Minister told C. P. Scott during the 1918 conscription crisis, “He knew 
there would be trouble—rioting, bloodshed, but it was better to face all that and get it 
over…There were to be no judicial trials and punishments.  If men were to be shot they were to 
be put up against a wall and shot on the spot.”171  Sinn Féin officials were assassinated 
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throughout 1920; police or soldiers were suspected in each case.172  Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff Henry Wilson wrote after a meeting with Lloyd George in September 1920, “He reverted to 
his amazing theory that someone was murdering 2 Sinn Feiners to every loyalist the Sinn Feiners 
murdered.  I told him that, of course, this was absolutely not so, but he seemed to be satisfied 
that a counter-murder association was the best answer to Sinn Fein murders.”173  The Prime 
Minister told the Cork deputation, “there are a few men we want to get at” before ending the 
coercion policy.174  This tacit support for government forces’ extralegal methods contributed to 
the growth of reprisals.175 
Public denunciation of government policy and continually escalating IRA violence 
prompted Lloyd George to make a serious effort at achieving a cessation.  There had already 
been signs of movement in this direction.  On October 8, 1920, Unionist MP George Cockerill, 
who later supported the Peace with Ireland Council, published a letter in The Times calling for a 
truce, an amnesty, and a conference to negotiate a “Convention between nations at peace.”176  
Arthur Griffith replied to Lloyd George’s aggressive Carnarvon speech that, if the government 
recognized Irish independence, they were prepared to negotiate treaties to protect mutual military 
and financial interests.177 
At the same time, Patrick Moylett of Galway was in London to complain that his home 
and business had been wrecked by Crown forces.  Griffith sent him to see John Steele, a Chicago 
Tribune correspondent who had traveled to Ireland over the previous two years.  Steele 
introduced Moylett to Cabinet member H. A. L. Fisher.178  Moylett went to Dublin, and Griffith 
gave him a letter reiterating that Sinn Féin would accept a conference with government 
representatives if there were no prior conditions.  From the time of his return to London, Moylett 
acted as an unofficial emissary for Griffith.179  Other republicans knew nothing of Moylett’s 
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actions.180  The talks continued for weeks but produced no results.  Griffith became worried that 
the affair might make it seem as though they were willing to accept something less than a 
republic.181  Michael Collins called it a “fiasco” and blamed Steele as being out for a story.182 
Nonetheless, from this period forward there were concerted attempts by Cabinet members 
and Dublin Castle officials to maintain contact with Irish republicans.  As the Moylett 
discussions were ending, Lloyd George tried to get George “Æ” Russell to act as an 
intermediary.  The Prime Minister offered to amend the Government of Ireland Bill, but Russell 
cut off communication after Griffith was arrested on November 26.183   
On December 1 and 2 Patrick Clune, a Co. Clare native and Catholic Archbishop of 
Perth, Australia, met with Lloyd George to protest reprisals.  The Prime Minister expressed his 
horror, and asked Clune to act as an intermediary in arranging a truce with Sinn Féin.184  
Reporting these meetings to Griffith, Art Ó Briain said that it was clear the government was 
desperate for peace.185  Clune delivered Lloyd George’s terms to Griffith in Dublin’s Mountjoy 
Gaol.  They were simple and strikingly similar to Cockerill’s suggestions: both the IRA and 
government forces would cease their activities and the Dáil would be allowed to meet.  Griffith 
remarked that this entailed “no surrender of principle on our part.”186  On December 4 the 
Archbishop met with Collins, who agreed.187  There was every reason to believe that a cessation 
of violence was very close when Clune returned to London. 
While the Archbishop was in Dublin, the Prime Minister received indications that the 
coercion policy was at last bearing fruit.  On December 3, 1920, the Galway County Council 
passed a resolution calling on the Dáil and the British government to appoint three delegates 
each to negotiate a truce and a lasting peace.188  Three days later, the Galway Urban District 
Council passed a similar motion, which noted that the Archbishop of Tuam and Dáil member 
                                                 
180 NLI, Art Ó Briain Papers, Ms. 8426/11, Art Ó Briain to Michael Collins, 20 October 1920; NLI, Art Ó Briain 
Papers, Ms. 8426/7, Michael Collins to Art Ó Briain, 1 November 1920. 
181 University College Dublin Archives (UCDA), Eamon de Valera Papers, P150/1413, Arthur Griffith to Michael 
Collins, n.d. 
182 NLI, Art Ó Briain Papers, Ms. 8426/7, Michael Collins to Art Ó Briain, 15 December 1920; NLI, Art Ó Briain, 
Ms. 8430/12, Michael Collins to Art Ó Briain, 4 January 1921. 
183 UCDA, Eamon de Valera Papers, P150/1412, James Haverty to Eamon de Valera, 3 April 1952. 
184 BMH WS No. 362, J. T. McMahon. 
185 UCDA, Eamon de Valera Papers, P150/1413, Art Ó Briain to Arthur Griffith, 2 December 1920. 
186 UCDA, Eamon de Valera Papers, P150/1413, Arthur Griffith to Diarmuid Ó hÉigeartaigh, n.d. 
187 UCDA, Eamon de Valera Papers, P150/1413, Note by Michael Collins. 





Roger Sweetman had also declared for peace.189  John Harley Scott, a unionist and sheriff of 
Cork City, submitted a peace resolution to a meeting of the Cork Corporation.  In conveying this 
to Lloyd George, he suggested that the first clause in any truce agreement should be an insistence 
that Irish arms be surrendered.190  On December 5, Michael O’Flanagan, a Catholic priest and 
Sinn Féin vice president, sent Lloyd George a telegram acknowledging that the Prime Minister 
had recently declared in favor of peace, and inquiring what his first step would be.191 
These messages convinced some within the British government and military that they 
were defeating the republicans, and could impose any terms they wished.  During Clune’s 
subsequent interviews with Lloyd George on December 8 and 11, the Prime Minister’s proposals 
were less lenient.  He suggested that during the truce no arrests would be made, but the 
government should have a free hand in hunting down the perpetrators of an ambush at 
Kilmichael, Co. Cork, in which seventeen Auxiliary RIC were killed.  Lloyd George suggested 
that representatives of Irish labor and the Catholic Church should sit with the Dáil, in order to 
“constitute the national sentiment of Ireland outside Ulster.”  Clune quoted the Prime Minister as 
saying that the peace resolutions and Father O’Flanagan’s telegram proved the republicans were 
“showing the white feather,” a First World War reference to an implication of cowardice, and 
were “anxious for peace at any price.”  Lloyd George added that Collins and IRA Chief of Staff 
Richard Mulcahy could not meet with the Dáil when it assembled.  Finally, Greenwood 
suggested that arms should be surrendered as a prelude to a truce.192  The Cabinet confirmed 
these two conditions.193 
Above all else, the Sinn Féin leaders objected to the idea of giving up arms.  Griffith 
commented, “this is not a truce but a surrender,” while Collins warned, “Let Ll. George make no 
mistake, the I.R.A. is not broken…Neither is the spirit of the people subdued.”194  Under-
Secretary John Anderson convinced Clune that they could enact an “unofficial truce” without an 
arms surrender by simply calling off actions by both sides.195  The Sinn Féin representatives 
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interpreted this suggestion as the arms condition being “waived.”  On this and an understanding 
that the entire Dáil could meet, the republican Cabinet consented to the truce.196 
However, on December 17 the British Cabinet insisted that weapons must be given up as 
part of any truce deal.197  Griffith informed Clune that this was impossible, ending the most 
serious attempt at a ceasefire to date.198  On December 24 the Cabinet was informed, without 
evidence, that arms were already being handed in to the authorities.  They determined not to 
change course, as “the forces of the Crown had at last definitely established the upper hand.”199  
General Tudor assured a December 29 meeting that in four months “the terror would be broken if 
there was no truce.”200 
Despite the Government of Ireland Act’s passage, the Cabinet had taken no steps to 
implement it.  Believing that the republicans were eager for a ceasefire, they considered holding 
quick elections to the northern and southern parliaments, while refusing to negotiate with Sinn 
Féin in the meantime.  They also pondered further delays in the hope that their coercion policy 
would enable the measure to operate smoothly.201  Craig was already preparing for the six-county 
elections and protested, “the sincerity in the British Government in pressing forward the Act has 
always been in doubt, and a long pause now might be construed as an attempt to go a step further 
towards conciliating the rebel element.”202  The Cabinet set the opening of the two parliaments in 
motion in January 1921.203  Greenwood said that this decision would furnish “indisputable proof 
that the Government of Ireland Act is a reality and the independence of Northern Ireland an 
accomplished fact.”204  Thus, the decision to implement the Act was not taken as a necessary 
prelude to the ultimate truce of July 1921, but after the failure of a previous attempt.  How the 
plans for an as-yet-unestablished six-county parliament might have been affected by negotiations 
in December 1920 can only be guessed. 
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Eamon de Valera returned to Ireland on December 23, 1920, and discouraged secret 
peace initiatives.  In January 1921 he told O’Flanagan that Lloyd George’s “pretences” toward 
peace were insincere.205  Collins replied to another overture, “All these things are simply 
designed to get us arguing about things that the English have no intention of conceding.”206 
Despite the republicans’ reluctance to engage, secret parleys continued.  In mid-March 
Arthur Vincent, a former government lawyer and Co. Kerry landowner, approached Lloyd 
George to ask him to stop a series of scheduled executions.  Instead, the Prime Minister used him 
to suggest a meeting with de Valera, which did not come off.207  Lord Derby made a supposedly 
secret visit to Ireland in April, which was in fact remarkably well publicized.208  He met de 
Valera on April 21 and tried to get him to drop the demand for complete independence as a 
prerequisite for meeting Lloyd George.  The Sinn Féin leader refused.209 
One of the sincerest approaches came from the Irish Business Men’s Conciliation 
Committee between March and May 1921.  Comprised of nationalist and unionist industrialists, 
this group offered to mediate negotiations between the Dáil and the government.210  Lloyd 
George met them and claimed that he had “offered every facility” for the Dáil to assemble, 
except for four members whom he did not name.211  The committee thought that the Dáil had also 
accepted their meditation, but were overly optimistic in their interpretation of the republican 
reply.  On May 2, Dáil secretary Diarmuid Ó hÉigeartaigh wrote to the committee’s chairman, 
Andrew Jameson, that as long as the government required them to give up their demand for 
independence negotiation was impossible.  He said renouncing that object would be a 
“surrender” and further talks would merely be “notification to us of the amount of freedom 
which England will be good enough to concede.”  Ó hÉigeartaigh added, “England is the 
aggressor.  Her troops occupy our country.  That alone is the cause of this war.  If England had 
the will for peace, she could have it instantly by withdrawing these troops.”212 
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Despite these rebuffs, republican priorities were being made increasingly clear.  They 
wanted negotiations without any preconditions and an acknowledgement of the Dáil’s right to 
assemble in its entirety.  This is a significant point, as allowing the British government to ban 
certain republicans from the deliberations would concede to them the right of continuing to 
pursue those individuals as criminals, even after IRA actions ceased.  This one-sided ceasefire 
would show that the Irish republicans were not of equal status with the British negotiators.  Ó 
hÉigeartaigh’s reply—which undoubtedly expressed de Valera’s opinions—shows the high 
priority republicans placed on the withdrawal of British troops from Ireland.  On May 29, de 
Valera told O’Flanagan that he would not meet with any emissaries except an official, accredited 
envoy from the British Prime Minister, bearing a written statement of terms.213 
Solicitor-General James O’Connor was convinced that, if de Valera reached a settlement 
with the Ulster unionist leaders, the government would be forced to implement it.214  To this end, 
O’Connor met with Edward Carson several times to gauge the unionist leader’s reaction to 
various settlement ideas.  During one interview, Carson suggested that Sinn Féin might have to 
accept a settlement that fell short of their ideal as “a step nearer to liberty.”215 
Government officials including Under-Secretary Alfred “Andy” Cope and Greenwood 
advocated arranging negotiations between Sinn Féin and the Ulster unionists in the belief that 
this would solve the Irish question.216  This attitude incorporated a denial of the Sinn Féin view 
that Ireland and the United Kingdom were nations at war, and that unionists were a minority 
within the former nation.  It also obviated any British responsibility for division or violence in 
Ireland by assuming that the Irish question was purely one between Irish people.  Craig and de 
Valera did meet on May 5, 1921.  According to Greenwood they merely exchanged views, the 
unionist leader urging the republican President to accept the Government of Ireland Act.217  De 
Valera suggested the Ulster unionists should work with Sinn Féin to strengthen the Irish 
Republic.  Craig ruled this out, but offered to formulate joint demands and take them to Lloyd 
George.218  Cope, O’Flanagan, and Craig, with the Cabinet’s support, tried to arrange further 
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meetings but de Valera held aloof.219  On June 4 the republican President wrote to O’Connor, “If 
the sky fell we should catch larks, and such is the hope of securing the end of the struggle with 
England through a prior agreement with the Unionist minority.”220 
Meanwhile, the British government was coming to grips with the fact that their coercion 
policy was not achieving the desired results, certainly not within the anticipated timeframe.  The 
Cabinet relied to a great extent on the Chief Secretary and the generals for information on the 
state of Ireland.  In September 1920, Greenwood confidently assured Lloyd George, “the tide has 
definitely turned against the Sinn Feiners.”221  Four months later he said the same thing in almost 
identical terms.222  Privately, Greenwood admitted that the situation was deteriorating.  In April 
1921 Lloyd George’s aide Thomas Jones wrote that the Chief Secretary “now talks of 
pacification in years rather than months.”223  However, Greenwood’s official prognostications 
continued to be fatuously bullish.  In May he assured the Prime Minister that the “Sinn Fein 
Army” were “losing heavily, and certain to be defeated.”224  Dublin Castle’s own statistics show 
that IRA actions increased steadily throughout the conflict.225  Greenwood’s attitude was 
symptomatic of a mindset within the government that delayed any cessation of violence; they 
expected victory at any moment, and therefore did not want to stop the conflict. 
In December 1920, Tudor told the Cabinet that the rebellion would be crushed in four 
months.  April 1921 arrived with no sign of pacification.  On April 27 the Cabinet again 
considered postponing the elections mandated by the Government of Ireland Act, or granting a 
truce during the polling period.  Greenwood told them frankly that he could not guarantee that 
conditions would improve in the next six months.  Secretary of State for India Edwin Montagu 
supported a ceasefire, saying they had demonstrated that “the Irish are never going to achieve a 
Republic.”  Churchill was against altering their course.  If the republicans dominated the 
southern legislature “We can break up this Irish Parliament and revert to coercion.”  Sinn Féin 
was contesting the elections but had not altered their abstentionist policy.  The party was simply 
using the polls to elect a new Dáil.  Lloyd George argued against making concessions, as the 
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republicans would use them to leverage further demands.226  On May 12, Montagu and Fisher 
suggested that a truce might enable the Sinn Féin candidates to abandon the republican position.  
Fisher said, “I doubt if there is any real substance in the Republican agitation now.”  Balfour 
described a ceasefire as a sign of weakness.  The often-belligerent Churchill now asserted that a 
truce was necessary, and might get British public opinion back on their side.  Lloyd George 
again argued against a ceasefire, or further concessions, “We’ve been generous in the Home Rule 
Act.  Anything beyond that would contain germs of trouble.”  The truce proposal failed on a 9-5 
vote.227 
While Lloyd George’s uncompromising stance remained supreme in the Cabinet, 
pressure to make a definite peace offer mounted.  On May 24, Secretary for War Laming 
Worthington-Evans described the military situation in Ireland as “virtual stalemate,” and 
predicted that any change would be to the rebels’ advantage.228  That day the polls for the 
Northern and Southern Ireland parliaments opened.  The twenty-six counties returned 124 Sinn 
Féin representatives and four Unionists—the latter for Trinity College—all without opposition.  
The southern parliament was to open on June 28.  On June 2 the Cabinet agreed to institute 
martial law throughout the twenty-six counties if the legislature did not function.229 
The Northern Ireland Parliament opened on June 22, 1921.  Some Cabinet members 
expressed benign satisfaction.  Churchill wrote, “it is something gained to have Ulster Parliament 
[sic] firmly established in Belfast with an overwhelming loyalist majority.”230  King George V 
opened the legislature with an appeal “to all Irishmen to pause, to stretch out the hand of 
forbearance and conciliation, to forgive and to forget.”  He even held out the prospect of a future 
political reunion.231  This conciliatory tone gave Lloyd George the cover he needed for a change 
of policy toward Sinn Féin. 
Meanwhile, Cope had sent de Valera a list of specific negotiating points around June 14.  
These were likely the same terms that the Sinn Féin leader communicated to Art Ó Briain.  They 
included fiscal autonomy, free trade between Ireland and Britain, a reduced contribution to the 
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UK debt, and Northern Ireland to retain its present powers, i.e. no guarantee of north-south 
reciprocity.  De Valera’s reaction was, “they are on the wrong track” and “the right way is to 
propose a treaty with Ireland regarded as a separate state.”232  He told Cope that he would reply to 
a direct, written offer of negotiations.233  On June 15 another Castle contact informed Collins that 
the authorities were preparing to institute a “most rigorous” form of martial law if the southern 
parliament failed.234  On the night of June 22 de Valera was arrested but released the next 
morning.  The authorities seized his papers, including the letter to Ó Briain that likely contained 
Cope’s peace terms.235 
At a Cabinet meeting on June 24, Lloyd George announced his intention to capitalize on 
the conciliatory tone of the King’s speech by inviting de Valera and Craig to London to discuss a 
settlement.  Justifying his abrupt about-face, he said that there was “some evidence that Mr de 
Valera was inclined to discuss a settlement on lines short of insistence on an Irish Republic.”236  
This likely refers to the terms in de Valera’s letter to Ó Briain, though the Sinn Féin leader had 
not committed to negotiating on those points.  Cope also met with members of the government, 
and he had de Valera’s assurance that a direct communication would draw a response.237  Cope 
gave the republican President the invitation surreptitiously, and it was published in the press on 
June 27.  De Valera hesitated.  He tried to compel Lloyd George to recognize Ireland’s “essential 
unity” and right to self-determination, but eventually agreed to a conference without 
preconditions.  The republican leaders arranged a ceasefire with Macready and Tudor.  From 
noon on July 11 IRA actions and government countermeasures largely ceased. 
 
Conclusions 
Between 1919 and 1921, Sinn Féin, the British Cabinet, and numerous civilian groups all 
took steps to implement their vision of Ireland’s future government.  The terms of the 
Government of Ireland Act were arrived at circuitously and even reluctantly.  There is ample 
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evidence that it was designed merely to remove the 1914 Home Rule Act, not to operate as a 
governing instrument.  Nonetheless, Cabinet members clung to the measure tenaciously, if only 
as a symbol of their own determination.  The fact that the British government stubbornly pushed 
legislation that few Irish people saw as positive might be considered remarkable.  However, 
British legislators had shown little regard for Irish nationalist opinion since the beginning of the 
home rule crisis in December 1909.  By 1919 the Cabinet was only concerned with delivering 
the form of partition most palatable to the Ulster unionist leaders.  This meant a geographical 
region they could control, namely the six counties Carson had identified in 1913. 
Lloyd George often declared that he would negotiate with Sinn Féin on any terms other 
than an Irish Republic.  However, his refusal to consider the demands of the Irish Dominion 
League and other advocates of a more generous settlement than that embodied in the 
Government of Ireland Act exposed the fact that the Prime Minister did not want to make any 
concessions, particularly not before he restored “law and order.”  Nonetheless, the dominionists 
generated considerable anti-government criticism, particularly on the issue of reprisals.  This 
divorced a significant body of opinion among all parties from support for the government’s Irish 
policy. 
The Cabinet knew from June 1920 that they would eventually have to negotiate with Sinn 
Féin.  Their mistaken but persistent belief that military victory was imminent scuttled the Clune 
peace initiative.  Several other efforts—including the Davies, O’Flanagan, Derby, and Craig 
overtures—were merely attempts by government members to extract a commitment from an 
authoritative figure within Sinn Féin that they would negotiate on less than the republic.  Each of 
these was initiated or encouraged by Lloyd George, or by people close to him.  Only the Moylett 
affair of October 1920 originated with a high-ranking member of Sinn Féin, Arthur Griffith. 
The opening of Northern Ireland’s parliament in June 1921 is sometimes interpreted as 
the government’s prerequisite to negotiations with the Irish republicans.  The many Cabinet 
efforts toward a truce prior to this, and their vacillation as to when to implement the Government 
of Ireland Act, suggest that this was not the case.  By July 1921 the IRA and Sinn Féin had been 
unable to compel a recognition of Irish independence.  However, they did force negotiations 






Individuals on both sides thought that the ceasefire would work to their advantage.  
Dublin Castle Under-Secretary James MacMahon said of Sinn Féin’s representatives, “If once 
they get to London…they have ispo facto given up ‘the Republic.’”238  Conversely, Dáil member 
Liam de Roiste called the truce, “a recognition of our national status as coequal with England.”239  
Republicans also rejected the idea that the opening of the Northern Ireland Parliament settled that 
question.  Art Ó Briain thought that the operation of the northern government would show the 
British people that “political Ulster had no relation whatever to geographical Ulster,” and “what 
they have always known as Ulster is nothing more than a handful of people in one corner of the 
country, whose material interests depend on the maintenance of their foreign ascendancy, and 
who are bent on securing their material interests at all costs.”240 
Irish republicans expected the upcoming conference to deliver a settlement that 
recognized their equal national status with Britain, and altered the status of the six counties.  As a 
coalition government, the British Cabinet had to deliver a settlement that legislators of both 
major parties could support.  Already damaged by the reprisal policy, the truce diminished their 
prestige among hardliners who wanted to crush the rebellion.  Therefore, the republicans entered 
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CHAPTER 6  
“TERRIBLE FINALITY:”  
THE TREATY, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE BOUNDARY COMMISSION 
 
Introduction 
Between July and December 1921, representatives of Sinn Féin engaged in negotiations 
for an Irish settlement with members of the British Cabinet.  The resulting Anglo-Irish Treaty 
embodied dominion status with reservations.  The roots of these terms lay in proposals that 
British Prime Minister David Lloyd George presented to Sinn Féin President Eamon de Valera 
on July 20, 1921.  The eventual agreement, negotiated between October and December 1921, 
was essentially the July 20 proposals with a few modifications.  Analyzing reactions to the July 
20 scheme provides an opportunity for considering how Irish people received a proposition 
representing dominion status with reservations while it was still an offer, not the fait accompli of 
the signed Treaty. 
De Valera’s counter-offer to dominion status became known as “external association.”  
Historians frequently describe this as a brilliant idea, but an impractical one.1  This assumption of 
impracticability rests on the assertion that the British government would never have accepted 
external association in lieu of their own proposals.  R. F. Foster calls the concept, “prophetic and 
ingenious” but also “completely unacceptable to all the British negotiators.”2  Jason Knirck 
asserts that the Sinn Féin delegation proposed external association several times, and their British 
counterparts rejected it consistently.3 
Combining this lack of options on the constitutional question with the idea that the 
opening of the Northern Ireland Parliament in June 1921 made partition irreversible, much of the 
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existing scholarship implies that Sinn Féin had no practical alternatives to dominion status for 
the twenty-six counties.  I argue that the British government was willing to alter both of these 
facets of the eventual treaty.  The British negotiators seriously considered external association, 
and in fact never formally rejected the idea during the conference.  Lloyd George rejected the 
scheme, but did so verbally and without attempting to formulate arguments justifying his refusal.  
De Valera made a mistake in not publishing a plan based on external association prior to the 
negotiations, and the Sinn Féin delegation compounded this error by not pressing for a formal 
debate on the idea during the conference.  The delegates tacitly accepted the July 20 proposals as 
the basis for negotiations and gradually accommodated themselves to the British plan. 
Lloyd George showed his greatest flexibility on the issue of Northern Ireland.  Some 
observers assert that the vast majority of Sinn Féin were unconcerned about the six counties, 
with the result that their delegates focused on negotiating a constitutional status they found 
acceptable for the rest of the island.4  On the contrary, much of the conference turned on the issue 
of partition, and the issue of the governance of the twenty-six counties was intimately connected 
with the fate of the six.  On the issue of partition, the Irish republicans did not demand the simple 
closure of the northern parliament.  De Valera and his Cabinet proposed that there be three Irish 
parliaments: one for a northern area, one for the rest of the country, and an overarching 
legislature for the whole island.  The Sinn Féin delegation also pushed for plebiscites to 
determine the northern area.  Lloyd George seemed willing to implement this plan, until he met 
resistance from Craig. 
Some historians argue that British Unionists, particularly Andrew Bonar Law, limited 
Lloyd George’s negotiating options by opposing changes regarding Northern Ireland.5  This idea 
of a strong opposition implies that a better deal than the Treaty was politically impossible.  The 
die-hard Unionists—those who often opposed coalition policy, particularly on Ireland—were 
never a threat to Lloyd George’s parliamentary supremacy on their own, but he feared stiffer 
resistance if Bonar Law joined them.  In the end the Prime Minister chose to placate the 
Unionists in the hope of improving his political position. 
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Treaty supporters within Sinn Féin accepted the agreement not for what it was, but how 
they expected it would operate.  Pro-Treaty Irish republicans assumed they could govern Ireland 
without reference to London.  Many interpreted the twenty-six county state as a sovereign 
entity.6  However, when the Free State’s Provisional Government drafted a constitution asserting 
this, the British Cabinet insisted that it be altered.  This shattered the illusion of Free State 
sovereignty.7  The final disappointment with the Treaty’s implementation came in 1925.  Treaty 
supporters declared that the boundary commission promised by its terms would transfer large 
majority-nationalist parts of Northern Ireland to the Free State.  The commission’s decision to 
make only small modifications to the border prompted the Free State government to make a deal 
that maintained the status quo. 
Few observers discuss reactions to the Treaty in Northern Ireland.  Those that do portray 
Prime Minister James Craig and his government as immediately and unalterably opposed to the 
agreement, largely due to the boundary commission clause.8  In fact, Craig’s response was more 
nuanced.  After initially indicating his willingness to cooperate with the commission, he reverted 
to his old tactic of threatening unionist resistance to any reduction of their territory or status. 
 
External Association and the July 20 Proposals 
De Valera developed the concept that would become known as “external association” in 
the summer of 1921.  He outlined the idea to Dáil propagandist Robert Brennan in June.  De 
Valera drew a large circle, representing the British Empire.  He then drew smaller circles within 
the large one, symbolizing the dominions.  Finally, he drew another circle representing Ireland, 
which was outside of the Empire circle but touching it.9  In its full form, external association 
involved setting up an Irish state that was outside the Empire but associated with it in matters of 
“common concern.”  Those matters would be delineated by treaty.  Griffith described it as more 
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than an alliance but less than full membership.10  Brennan later wrote that there were two schools 
of thought within Sinn Féin: one wanted to hold out for the independent republic at all costs, 
while the other believed the British would never concede this.  He called external association a 
“painstaking, sincere and well thought out plan” to reconcile the two.11 
Therefore, De Valera went into his private talks with Lloyd George with a plan for 
establishing Irish self-government while maintaining a British connection.  The two met 
privately on July 14, 15, 18, and 21.12  At the second meeting, de Valera discussed his idea for 
“an independent but ‘associated’ republic.”  The Prime Minister called this “an impossible 
demand.”13  Another point on which de Valera and Lloyd George differed was the role of force in 
their negotiations.  For Irish republicans, a free choice to enter or leave the Empire was a key 
symbol of their right to independence.14  After the July 15 meeting, the Prime Minister 
complained to the King that de Valera “harps constantly on the Irish feeling that Ireland cannot 
be expected to come into the Empire ‘by force.’”  He added, “I have explained again and again 
that we are inviting her to a status which many other free nations enjoy under Your Majesty’s 
Throne.”15  Coupling his offers with threats of force should they be rejected was a standard 
negotiating tactic for Lloyd George.  In 1916 he had assured John Dillon that government by 
coercion was the only alternative to his proposals, and had reiterated this to Redmond during the 
Irish Convention. 
On July 20, Lloyd George sent de Valera detailed proposals for a settlement.  They 
offered dominion status with reservations.  The proposals forbad an Irish navy and demanded 
facilities in Ireland for the British Navy and Royal Air Force.  The scheme offered fiscal 
autonomy on the understanding that the British and Irish governments would enact a free trade 
agreement.  Ireland could have a limited army in the form of a territorial force.  The twenty-six-
county government must recognize Northern Ireland and all its “powers and privileges.”  The 
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British government would “undertake to give effect” to any agreement reached between the two 
governments of the island.16  Northern Ireland was to have a territorial force as well, indicating 
that the Cabinet intended to follow the principle of equal, reciprocal powers for the two 
governments.17 
At his July 21 meeting with Lloyd George, de Valera rejected the terms out of hand.  The 
Prime Minister indicated that “Ulster,” as he called Northern Ireland, was the major objection.  
He said that de Valera would accept “Dominion status sans phrase,” meaning without the 
restrictions outlined in the proposals, and would negotiate a treaty for mutual defense, but this 
dominion must embrace the entire island.  If the British government refused to negotiate on 
Northern Ireland, he wanted “complete independence for Southern Ireland.”  Lloyd George 
rejected these ideas, and said that the only thing left for them to discuss was the date on which 
the truce would terminate.  De Valera offered to consult his Cabinet, adding that he would 
deliver counter-proposals.  The Prime Minister told the King that there was little chance of these 
being satisfactory.18  Lloyd George was “very depressed” after the meeting, and told Frances 
Stevenson that if Sinn Féin rejected the offer the only option was “to re-conquer Ireland.”19 
The Dáil Cabinet considered the proposals on July 24.  According to de Valera’s notes, 
Eoin MacNeill and IRA Chief of Staff Richard Mulcahy emphasized the importance of 
“sovereignty” and “freedom” in Ireland’s future relations with the Empire.  MacNeill added that 
they might publicly accept dominion status, while continuing to function as a republic “in the 
background.”  Arthur Griffith said that they should indicate a willingness to cooperate with the 
British now, and later the people might be in a better condition to resist.  Defence Minister 
Cathal Brugha asserted that they were not empowered to abandon the Republic.  Collins called a 
“Free Dominion” a “step” toward their ultimate goal, alluding to an argument he would develop 
later in the negotiations.20 
Home Affairs Minister Austin Stack later said that he and Brugha declared that they 
would accept nothing short of independence, and a number of Cabinet members supported them 
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at the meeting.  He described Mulcahy and Collins as viewing the proposals favorably.  Griffith 
objected to the Ulster clauses but was otherwise in favor.21  The Cabinet decided to leave the 
reply to de Valera, stipulating only, “The basis of reply was ‘external association,’” indicating 
that the republican government accepted this formula.22  De Valera informed Lloyd George of his 
Cabinet’s decision in an August 10 letter.  A Dáil meeting five days later confirmed this decision 
unanimously. 
To the republicans’ surprise, the proposals, de Valera’s response, and an August 4 letter 
from South African Premier Jan Smuts to the Sinn Féin leader touting the proposed settlement 
were published on August 15.  Though Lloyd George and de Valera had agreed not to publish 
anything unilaterally, the British government was likely the source of the leak.  The Prime 
Minister and his colleagues believed that, if the terms were widely known, the Irish public would 
demand that the Dáil accept.23  The British Cabinet thought publication would “rally Irish 
moderate opinion to our side.”24 
An Irish Times correspondent wrote that ninety-nine percent of Englishmen would 
consider the July 20 proposals “generous to the point of extravagance.”25  The Irish nationalist 
press did not rush to accept this generosity.  The Freeman’s Journal urged the public to display a 
united front, indicating that they should accept the Dáil’s answer to the proposals.26  Above all, 
the paper hoped that Lloyd George would endorse Smuts’s interpretation of the July 20 scheme 
as involving full dominion status.27  He never did so.  The Irish Independent was also cautious 
toward the proposals, but praised de Valera’s rejection.28  By August 27 the Irish Independent’s 
editors concluded that the July 20 proposals did not embody real dominion status, and added that 
partition “would be a blot on the best settlement.”29  The Ulster Herald, a nationalist paper in 
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Northern Ireland, vehemently condemned the plan as not offering real dominion status or 
safeguards for six-county Catholics.30  The paper declared, “The Lloyd George scheme 
contemplates not freedom, but perpetual vassalage for Ireland.”31 
The Irish Dominion League had consistently advocated granting Ireland dominion status, 
but qualifying it to meet British security fears.  This was what the July 20 proposals, combined 
with Smuts’s letter, purported to do.  The organization represented many of the moderates the 
government hoped to rally.  One might assume that they would welcome the scheme.  However, 
League spokesmen sided with the Dáil in rejecting it.  Henry Harrison urged Sinn Féin to uphold 
its demand for independence, and claimed that in the proposals, “Ireland has been invited to 
make the maximum of concessions.”32  Horace Plunkett warned that any settlement involving 
partition would not bring peace.33 
The rejection of the July 20 proposals was significant, as it might have ended the truce 
between the IRA and Crown forces.  Lloyd George had assured de Valera that this would be the 
consequence if his scheme was rejected.  Public discourse concerning the proposed settlement 
shows that, while Irish nationalists did not leap to its support, most did not want to return to pre-
truce conditions.  This was equally true of the British government.  Thomas Jones described “a 
feeling of mild panic” at an August 11 Cabinet meeting to consider de Valera’s refusal, adding 
that the atmosphere was “as though Michael Collins was about to break the truce in ten 
minutes.”34  On August 15 the administration formally concluded, “it was not desirable that the 
British Government should denounce the truce in Ireland.”35  Three days later, the Cabinet 
intimated that they would not abandon the ceasefire unless the republicans did so first.36  Sinn 
Féin’s rejection of the July 20 proposals caused a stalemate but not a breakdown in the 
negotiations, and not the public outcry for settlement that the government had hoped. 
De Valera made a major mistake in not sending counter-proposals to Lloyd George, as he 
had said he would.  He likely feared that any proposal based on external association would be 
seen as a retreat from the republican position.  However, Lloyd George had interpreted the idea 
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as a means of maintaining the republic, or at least a form of independence.  It is likely, 
particularly given the Dáil’s effective propaganda instruments, that they could have garnered 
widespread public support for external association in Ireland.  This would have given the Irish 
republicans a strong bargaining chip in future negotiations, and would have undermined the idea 
that they were unreasonable or unwilling to compromise. 
Instead, de Valera and Lloyd George engaged in a long correspondence in which the 
former tried to compel a recognition of the Republic while the latter attempted to force a public 
renunciation of this claim.  The two eventually agreed to a conference without preconditions.  
The republican Cabinet selected its negotiators on September 10.37  De Valera proposed Griffith 
and Collins.  Stack objected that they had both favored the July 20 proposals.  De Valera and 
Minister for Defence Cathal Brugha defended Collins’s nomination, arguing that Stack must 
have misunderstood his stance on the proposals.38  The other selections were Minister for 
Economic Affairs Robert Barton, as well as lawyers George Gavan Duffy and Eamonn Duggan.  
Erskine Childers, widely considered “the godfather of the Dominion policy,” was the 
delegation’s secretary.39  Like many contemporaries, his opinions had radicalized since the home 
rule crisis.  Childers became an ardent republican, and his tirades against the British government 
led his dominionist friends to dub him, “The encyclopaedia anti-Britannica.”40 
From intelligence reports and conversations with de Valera, the Prime Minister and his 
Cabinet knew they could extract constitutional concessions from Sinn Féin by promising Irish 
unity.  De Valera told one of Smuts’s emissaries in July, “For unity I could persuade my Dail to 
accept much that is otherwise unacceptable.”  He suggested a form of “home rule within home 
rule” involving three parliaments: one for each part of Ireland and an over-arching legislature for 
the whole island.  De Valera also offered extra seats to the unionist minority.41 
The Sinn Féin delegation planned to base their proposals on external association, but like 
de Valera were prepared to make concessions in the direction of dominion status if they could 
obtain a guarantee of Irish unity.  However, placing Ireland firmly within the Empire and taking 
an oath of allegiance to the British monarch—a common feature of dominion constitutions—was 
                                                 
37 NAI, DE/1/3/118, Dáil Cabinet Minutes, 10 September 1921. 
38 BMH WS No. 418, Una Stack, 42. 
39 NLI, G. F. Berkeley Papers, Ms. 10,925, Horace Plunkett, The Irish Peace Conference and After (Dublin: Irish 
Dominion League, 1920). 
40 NLI, Horace Plunkett Papers, Ms. 42,222/39, Diaries of Horace Plunkett, 30 June 1919. 





anathema to many republicans.42  One of the biggest obstacles to a settlement was British 
insistence that Westminster, and the dominion legislatures, derived their authority from the 
Crown.  Sinn Féin insisted that legitimate power in Ireland should stem from the Irish people. 
 
Treaty Negotiations I: Establishing Positions 
 The republicans’ failure to offer counter-proposals to the July 20 scheme impacted the 
conference from its first meeting on October 11.43  Though the republicans had rejected the 
government’s terms, Sinn Féin had not made any alternative suggestions, therefore the July 20 
proposals held the field by default.44 
 The first sharp exchanges of the conference came over Northern Ireland.  On October 14, 
Griffith criticized the British government for institutionalizing partition by establishing Northern 
Ireland.  Collins protested the injustice of two majority Catholic and nationalist counties being 
forced into the northern state.  Lloyd George responded that his administration supported the 
northern government “to prevent civil war.”45  He hinted that it might be possible to adjust the 
area of Northern Ireland through a boundary commission.  Collins indicated this could rectify the 
situation.46  At the next meeting on October 17, Griffith launched into a detailed statistical 
breakdown of the population of the nine counties and the six.  He proposed that plebiscites be 
held throughout the six counties to determine which parliamentary area the people wished to 
inhabit, using poor law union areas or parliamentary constituencies as their basis.47 
Gavan Duffy ended the October 17 meeting by pressing Lloyd George to admit that the 
six-county area could not be maintained, and that if Northern Ireland refused to consider unity, 
its powers would not be expanded without the rest of the island’s consent.  The Prime Minister 
concluded the proceedings without promising anything.48  The Irish negotiators had scored on the 
northern question.  During the meeting, Lord Birkenhead admitted that the six county area was 
unreasonable.  Lloyd George passed a note to Thomas Jones that read, “This is going to wreck 
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settlement,” indicating that he had no intention of forcing the type of agreement the Sinn Féin 
delegates wanted, and he did not expect them to compromise.49 
On October 18, the British delegation privately discussed the constitutional arrangements 
the Sinn Féin delegates were likely to propose.  The Irish republicans still had not promulgated 
detailed proposals on the constitutional question, but the British ministers were familiar with the 
basic outline of external association.  Churchill summarized the Sinn Féin delegation’s position 
as, “their independence should be admitted in the morning and that they should vote themselves 
into the Empire in the afternoon.”50  Though flippantly expressed, this ably encapsulates their 
opponents’ aims.  De Valera and his colleagues wanted an acknowledgement of Irish 
independence and a free choice on their future relations with the British Empire.   
The British ministers discussed “very tentative,” “conceivable methods” by which they 
might meet the Sinn Féin demand.  They might sign two simultaneous treaties, one “admitting 
the position taken up by the Irish representatives,” the other “defining their entry into the British 
Empire.”51  This was precisely the type of settlement the Sinn Féin delegates hoped would 
emerge from the talks.52  The British delegation decided against this as the Dáil might ratify the 
first treaty but reject the second.  They considered acceding to the Irish delegates’ demand in a 
preamble to a treaty outlining their future relations with the Empire.  However, the Dáil might 
acknowledge the British admission of their independence but repudiate the agreement itself.  The 
British delegates did not reach a definite conclusion, but the “general view of the Conference 
was that Ireland must approach the question from inside the Constitution.”  This vague phrase 
does little to elucidate British reactions to Sinn Féin’s anticipated constitutional demands, but 
they evidently wanted to avoid constitutional experimentation via a new form of association.53 
The Sinn Féin delegates continued to develop external association.  John Chartres, a 
delegation secretary, recognized the monarchy’s importance to the British ministers.  On October 
14 he suggested that, if the British government acknowledged Irish independence and the new 
state negotiated its association with the Empire, they might recognize the King as head of the 
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association of states, but not as King of Ireland.54  De Valera accepted the idea.  Historians 
sometimes characterize individuals close to the Sinn Féin President as “intransigent” or 
“irreconcilable” republicans who would not have countenanced external association.55  However, 
de Valera convinced many of these Dáil members to accept his formula, including Cathal 
Brugha, Childers, Mary MacSwiney, and Austin Stack.56 
The Sinn Féin delegation sent the first statement of their claims to the British on October 
24.  The republicans called on the British government to recognize Ireland’s independence, 
territorial integrity, and right to international recognition.  After this, they proposed to make a 
series of treaties outlining trade relations and defense.  The Sinn Féin delegates outlined possible 
matters of “common interest,” including “reciprocity of civil rights,” income tax, postal services, 
immigration, and shipping.  They blamed the British for partition and declared, “a free choice 
must be given to electorates within the area.”  They also criticized the July 20 scheme, “The 
claim of Ireland is not Dominion Status but, if it were, your proposals would not confer that 
status.”57  Griffith expanded on their ideas during an October 24 conference meeting.  He 
outlined a form of dual citizenship between Britain and Ireland, and asserted that they would not 
automatically go to war if their neighbor or one of the dominions did so, but would allow the 
British Navy to use Irish ports during a period of common hostilities.58 
Lloyd George was delighted with the memo.  During a meeting of the British delegates 
he pointed out that the Sinn Féiners had conceded common citizenship, access to naval bases, 
and coming into “the mechanism of the Empire.”  They had not accepted allegiance to the 
monarchy.  Chamberlain called the proposals “a republic within the Empire.”  Lloyd George and 
Chamberlain asked Griffith and Collins to meet them alone.  The British ministers asked what it 
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would take to get them to accept an oath of loyalty to the Crown.  Griffith and Collins replied 
that their primary condition was Irish unity.  They implied that Northern Ireland could retain a 
subordinate legislature, but not one with equal powers to the Irish parliament.59 
This private meeting marked a turning-point in the format of the talks.  From October 24, 
the British delegation made a concerted effort to limit contact with their Irish counterparts to 
Griffith and Collins.  Robert Barton said later that he and his colleagues were unperturbed by the 
change in procedure.  Griffith had “fought magnificent actions” during the full conference 
sittings, and neither the delegation nor the Dáil Cabinet had reason to doubt him.60  However, 
Childers was immediately disturbed by Griffith’s and Collins’s private meetings with the British 
negotiators.61  The effect of these smaller conferences was to sideline those Sinn Féin delegates 
who had not viewed the July 20 proposals as an acceptable basis for a settlement. 
Instead of replying directly to the Sinn Féin delegation’s October 24 outline of external 
association, the British ministers sent a memorandum by Lionel Curtis demanding their concrete 
positions on the Crown, common citizenship, defense, trade, and finance.  It included, “The 
Crown is the symbol of all that keeps the nations of the Empire together.”62  Childers seized on 
this to argue against swearing allegiance to the Crown.  He wrote, “Allegiance implies 
submission to authority. A symbol has no authority.”63  In the context of the conference, the 
statement seemed to prove Chartres’s theory that adhering to the Crown as a symbol would be 
acceptable to the British negotiators.  Birkenhead, the Lord Chancellor and a former Attorney-
General, emphasized the Crown as a symbol during a November 24 meeting.64 
On October 27, the British delegates gave Griffith and Collins an overt assurance that 
they could barter allegiance to the Crown for a united Ireland.  Describing that day’s meeting, 
Griffith told de Valera, “The gist of it was that if we would accept the Crown they would send 
for Craig, i.e.—force ‘Ulster’ in, as I understood.”  He concluded, “above all Ireland unified.”65  
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On October 29, the Sinn Féin delegates sent a memo that adhered to external association but 
stated explicitly that, if the British agreed to recognize a free and united Ireland, they would 
“recognise the Crown as symbol and accepted head of the combination of signatory States.”66  
The memo pleased the British delegates.  Minister for War Laming Worthington-Evans said, 
“They are coming along.  They will presently say—O King.”67 
 
Treaty Negotiations II: Northern Ireland and the British Unionists 
The conference was now turning on partition, and there is evidence that Lloyd George 
was considering significant alterations to his Northern Ireland policy.  He told Griffith and 
Collins on October 30, “he could carry a six-county Parliament subordinate to a national 
Parliament.”  If this failed, Lloyd George would redraw the border or arrange a vote of the nine 
counties as a whole.68  The Prime Minister mentioned similar ideas to his friend George Riddell, 
specifically an “over-riding” or “central” Irish parliament in addition to the “Northern and 
Southern” legislatures.  He was also considering plebiscites of the northern parliamentary area 
that he predicted would place counties Fermanagh and Tyrone under the southern legislature.69  
Lloyd George even reached out to the anti-coalition Liberals led by H. H. Asquith, exploring 
possibilities of an alternative administration should he decide to grant greater concessions to the 
Irish republicans than his Unionist partners would countenance.70  However, he was more 
circumspect with his colleagues within the conference.  Lloyd George told Jones on November 2 
that Sinn Féin “must be satisfied at present with the nominal unity of the whole of Ireland and 
that it would take time to make it real.”71 
Lloyd George continued to give a very different impression to Griffith.  The time for 
inviting Northern Ireland Prime Minister James Craig was approaching, and on November 1 the 
Prime Minister asked the Sinn Féin delegation leader for a letter outlining the constitutional 
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concessions he was willing to make.  Griffith wrote to de Valera that the Prime Minister wanted 
the document “to produce against Craig on the question of Irish unity.”72 
Griffith drafted the letter against the protests of Barton, Childers, and Gavan Duffy, but 
with input from them as well as the British ministers.  Significantly, after meeting with the 
British delegates, Griffith removed the phrase, “on no account could I recommend any 
association with the Crown or the Commonwealth if the unity of Ireland were denied in form or 
in fact” from a draft of his letter.73  Griffith insisted that Ireland would associate “with” and not 
“within” the Commonwealth, in accordance with external association.  The British ministers’ 
agreed to this, implying that they were open to this formula.  The final version also accorded 
with external association, but the condition that Ireland must be united “in fact” was significantly 
watered down.74  At the end of their November 2 meeting, Birkenhead told Griffith that with his 
letter they were ready “to face the Ulster Die-hard position.”75  The British delegates had, to an 
extent, dictated the terms of a document that was supposed to reflect Griffith’s position, but did 
so in a way that made him feel as though he was working with them to bring the northern 
unionists into an all-Ireland legislature. 
Griffith believed that Lloyd George and his Cabinet were firmly on their side in dealing 
with the northern unionists.  He wrote to de Valera after submitting the letter, “if ‘Ulster’ proves 
unreasonable they are prepared to resign rather than use force against us.  In such an event no 
English Government is capable of formation on a war-policy against Ireland.”76  Lloyd George 
was employing the same negotiating strategy with Griffith and Collins that he had with Redmond 
and Dillon in 1916.  He convinced the Sinn Féin delegation leaders that he was on their side, that 
they would have to overcome outside opposition in order to achieve a settlement, and that he 
would resign if their efforts failed. 
Another tactic the British delegates used to win Griffith’s and Collins’s trust was to 
portray themselves as constantly battling Unionist opposition in the interests of peace.77  Some 
British Unionist MPs were angry that the government had called a truce and opened negotiations 
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with the Irish republicans.  However, when a group of Unionist die-hards in the Commons forced 
an October 31 censure vote condemning Lloyd George’s Irish policy, they mustered just forty-
three votes compared with 439 in favor of the government.  It was literally a ten-to-one victory 
for the Prime Minister.78  Therefore, he had every reason to believe that the vast majority of the 
Unionist Party supported his policy.  Despite this success, Griffith and Collins were convinced 
that Lloyd George was fighting a militant unionist opposition to his negotiation policy.79  In 
meetings on November 8 and 9, the Prime Minister said that if he resigned it was likely that 
Bonar Law, who had resigned from the government in March, would return to lead a “Militarist 
Government” against Ireland.80  This contradicted the impression that Lloyd George had given 
Griffith just days earlier that “no English government” could prosecute a war in Ireland, but the 
Sinn Féin delegation leader reported both statements as though they were incontrovertible.  
Meanwhile, Birkenhead portrayed the upcoming Unionist conference at Liverpool as a 
showdown between the die-hards and Lloyd George’s supporters.81 
The Prime Minister and his Cabinet feared that Bonar Law would return to lead the 
discontented Unionists, using the “Ulster” issue as a rallying cry.  Northern Ireland’s government 
was anxious as to how the negotiations might affect them.  After corresponding with British 
Unionist organizer George Younger and Lord Lieutenant FitzAlan, Craig assured his Cabinet on 
October 24, “the Unionists in Great Britain were exerting very great pressure to safeguard the 
interests of Ulster.”82  Having heard rumors of the course of the negotiations, on November 4 
Craig’s Cabinet described their stance in two resolutions: “the giving up of any part of the Six 
Counties was unthinkable,” and “they would under no circumstances submit to the Parliament of 
Northern Ireland owing allegiance or admitting the ascendancy of any Parliament other than 
Westminster.”83  This was phrased in express opposition to “home rule within home rule.” 
Craig went to London to meet with Lloyd George on November 5.  Frances Stevenson 
said the British Prime Minister “extorted significant concessions,” including an all-Ireland 
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parliament.84  However, two days later Lloyd George told Jones, “Craig will not budge one 
inch.”85  In the interim, Craig met with Worthington-Evans and Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff Henry Wilson, who had been a key supporter of the Curragh mutiny.  They agreed to allow 
Craig’s administration to take over responsibility for “law and order” in the six counties, 
including control over the RIC and the Special Constabulary, which would be armed and paid by 
the War Office.86  John McColgan argues that Lloyd George agreeing to transfer some of the 
“reserved services” to Craig’s government at their November 5 meeting legally finalized 
partition, implying that this was now impossible to overturn.87  This overlooks the fact that Sinn 
Féin was not demanding the closure of the six-county parliament, but a form of home rule within 
home rule.  It is more likely, as Ronan Fanning asserts, that Craig’s emboldened stance with 
Lloyd George after November 5 was a result of his newfound power over law and order.88 
Faced with an imminent breakdown in the negotiations, Lloyd George altered his terms.  
He tasked Jones with sounding out the Sinn Féin delegates on a twenty-six-county dominion, 
Northern Ireland retaining its current powers, and a boundary commission to delimit the two 
areas.89  Lloyd George had favored the idea of a boundary commission since 1917.  He had 
reason to believe that Craig would accept the idea, after all the northern unionist leader had 
suggested it to the British Cabinet in 1919.  Jones proposed it to Griffith and Collins on 
November 8.  They rejected the commission.  Griffith called Craig’s obstinacy, “a gigantic piece 
of bluff.”  He insisted on plebiscites to alter the northern area.  Collins called the commission 
idea a rejection of Irish unity.90  Though this refusal seemed absolute, Griffith told de Valera that 
a commission would likely “give us most of Tyrone, Fermanagh, and part of Armagh, Down 
etc.”91  Jones met Griffith and Duggan the next day.  He maintained that the three-parliament 
idea would be the government’s first proposal, but the Prime Minister wanted to suggest a 
commission “as a last card.”  The Irish delegates were suddenly receptive.  Griffith said they 
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would neither accept nor oppose the idea; it would be Lloyd George’s responsibility.  He added, 
“We would prefer a plebiscite, but in essentials a Boundary Commission is very much the 
same.”92  Other members of the Sinn Féin delegation agreed with this interpretation.  Childers 
described the options to Northern Ireland as, “6 county area subordinate to Irish Parl.” or “a 
Boundary Commission area plebiscite.”93 
On November 8, prior to receiving the Sinn Féin delegates’ assent to the commission, 
Lloyd George instructed Lionel Curtis to draft a letter to Craig embodying a detailed plan for an 
all-Ireland parliament.  Northern Ireland could opt out of the island-wide legislature, but the six 
counties would be subject to a commission to “adjust the line both by inclusion and exclusion so 
as to make the Boundary conform as closely as possible to the wishes of the population.”94 
At a British delegates’ meeting on November 10, Lloyd George overcame the Cabinet 
Unionists’ objections to the idea that Northern Ireland would merely maintain the status quo, not 
receive powers equal to those of the new twenty-six-county legislature.  He also insisted that 
Northern Ireland pay the same taxes as the rest of the United Kingdom.  This ensured higher 
taxation in the six counties, which the Prime Minister believed would induce the northern 
unionists to join an all-Ireland parliament.95  Chamberlain, the Unionist Party leader, disliked the 
idea of putting any pressure whatsoever on the northern unionists.  However, he expected 
Northern Ireland’s government to cooperate.  After all, in a July 29 letter to Lloyd George, Craig 
had called Sinn Féin pressure for wider powers than those within the Government of Ireland Act 
“repugnant,” and declared that “Ulster” would maintain the status quo.96  Chamberlain said of 
Northern Ireland’s Prime Minister, “He is a patriot.  He will not forget the Empire.”97  Lloyd 
George formally invited Craig to join the conference to discuss an all-Ireland settlement.98 
Craig’s reply was a flat refusal to negotiate on the basis of an all-Ireland parliament.  He 
called the idea, “precisely what Ulster has for many years resisted by all the means at her 
disposal,” adding that “no paper safeguards” could protect northern unionists in a united 
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legislature.  He wrote that the northern unionists accepted the Government of Ireland Act “As a 
final settlement and supreme sacrifice,” but demanded that Northern Ireland be given dominion 
status and required to pay nothing but a voluntary contribution to the Imperial Exchequer.99  
Craig’s attitude perturbed the British Cabinet.  Chamberlain wrote to Lloyd George that the 
northern unionists, whom he referred to as “Ulster,” were undermining all of their past 
declarations of loyalty.  Far from maintaining the Union, which they had always declared to be 
their goal, “Ulster here says that she would prefer exclusion from the Imperial Parliament to 
inclusion with equal taxation.”  He added, “She is false to the claim that she has always made 
that her only wish was to share the privileges & the burdens of the U.K.”100  Northern Ireland’s 
government wanted to publish the letter, a move that Chamberlain said would seriously damage 
their support among the British public.101 
Craig and his colleagues had been promised the principle of reciprocal powers in the 
Government of Ireland Act, therefore they firmly believed they were right to demand dominion 
status if it was being offered to the twenty-six counties.  Craig told his Cabinet on November 28, 
“it would be very easy for him to deliver a smashing attack upon the Government quoting from 
their own speeches and actions and showing how they had broken their pledges.”  But he decided 
to “do nothing to quarrel with those who might again be friendly to our interests.”102  This urge to 
embarrass the British administration explains their eagerness to publish.  However, the British 
Cabinet’s certainty that this would damage the northern unionists’ image suggests they were 
ignorant of the concerns actuating the majority of the British populace.  Lord FitzAlan, a former 
Unionist Party whip, told the Cabinet on November 10 that Edward Carson’s popular strength 
had “evaporated” in recent years.  He added that there was little interest in Ulster among the 
British public, and “It would be difficult to fight a General Election on Ireland.”103 
The Prime Minister’s position in relation to the British unionists continued to improve.  
On November 12 he told the Cabinet that he had met with Bonar Law.  The former Unionist 
leader was willing to agree to Northern Ireland maintaining its current powers, the boundary 
commission, and placing fiscal pressure on the northern unionists via the tax scheme.  He was 
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even willing to contemplate the disappearance of the six-county parliament, as long as the area 
remained within the United Kingdom.104  However, Bonar Law told Lloyd George that he would 
oppose an all-Ireland parliament, and he hoped to convince the Unionist Party to join him in 
doing so.  The Prime Minister had a choice as to whether he would pressure Craig for a 
settlement, or the republicans.  Bonar Law told him, “Don’t confine your bullying to Ulster.  Try 
it on the Sinn Feiners too.”105  It is ironic that, after all that had transpired since 1919, Lloyd 
George would be accused of bullying the northern unionists and not Sinn Féin. 
The Prime Minister met with Griffith on November 12 and said that his next letter to 
Craig would outline a plan to create an all-Ireland parliament, but allow Northern Ireland to opt 
out after one year.  In that case, the boundary commission and tax penalties would take effect.  If 
Craig refused this offer, Lloyd George promised either to resign or pass an act establishing an 
all-Ireland legislature.  Griffith agreed not to stand in his way.106  Later, Lloyd George told 
Francis Stevenson that the Irish delegates “have behaved splendidly all through this fight.”107 
However, events did not transpire as Lloyd George predicted to Griffith.  On November 
12, Worthington-Evans recommended a series of compromises.  They should give the twenty-six 
counties “Dominion status subject to safeguards,” and confirm Northern Ireland’s current 
powers, but retain Imperial control over some taxes.  They should ensure the functioning of the 
Council of Ireland, which Worthington-Evans called, “a green umbrella.”  If it pleased the Sinn 
Féiners, they might create an all-Ireland parliament but allow Northern Ireland to opt out.  In that 
case, a boundary commission might operate in the border counties only.  He made clear that 
territory could be exchanged between both areas.  Worthington-Evans argued that the only other 
way to meet Sinn Féin’s demands was to pass an act creating an all-Ireland parliament despite 
the Ulster unionists’ protests.  In that case, they would create “a new set of rebels” who “if not 
coerced into submission, would render the Act unworkable.”108 
As Worthington-Evans was a Unionist, Lloyd George might have assumed that these 
ideas would carry weight with his party.  The warning note at the end likely prompted the Prime 
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Minister to recall the unrest the Ulster unionists had provoked between 1912 and 1914, in 
opposition to an all-Ireland home rule bill.  On November 14, Lloyd George declared that he did 
not want to see Craig again until after the Liverpool meeting in three days.109  The Prime 
Minister’s letter to Craig that day did not deliver the ultimatum he had promised Griffith.  He 
rejected the northern dominion idea, but simply repeated the invitation to confer in London.110 
The November 17 Unionist conference at Liverpool resulted in an even more 
overwhelming victory for the Coalition than the October 31 censure vote.  Fewer than 70 of the 
1,800 Unionist delegates supported a motion condemning the negotiations with Sinn Féin.111  
Some Unionists interpreted the censure and conference votes, not as signs of confidence in Lloyd 
George, but as admissions that negotiation was the only way to deal with the Irish problem.112  
This is a powerful assertion that British unionists did not want to return to the pre-truce situation.  
If negotiation was the only option, ostensibly an all-Unionist government would also be forced to 
negotiate on the Irish question.  This was the impression the Prime Minister had given Griffith 
on November 2, when the latter wrote that no British government could carry out a militant 
policy in Ireland.  After the Liverpool meeting, Walter Long wrote that many of his fellow 
Unionists distrusted Lloyd George, but “There is a very strong feeling…that there ought to be a 
settlement, and there is a good deal of ill-disguised impatience with Ulster.”113  The unionist 
Saturday Review went so far as to say after the conference, “It is now certain that Ulster cannot 
rely for support on the Conservative Party in England.  It is equally certain that she cannot rely 
for support on the electorate in England and Scotland.”114 
However, even after the government’s victory at Liverpool, Lloyd George did not 
increase the pressure on Craig.  On the contrary, he declared that he would not meet with 
Northern Ireland’s Prime Minister again until he had a “fast agreement with Sinn Fein.”115  In the 
space of a few days, Lloyd George moved from intending to compel Craig to join an all-Ireland 
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parliament to preparing to pressure Sinn Féin into accepting dominion status, a separate northern 
legislature, and a boundary commission. 
On November 16, the British government sent the Sinn Féin delegates an outline of 
proposals that were essentially the July 20 terms plus the commission.  The document did not 
mention an all-Ireland parliament.116  Most of the Irish delegation were skeptical, but Griffith 
approved.117  The Sinn Féin delegates proposed external association on November 22 and 28.118  
Chamberlain wrote that they could not accept these terms, but they “must not break” on them 
either, indicating that many would see them as a reasonable compromise.119  Lloyd George 
wanted to reject external association out of hand, not on its merits but because he thought that 
Griffith and Collins had committed to dominion status.  He did not appreciate that they had only 
indicated a willingness to accept this constitutional formula in exchange for a guarantee of Irish 
unity.  The Prime Minister called the November 22 memo a “reversion” to the “independent 
state.”  He sent Jones to tell them that if they did not come into the Empire, “we will make 
them.”120  Such threats had receded in the second and third weeks of November, as Lloyd George 
and the Sinn Féin delegation cooperated to draw Craig into the talks.  After November 22 this 
method returned to the forefront. 
 
Planning for Failure 
While the negotiations progressed, British officials developed plans for returning to a 
state of hostilities.  The major difference from the pre-truce situation would be the imposition of 
martial law throughout the twenty-six counties.121  In September, Macready outlined what martial 
law would entail.  Arms possession would be punishable by death, after a court martial.  All 
ports except Cork and Dublin were to be closed.  There would be extensive measures to control 
the civilian population, including a passport system and the possibility of rationing food.  
Macready wanted either to place “Ulster,” meaning the six counties, under martial law or 
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withdraw all troops and require the northern government to defend itself.122  In October, 
Worthington-Evans proposed to accord captured rebels belligerent status.  This was a major 
policy change, but would only be granted if they were uniformed and adhered to the rules of war.  
He estimated that they would need to increase the Army in Ireland by 85,000 to enforce martial 
law.  He wanted to recruit many of these from the Irish unionist population, particularly by re-
forming the 36th (Ulster) Division, which had been drawn largely from the UVF.123 
Another proposal to avoid a return to the pre-truce situation was to withdraw all troops to 
the ports and impose a blockade.  Lloyd George considered a version of this idea in August, 
while the Dáil Cabinet debated the July 20 proposals.  He described it to H. A. L. Fisher as his 
plan to “hold the fat bits on the coast while abandoning the interior.”124  Dublin Castle officials 
John Anderson and Andy Cope later proposed versions of this separately.125  The latter pointed 
out that this plan would mitigate the need for sending reinforcements to Ireland, decrease 
bloodshed, and avoid “The scandal of England reconquering Ireland in the 20th Century.”126 
Northern Ireland’s government also made plans for resuming hostilities.  In September, 
Craig told Macready that all of Ireland should be placed under martial law, including the 
“Northern Area.”127  However, after the general agreed, Craig made a series of proposals 
designed to ensure that he or officers close to him oversaw the operation of martial law in the six 
counties.128  Craig told Henry Wilson that the British government would not be able to raise the 
forces required from the unionist population to carry out Worthington-Evans’s plans.129  He 
predicted that only a few hundred men would join a military formation, compared with the 
thousands who had flocked to the Special Constabulary.130  By November, under Wilson’s 
advice, Northern Ireland’s Premier concluded that the six counties would not receive 
differentiated treatment under military governance.131  While in London to meet with Lloyd 
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George, he arranged with Worthington-Evans and Wilson that martial law would not extend to 
Northern Ireland.  Instead, all troops would withdraw from the interior of the six counties to 
“hold the boundary outside Ulster.”132 
Northern Ireland’s primary security force was the Ulster Special Constabulary.  In 
November, the regular RIC in the six counties numbered 2,324, compared with 3,472 full-time 
“A” specials and 15,780 part-time “B” specials.  If hostilities resumed, Craig wanted to increase 
the Constabulary to between 25,000 and 30,000, all armed, equipped, and paid by the British 
government.133  By September 1921, 1,000 “A” specials had been designated to invade Donegal.  
They were to be a permanent presence, distributed in nine depots throughout the county.134  
Northern Ireland’s Police Commissioner C. G. Wickham even referred to his forces for “the 
Seven Counties.”135  There is evidence of similar plans for Cavan and Monaghan.136  This belied 
Craig’s assertions that northern unionists simply wished to govern the six counties in accordance 
with the Government of Ireland Act.  In addition, the northern unionist leader denounced Sinn 
Féin for trying to acquire six-county territory by means of a boundary commission while his 
administration developed plans to seize majority-nationalist areas by force.137  If hostilities 
resumed, the northern government intended to extend their area of control using a force equipped 
and paid by the British government, while the British Army guarded their border. 
The IRA was far from idle during the truce.  Peace brought a huge influx of recruits, 
often to the chagrin of those who had endured active service during the most dangerous periods.  
IRA GHQ encouraged units to focus on training during the lull in operations.138  Macready told 
the Cabinet that by October drilling and arms practice were common throughout the country.139  
He reported a growing feeling among civilians, even former unionists or non-Sinn Féin 
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nationalists, that “the rebel Army is in fact capable of justifying its leaders [sic] boast that it 
could beat the British Army if hostilities were renewed.”140 
On October 1, a colonel on Macready’s staff asserted that the IRA was much larger, 
better organized, and perhaps better equipped than prior to the truce.  The only positive note was 
that the glut of recruits lessened the difficulty of distinguishing rebels from civilians, as in many 
districts “all young men have joined the I.R.A.”  Republican intelligence captured this memo and 
sent it to the delegation in London.141  Two weeks later, the Limerick police commissioner 
reported of the IRA, “there is no intention to fight if it can by any possibility be avoided.”  He 
described their training as “make-believe” and “political manoeuvres.”  But he added, “In the 
unlikely event of fighting, however, I do not under-estimate our difficulties.  The hostility of the 
country as a whole and the very large numbers of the I.R.A. have to be reckoned with.”142  In 
addition to recruiting and training, the republicans were importing arms.  In the most successful 
of these efforts, on November 11 an IRA gunrunner landed hundreds of rifles, pistols, and 
ammunition from Germany on the Waterford coast.143  If the British government and military 
returned to the pre-truce situation, they would face a much stronger militant republican 
organization, and they were aware of this. 
Politically, renewing a coercion policy in Ireland was fraught with pitfalls.  Lloyd 
George’s Cabinet had already alienated British people of all parties with a pre-truce policy that 
was perceived by some as overly harsh.144  Support for Northern Ireland’s government might 
have decreased significantly if they acted as aggressively as they planned.  Only the Unionist 
die-hards would have been pleased by all-out war.  Lloyd George hoped that, if the negotiations 
had to end, they would terminate in a way that enabled him to blame Sinn Féin irascibility, 
eroding their support in Britain and the dominions.  However, on November 25 Liberal Cabinet 
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member Edwin Montagu told Lloyd George that the Unionists would desert the government on 
any excuse, therefore, “the P.M. could not afford to let the negotiations fail.”145 
Historians sometimes downplay British threats of coercion should the negotiations fail as 
“political theater,” or imply that the threats themselves did not matter, merely that the Irish 
delegates believed them.146  Others assert that Lloyd George would have resigned if the talks 
failed, ushering in a Unionist government under Bonar Law that would have no qualms about 
coercing Sinn Féin.147  Without a settlement, the Prime Minister might have resigned, though he 
had proven adept at making this threat without actually following through.  Even had Lloyd 
George resigned, the institution of a coercion policy by a new government seems unlikely, given 
that even Unionists opposed to coalition policy admitted the necessity of negotiating with the 
Irish republicans.  John Regan assigns the Prime Minister’s threats of war great importance, 
asserting that such maneuvers denied Irish people a real choice in their governance.148  This is 
true, however, despite the plans in place, it does not seem that the British government was 
prepared to enact a new regime of coercion.  One of Lloyd George’s secretaries, Geoffrey 
Shakespeare, called his boss’s threat of war a bluff.149  Some of the Prime Minister’s biographers 
concur in this analysis.150  It is likely that, had the negotiations failed, a new round of talks would 
have begun, whether under Lloyd George or a Unionist Premier.151 
 
Finalizing the Treaty 
After the Prime Minister rejected Sinn Féin’s external association proposals of November 
22 and 28, his ministers polished their own terms and submitted them as “Proposed Articles of 
Agreement” two days later.152  The Sinn Féin delegation took a revised draft to the Dáil Cabinet 
in Dublin on December 3.  Griffith and Collins thought they had achieved considerable 
concessions on Northern Ireland.  Collins considered rejecting the agreement too risky, as, 
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“England could arrange a war in Ireland within a week.”  Barton and Gavan Duffy asserted that 
the delegation had not pushed their own ideas strongly enough.  The latter said, “England was 
bluffing,” and “the Irish proposals”—referring to external association—“could be obtained.”153  
De Valera objected to the oath of allegiance, and stated that he could not “sign any document 
which would give N.E. Ulster power to vote itself out of the Irish State.”  Nonetheless, he felt 
that if the draft was modified, “it might be accepted honourably,” and he wanted the delegation 
to make peace if possible.  Griffith promised not to sign anything without reference to Dublin.154 
 On December 4, the Sinn Féin delegates presented external association again, this time as 
a series of amendments to the British proposals.155  Lloyd George asserted that these ideas had 
already been rejected.156  In fact, the conference had never held a verbal or written debate on 
external association.  Curtis drafted a reply to the Sinn Féin amendments.  He leveraged 
unionists’ sentimental attachment to the monarchy and implied that Irish unity would be 
hastened by nationalists’ acceptance of the Crown and Empire.  The primary legal argument 
Curtis utilized was that judicial precedent rested upon litigants being either British subjects or 
aliens.  He called this a “cruel and embarrassing choice” to force upon Irish unionists.  The 
highlighting of sentimental attachments to the monarchy reinforces the idea of the Crown as a 
symbol, on which the Irish delegation based some of their proposals.  Griffith’s idea for dual 
citizenship might have met the legal argument, but it was never debated after the October 24 
conference session.  Curtis ended by asserting that external association “would break the Empire 
in peaces [sic], dislocate society in all its self-governing nations and cancel for ever [sic] the 
hope of national unity in Ireland itself.”157  However, Curtis had argued in an October 17 memo, 
“Dominion Status cannot be defined” and the constituent states were “Free to develop on their 
own lines.”158  If this was the case, it is difficult to believe that giving Ireland a different status in 
relation to the Empire would break it into pieces or cause dislocation in societies such as 
Australia or Canada.  Curtis’s December 4 memo would have been the only formal British reply 
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to external association, but it was never sent.  Lloyd George’s determination to pressure Sinn 
Féin for a settlement instead of Craig was decisive; academic arguments were unnecessary. 
The Prime Minister met with Collins on December 5.  The latter declared himself 
dissatisfied with the British proposals regarding “the North-East.”  Lloyd George pointed out that 
Collins himself had asserted that economic exigencies would force Northern Ireland into a united 
parliament.  The Prime Minister emphasized the boundary commission, and Collins predicted 
that this would “save” Tyrone and Fermanagh, as well as parts of Armagh, Derry, and Down.  If 
Lloyd George replied, Collins did not record it.159 
At a meeting later that day, Lloyd George and Chamberlain berated Griffith as having let 
them down on “the Ulster proposals.”  Griffith protested that he wanted an acknowledgement 
from Craig of Ireland’s essential unity before acceding to further British demands.  The British 
ministers replied that this was impossible and unreasonable.  Lloyd George trumped Griffith’s 
protests by producing a memo, which the Sinn Féin delegation leader had signed without his 
colleagues’ knowledge, declaring his agreement to all of the Northern Ireland proposals: the right 
to opt out of an all-Ireland parliament, the boundary commission, and the tax scheme.  In the 
ensuing discussion, the British delegates agreed to drop the stipulation that the Irish government 
must make a free trade agreement with Britain, ensuring full fiscal autonomy.  Abrogating his 
promise to the Dáil Cabinet, Griffith declared that he would sign.  Lloyd George insisted that all 
of the delegates must do so.  He said that he and his colleagues had risked their political futures 
for an accord, and the Sinn Féiners must do the same.  The Prime Minister added, “those who 
were not for peace must take the full responsibility for the war that would immediately follow 
refusal by any Delegate to sign the Articles of Agreement.”160  Griffith genuinely wanted to 
accept the terms, and the threat of war convinced the rest.161  Griffith, Collins, and Barton signed 
at 2:20am on December 6.  Gavan Duffy’s and Duggan’s signatures were added hours later.162 
The signed agreement became known as the Anglo-Irish Treaty.  In its large aspects, it 
differed little from the July 20 scheme.  Jones wrote the day of the signing, “In essentials we 
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have given nothing that was not in the July proposals.”163  He and Curtis later asserted that the 
concessions the Sinn Féin delegates secured “were mainly in matters of phraseology.”  The 
biggest difference was the last-minute grant of fiscal autonomy.164 
Ireland was to have dominion status, subject to certain restrictions.  The British Navy 
would retain specified port facilities.  Irish legislators were required to take an oath of allegiance 
to the Crown.  The dominions’ right of secession was precluded by the British ministers’ 
insistence that Ireland remain within the Empire.  The Sinn Féin negotiators secured some 
concessions apart from fiscal autonomy, primarily relating to Northern Ireland.  The British 
agreed to abandon the principle of reciprocal powers for the six-county legislature.  The idea that 
Northern Ireland could have an army was dropped.  The biggest concession seemed to be the 
boundary commission.  Whether this would result in a substantial benefit for the Free State 
remained to be seen, but Griffith and Collins believed that it would. 
The mainstream nationalist press, which had received the July 20 proposals hesitantly, 
hailed the Treaty without reserve.  The Irish Independent published both a glowing editorial and 
a poem praising the agreement, the first line of which exclaimed, “Hail Freedom!  Hail the dawn 
of Liberty!”165  The Freeman’s Journal declared that the Treaty meant they were entering 
“halcyon days” for Ireland and praised the signatories as heroes.166  The Ulster Herald, which 
had denounced the July 20 proposals as perpetual vassalage, greeted the Treaty with an editorial 
entitled, “Victory!”  The paper predicted that majority-nationalist areas in five of the six counties 
would soon be joined to the Free State.167   
Members of the British military reported that the public did not share the enthusiasm for 
the Treaty exhibited by the nationalist press.  Colonel Brind told the Cabinet that news of the 
Treaty signing “was received in the country without any particular demonstration of 
enthusiasm.”168  A War Office report said the announcement was received “in a manner which 
can only be described as apathetic.”  It explained this lackluster response by saying that Irish 
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people had expected more than the Treaty delivered, “They had been told they were accepting 
nothing less than non-partition, non-allegiance and a Republic and have got none of these.”169 
The first public sign that the Treaty would not meet with universal acceptance was a 
December 9 statement from de Valera condemning the agreement.170  The republican President 
was most upset that the delegation had actually signed the Treaty, as this would be viewed as 
final regardless of the stipulation that the Dáil must ratify it.  During a December 8 Cabinet 
meeting, Collins asserted of the Treaty, “We have only recommended it to Dail Eireann.”  De 
Valera responded, “No—Much more.”171  The President had not believed that the negotiations 
were going to reach a crisis point immediately after the December 3 Cabinet meeting.172  
Griffith’s promise not to sign the draft agreement reassured him of this.  In a November 29 letter 
to Harry Boland, de Valera declared himself resigned to war if the British insisted on Irish 
allegiance to the Crown, and remaining within the Empire.173  He was likely willing to allow the 
negotiations to break down, thereby forcing the British government to decide whether they 
would renew hostilities or begin a new round of talks.  De Valera expected the British to publish 
their proposals and intended, at long last, to publish counter-proposals based on external 
association.174  The signing of the Treaty precluded this, and placed the onus of deciding between 
peace and war on the Dáil.  
As the Dáil engaged in weeks of debates on whether to ratify the Treaty, de Valera finally 
put forward external association in what would become known as “Document No. 2.”  He used 
the framework of the Treaty, but added a preface and changed the oath.  De Valera said he 
designed this document to closely resemble the signed agreement to emphasize that the changes 
required by the Dáil’s anti-Treaty party were so slight that the British would not fight against 
them.175  This left him open to the counter that Irish people would not fight for them.  IRA officer 
and anti-Treaty Dáil member Seamus Robinson called the Treaty and Document No. 2, 
“Tweedledum” and “Tweedledee,” adding, “there is a difference but it is not a difference worth 
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fighting about.”176  The press reacted similarly.  The Freeman’s Journal accused de Valera of 
being willing to send men to die for “a grammarian’s formula.”177  Anti-Treaty republican and 
writer Sean Ó Faoláin said that external association “puzzled most people.”178  This is 
understandable given that few outside the Dáil Cabinet knew of the idea before mid-December.  
By then the Dáil and the public were engaged in fierce debates over the Treaty.  There was little 
chance that they would seriously consider a concept that seemed only cosmetically different.  De 
Valera’s failure to publish proposals based on external association in August, when there would 
have been ample time to explain the idea in comparison to the government’s July 20 proposals, 
continued to undermine his position. 
The Dáil ratified the Treaty by a 64-57 vote on January 7, 1922.  De Valera resigned as 
President of the Dáil.  Two days later, Griffith defeated de Valera for the presidency by a mere 
two votes.  He formed a Cabinet from the ranks of the pro-Treaty Dáil members, which also 
functioned as the Irish Free State’s Provisional Government. 
 
The Free State Constitution 
Many pro-Treaty members of Sinn Féin asserted that they were still republicans, and 
accepted the agreement as, in Collins’s words, “not the ultimate freedom that all nations desire 
and develop to, but the freedom to achieve it.”179  This was also expressed as a “stepping-stone” 
to the Republic.180  The first step was to be the Free State constitution.  Treaty advocates 
emphasized the new government’s liberty to use the constitution to maximize their separation 
from the Empire and the monarchy.  During the Treaty debate, Griffith quoted a December 13 
letter from Lloyd George, “The framing of that constitution will be in the hands of the Irish 
Government.”  Griffith’s opponents pointed out the importance of the Prime Minister’s next 
phrase, “subject of course to the terms of the Agreement.”181  Nonetheless, Gavan Duffy said, “It 
will be the duty of those who frame the Constitution…to relegate the King of England to the 
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exterior darkness as far as they can, and they can to a very considerable extent.”182  Some anti-
Treaty activists asserted that the Provisional Government could avoid a permanent split in the 
republican movement by enacting a constitution that was acceptable to their point of view.183 
There were indications that the British government intended to give Griffith’s 
administration significant latitude regarding the constitution.  On January 31, Duggan reported 
an assurance from Curtis that, after the Treaty’s ratification, approval of the constitution would 
“go by default.”184  Churchill proposed that Westminster pass the Treaty and the constitution in a 
single bill, indicating that neither would arouse much controversy.185  Curtis argued that the 
Provisional Government should be given considerable leeway in the drafting process, as their 
domestic political position would be damaged if their foundational document could be 
represented as “the work of the British Parliament.”  However, it was clear that the British 
Cabinet could reject the constitution if they considered it was not “consistent with the Treaty.”186 
In the first few months of the Provisional Government’s tenure, a number of 
developments disturbed the British government.  On April 14, members of the anti-Treaty IRA 
seized the Four Courts and nearby buildings in Dublin to protest what they saw as the betrayal of 
the Republic.  On May 20, Collins made a pact with de Valera that at the forthcoming Free State 
election they would run pro- and anti-Treaty candidates in a “National Coalition panel.”  The 
goal was to elect representatives from the two sides in the same proportion as the Dáil Treaty 
vote.  Both pro- and anti-Treaty panel candidates would use the name Sinn Féin, avoiding a 
formal split.  Four anti-Treaty legislators would sit in the Free State Cabinet as “extern” 
members.  The result would be a coalition government of pro- and anti-Treaty Sinn Féiners.187 
The election pact incensed the British Cabinet.  During a May 23 meeting, Chamberlain 
said that the Provisional Government “had made a bargain with the enemies of this country.”  
Churchill said of Griffith’s Cabinet, “Their whole procedure had been to leave intact the 
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republican conception whilst at the same time establishing the organisation of the Provisional 
Government.”  Lloyd George declared that he and his colleagues were “drifting into a position of 
either having to abandon or to re-conquer Ireland…We may have to face re-conquest.”  
Churchill said that he was reviewing military options.  He favored maintaining British forces to 
the six counties and Dublin, while imposing a blockade on the rest of the island.  Balfour argued 
that military coercion would fail and interjected, “You might imitate Sherman and burn every 
house and crop!”  Lloyd George wanted a reason for using force that would keep British and 
dominion opinion on the government’s side.  A Free State constitution that clearly violated the 
Treaty would provide such a justification.  Churchill said that they had been prepared to “wink” 
at some of the Provisional Government’s actions, but under the circumstances, “we are in a 
position to be much more searching in our examination of the Constitution.”188 
Churchill told Griffith on May 26 that if he formed a government with Dáil members 
who were not willing to take the oath of allegiance included in the Treaty, the British 
government would consider this a breach of the agreement.189  The Free State Cabinet delivered 
the draft constitution the next day.  The first article declared, “Ireland is a free and sovereign 
nation.”  The second said that all governmental authority derived from the Irish people.  The 
British ministers were as concerned over what the draft omitted as what it contained.  The 
clauses outlining the executive did not mention the royal representative.  The monarchy was not 
included as a component of the Free State legislature, and the draft did not admit that legislative 
authority derived from the Crown.  The oath of allegiance was absent.  The Free State 
government assumed treaty-making powers, and did not mention Northern Ireland or the 
Commonwealth.190  Lloyd George called the document, “purely republican and but thinly 
veiled.”191  Curtis saw it as another attempt at achieving external association, to which the British 
government “must remain unalterably opposed.”192 
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Lloyd George communicated his displeasure over the draft constitution to Griffith the 
same day it was delivered.  Griffith responded that the document had been drawn up hastily, but 
“their intention was to conform to the Treaty.”193  On June 1, the Prime Minister sent Griffith a 
letter demanding whether the position of the Crown in the Free State would be as in the other 
dominions, and whether it “shall be within the empire on the basis of common citizenship, or 
merely associated with it.”194  Meanwhile, Churchill met with the Committee on Imperial 
Defence and fleshed out plans to blockade the island in the event of “Southern Ireland 
repudiating the Treaty.”  The British would withdraw to several ports, including Dublin, 
Queenstown (now Cobh), and perhaps Limerick.  Worthington-Evans said they should hold the 
fewest ports possible, indicating that while the Cabinet intended to exert coercive pressure on the 
Provisional Government, Lloyd George’s idea of “re-conquest” was not a viable option.195 
These plans were unnecessary, as Griffith’s reply to Lloyd George indicated that the 
Provisional Government intended to comply with all of the British demands.  He asserted that the 
Free State would be “not merely associated with, but a member of and within the Community of 
Nations known as the British Empire.”196  Over the next two weeks, the Provisional 
Government’s legal adviser Hugh Kennedy and Lord Chief Justice Gordon Hewart negotiated 
alterations to the Free State constitution that conceded all of the major British points.197  Lloyd 
George declared the constitution to be in compliance with the Treaty on June 15.  In a meeting 
with Craig the next day Lloyd George said of the Provisional Government, “At first it looked as 
if they were going to fight it out, but they had surrendered completely.”198 
 
The Boundary Commission 
By mid-June 1922, Treaty supporters’ hope that the constitution would give their state 
greater powers than the agreement itself had vanished.  The other benefit they expected to accrue 
through the Treaty was territorial.  As noted, Griffith and Collins expected the boundary 
commission outlined in Article 12 to transfer large areas from Northern Ireland to the Free State.  
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It is unclear whether Lloyd George or his colleagues encouraged this belief.  Robert Barton later 
claimed that discussion of the boundary commission during the Treaty negotiations were much 
more concrete than the eventual terms of Article 12.  The delegates had primarily discussed 
plebiscites, and debated whether they should be conducted by parishes, rural districts, poor law 
union areas, or counties.199  The Treaty clause merely stated that the border would be adjusted “in 
accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants, so far as may be compatible with economic and 
geographic conditions.” 
The Irish negotiators do not seem to have considered that the commission might transfer 
land from the Free State to Northern Ireland.  By contrast, British documents relating to the 
commission, including the 1919 Cabinet discussions, as well as Curtis’s and Worthington-
Evans’s November 1921 memos, assumed that adjustments would be made on both sides of the 
border.  While there is little evidence that the British negotiators deliberately misled their Irish 
counterparts as to what areas could be transferred or how, there is nothing to indicate that they 
attempted to clarify these issues.  Therefore, pro-Treaty activists interpreted them in their own 
favor.  Lloyd George had not replied to Collins’s December 5 assertions that the boundary 
commission would result in large territorial gains for the Free State.  During a February 5, 1922, 
meeting with the British ministers, Collins called the boundary commission, “a matter of two 
whole and two half counties.”  According to the minutes, no one responded, and in fact Hewart 
quickly changed the subject.200  Ten days later, Griffith and Collins asked the British Cabinet to 
announce that the boundary commission would operate without regard to the existing border, to 
counter suggestions “that the enquiry will cover only a narrow area.”201  No such statement was 
forthcoming.  Vagaries that played on his opponents’ hopes were part of the Prime Minister’s 
negotiating strategy.  In 1916, Lloyd George had allowed Redmond to assume that six-county 
exclusion would be temporary.  He had not initially corrected Redmond as that would have 
damaged his chances of getting an agreement.  Similarly, in 1921 and 1922 he did not dispute the 
assumption that the boundary commission would transfer large parts of Northern Ireland to the 
Free State. 
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Lloyd George sent Craig a copy of the Treaty immediately after its signing.  He likely 
expected no opposition from that quarter.  Initial indications were positive.  A draft letter from 
Craig to Austen Chamberlain said that, “after long and earnest consultation with those chiefly 
concerned,” he intended to “recognise” the boundary commission and appoint a representative.202  
Craig did not send this letter, however, on December 7 he said publicly, “It now appears to me 
that peace may possibly be within sight” and praised the “freedom of choice for Ulster” 
embodied in the Treaty terms.203  Craig met with Lloyd George on December 9.  The British 
Prime Minister assured his counterpart that the boundary commission “was only intended to 
make a slight re-adjustment of our boundary line,” adding that any transfers would result in an 
equal population exchange between Northern Ireland and the Free State.204 
Three days later, the northern unionist leader suddenly changed his tone.  Craig declared 
his opposition to the Treaty in a December 12 speech in Northern Ireland’s House of Commons, 
vehemently denouncing its financial implications and the boundary commission.  He accused 
Lloyd George of breaking his pledge that “the rights of Ulster would neither be sacrificed nor 
prejudiced.”205  Craig sent messages to Bonar Law and to the Prime Minister venting his anger 
over the boundary commission.206  Both letters protested that Sinn Féiners were declaring that 
large areas of Northern Ireland would be transferred to the Free State via the boundary 
commission. 
Craig sent his most strident message to Chamberlain on December 15.  He implied that 
he had never been invited to take part in the Treaty negotiations, and predicted that the boundary 
commission would lead to “Civil War” between Northern Ireland and the Free State.  Craig 
added, “So intense is local feeling at the moment that my colleagues and I may be swept off our 
feet,” and, “Loyalists may declare independence on their own behalf, seize the Customs and 
other Government Departments and set up an authority of their own.  Many believe that violence 
is the only language understood by Mr. Lloyd George and his Ministers.”207  This threat, framed 
as a prediction of violence, was identical to the tactics northern unionist leaders had employed 
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between 1912 and 1914.  He declared that he could not control his followers, who were being 
goaded into extreme actions by Irish nationalists and the British government.  The root of the 
idea that northern loyalists would form “an authority of their own” lay in Carson’s and Craig’s 
prewar plans for a provisional government.  This concept was rendered ironic by the fact that, in 
1922, this “authority” would oppose Northern Ireland’s Unionist executive. 
Unlike Bonar Law during the home rule crisis, Chamberlain was not willing to use 
northern unionist anger to undermine the sitting government, as he was a member of it.  
Chamberlain’s reply reminded Craig that he had been asked to participate in the Treaty 
negotiations, and had refused.  He assured Northern Ireland’s Prime Minister that the 
commission would work on a narrow basis, and issued the reproach, “I cannot believe that men 
whose loyalty is their pride are contemplating acts of war against the King.”208 
Officials within the government and the Unionist Party were surprised at Craig’s sudden 
about-face on the Treaty.209  Carson compounded this by speaking out against the agreement on 
December 14, primarily citing the boundary commission.210  Lloyd George was perturbed.  He 
thought that “Ulster” owed him a debt of gratitude, “We have emancipated her and it was very 
unfair of Craig to talk of betrayal.”211  It is possible that Carson and Craig were acting in concert 
with the die-hard Unionists in an attempt to undermine the government.212  If this was the case, 
Bonar Law swept the rug out from under them by returning to Parliament on December 15 to 
support the Treaty.213  Nonetheless, The Times predicted that “Ulster’s” opposition to the Treaty 
would prompt 150 Unionists legislators to “revolt” against the government.214  As it happened, 
the bill to implement the Treaty passed its final reading with 295 votes in favor and just 52 
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against.215  An amendment—inspired by Craig—that Northern Ireland’s territory could not be 
altered by a boundary commission garnered just a few more votes, and was defeated 302-60.216   
The wide margins of these votes suggest that the Treaty’s terms were not close to the 
limit of concessions that most British lawmakers would consider in exchange for peace in 
Ireland.  Lloyd George feared that, if the Treaty negotiations produced a settlement that was 
more generous to the Sinn Féin point of view, Bonar Law would return to unite the Unionist 
Party in opposition to it.  However, many Unionists supported the coalition government, 
including the actual party leader, Austen Chamberlain.  Moreover, the combined Liberal and 
Labour MPs elected in 1918 accounted for 224 votes in the Commons, therefore the 382 
Unionists would have had to remain substantially united to oppose a more generous deal.217  This 
would have posed a significant challenge given the fractured state of the Unionist Party.  Lloyd 
George could likely have granted greater concessions to Sinn Féin and still passed the resulting 
settlement through Parliament.  This was unnecessary, as Lloyd George assured his government 
of an easy Parliamentary victory by deciding, in November 1921, to pressure the Sinn Féin 
negotiators for a settlement instead of Craig. 
Despite the Treaty’s widespread support at Westminster, Craig and his Cabinet opposed 
it, and considered open hostility to the British government.  In January 1922 Craig said that they 
could violently resist the boundary commission, but he did not recommend it as they would 
likely lose British unionist support.218  He continued to state publicly that his government would 
resist any alteration of their territory.219 
Some British administrators became concerned at the increasingly hostile attitude of 
Northern Ireland’s government.  On March 18, Thomas Jones and Lionel Curtis submitted a 
memo to the Cabinet arguing that the Ulster Special Constabulary was a military force disguised 
as police.  Moreover, they were paid and equipped by the British government, while Craig’s 
threats implied that this force might be turned against that very administration.220  This 
                                                 
215 The Times (London), 9 March 1922. 
216 For the vote totals see The Times (London), 18 February 1922. For the amendment as Craig’s inspiration see 
PRONI, CAB/9/Z/3/1, James Craig to Charles Craig, 11 February 1922. 
217 These figures are from F. W. S. Craig, British Parliamentary Statistics, 1918-1968 (Glasgow: Political Reference 
Publications, 1968), 2. 
218 PRONI, CAB/4/29, NI Cabinet Conclusions, 10 January 1922. 
219 UKPA, Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/11/3/32, James Craig to David Lloyd George, 6 February 1922; The Times 
(London), 7 February 1922. 
220 UKNA, CAB/24/134/73, Thomas Jones and Lionel Curtis, “Memorandum on the Present Position of the Imperial 





potentially alarming analysis did not result in any British policy change.  Macready suggested 
that the government cease arming the Specials, but Churchill rejected the advice.221   
Two months later, Craig again stated that Northern Ireland would not submit to any 
alteration of its territory.  This time Churchill rebuked the northern unionist leader, asserting that 
Craig was “little short of a defiance of the Imperial Government whose aid you seek.”  He 
predicted that among the government, press, and public, “A very strong effort will undoubtedly 
be made in favour of a policy of Britain disinteresting herself entirely in Irish affairs.”222  Craig 
responded that as his government paid taxes they had a right to expect the British government to 
defend them.  He wrote, “you are only doing what would be done if one of the Eastern Counties 
was threatened by an enemy from without.”  The word “without” is ironic as much of the Treaty 
negotiations had focused on whether the Free State would be within the British Empire.  At 
British insistence it was, and the twenty-six-county government had as much right as its 
counterpart in the six counties to expect Westminster to uphold their claims.  But Craig based his 
arguments largely on sentiment, not constitutional realities.  He wrote, “although I may have 
acted from time to time in a manner which appeared antagonistic to you and the British 
Government, I have acted throughout in what I hold to be the best interest of you, as well as of 
ourselves…we must hang together and win through for the credit of Great Britain and the 
Empire.”223 
Craig was confident that he could do virtually anything short of initiating violence 
against British forces and claim that he did so out of loyalty.  British nationalism was strong 
enough that at least a section of public opinion in the “predominant partner” would respond to an 
appeal on patriotic grounds.  In 1914, this had been a major factor in the home rule crisis.  By 
1922 there was ample evidence that the “Ulster” lobby was not as powerful as it had been, but 
Craig bet that Lloyd George’s government would not test this.  British ministers’ unwavering 
support of his administration suggests that he was right.224  At the end of July, Churchill informed 
Collins that the British government would not interfere in the internal affairs of the six counties.  
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This amounted to a grant of de facto dominion status.225  Thus, another concession that the Sinn 
Féin delegation theoretically won during the Treaty debates was abandoned in practice. 
The outbreak of civil war between pro- and anti-Treaty factions in June 1922 obviated 
immediate tensions over the boundary commission.  It was March 1924 before the Free State 
government asked their British counterparts to reopen the issue.226  British officials wanted Free 
State President William Cosgrave to negotiate a solution with Craig, who remained Northern 
Ireland’s Prime Minister.227  In June, Cosgrave told British Premier J. Ramsay MacDonald that 
the idea of a closed-door conference raised fears in Ireland that “the wishes of the inhabitants 
were to be subordinated to whims of persons in positions of authority and power.”  The Free 
State government assumed that plebiscites would form the basis of the commission, and 
Cosgrave offered his administration’s services in taking a census of Northern Ireland’s 
population.228 
This time, the Free State government was determined to hold the British to the letter of 
the Treaty, but this raised the issue of the boundary commission’s actual powers.  On August 9, 
Chamberlain said that he and his fellow British Treaty signatories had only ever contemplated “a 
mere question of the rectification of the existing frontier.”229  Duggan countered that the 
commission idea had been based on self-determination, and envisioned plebiscites throughout 
the six counties to gauge the wishes of the population.  He claimed that Birkenhead had 
expressed this interpretation on the morning of the Treaty signing.230  Churchill unearthed a 
March 1922 letter from Birkenhead to Balfour insisting that the commission would be restricted 
to small territorial changes only.  Any other interpretation had sprung from Collins’s “overheated 
imagination.”  Churchill sent the letter to Craig and to the press.231  On September 10, 1924, 
Lloyd George declared that he shared the interpretation in Birkenhead’s letter.232  Cosgrave said 
that these opinions had been “carefully concealed” during the Treaty negotiations, and if the Irish 
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delegates had known of them they would not have signed.233  Significantly, the two Irish 
signatories most responsible for the Treaty’s passage were no longer alive to give their versions 
of what the commission should entail.  Arthur Griffith died of heart failure on August 12, 1922, 
and Michael Collins was killed in an anti-Treaty IRA ambush ten days later.  Before his death, 
Collins declared several times that he expected the commission to transfer at least two counties 
to the Free State, but in 1924 neither he nor his most influential pro-Treaty colleague could 
reiterate this interpretation. 
Craig responded to the imminent establishment of the boundary commission by reverting 
to his old tactics.  In public, he declared that he had “a unanimous loyalist Ulster at his back,” by 
which he meant Northern Ireland’s unionist population.234  However, he and his colleagues also 
warned that they could not restrain that population from violent outbreaks if large parts of the six 
counties were transferred to the Free State.235  At times they even encouraged violence.  Northern 
Ireland’s Finance Minister H. M. Pollock said in January 1924, “any arrogant claim to Ulster 
territory would be resisted by their people to the death.”236  During the boundary commission’s 
sittings between November 1924 and November 1925, Craig discouraged its members from 
visiting Northern Ireland.  He offered to send witnesses to London to give evidence, but a visit 
might “lead to a disturbance of the peaceful conditions at present prevailing.”237 
As it happened, the boundary commission recommended only minor changes.  The 
British-appointed chairman, South African judge Richard Feetham, interpreted Article 12 of the 
Treaty as assuming the established and continued existence of Northern Ireland as created by the 
Government of Ireland Act, therefore large-scale changes were out of the question.238  Further, he 
considered that if the Treaty framers had intended that plebiscites should be employed to decide 
the “wishes of the inhabitants” they would have said so, therefore he ruled out this method.239  
The commission recommended transferring 183,290 acres of land and 31,319 people to the Free 
State, and 49,242 acres with its 7,594 inhabitants to Northern Ireland.240  While this balance 
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favored the Free State, it paled in comparison to what they had hoped to receive.  Moreover, few 
within the Free State had seriously considered having to cede any territory. 
The Morning Post published a premature report of the commission’s findings on 
November 7, 1925.  Cosgrave, fearing that nationalist anger at this failure of the Treaty to deliver 
significant gains for the Free State would cause his administration’s ouster, negotiated a deal to 
suppress the official report in exchange for financial concessions.241  The border remained 
unchanged.  The political settlement of the island of Ireland assumed a form that would remain 
unaltered until the closure of Northern Ireland’s parliament in 1972. 
 
Conclusions 
During the negotiations that culminated in the Anglo-Irish Treaty, Lloyd George’s 
Cabinet was willing to consider alterations to both major facets of its Irish policy: constitutional 
status and partition.  On the former issue, The Sinn Féin negotiators’ tactics did not help their 
cause.  De Valera’s decision not to publish a plan based on external association in August 1921 
was his biggest mistake during the negotiations.  The Irish public did not see the plan, therefore 
the Sinn Féin delegates at the conference could not argue that they had popular opinion behind it.  
Moreover, this lack of an apparent constitutional plan from the Irish republicans allowed Lloyd 
George’s July 20 proposals to form the basis of the conference’s deliberations by default.  The 
British ministers did not engage with external association in written or oral argument, and the 
Sinn Féiners made little effort to press for such a debate.  By the time the plan came before the 
Irish public, the Treaty had been signed and published.  De Valera’s intervention with Document 
No. 2 was too late. 
On the issue of partition, the turning-point in the conference came between November 12 
and 17.  On the former date, Lloyd George told Griffith that he intended to force Craig into an 
all-Ireland settlement, or he would resign as Prime Minister.  By that time, he had little to fear 
from the British Unionists.  The die-hards had lost the October 31 censure vote by an 
overwhelming margin.  The November 17 Liverpool conference confirmed that, even if they did 
not trust the Prime Minister, most Unionists considered they had no choice but to negotiate with 
Sinn Féin.  Nonetheless, fearing that Bonar Law might return to galvanize the die-hards, Lloyd 
George decided to focus his persuasive efforts on Griffith and Collins rather than Craig.  What 
                                                 





might have happened to the Prime Minister’s parliamentary support had he tried to institute an 
all-Ireland parliament can only be guessed, but his contemporary statements show that he did not 
think that even a Unionist-led government could return to the pre-truce situation.  The large 
parliamentary majorities in favor of the Treaty indicate that the terms embodied in that document 
did not approach the limit of what British legislators were willing to grant in exchange for peace. 
Several of the Sinn Féin delegates and their supporters believed that they had made 
significant gains during the Treaty negotiations.  However, as the agreement began to operate, 
the powers they expected the agreement to confer were gradually undermined.  Whatever 
handshake agreements and understandings Lloyd George and his colleagues conveyed to Griffith 
and Collins at the negotiating table fell by the wayside as they were held to the letter of the 
Treaty.  The revisions the Cabinet demanded to the Free State Constitution showed that the 
supremacy of the British Crown and Parliament must be recognized, even if it was not exercised.  
The idea that Northern Ireland would not receive reciprocal powers to the Free State was 
abandoned as the British government accorded Craig’s administration de facto dominion status 
and the Special Constabulary increasingly functioned as an army.  The Provisional Government 
realized that the promises they had given to the Dáil were being undermined, and made 
occasional protests.  Collins asked Churchill in February 1922 why the Treaty was “being 
interpreted to the great legal disadvantage of Irish ministers.”  He did not receive a direct 
response.242 
In 1924 the Free State government forced their British counterparts to implement the 
final outstanding Treaty clause: the boundary commission.  President William Cosgrave and his 
colleagues were disappointed in the execution.  The 1924-1925 commission was the last chance 
to take a plebiscite of Northern Ireland’s population to determine their wishes.  This was what 
Cosgrave and his colleagues wanted and expected.  However, Northern Ireland’s government 
was opposed to the entire project, therefore it was up to the British administration to compel such 
a vote.  Not only did they not do so, but Feetham’s interpretation of the boundary commission 
clause resulted in a principle that even nationalist majorities would not be respected if their 
transfer to the Free State would cause disruption to the status quo in Northern Ireland. 
 
 
                                                 





POSTSCRIPT: WAS THE ANGLO-IRISH TREATY A POPULAR SETTLEMENT? 
 
Irish Free State 
 Whether the settlement embodied in the Government of Ireland Act and the Treaty can be 
described as popular is difficult to ascertain.  In fact, gauging the level of support for any policy 
at this time is problematic.  As historian Charles Townshend writes, “Public opinion, in 1922, 
effectively meant press opinion: ordinary people’s views emerged only indirectly.”1 
Leaders of the dominionist movement were pleased with the Treaty.  Horace Plunkett 
described it as “in substance, the Irish Dominion League’s policy.”  He wrote that through the 
agreement Ireland would have a “proud place among the nations who have won their freedom in 
the British Commonwealth,” and it “laid foundations upon which Irish unity can be surely 
built.”2  Lord Monteagle issued a mild “I-told-you-so” to The Times in December 1921.  He 
claimed that the signature and public acceptance of the Treaty marked “the conversion…of the 
Irish delegates and thousands, perhaps millions, of Irish Republicans.”3  It soon became evident 
that not so many Irish republicans had been “converted” as Monteagle believed. 
Southern unionists took issue with various aspects of the Treaty.  The British government 
still recognized Lord Midleton as the southern unionist leader, and facilitated meetings between 
him and the Sinn Féin delegates during the negotiations.  The southern unionists received 
assurances on every point they raised.4  However, Midleton and his supporters continued to 
protest to the British government, particularly at the idea of an elected Senate.  They submitted a 
letter protesting “any Senate constituted as proposed by Popular Election.”5  In other words, they 
did not trust to democratic practice.  The idea of an elected Senate eventually gave way to a 
system in which some members were selected by the Dáil and others appointed by the Taoiseach.  
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While these reactions came from rarified political circles, historian Patrick Buckland asserts that, 
after the Treaty was signed, “most southern unionists accepted it as a fait accompli.”6 
Some historians assert that, as pro-Treaty candidates won a clear majority in the June 
1922 election, there was a high level of public support for the agreement.7  The press portrayed 
the Irish population as overwhelmingly in favor.  Numerous public bodies passed resolutions 
supporting the Treaty, though de Valera complained that the press solicited many of these.8  The 
debates on those local government resolutions reveal almost equally balanced pro- and anti-
Treaty opinions.9 
Provisional Government members indicated a level of “buyers’ remorse” among the Irish 
population after the Treaty’s ratification.  In December 1921, Arthur Griffith told Chief 
Secretary Hamar Greenwood that 95 percent of the public supported the agreement.10  However, 
Collins told Churchill in February 1922, “If they did not have an election till after the 
Constitution were drafted, the Treaty would be beaten in Ireland.”11  Three months later, Eamonn 
Duggan said that without the Collins-de Valera election pact the Treaty would be “smashed.”12  
Nonetheless, British Cabinet members seized on the idea that the Irish public were 
overwhelmingly pro-Treaty.  Churchill derided de Valera as representing just two percent of the 
population.13 
Anti-Treaty republicans admitted that most Irish people were in favor of the agreement.  
On May 1, 1922, ten anti-Treaty IRA officers issued a statement urging a compromise.  Its terms 
included, “The acceptance of the fact—admitted by all sides—that the majority of the people of 
Ireland are willing to accept the Treaty.”14  The anti-Treaty Dáil deputies involved in negotiating 
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the election pact reported, “the Treaty has been approved by the majority of Dail Eireann, and, in 
the circumstances is accepted by a majority of the people.”15  To those who portray the anti-
Treaty party as anti-democratic, such statements show that they deliberately opposed the will of 
the majority.16  However, there is a difference between public opinion and democracy.  Public 
opinion is subject to constant change.  Politicians often find that their personal convictions 
conflict with the popular mood.  In that case, individuals in democratic systems are faced with 
several alternatives: to alter their convictions to accord with the popular judgement, to wait for 
public opinion to change, or to try to force that change.  Many anti-Treaty republicans chose the 
latter two options.  The phrase “in the circumstances” shows that the Treaty’s opponents 
believed that, under different conditions, most Irish people would reject the agreement.  
Moreover, Irish republicans had witnessed dramatic swings in public opinion, including from the 
IPP to Sinn Féin between 1916 and 1918.  Treaty opponents saw themselves as representing an 
Irish desire for complete independence, which was being suppressed by the British and 
Provisional governments.  This was similar to the unionist attitude between 1910 and 1914, as 
they insisted that the British population were against home rule but were misrepresented by 
Asquith’s government. 
 The outcome of the June 16, 1922, election can be interpreted as a significant popular 
endorsement of the Treaty.  Pro-Treaty Sinn Féin won 38.48 percent of the first-preference vote 
and 58 of the 128 seats in the Dáil.  Anti-Treaty Sinn Féin won 21.26 percent and 36 seats.  
Labour received the second-highest share of the popular vote at 21.33 percent, but just 17 seats.  
Independents won 10.59 percent and 10 seats, while the Farmers’ Party garnered 7.84 percent 
and 7 seats.17  These last three groupings accepted the peace agreement, and combining their 
totals with pro-Treaty Sinn Féin accounts for 78.24 percent of the popular vote. 
However, bare statistics cannot reveal voters’ motivations.  After the finalization of the 
Collins-de Valera pact in May 1922, the anti-Treaty party campaigned, not on their own 
platform, but as participants in the envisaged coalition.  For example, on June 14 the pro-Treaty 
Irish Times reported that de Valera told an election meeting that he was there “to advocate the 
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claims of the panel candidates, irrespective of their views on the Treaty.”18  Assertions such as 
these likely influenced some to vote for any Sinn Féin candidate, whether from the pro- or anti-
Treaty camp.  However, after the results showed a pro-Treaty victory, the agreement’s supporters 
seized on this as proof of their public support.  The Irish Times asserted on June 26, “the recent 
elections were fought largely on the issue of the Treaty, and the results are decisive.”19  However, 
anti-Treaty activists did not believe that the election had settled the question.  A July 23 proposal 
for negotiations from anti-Treaty IRA officer Tom Barry included the stipulation, “Election on 
Treaty issue,” indicating that the June 16 poll had not been fought on that question.20 
Churchill told Griffith on May 26 that the British government would not allow a pro- and 
anti-Treaty coalition, but the latter does not seem to have shared that information.  De Valera and 
his supporters continued to campaign on the pact and a coalition.  As late as June 27 the Irish 
press continued to speculate that the coalition idea might still be viable.21  Moreover, the British-
approved version of the Free State constitution was not published until June 16, the day of the 
election, giving most voters no time to digest its contents.  These maneuvers undoubtedly 
increased the pro-Treaty vote, but do not enhance their leaders’ democratic credentials. 
Anti-Treaty republican Dorothy Macardle asserts that the election gave a clear mandate 
for a coalition government.  She combines the totals of both Sinn Féin wings to show a two-
thirds majority in the new Dáil.22  Townshend asserts that the meaning of the 1922 elections is 
unclear, citing the British government’s coercive threats.23  The Civil War began two days after 
the results were announced, overshadowing the poll.  The Provisional Government suspended the 
new Dáil, another move that undermines its members’ democratic qualifications.24 
 
Northern Nationalists 
Reactions to the Treaty in Northern Ireland were also complex.  Historian Eamon 
Phoenix asserts that northern unionists’ rejection of the agreement due to the boundary 
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commission convinced many six-county nationalists, especially in the border areas, to support 
it.25  Brian Feeney asserts that, while Sinn Féin split on the Treaty question throughout most of 
the island, in Northern Ireland the party was almost unanimously in favor.26  After the Treaty’s 
ratification, most northern IRA members seem to have been willing to work in tandem with the 
Provisional Government.27  Collins cooperated with the anti-Treaty faction in planning an IRA 
offensive in Northern Ireland for May 1922.  Elements within the Free State were to supply large 
quantities of arms to each brigade in the six counties.28  Commandant Roger McCorley said the 
effort was designed to bring about “the downfall of the six-county Government.”29  The offensive 
failed amid a welter of conflicting orders, disjointed attacks, unsuccessful arms deliveries, and 
the rounding up of many active republicans by the Constabulary.   
As Sinn Féin and the IRA continued to fragment over the Treaty, a number of northern 
commanders tried to unite them by highlighting the plight of six-county nationalists.30  These 
efforts were insufficient to heal the split, and some of the northern IRA fought on different sides 
in the Civil War.31 
Historians often assert that the Treaty split was not about partition, citing the fact that 
during the ratification debates Dáil members paid greater attention to constitutional issues such 
as the oath, the Crown, and the utilization of Irish ports by the British Navy.32  This idea gained 
significant credence in historical discourse in 1966 when Maureen Wall asserted that, in the 
printed version of the Dáil Treaty debates, speeches on partition occupy just nine out of 338 
pages.33  Martin Mansergh attempted to modify this in 1998 by stating that twenty Dáil members 
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spoke on northern questions.34  While Sinn Féin legislators debated constitutional issues at 
greater length, historians’ characterizations of the idea that partition was not a part of the 
discussions at times approach the point of caricature.  After noting that Collins mentioned 
partition, Peter Hart asserts, “almost no one else even brought it up.”35 
A number of Dáil speakers condemned partition.  Others discussed Northern Ireland, or 
“Ulster,” the “Partition Bill,” as they called the Government of Ireland Act, the status of northern 
nationalists, and the fear that the British Army might use the six counties as a base to reoccupy 
the rest of Ireland.  In other words, they discussed multiple issues that were either created or 
exacerbated by partition.  By my count, at least thirty-three individual Dáil members discussed 
issues relating to partition or to Northern Ireland.  Nineteen of these voted for the Treaty and 
fourteen against.  There were 125 members of the Second Dáil, therefore thirty-three of the 
comprises 26.4 percent of the house.  According to Jason Knirck, ninety-five individuals spoke 
during the Treaty debates, consequently 34.7 percent of them mentioned northern issues.36  This 
is still a minority, but it is a larger group than many commentators allow.  Even in the moment 
there was confusion as to how much time was being devoted to questions relating to Northern 
Ireland.  Ernest Blythe said on January 3, 1922, “There has been a good deal said about the 
clauses in this Treaty in regard to North East Ulster.”37  The next day, Eoin O’Duffy said of “the 
North-East,” “very little has been said about it up to the present.”38 
Belfast native Seán MacEntee was the principal anti-Treaty spokesman on the northern 
question.  Seán Milroy countered for the pro- side.  It is logical that these two conducted the 
main debate on partition; both sat for constituencies in the nine-county province of Ulster, 
MacEntee for Monaghan and Milroy for Fermanagh and Tyrone.  It was common parliamentary 
practice for a party to allow or even to designate speakers to focus on a particular topic.  This 
procedure seems to have been followed on partition, as Milroy knew before MacEntee spoke that 
he was going to criticize the Treaty on that basis.39  Milroy was one of six Dáil members sitting 
for constituencies in Northern Ireland, five of whom discussed northern issues during the Treaty 
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debate.  The other four were Michael Collins (pro-), Eamon de Valera (anti-), Arthur Griffith 
(pro-), and Eoin MacNeill (pro-).  Seán O’Mahony (anti-) was the only deputy representing a 
six-county constituency who did not speak on any issue relating to partition.40 
Anti-Treaty speakers mainly condemned the principle of partition, and the Treaty’s 
recognition of it.  Pro-Treaty members had a slightly more discursive field.  They also 
condemned partition, but added that the Treaty would mitigate, or even end it.  Pro-Treaty 
deputies criticized the fact that de Valera reproduced the Treaty’s articles relating to Northern 
Ireland almost verbatim in his suggested alternative, Document No. 2.  De Valera later wrote, “I 
hated these clauses, but I had to deal with Ulster in one way or another.”  He described including 
those passages in his document as his biggest mistake during the debates.41  This highlights the 
conundrum in which Dáil members found themselves regarding the six counties: they wanted a 
united Ireland, but had few ideas how to effect it.  On issues such as the oath or Ireland’s 
relationship to the Empire, they could protest—as some did regarding partition—but they could 
also debate phrasing and suggest modifications.  On partition, they had few alternatives to 
discuss.  At least one deputy asserted that this should not confuse anyone as to the biggest issue 
confronting them.  Lorcan Robbins of Co. Westmeath said on January 3, “The people in my 
county care nothing about formulas or oaths; they do care a lot about Ulster being kept out.  That 
is the biggest question.  Anything that ever mattered to the people of Ireland was the unity of 
Ireland.”  He also argued that the Treaty provided the most practical means to freedom, 
particularly as it conferred an army, therefore he voted in favor.42 
In any case, the Dáil debates provide too narrow a source base to gauge the importance of 
partition as an issue within nationalism.  The nationalist press denounced partition and reported 
daily on events north of the border.  Collins spent significant time attempting to broker deals 
with Craig, pressure the British Cabinet to safeguard six-county nationalists, and orchestrate the 
failed IRA offensive.  The outbreak of the Civil War and Collins’s death distracted from these 
initiatives, and the failure of the boundary commission largely ended them. 
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Northern Ireland’s government ultimately opposed the Treaty, but were they content with 
the overall settlement?  Historians often note the paradox that, despite Irish nationalists’ decades-
long agitation for home rule, it was their northern unionist opponents that achieved it.43  A 
greater irony is that, once they were in charge of a self-governing state, unionists strained against 
the restrictions they had insisted must be included in any home rule bill.  In 1910, Carson 
protested that home rule would make unionists a “permanent minority” in an Irish parliament, 
but insisted on partitioning an area that placed six-county nationalists in that exact position.44  
Craig used his May 1921 meetings with Michael O’Flanagan, James O’Connor, and de Valera to 
try to alter facets of the Government of Ireland Act he found inconvenient.  Craig wanted fiscal 
autonomy, if only through the Council of Ireland, suggested that neither Irish parliament pay any 
Imperial contribution, and wanted the northern Senate abolished.45  All of this is ironic as 
unionists had refused to countenance allowing a majority-nationalist legislature fiscal autonomy, 
argued that home rule would be a drain on Imperial resources, and insisted on safeguards that 
would result in their representation in excess of their population.  
Unionists had insisted that certain services be “reserved,” or withheld from any home rule 
government for a period of years, particularly taxation and police.  Some powers were 
temporarily withheld from the six-county government, but even before the Northern Ireland 
Parliament convened Craig’s Cabinet determined to pressure the British government to transfer 
them as soon as possible.46  One of the first measures Craig’s government introduced would 
remove proportional representation, which had been instituted throughout Ireland prior to the 
1921 elections in a bid to increase minority representation in both parliaments.  Collins protested 
to Churchill, who replied in a letter justifying the British government’s non-intervention.  Collins 
wrote on his copy, “It is a sentence of death or expulsion on every Catholic in the North.”47  This 
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was an exaggeration of the bill’s effects, but it is an early demonstration of Northern Ireland’s 
“official Unionists” to monopolize political power.  This was the first test of the relationship 
between the Belfast and London governments, and non-intervention resulted in the precedent 
that Northern Ireland would have the legislative independence of a dominion, despite its official 
status as an integral part of the United Kingdom. 
No home rule bill had contemplated giving Irish nationalists control of an army, which 
the northern unionists effectively established in the Special Constabulary.  The force became a 
permanent tool of the six-county government.  In November 1922, British General Arthur Solly-
Flood, Northern Ireland’s military adviser, tried to convince the London administration to take 
control of the Specials.  Craig learned of this intrigue and Solly-Flood resigned.48 
Craig’s description of his policy toward the United Kingdom government indicated his 
concern for Northern Ireland’s finances.  He wrote in May 1922, “I have to be very careful on 
the one hand to get as much as possible out of them free of cost, and on the other, to see that the 
tax payers in Ulster are not much in too heavy damages regarding the balance.”49  This policy 
was vindicated as the British government agreed to pay the entire balance for the Constabulary 
through March 1923.50  They covered part of the cost through 1925.51 
Several scholars assert that Craig had reasons to be worried, as the form of government 
established in Northern Ireland was doomed from the start.  Buckland and Alan Ward argue that 
the Government of Ireland Act placed too many restrictions on the northern government to 
facilitate the economic development of the six counties.52  While Northern Ireland was accorded 
the political status of a dominion, its economy remained tied to Britain.  This resulted in 
significant subsidies from the UK treasury, but economic policies were set in London and were 
not attuned to Northern Ireland’s needs.  Alvin Jackson and John Kendle assert that the 
governmental structures in the Act were not intended to operate in isolation long term; the 
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northern state apparatus was designed to facilitate reintegration with the rest of Ireland.53  This 
never occurred, due largely to unionists’ insistence that it should not. 
The two primary northern unionist leaders’ long-term reactions to the settlement were 
very different.  Edward Carson experienced both failures and successes during the long debates 
over Irish self-government and partition.  Some biographers note that he failed to preserve the 
Union.54  However, as early as 1913 he formulated a demand for six-county exclusion, and saw it 
implemented despite many difficulties.  Nonetheless, Carson was angry at the outcome.  During 
a December 1921 speech denouncing the Treaty he admitted that his anti-home rule campaign 
had been designed to overturn Asquith’s government, not to result in self-government even for a 
partitioned Ireland.  He said, “I was in earnest.  What a fool I was.  I was only a puppet, and so 
was Ulster, and so was Ireland, in the political game that was to get the Conservative Party into 
power.”55  Carson sat in the House of Lords until his death in 1935.  He remained bitter, and 
observed the Free State’s increasing assertiveness with disgust.56 
Buckland blames Craig for much of the economic stagnation and entrenched sectarian 
politics that characterized Northern Ireland, as he remained Prime Minister until his death in 
1940.  At the same time, he portrays Craig as largely happy in the state he had helped to build.  
Buckland writes, “He liked to play down difficulties and to see Northern Ireland as one large 
happy family with himself as the benevolent and popular pipe-smoking father-figure.”57  This 
self-image was facilitated by the fact that the extent of Northern Ireland’s problems was not 
apparent until the 1970s.  Writing after the Second World War, in which Northern Ireland had 
participated as part of the United Kingdom while the Free State’s successor Éire had remained 
neutral, a northern unionist declared that Craig’s choices had been “good for Ireland, good for 
Britain, good for the Commonwealth, good for the world.”58  Prior to the outbreak of the 
Troubles, many northern unionists portrayed their state as primarily positive. 
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Historians sometimes attribute Lloyd George’s fall from power to British unionist anger 
at the Treaty.59  Joseph Curran asserts that many Unionist legislators never forgave the Prime 
Minister for his “surrender to murder” in Ireland.60  This was true of some, but their numbers 
were insignificant until other criticisms were leveled at Lloyd George’s government.  Asserting 
that the Irish settlement was the prime issue that led to the coalition’s downfall places too much 
emphasis on the “sister island.”  David Powell highlights industrial unrest and an economic 
downturn as most damaging to the administration.  The event that immediately precipitated 
Lloyd George’s ouster as Prime Minister was his support for the Greeks in their war against 
Turkey, which by September 1922 threatened to draw the British Empire into the conflict.61  The 
coalition’s end was a slow process brought on by a number of factors; the Anglo-Irish Treaty 
was just one of several policies that were not very popular with some Unionists, but that they 
were bound as coalition members to support.62 
The Unionist Party voted to leave the coalition in October 1922.  An election the 
following month saw the Unionists remain the largest single grouping in the Commons, with 
38.5 percent of the vote and 344 seats.  However, this was slightly fewer votes than the 
combined coalition and non-coalition Unionists had garnered in 1918, and they lost thirty-eight 
seats.63  The Unionists did not gain office by harnessing a wave of public indignation over any 
issue.  If there was a change in public opinion after the establishment of Northern Ireland and the 
Free State, it did not register at the polls.  Lloyd George’s fall was a palace revolution; the 
Unionists simply decided to replace him with a member of their own party.  Incoming Premier 
Bonar Law confirmed speculation that a Unionist government would be forced to adopt Lloyd 
George’s Irish policy, as he pledged to complete the process of Treaty ratification and 
implementation.64 
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Lloyd George’s reputation has gone through several permutations among scholars.  Prior 
to the outbreak of the Northern Ireland Troubles in the 1970s, claims that Lloyd George had 
settled the Irish question were common.65  Confining their analysis to the immediate exigencies 
of British political priorities, some authors continue to describe Lloyd George’s Irish policy as a 
success.66  These analyses ignore the violence that ensued between 1922 and 1923, or imply that, 
due to Irish self-government, it was not the British administration’s responsibility.  The 
settlement did not enable short-term peace in either part of Ireland, and long-term stability 
eluded Northern Ireland.  This is not a matter of hindsight.  Many individuals, some of them 
close to the British Cabinet, predicted that partition would not result in lasting peace.  Historian 
Michael Hopkinson notes Lloyd George’s enabling of reprisals and a “laissez-faire” attitude to 
events in the six counties after 1920, concluding that he “does not merit the favourable historical 
press he has generally received on the Irish Question.”67 
Some of Lloyd George’s recent biographers assert that he was more interested in getting 
a deal within the closed confines of a conference than one that could be implemented 
successfully.68  At times this was evident in his negotiations on Ireland, however there was 
another factor.  Whenever he was forced to choose between what might be termed “Unionist” or 
“Liberal” aspects of Irish policy, he invariably chose the former.  In 1910, Lloyd George wanted 
to form a coalition with the Unionists to implement a federal system.  Two years later, he was the 
first British politician to propose exclusion, foreshadowing a policy that Unionists would later 
adopt.  In 1916 he upheld Carson’s priorities over Redmond’s.  Lloyd George advocated 
coercing Sinn Féin from 1918.  In 1921 he bowed to the threat of pressure from Bonar Law 
rather than attempt to implement an all-Ireland settlement.  Some of these maneuvers were 
designed to benefit his political career, but he was also motivated by an anti-Catholicism that fed 
a personal aversion to home rule.  Though he remained a Liberal for his entire political career, on 
Irish policy, Lloyd George is best understood as a unionist. 
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Consequences of the Settlement 
It is difficult to determine the cost of the struggle over Irish self-government in terms of 
human lives and fortunes.  More than 500 people died during the 1916 Easter Rising.69  In 1936, 
former IRA and Free State General J. J. O’Connell reported that, between 1919 and July 11, 
1921, 1,376 people were killed in Ireland and 1,812 wounded.70  Presumably this includes the 
103 fatal casualties of Belfast riots between July 1920 and July 1921.71  After this, the figures 
become less certain.  A number of RIC, soldiers, and suspected informers were killed during the 
Truce and the buildup to the Civil War.  That conflict likely claimed around 1,500 lives.72  
Between August and December 1921, at least fifty-two people were killed in Belfast as riots 
continued while the IRA and unionist groups became more active.73  Another 265 people died in 
Northern Ireland’s capital from January to June 1922.74  How many died in the six counties 
outside of Belfast is uncertain.  Killings continued in Northern Ireland until at least October 
1922, but with the Civil War ongoing in the Free State they garnered little attention. 
There were social and economic consequences for the survivors.  Gavin Foster points out 
that anti-Treaty republicans in the Free State were often discriminated against in both public and 
private sector employment, forcing thousands to emigrate.  This ended when de Valera’s Fianna 
Fáil party won a Dáil majority in 1932.75  Republicans from Northern Ireland attempting to return 
to their homes between 1922 and 1923 faced possible arrest or extralegal unionist violence.76  
Northern nationalists alleged that they too faced employment discrimination.  Buckland 
dismisses these accusations, asserting that unemployment was an endemic problem in Northern 
Ireland.77  As thousands of suspected nationalists and republicans were expelled from their jobs 
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in the six counties between 1912 and 1922, the idea of economic discrimination seems valid, at 
least in the early years of partition. 
Southern unionists left the Free State in large numbers during this period.  Andy 
Bielenberg has calculated that 106,456 Protestants left the twenty-six counties between 1911 and 
1926.  Any analysis based on religion does not account for how many Catholic unionists left 
Ireland, but as census records provide a religious but not a political categorization this may be 
the only available quantifier.  Some Protestant emigrants were members of the British Army or 
bureaucracy, while others had economic ties to Britain or simply did not want to live under an 
Irish government.  Finally, some were intimidated into leaving by republicans, agrarian agitators, 
or the general disorder prevailing between 1920 and 1923.  Bielenberg asserts that intimidation 
accounts for a minority of the total Protestant emigrants, approximately 15 percent of the total.  
He also points out that the majority of Protestants remained in the Free State, and their over-
representation in both legislative houses gave them significant influence.78  Gemma Clark 
identifies an “unavoidable trend” of anti-Treaty activists targeting the Protestant minority, but 
emphasizes multiple motivations at work among the perpetrators, including sectarianism, 
political identity, class, and gender.  She notes that Catholics could become victims for any of 
the latter three reasons, and adds that the trend of Protestants leaving the area comprising the 
new state was established long before the conflict over Irish self-government began.79 
 Apart from pro-Treaty officials and dominionists, the settlement enacted between 1920 
and 1922 cannot be described as a popular one.  Those who supported the Treaty did so largely 
based on what they thought it might bring in the future, not on its merits or immediate 
consequences.  Scholars sometimes point to the long-term use of the Treaty to achieve wider 
powers as a retrospective validation of its terms.80  However, this did not seem like an obvious 
outcome to everyone in 1922.  While arguing against the Treaty, Seán MacEntee said, “it is the 
terrible finality of the settlement that appalls me.”81  The Free State’s eventual constitutional 
evolution made this assumption of finality a mistaken one, but it highlights that, apart from pro-
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Treaty assurances, contemporaries had little reason to believe that the powers granted by the 
agreement would not remain static for the foreseeable future.   
The Provisional Government feared a popular backlash against the Treaty; as evidenced 
by their maneuvers to avoid an election on the agreement in 1922 and the closing of the Third 
Dáil.  The boundary commission’s failure three years later renewed these fears.  Though they 
publicly described the Treaty as “sacred,” Cumann na nGaedheal officials began to undo some of 
its terms by distancing the Free State from the Commonwealth, a process de Valera and Fianna 
Fáil advanced more dramatically.82  Northern Ireland’s unionist governors publicly declared their 
adhesion to the Government of Ireland Act and portrayed themselves as having made a great 
sacrifice by accepting it, but they also agitated for wider powers.  The British electorate’s voting 
behavior suggests that they were ambivalent toward the Irish settlement. 
In a sign of the settlement’s enduring unpopularity in Ireland, the anti-Treaty political 
movement began to regroup just three years after the Civil War.  De Valera returned to 
mainstream politics by founding Fianna Fáil in 1926.  The party won a Dáil majority during a 
1932 general election.  De Valera enacted a new constitution in 1937 which renamed the Free 
State, “Éire,” removed the monarchist symbolism, and relegated the oath to obsolescence.  
Treaty signatory Robert Barton interpreted Ireland’s evolution away from the Commonwealth as 
de Valera finally achieving external association.  He added that attaining Irish unity would be the 
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By providing a detailed analytical narrative that methodically explores the process by 
which British and Irish politicians reached the 1920-1922 settlement, this dissertation has 
advanced three major claims.  First, the form of Irish self-government was never inevitable, but 
was instead changeable from the time it became a practical issue in December 1909 right up to 
the point of implementation in 1922.  Both the powers of the Third Home Rule Bill and the area 
to which it would apply continually changed, despite the measure’s introduction in April 1912.  
Moreover, up to the outbreak of the First World War, Unionist Party leaders hoped that they 
could win a general election and defeat home rule entirely.  Schemes for partition remained 
vague.  In particular, the issues of how to define an “Ulster” area to exclude from home rule and 
how that area would be administered were undecided.  These issues remained unresolved by the 
efforts to implement home rule during the war, though in 1916 Lloyd George arrived at his 
personal preference to exclude six counties until Westminster decided otherwise.  Irish 
nationalists still hoped that partition would be temporary, while during the Irish Convention they 
tried to avoid it altogether by granting unionists an overwhelming influence in the home rule 
parliament.   
Between 1919 and July 1921, both Sinn Féin and groups like the Irish Dominion League 
proposed settlements that would result in a single Irish state, and grant more extensive powers 
than home rule.  The creation of an all-Ireland parliament was possible as late as November 
1921, as Lloyd George entertained the idea during the negotiations that led to the Anglo-Irish 
Treaty.  During the Treaty’s implementation, the Irish Free State’s Provisional Government tried 
to remove some of the agreement’s objectionable features by instituting an essentially republican 
constitution.  By June 1922 it was clear that, at least in the short term, the Free State’s powers 
were fixed by the Treaty.  This made negotiations to avoid civil war unrealistic.  Some pro-
Treaty activists continued to hope that the 1924-1925 Boundary Commission might undo 
partition, but the narrow interpretation of its powers precluded major alterations. 
The second claim made here is that the exigencies of British party politics were a 
decisive influence in shaping the Irish settlement.  Asquith only gave his home rule pledge in 
December 1909 to win Irish votes in Britain and maintain a majority in the Commons.  Between 





government of Ireland, without consulting Irish nationalists or unionists.  If the constitutional 
conference or Lloyd George’s idea for a coalition government had succeeded, or if the Unionist 
Party adopted federalism, there would have been no home rule bill.  Asquith and his government 
framed the Third Home Rule Bill in accordance with their own political priorities, a fact most 
obvious in the measure’s financial restrictions.  From October 1913 Asquith began negotiating 
with the Unionists on the principle of exclusion, and within weeks had ceased to consult 
Redmond on these talks.  This pro-unionist bias grew more pronounced during the First World 
War, as in 1916 Lloyd George adopted the formula for partition that Carson had advocated two 
years earlier.  As Prime Minister, Lloyd George set up the Irish Convention in 1917 as an 
ostensibly free forum to frame a scheme of self-government for Ireland, only to privately 
preclude dominion home rule and intrude with his own settlement suggestions.  His government 
framed the expressly partitionist Government of Ireland Act between 1919 and 1920, a measure 
that was intensely unpopular with most Irish people, both nationalist and unionist.  During the 
Treaty negotiations in 1921, Lloyd George considered altering the status of Northern Ireland, but 
abandoned the idea in a bid to prolong the life of his government. 
Finally, as well as being highly contingent and heavily shaped by British interests, the 
settlement implemented between 1920 and 1922 was profoundly undemocratic.  Even when 
home rule seemed likely, the powers of an Irish parliament were to be determined by 
Westminster politicians.  This was evident in the framing of the Third Home Rule Bill and Lloyd 
George’s interventions in the Irish Convention.  Sinn Féin’s calls for self-determination were 
ignored, as was the Irish Dominion League’s appeal for a constitutional convention.  The British 
threat of coercion was a feature of the Treaty negotiations from the first meetings between de 
Valera and Lloyd George in July 1921.  It was the threat of war that compelled several of the 
Sinn Féin delegates to sign the agreement on December 6.  The coercion threat hung over the 
Dáil debates that eventually ratified the Treaty in January 1922, and was revived five months 
later during the negotiations on the Irish Free State constitution.  All of this denied Sinn Féin 
activists a free choice as to their form of government.  The Free State itself was not established 
on firm democratic practice.  The Collins-de Valera pact was designed to avoid an election on 
the Treaty issue, and the non-publication of the Constitution gave most voters no time to decide 





The implementation of partition was an overtly undemocratic procedure.  Between 1913 
and 1914 Asquith gradually negotiated away the principle that plebiscites must determine the 
area to be excluded from home rule.  During the Buckingham Palace Conference in July 1914, 
Carson asserted that Westminster should determine the area and duration of exclusion, not any 
segment of Ulster’s population.  Lloyd George adopted these principles in 1916, and the next 
year rejected draft bills embodying county option.  His Cabinet provided no mechanism for 
gauging the wishes of the six-county population in framing the Government of Ireland Act.  
Judge Feetham’s decision during the 1924-1925 boundary commission sittings not to enact 
plebiscites confirmed that this facet of the settlement should be in the hands of political elites. 
 The individuals most responsible for partition were Edward Carson, H. H. Asquith, David 
Lloyd George, and James Craig.  In 1913, Carson first articulated the form of six-county 
partition that was eventually implemented.  Though he claimed not to want this type of 
settlement, every move Carson made brought exclusion closer.  He reiterated his demand for six-
county partition in 1916 and in 1919.  Asquith abandoned the idea of temporary exclusion in 
1914, and though he usually pushed for plebiscites as to the area involved, he was willing to give 
way on that point as well.  He also outlined an explicitly religious form of partition, emphasizing 
that a majority-Protestant area should be excluded from home rule.  Lloyd George adopted 
Carson’s formula for partition in 1916, and was instrumental in steering his government away 
from other potential settlements over the next four years.  Given an opportunity to create an all-
Ireland parliament in November 1921, Lloyd George declined, in a bid to prolong the life of his 
administration.  Craig aided Carson in making his demand for six-county exclusion.  Though he 
claimed not to want a six-county parliament, he ensured that it was implemented to the 
maximum advantage of northern unionists between 1920 and 1922. 
The settlement left considerable unfinished business.  The governments of both the Free 
State and Northern Ireland immediately sought to expand their powers.  Partition left a Protestant 
unionist minority in the twenty-six counties, as well as a Catholic nationalist population in the 
six.  Northern Ireland’s Unionist government was conditioned to see the minority population in 
the six counties as inveterate enemies, and possessed a large, British-sponsored police apparatus 
with which to suppress political agitation.  Republicans across the island engaged in both 





settlement.  In the early 1970s that discontent erupted into the decades-long civil conflict known 
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